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PREFACE
This volume is the result of a workshop which was held twice, the first time 
in 2008 in Bergen (Norway) then a year later in Aix-en-Provence (France). 
The papers presented in Bergen were discussed by the participants among 
themselves. We then decided to meet again in Aix, this time with other 
Middle East scholars as discussants of our works. 
We extend our thanks to the University of Bergen and the Christian 
Michelsen Institute for funding and organizing the workshop in Norway. 
Alongside the Research Council of Norway both institutions have also 
given generous support for the publication of this volume. We also wish 
to thank the Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et 
musulman (IREMAM). The IREMAM generously funded and hosted our 
second meeting in Aix-en-Provence in 2009. We are grateful to the discus-
sants in Aix, Bernard Botiveau, Hamit Bozarslan, Christian Bromberger, 
and Lucette Valensi, for their inspiring comments and expert insights. 
Our special thanks go to Hamit Bozarslan for the continued interest he 
showed for our project. 
The problem of transliteration, well-known to authors writing on the 
Middle East in Western languages, is made more acute in the case of edited 
volumes which deal not only with the Arab world but also with Turkish and 
Persian-speaking societies. The editors have solved the problem by letting 
each author use his or her preferred transliteration style.

INTRODUCTION
DOMINATION, SELF-EMPOWERMENT,  
ACCOMMODATION
Anh Nga Longva
Religious Minorities as a Research Topic
Until recently, religious minorities in the Middle East were not the object 
of much scholarly interest. With the exception of a few classic works by 
historians on Christians and Jews, mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the field was dominated by literature written by activists and 
Western missionaries, the bulk of which deals with one specific period, 
the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and one specific type of event, the 
massacres of Christians in Eastern Anatolia. Wider scholarly interest for reli-
gious minorities in the Middle East developed in the 1980s, triggered by the 
Iranian revolution and the rise of Islamism in the Muslim world. The 1990s 
saw a series of publications on the topic, but it was in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century that the religious minorities in the Middle East really 
moved to the foreground of academic research. This is in part related to the 
so-called war on terror, especially the military intervention by the US and 
its allies in religiously plural Iraq. This intervention and the ensuing change 
in the sectarian balance of power led to violent retaliations exerted, by 
proxy as it were, against the local religious minorities. Besides these topical 
events, the twentieth century has been described as the century of minori-
ties, or more precisely, the century when concern with the need to provide 
a legal framework to protect minorities gained unprecedented attention. 
The United Nations, the key forum where minority issues were debated, has 
contributed importantly to fostering greater awareness and mobilization 
among the groups concerned. By the late twentieth century, minorities no 
longer accepted tolerance as an ideal value; instead they were demand-
ing the right to recognition, and there are no signs that these demands 
will diminish. The combined interest in minority issues and  political 
© Anh Nga Longva, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_002
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Islam has resulted in an increase in the number of academic publications 
on religious minorities in the Middle East over the past ten years.
Why do we need yet another volume on this topic? This book differs from 
most works on religious minorities in several ways. First of all, although 
it is historically informed, this is not a historical work but a study of the 
religious minorities in the contemporary, post-colonial context. It aims at 
throwing light on the minorities’ situation today. Even when the past is 
granted much scrutiny, as is the case with several chapters, this is done to 
underlie the fact that the relationship between majorities and minorities 
is part of a dynamic process in which both continuity and change must be 
taken into consideration. The analysis of the majority-minority relations 
and the minorities’ responses to the challenges of domination is carried 
out in light of some of the major political and social events which have 
shaped the region up to the beginning of the twenty-first century. In order 
to grasp this complex, multi-faceted situation, we have drawn on the exper-
tise of researchers from various disciplines. While we may be differently 
positioned in terms of theories, what most of us do have in common is 
that our knowledge is based on extensive and repeated field studies in the 
societies about which we write.1
Another distinctive feature of this volume lies in its dealing with both 
non-Muslim and Muslim minorities. Traditionally, Muslim minorities are 
not included in studies of religious minorities in the Middle East. The very 
concept of ‘religious minorities’ tends to be used only in reference to non-
Muslims. We recognize here the century-old perspective of the successive 
Muslim States as well as the influence of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, 
which formalized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and deals with 
the issue of religious minorities’ rights in the Republic of Turkey. Because 
the Treaty was signed between Turkey and major European states—the 
only non-European signatory was Japan—the minorities under consid-
eration were exclusively Christian and Jewish. The exclusion of Muslims 
from the study of religious minorities in the Middle East since then has 
been a major weakness in this field of research. We are convinced that an 
integrated approach is more fruitful. To adopt a water-tight distinction 
between Muslim and non-Muslim minorities is to espouse uncritically 
the majorities’ premises. Such an analytical perspective almost certainly 
1 The possibility for doing field research on religious minorities in Iran being extremely 
limited, the authors on the Bahaʾis and the Zoroastrians, Margit Warburg and Michael 
Stausberg, have had to resort to other research methods.
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overemphasizes the differences between the two types of minorities and 
blinds us to whatever commonalities may exist between the treatment to 
which they are subjected and their responses to this treatment. Dealing 
with both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities also opens up for compara-
tive reflections. Even in the absence of explicit and systematic comparison, 
the mere fact of exploring case-studies from both groups within the same 
volume helps throw light on majority-minority relations, not as unique 
cases involving groups with unique doctrinal and cultural idiosyncrasies, 
but as universal interactional processes with comparable patterns of action 
and reaction. Relations between religious majorities and minorities are 
not only a matter of religion;2 they are also shaped by factors external to 
religion, among them domestic and international politics, the economy, 
and class. This is not to say that the differences between Muslim and non-
Muslim minorities are negligible, but these differences exist side by side 
with important non-religious, structural similarities. There are, therefore, 
strong arguments for treating the two groups of minorities together rather 
than for keeping them analytically apart.
Finally, this volume seeks to analyse the religious minorities from a 
dynamic perspective. The relationship between religious majorities and 
minorities in the Middle East is often construed in terms of a stark opposi-
tion between active domination and passive submission. Besides accepting 
uncritically, or overstating, the majorities’ power, such a description places 
emphasis on the challenges faced by the minorities while overlooking their 
astonishing ability to mobilize internal and external resources to meet 
these challenges. Religious minorities are not passive victims living under 
the iron rule of an all-powerful majority, even though one easily gets this 
impression from the literature written by activist authors. Much of this 
literature tends to focus exclusively on times of acute conflicts, leaving 
aside long periods of relatively peaceful coexistence. In times of conflict, 
the minorities’ margin of action is severely reduced, and their status as 
victims overshadows their status as social agents, active devisers and 
users of strategies of accommodation and self-empowerment. Yet this is 
an important part of their overall identity, and it must also be taken into 
consideration in the analysis. While it is imperative to highlight the victim-
ization of all minorities in times of conflict, a true understanding of such 
conflicts requires an understanding of what goes on between minorities 
2 Nor are religious differences in the Middle East, where all the faiths involved are varia-
tions on a monotheistic theme, particularly irreconcilable.
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and majorities in times of relative peace as well. A literature that depicts 
minorities only as victims conveys the erroneous impression that they 
are systematically alienated from their societies. Field observation shows 
that this is not the case. Whether Muslim or non-Muslim, the minorities 
share many cultural values and practices with the majorities. They are as 
much part of the local societies as the majorities. Only by treating them as 
informed social agents can we do justice to the men and women gathered 
under the impersonal and insidiously disempowering rubric of ‘religious 
minorities’. For these groups, the problem lies precisely in that rejection 
comes from home, that is, from people with whom, in most cases and for 
most of the time, they share a common cultural script—norms, languages, 
ways of life. Seeing members of religious minorities as whole persons and 
social agents and not only as victims allows us to better understand their 
dilemmas and appreciate the resourcefulness they display in facing these 
dilemmas. We believe that an epistemology that axiomatically defines 
minorities as powerless calls for critical reflections; at the very least its 
underlying assumptions need to be made explicit. The first step is to clarify 
the minority concept itself.
The Concept of Minority
As seen above, in the Middle East, the phrase ‘religious minorities’ has 
long been used to refer only to non-Muslim populations. But even non-
Muslims were not always known as minorities. The term ‘minority’ (Ar. 
ʿaqalliyya) was introduced to the Middle East in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century by the European Powers, who cited the protection of 
Ottoman Christians as justification for intervening in Ottoman domestic 
affairs. Applied to the non-Muslim population, ʿaqalliyya is a substitute for 
the older, more common term taʾifa (‘sect’) (Shami 2009).3 ʿAqalliyya is a 
quantitative term which depicts the relative size of a group, while taʾifa, 
which besides sect also means group, class, people, and depicts the group’s 
identity, in this case, its religious identity. Taʾifa can thus be used to speak 
of a majority as well as a minority. One could argue that this way of thinking 
about human groups, not in terms of relative size but in terms of identity, 
e.g. beliefs, practices, and other defining characteristics, is ‘pre-modern’: 
taʾifa refers to the supposedly primordial nature of the group, that which 
3 From the nineteenth century onwards, the preferred term by the Ottomans was milla/
millet.
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distinguishes it from other groups, whereas ‘minority’ does not ascribe to 
this group any specific, pre-ordained features. On the face of it, the use of 
the more neutral, quantitative term ‘minority’ implies the recognition of an 
essential human commonality beneath the religious differentiations. This 
makes ‘minority’ a decidedly modern concept, a product of the Enlighten-
ment. In this sense, the secular term ʿaqalliyya is, in theory, a better way 
of describing groups than taʾifa. In practice, however, ‘minority’ comes 
burdened with its own essentializing connotations, despite its purportedly 
being merely the description of a group’s relative size.
‘Minority’ is commonly understood as synonymous with inferiority, weak-
ness, subordination. This semantic association is so strong that the term is 
often used in its extended, rather than its original, meaning. Thus, suppressed 
and disempowered numerical majorities are not uncommonly referred 
to as minorities, with or without the adjective ‘sociological’ (see below). 
This is why it is difficult to dissociate minority from powerlessness, even 
though there are plenty of instances of dominant and powerful minorities 
in the world, past and present. In popular usage but also in social theory, 
the defining characteristic of a minority is precisely its being the “object of 
collective discrimination” (Wirth 1945: 347). It has even been suggested that 
minority is merely “a sociological euphemism for oppressed groups” (Nibert 
in Wilkinson 2000). In this view, a powerful minority is an oxymoron: if it is 
powerful, it cannot be a minority, hence, the tendency to speak of powerful 
minorities not as minorities but as elites. A minority exists only in relation 
to a majority, which is assumed, also by definition, to be powerful. But as 
is well known, size does not always entail might. A minority can be more 
or less weak or more or less powerful, and so can a majority. Considering 
these fluctuating semantic practices and the ambivalence that characterizes 
‘minority’ and ‘majority’, these terms must be used cautiously and critically. 
The correlation between minority and subjugation or powerlessness is a 
matter to be investigated, not a natural fact on which to build an analysis. 
The important thing to bear in mind is that relationships between majority 
and minority are not given and static but always processual. They are the 
temporary, evolving outcomes of ongoing interaction between groups under 
shifting political and material conditions.
Religious and Ethnic Minorities
In much of the literature on minorities in the Middle East religion is sub-
sumed under ethnicity, and religious minorities are often studied as part 
of ethnic minorities (i.a. Esman and Rabinovich 1988, Bengio and Ben-Dor 
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1999). Ethnic groups are groups which define themselves and are defined 
by others in terms of ascriptive characteristics, perceived as ‘primordial’ 
or inherited. In fact, these characteristics range from: imperative traits, 
i.e. traits that people are born with, such as facial features, skin colour, 
hair type (‘race’); to traits that are acquired, therefore can be modified, 
unlearnt or abandoned, such as language, customs, religion (‘culture’); to 
accidental and/or arbitrarily imposed characteristics such as national and 
territorial affiliations. According to this definition of ethnicity, religious 
minorities are a sub-category of ethnic minorities. While some of these 
minorities may also differ from the majority linguistically or racially, such 
differences are not granted the same importance as is religion in the soci-
eties where they live.
In this book we choose to focus on religion as the primary difference 
marker. As elsewhere in the world, Middle Eastern societies have a vast 
range of criteria for social categorization. Of these, religion is arguably 
the most significant, in social, legal, and political terms. The Middle East 
is not only the birthplace of the great monotheistic religions, it is also the 
first place where monotheism was adopted as state religion. In 380 CE, 
the Byzantine emperor Theodosius I enacted a law establishing Catho-
lic Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Since then 
religious diversity has been subject to state control and regulation, as 
evidenced by the relentless persecution of Christian sects declared heretic 
by the Byzantine State. Although much more tolerant, the Muslim States 
also held firm control over religious diversity. Detailed rules were devised 
for the incorporation, on specific conditions, of the Peoples of the Book, 
the only tolerated non-Muslims, into Muslim society. The basic rule of 
Islamic law was to uphold diversity on the basis of inequality. Today, the 
Constitutions of most Middle Eastern States explicitly define their religious 
nature. With very few exceptions, religion still provides the basis for the 
legislation on personal status and family relations. The absence of a uni-
versal code perpetuates the differentiation of the citizenry along religious 
lines, which was a characteristic feature of the Ottoman millet system. At 
the same time, the religious minorities’ legal autonomy has become more 
limited in a number of countries, as a result of reforms during the twentieth 
century.
The depiction of a group as a ‘religious’ or an ‘ethnic’ minority is not a 
constant one throughout the region: a group that is classified as a religious 
minority in one society can be classified as an ethnic minority in another. 
Thus, Kurds are an ethnic minority everywhere because their language dif-
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fers from Arabic in the Arab countries, from Turkish in Turkey, and from 
Persian in Iran. But while Kurds, who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, 
are part of the religious majority in Turkey, Iraq or Syria, they are a religious 
minority in Iran. Conversely, the Shiʿis are the religious majority in Iran 
but a religious minority, sometimes in the sociological sense, elsewhere. 
In the Muslim Middle East, only Armenians and Jews are at the same time 
religious and ethnic minorities. The porous line between ‘ethnic’ and ‘reli-
gious’ categories shows that cultural traits are not the critical feature in 
the classification of groups in society because such traits are situationally 
defined. Therefore, although religion is the primary distinguishing feature 
of the minorities in this study, the object of our analysis is not religion 
per se but the use to which it is put in the production and reproduction 
of similarities and differences among and between groups. In other words, 
we are interested in the rationale and strategies of inclusion and exclusion 
or, to borrow from Fredrik Barth, in the “structuring of interaction which 
allows the persistence of cultural differences” (1994: 16) rather than in the 
differences themselves.
Minorities: Numerical and Sociological
Most Muslim and all non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East are numeri-
cal minorities. There has occurred a radical shift in this regard since the 
days of the Prophet Mohammed. At his death, large areas of the region 
which is now known as the Middle East were predominantly Christian. 
Muslims were a numerical minority until the tenth, probably even the 
eleventh century CE (Courbage and Fargue 1992). Today, the region is 
overwhelmingly Muslim. The number of Christians is rapidly decreasing, 
due to emigration and low birth rate. Only Egypt, Syria and Lebanon still 
have a substantial, but nevertheless decreasing, Christian presence. As 
for Jews, with the exception of Iran and Yemen which still have tiny Jew-
ish communities, practically all have left, principally to Israel. Numbers 
are important as, below a certain threshold, it is difficult for a minority, 
whether ethnic or religious, to have a well- organized social life as a distinct 
group and to ensure its own social reproduction. Besides, the smaller and 
more dispersed a group is, the easier it is for the majority to overlook its 
demands and interests, even violate its rights. On the other hand, large 
numbers are not always a guarantee of empowerment, as is illustrated by 
the case of the Shiʿis in Bahrain.
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Are the religious minorities in the Middle East sociological as well as 
numerical minorities? By sociological minorities are meant groups that 
are systematically discriminated against and dominated, irrespective of 
their number. If we take our cue from the events reported in the media, 
the answer to the above question is clearly yes, but we must bear in mind 
that the Middle East is a diverse region and the minorities’ situation is best 
described in terms of a continuum. Among the case-studies presented in 
this volume, some minorities are the object of serious and enduring dis-
crimination, such as the Bahaʾis in Iran. For others, the situation is more 
fluctuating and ambivalent. Claims of discrimination have been frequently 
reported and documented by all minorities, and they must be taken seri-
ously. As students of ethnic and religious relations, meanwhile, we know 
that perceptions of discrimination are not only based on the individual’s 
or the group’s actual experience of ongoing interaction. They also derive 
from the group’s collective memory of minority-majority relations over 
time, and from the enduring impact of power asymmetry on groups’ self-
perception. Nonetheless, discrimination is not merely a matter of percep-
tions; it is also a social practice that can be observed and recorded. The 
most important signal of discrimination is denial of the rights enjoyed by 
the rest of the society.
Minorities and Rights
Experts in international law distinguish between two major categories of 
rights: civil and political rights, and social and economic rights. Civil and 
political rights are commonly known as ‘first generation rights’, as they were 
historically the first to be recognized and codified. Among these rights are 
the guarantee of integrity of person and property, freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, the right to due process and fair trial, and the right to seek redress. 
Social and economic rights are more recent, hence ‘second generation 
rights’, yet denial of these rights—e.g. the right to found a family, to own 
property and to work, and access to education and health assistance—is 
the most effective weapon of domination and disempowerment. Most of 
the minorities in this volume have experienced or are experiencing denial 
of some rights, both first and second generations, either as a result of direct 
discrimination or because of a general absence of justice, law and order 
in their society; being often the weakest members, they also tend to be 
the prime victims.
All human rights, both ‘first generation’ (civil and political) and ‘second 
generation’ (social and economic), are individual rights. In the 1990s, the 
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United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
and the Council of Europe promulgated minority rights instruments. As 
defined in these documents, minorities’ rights are also individual, insofar 
as they are given to persons belonging to minorities and not to the minor-
ity group itself (Gilbert 2005).4 But to consider the minority group simply 
as the context for the exercise of the individual members’ rights is highly 
unsatisfactory. A vast debate is ongoing as to who should be the minority 
rights-holder, the individual or the group. This in turn leads to asking what 
the relationship between the individual member’s rights and the rights, if 
any, of the minority group should be, and what is the role of the state vis 
a vis both individual members of the group and the group itself (ibid.: 140). 
The present volume does not deal with this legal debate, which takes 
particularly place in forums concerned with matters of ethnic indigeneity. 
But since the concept of ‘nativism’ (indigeneity) is raised in one chapter 
(chapter 9), and since this topic is of potential relevance to several reli-
gious minorities in the Middle East, a brief mention of the status of native 
or indigenous people is called for. The term ‘indigenous people’ is widely 
used to refer to a variety of ethnic minorities the world over, but so far it 
has not been applied to religious minorities, even though this category is 
regularly included in most minority rights documents. In the Middle East, 
some of the Christian autochthonous inhabitants, whose presence in the 
region dates back to the pre-Islamic era, have claimed the indigenous status. 
Copts in Egypt and, more recently, Chaldo-Assyrians in Iraq (through their 
diasporic representatives in the USA) are two examples. Among the Muslim 
minorities, the Baharna Shiʿis of Bahrain have also claimed to be indigenous, 
not in relation to Islam but in relation to the ruling Sunni minority of the 
island kingdom (Louër 2006). The Shiʿis in Saudi Arabia are making use 
of the same strategy (Louër, this volume).5 Of crucial importance among 
4 This is for instance, the view propounded in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights. Article 27 defines cultural rights as follows: “In those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” (emphasis added).
5 All these groups satisfy the requirement of long-term presence which is a crucial 
component in the definition of an indigenous people by international organizations. The 
1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, Art. 1 (b) gives the following definition of 
indigenous peoples: “Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical 
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establish-
ment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all 
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions”. That the status of indigenous 
people is not applied to the religious minorities in the Middle East is possibly due to the 
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the minority rights is the right to self-determination. Because the notion 
of self-determination often raises the spectre of secession, even the UN, 
in whose Charter this principle is embodied, has so far been reluctant to 
recognize any further extension of this right beyond the traditional context 
of decolonization. In the context of minorities, however, self-determination 
means the right to define themselves rather than being defined by the 
majority, to represent themselves rather than being represented, to write 
their own histories, and to see their children taught their own, and not the 
majority’s, religion at school. Self-determination here is, in Alfredsson’s 
words (2005: 164) “about keeping groups happy within States”; hence, it is 
ultimately about preventing or reducing the likelihood of state dismember-
ment (ibid.). The exercise of the above rights presupposes a certain type 
of social organization, and this is only possible with the consent of the 
state, which means that cultural rights belong to both the social and the 
political fields. Minority rights are those the power-holders are most prone 
to ignore and reject. For them, to acknowledge the presence of minorities 
within the nation-state is to jeopardize the national project. Therefore many 
states’ policy towards minorities consists in either neglect or repression. 
A more positive solution is an attempt at integration. In the Middle East, 
nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s could be seen as one such attempt, as 
far as most, though not all, religious minorities are concerned.
Religious Minorities in the Age of Nationalism
In the Arab world, Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism became the domi-
nant ideology after the revolution in Egypt put an end to the monarchy 
and eventually brought Nasser to power. The 1950s and 1960s, the heyday 
of Arab nationalism, were decades of hope for many religious minorities 
in the Arab countries. Being a secular ideology, Arab nationalism down-
played the importance of religious affiliation while elevating ethnic (Arab) 
identity. The key criterion for citizenship in an Arab country was the 
bearers’ Arabness, irrespective of their creed. Arab nationalism glorified 
understanding of the term ‘indigenous’ as implying a way of life “closely interwoven with 
land, including the links of traditional economies to the land, such as for fishing, gathering, 
herding and hunting” (Alfredsson 2005: 169). Besides, although religion is mentioned, in 
reality language and way of life are the key criteria in the definition. For example: in the 
country report The Rights of Indigenous People: Egypt by the International Labour Organiza-
tion and African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights 2009, the indigenous peoples 
discussed are the Bedouin nomads and the Nubians. There is no mention of Copts.
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Arab culture and Arab history, and the fraternal bond between all Arabic-
speaking people. As such it excluded all the non-ethnic Arabs: in Kuwait, 
for instance, Shiʿis were treated as second-class citizens and excluded 
from some jobs in the government sector in the 1960s and 1970s because 
many were of Persian origin (Fuller and Francke 1999). On the other hand, 
many Christian Arabs initiated or contributed to the creation of nationalist 
movements in Syria and Lebanon, among them Michel Aflaq, the Greek 
Orthodox founder of the Baʿth ideology. Not only Christians but also Shiʿis, 
Druzes, and Alawis pinned their hopes on the Arab nationalist project. Like 
Christians, these heterodox Muslims saw in Arab nationalism a longed-for 
opportunity to achieve integration once and for all in a nation in which 
the only entry ticket was Arab identity. In retrospect, some analysts are 
surprised that Arab nationalism, a European-inspired ideology, managed 
to hold centre stage for so long, given that when it appeared in the Middle 
East in the early twentieth century, the ground was already occupied by a 
much older, locally-bred ideology of state and identity: Islam. An answer to 
the puzzle is that, regardless of what the nationalist ideologues might have 
thought and claimed, at the grassroots level Arabness was undistinguish-
able from Islam. For many Arabs, being Arab and being Muslim are two 
sides of the same coin. Even among the nationalist ideologues, Islam was 
commonly viewed as “the crowning glory of [the Arabs’] history” (Zubaida 
2004: 410), and the Arabic language as the most precious item of Arab 
culture, because it was the language of the Qur a͗n. Yet there are undercur-
rents of tension between Arab nationalism and Islam. Arabness and Islam 
may be amalgamated categories at the popular level, but as an ideology, 
Arab nationalism counts secularism among its typical features.6 This does 
not mean that Arab nationalists were necessarily hostile to religion, only 
that they wanted to avoid granting too much importance to an institution 
they knew to have a potentially divisive effect on national unity. Neither 
under Nasser in Egypt nor under the Baʿth in Iraq and Syria, was religion 
allowed a determining role in the public sphere. Religion in this context 
means first and foremost Islam, which explains the warm support Arab 
nationalism enjoyed among non-Muslim minorities.
In Turkey, post-World War I nation-building took place against a dif-
ferent, much more dramatic backdrop: military defeat and the dissolution 
6 Saʿd Zaghloul, the early Egyptian nationalist leader, has proclaimed that “religion is for 
God, and the fatherland is for all its members” (quoted in Zubaida 2004: 407).
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of an empire, massacres and ethnic cleansing, vast population exchange, 
plus the desperate struggle to save Anatolia from the grasp of the victori-
ous allies and their Greek protégés. When the Republic of Turkey emerged 
after the war, it had very few non-Muslim minorities left in its territory, 
unlike in several Arab countries. But the common point between Turkish 
and Arab nationalisms was their decidedly secular character, and the Ale-
vis, Turkey’s largest Muslim minority, pinned all their hopes on Atatürk’s 
unswerving secularism.
Iranian nationalism developed in the late nineteenth century. According 
to the nationalist narrative, decline started with the Arab invasion in the 
seventh century CE, and continued with the domination by Turks, Mongols, 
then again Turks, and finally by Russia and Great Britain. Iranian national-
ists tend to hark back to the pre-Islamic past when Iranian civilization was 
said to flourish untainted by foreign influence. This untainted civilization 
had important Zoroastrian elements in it, making nationalism a port of 
access to the Iranian polity for this minority. The 1979 Islamic revolution 
was a turning point: from seeing itself as a secular nation-state Iran now 
sees itself as the heartland and the champion of Shiʿism. Consequently, 
lines were drawn between different kinds of citizens, those who, because 
of their religion, truly belong and those who belong only conditionally. 
Something similar to this situation also took place in other countries in 
the region with the rise of Islamism from the 1980s onwards.
Religious Minorities and Islamism
By the late 1960s it was clear that nationalism had failed to achieve its 
lofty promise of creating modern, prosperous, and just societies. While 
mass education had improved, economic development had come to a halt, 
unemployment was rampant, the gap between rich and poor had widened; 
political authoritarianism thrived. The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War 
against Israel in 1967 signalled the end of the age of nationalism, especially 
in the Arab world. Islamism stepped into the ideological void left by the 
demise of nationalism. The 1979 Iranian revolution was the key event that 
inaugurated the official rise of Islamism in the Middle East. It is commonly 
claimed that a significant and radical shift in the ideological landscape 
of the Middle East has taken place since 1979: from secular, left-leaning 
nationalism to conservative Islamism. This claim has been questioned by a 
number of central scholars, among them Sami Zubaida (2004), who argues 
that while there undoubtedly are contradictions between  nationalism and 
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Islamism, there are also important continuities. According to Zubaida, 
“[f]ew Islamists have followed the logic of Islamic community as against the 
nation, and few nationalists have not accorded religion a place of honour 
in the attributes of the nation” (op. cit.: 408). This contention by Zubaida 
is all the more convincing when we keep in mind that nationalism in the 
Middle East, especially the Arab and Iranian versions, was inspired not by 
the French Enlightenment model, with its focus on universal civic ties, but 
on the German Romantic model, with its focus on particularistic cultural 
ties. And while the most secular among the Arab nationalists have preferred 
to place emphasis on the Arabic language rather than on Islam as the core 
element of Arab culture, to most Arabs, religion is as important as, if not 
more than, language. Islam is part and parcel of their Arab culture.
Also in non Arabic-speaking Iran and Turkey, Islam is closely associated 
with the local culture, especially at the popular level and in daily life. In 
the Islamic Republic nationalism plays no less a role today than under the 
Pahlavis, but it is a nationalism whose defining historical events, myths, 
and landscapes are not ethnic but derive from Shiʿism. The real distinction 
we should make, therefore, is not between nationalism and Islamism but 
between secular nationalism and religious nationalism. Historically, there-
fore, the transition from nationalism to Islamism may not be the dramatic 
shift it is commonly said to be. Nevertheless, for the religious minorities in 
the region, the transition is often experienced in terms of the contradictions 
rather than the continuities between the two ideologies.
After secular nationalism had led them to believe that integration was 
possible, departure from secular politics, combined with calls for the 
integral implementation of the shariʿa, has had a disheartening effect on 
the religious minorities, especially the non-Muslims. Islamism, even when 
espoused by the state in an unofficial or semi-official way, entails a change 
in the social climate, as its goal is to carry out not only political but also 
social reforms, which are bound to affect people’s everyday life. The reli-
gious minorities watch these developments with considerable concern, 
uncertain about what their place in an Islamist or Islamist-leaning state 
would be. When national belonging is predicated on membership in a 
specific religious community, all those who are not part of this community 
are likely to be looked upon if not as outsiders, at least as ‘conditional’ 
members, i.e. tolerated citizens who are constantly expected to give proofs 
of their loyalty.
Generally speaking, the religious minorities respond to Islamism in two 
ways. First, there is mimesis, a process whereby the minority replicates the 
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strategies of the majority, both sides participating in the hardening of the 
identity boundaries between them (Picard, this volume). To the growing 
fundamentalism of the majority society there is a corresponding tendency 
toward communitarian withdrawal among the minority. A pattern of mutu-
ally exclusionary practices develops which, if left unchecked, can lead to 
conflicts and even physical violence.
The second reaction is voluntary emigration. Admittedly, these days 
migration is a solution considered by many in the region, majorities 
as well as minorities. Unemployment, authoritarianism, the escalating 
Arab-Israeli conflict, religious fundamentalism, the war in Iraq, all these 
problems combine to form powerful push-factors for the large population 
of youths who came of age in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
only to find that there are few prospects of jobs and even fewer prospects 
of fair wealth distribution. But while almost everyone in the Middle East 
toys with the idea of leaving, Muslim migrants in general leave temporar-
ily, often to work in the Gulf countries. Non-Muslims, for their part, aim 
at permanent emigration to Europe, the Americas, and Australia. Muslim 
minorities tend to follow the trend, but there are signs that, at least in the 
West, the chances for Christians to obtain visas and residence permits are 
better than for their Muslim counterparts.
Loyalty and the Scapegoat Syndrome
Borrowing from Hirschman (1970), several authors in this volume describe 
emigration as ‘exit’, the alternative strategy to ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’. Voice 
being a difficult choice for numerically weak minorities living under 
authoritarian rule, there remains loyalty. Loyalty is a complex, multi-layered 
concept. Analytically it consists of at least two components, the cultural 
and the political. Political loyalty, or patriotism, is the explicit allegiance 
to society as a political unit, and to its institutions. Cultural loyalty arises 
from the individuals’ attachment to their land, their society, and their par-
ticular way of life. Through cultural loyalty they make claims to legitimate 
belonging to a physical and social world. As stated earlier, several of the 
religious minorities in the Middle East today are autochthonous popula-
tions in their regions, often with considerable time depth. Their cultural 
loyalty is undeniable, and they will go to great lengths to accommodate 
themselves to the prevailing circumstances rather than severing their ties 
through exit. Loyalty and accommodation are strategies that go hand in 
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hand, and are most actively resorted to by minority members for whom 
exit is not a realistic alternative.
What is usually questioned by majorities is the minorities’ political loy-
alty. Minorities everywhere are frequently suspected of disloyalty and tar-
geted for lack of it in times of crisis. The more difficult the socio-economic 
conditions are, the greater the tendency for majorities to accuse minorities 
of disloyalty, and the more virulent the accusations. In the past, this was 
particularly the case with Christians. In the nineteenth century, many 
Christians threw their lot behind the European Powers and supported, 
sometimes directly, the latter’s efforts to undermine the Ottoman State. 
Christians have been persistently suspected of having strong allegiance to 
outsiders and lacking in patriotism. Nowadays, also Muslim minorities suffer 
from a similar fate. With the rise of Iran as a powerful player in regional 
politics, Shiʿis in the Arab world (Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf States) are often 
accused of being Iran’s fifth column.
Lately, another factor has contributed to heightening suspicions of 
minorities’ disloyalty: the creation, through emigration, of large reli-
gious minority diasporas abroad, especially in Europe and the US. These 
communities have close and sustained connections with their kin and 
co-religionists back home. As they gain in education and prosperity, the 
diasporas take upon themselves several roles, as their kin’s spokespersons 
and economic providers, and as watch-dogs of their rights.
With the world economic crisis and the Middle Eastern states embracing 
privatization, and with unemployment reaching alarming proportions, more 
and more families in the region have become dependent on the remittances 
sent home by their relatives abroad. But where the emigrants play the most 
critical role in the long run is in their initiating and financing communal 
projects such as the repair and construction of places of worship, the fund-
ing of private schools and hospitals, the distribution of scholarships, and 
other collective initiatives. In helping the minority communities achieve 
a higher level of welfare and education, and facilitating the practice of 
their religion, the diasporas seek to improve the minorities’ self-awareness 
and the image they project in the society at large. In several cases, the 
diasporas are becoming larger than the parent communities at home. This 
is particularly striking in the case of the Bahaʾis, but it is also true for the 
Christians: there are today more Eastern Christians in the Western world 
than in Beirut, Jerusalem or Bethlehem (Maïla 2010). With the growth of 
the diasporas, a third actor has appeared on the stage occupied so far by 
the minorities and their majority states. In most cases, this third actor is 
good at winning the backing of the international community through the 
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United Nations and the major human rights organizations. The diasporas 
also carry out intense lobbying among US and other Western politicians.
This new situation is not without its own problems: while international 
attention undoubtedly prompts the Middle Eastern state authorities to be 
more cautious in the way they treat their minorities, it also contributes 
to enhancing the latter’s visibility and otherness, and this, it is feared by 
the local minorities, can exacerbate the majority population’s resentment 
and hostility. In the past, Western intervention, purportedly in favour of 
religious minorities but mostly for political reasons, contributed to the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire. Some local Christian minorities paid a 
high price for it. The tragic consequences this event has had for millions 
of people are a dark chapter in the history of the Middle East, one that still 
touches a collective raw nerve in the region. Not surprisingly, any external 
intervention in favour of religious minorities today, against the backdrop 
of US-led military operations and talks of clash of civilizations, would be 
interpreted in light of the bitter experience of the past. The minorities are 
all too aware that support mustered by the diasporas among their new 
Western countrymen is a double-edged sword which must be used with 
greatest caution.
Diasporas, however, are only one part of the minorities’ transnational 
networks, the other part being their foreign co-religionists. Membership in 
a world religion automatically entails membership in a vast global network, 
and religion has always been, with trade and labour, a major force behind 
international exchange. Furthermore, thanks to technological develop-
ments, religious minorities are today more than ever in touch with the 
world beyond their national and territorial borders. In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Christian and Jewish minorities drew extensively 
on the support of their co-religionists in the West. Today this support takes 
place not in the form of overt political, let alone military, intervention but 
in the form of intervention by Western non-governmental organizations. 
One could say that these NGOs have taken over the role that Christian mis-
sionaries used to play in earlier days. They are the most vocal and arguably 
the most powerful actors in the field of minority politics nowadays. Muslim 
minorities too are globally oriented. Thus the Shiʿis in the Middle East and 
beyond have always kept in close touch with each other through their reli-
gious centres of learning and pilgrimage, primarily the holy cities of Najaf 
and Karbala in Iraq and Shiraz and Qom in Iran. Events in these centres are 
followed closely and are sources of inspiration for all the participants in the 
Shiʿi world, as the rise of the Islamic Republic has clearly shown. Not only the 
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relations between the minorities and their national majorities, but also the 
constant flow of interaction within the transnational networks consisting 
of diasporas and foreign co-religionists, play a key role in the shaping of 
the minorities’ collective strategies at home.
Muslim and Non-Muslim Minorities
This volume is divided in two parts.
Part I deals with non-Muslim religious minorities, the so-called dhimmis 
(Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians). Historically, the dhimmis enjoy an officially 
recognized legal status, and they have always occupied a well-defined social 
niche within Muslim society. Their rights and obligations are spelled out in 
the religious and legal texts, and, since Ottoman times, their inclusion in the 
Empire took place within a framework known as the millet system. As Maurits 
van den Boogert shows in chapter 1, this system, as reformed after the Tan-
zimat, still provides a formal model of social and legal organization in many 
post-colonial states in the Middle East. But it is a model with some significant 
modifications: the logic of modern statehood, with its emphasis on the citizens’ 
equality before the law, does not allow the existence of multiple ‘special laws’ 
and ‘special practices’, one for each religious community. As a result, non-
Muslim minorities in the sucessor states have lost many of the cultural rights 
they had taken for granted under the Ottomans. Van den Boogert’s chapter 
on the evolution of the millet system is important for the understanding of 
the non-Muslims’ situation in Middle Eastern states today.
The remaining chapters on this group of minorities show that this situ-
ation can best be described as variations against an admittedly loose com-
mon backdrop. Not only are there differences between state policies, but 
the minorities themselves are far from being homogeneous groups. They 
differ in the way they understand and interpret not only their histories but 
also fundamental aspects of their status as religious minorities. One of these 
aspects is the state of being protected. In the Middle East ‘protection’ is 
as strongly connoted to the concept of non-Muslim religious minority as 
‘powerlessness’ is to the concept of minority in general. Noting the common 
habit among Lebanese politicians to seek the support of powerful external 
allies in their internal disputes, Anh Nga Longva (chapter 2) explores the 
meaning of ‘protection’ through the eyes of two Christian communities, 
the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox. As ‘protection’ historically differs 
according to whether it emanated from the Muslim majority (through the 
dhimma) or from the European Powers in the nineteenth century (through 
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the capitulations), the two communities’ experience of protection and their 
memories of it are quite distinct. This has had a strong impact on the way 
most Maronites and Greek Orthodox today perceive themselves and their 
places in Lebanese society. In chapter 3, Grégoire Delhaye describes the 
remarkable revival of the Coptic Church and community since the early 
twentieth century; parallel to this are the events that led to the birth and 
growth of the Muslim Brotherhood. While these parallel ‘revivals’ have 
their own internal reasons, and are not part of a mimetic process with 
each side reacting to the other, the result has been a growing alienation 
between Muslims and Copts. Delhaye is sceptical to the oft-heard claim 
about a ‘(re)islamization’ of Egyptian society of which Copts are the 
powerless victims. He predicts that the 2011 uprising, which successfully 
toppled the Mubarak regime, is not likely to heal the rift between Copts 
and Muslims in any significant way. Today Copts are less than ever willing 
to play the role of a docile minority, all the more so as they benefit from 
the activism of a vocal diaspora in the US and its allies, some of whom 
are openly anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. It is precisely this type of support 
the Christian Palestinians in the West Bank, studied by Bård Kårtveit in 
chapter 4, seek to avoid. Kårtveit argues that the Christians of Bethlehem, 
a minority with a high educational level, a global social network, and who 
are well represented in public offices, are nevertheless structurally weak. 
This weakness is highlighted by the growing problem of land disputes which 
is interpreted by some Christians in sectarian terms. Absence of the rule 
of law under the Palestinian Authority leaves all Palestinians dependent 
on family and community networks for security and protection. Due to 
their dwindling numbers, Christian Palestinians find themselves in what 
the author describes as a ‘protection gap’. Yet the West Bank Christians 
are reluctant to seek the support of their Western co-religionists fearing 
that such an intervention might harm their position within the Palestin-
ian community and the Palestinian national project in general. That state 
policies play a critical role in shaping interactions between the various 
religious components of the society is brought to light by Annika Rabo in 
chapter 5. Rabo gives an analysis of the situation of religious and ethnic 
relations in the last bastion of pan-Arab secularism, the Republic of Syria. 
Contrary to Lebanon, ethnic and religious differences in Syria are typically 
under-communicated in the official discourse. Much has been written about 
the monopoly of power held by the Al-Assad family over Syria, and their 
membership in the Alawi minority, yet the largest group in the country are 
the Sunni Muslims. Building her analysis around the concept of convivial-
ity, the author explores the forms and contents of social relations among 
the various ethnic and religious groups in Aleppo, and the impact of Sunni 
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public dominance on the city’s particular brand of conviviality. The states 
studied so far can be described as secular or moderately religious. Sudan, 
the case-study in chapter 6 by Anne Sofie Roald, was, between 1993 and 
2005, an Islamic single-party state. The long-standing social tensions in 
Sudan are commonly described in terms of religious opposition between 
the Muslim North and the Christian South, with the former seeking to 
restrict the latter’s freedom of religion. Through an assessment of the 1998 
and 2005 Constitutions in light of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Roald finds that total freedom of religion in Sudan 
is infringed upon for non-Muslims as well as for Muslims, because the 
right not to belong to a religion is flouted. However, she suggests, tensions 
between Northern and Southern Sudan should be viewed as the result of 
a combination of ethnic differences and unequal socio-economic develop-
ment rather than being viewed exclusively in terms of religious conflicts. 
Of particular interest is the author’s highlighting of the role played by 
Western NGOs, many of them working in close cooperation with local 
Christian groups. In Chapter 7 Michael Stausberg traces change in the 
position of the Zoroastrians in Iranian society throughout history. They 
have gone from being the dominant and culturally influential religion in 
pre-Islamic times to being a tiny, subordinate religious minority. From 
1854, the fate of the Zoroastrians began to change and in the twentieth 
century they even enjoyed some decades of relative peace and prosper-
ity. Ironically, but not unexceptionally, the only regime which has shown 
willingness to give Zoroastrians full civic recognition in the modern era 
was the secular authoriatarian regime of the Pahlavis. Under the Islamic 
Republic, Zoroastrians, Armenians, and Jews have the status of officially 
recognized minorities; but although they are allowed one seat in parliament, 
they are denied full political and cultural rights. The fate of another large 
non-Muslim minority in Iran, the Bahaʾis, is discussed by Margit Warburg 
in chapter 8. Although originally an off-shoot of Shiʿism, Babism developed 
away from Islam, and its followers, the Bahaʾis, do not perceive themselves, 
nor are they perceived by others, as Muslims. Because the Bahaʾi doctrine 
rejects the belief that the Prophet Mohammed was the seal of prophets, its 
followers are considered by the Muslim religious authorities as apostates: 
hence their relentless discrimination throughout the movement’s history 
and their systematic persecution today in the Islamic Republic. The Bahaʾis’ 
predicament is heightened by their historic opposition to the ulama. Earlier, 
they were to a certain extent protected against the wrath of the latter by 
the secular monarchical State. With the Islamic revolution, however, the 
state and the ulamas have merged into one totalitarian regime, leaving the 
Bahaʾis devoid of protection.
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Part II deals with Muslim minorities. Whereas non-Muslims have a col-
lective denomination—dhimmis—and their status is based on a series of 
practices accumulated through time and known as the dhimma, there is 
no official collective denomination for Muslim minorities. In the English 
language literature, they are sometimes referred to as ‘heterodox Muslims’.7 
While non-Muslim minorities could be said to suffer from ‘overexposure’,8 
the problem for Muslim minorities is one of invisibility and silence. The 
Constitution of most Arab States cites Islam as the official religion and the 
primary source of law, but there is never any mention of sectarian affilia-
tion (Fuller and Francke 1999). Officially, Muslim minorities do not exist. 
Lack of official recognition is not always a problem, however; sometimes, it 
also has its advantages. Their ‘invisibility’ allows Muslim minorities, when 
necessary, to make efficient use of accommodation strategies. In chapter 9 
Laurence Louër analyses the remarkable change in the identity politics 
of the Shiʿis in Saudi Arabia over the past six to seven decades. Until the 
1950s, they were content with underplaying their religious practices in 
exchange for being left in peace by the Wahhabi zealots. Between the 
1950s and 1970s, their activism was articulated in a nationalist and leftist 
discourse perfectly in tune with the political mood of the time. In the 
1970s, encouraged by the support by the Daʿwa movement in Iraq and 
Khomeini’s revolution in Iran, the Saudi Shiʿis adopted a less accommodat-
ing attitude towards the Saudi State. Inspired by recent international and 
regional events, they have now moved from confrontation to a redefini-
tion of their collective identity, making use of discourses that resonate 
both with the Saudi power holders (national patriotism) and with the 
international community (minority rights). The same political flexibility 
and ability for accommodation are brought to light in Kais Firro’s study of 
Shiʿis, Alawis and Druzes in Lebanon and Syria (chapter 10). Through the 
reading of works by central intellectual figures of the three communities, 
the author gives a close view of the arguments that were used to support 
the ideological choices made. Central to the analysis is the distinction 
Firro draws between the practice of taqiyya (religious prudence) and 
what he refers to as ‘polytactic potential’, widely, and rather successfully, 
7 Sunnis sometimes use the term ghulāt when speaking of Shiʿis. Ghulāt is the adjectival 
form of ghuluww, Arabic for exaggeration. The Shiʿis are said to exaggerate their veneration 
of members of the Prophet’s family.
8 Prior to the Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century, non-Muslims had to follow 
an imposed dress-code and wear only certain colours in order to be easily distinguished 
from Muslims.
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used by Shiʿis in Lebanon since the early twentieth century. Firro is, less 
sanguine about their ability to accommodate to the more extreme form 
of ‘Sunni Islamist-fundamentalism’, which is spreading through several 
parts of the Middle East today. In chapter 11, Catherine Le Thomas gives 
us an in-depth look into what is undoubtedly the most common strategy 
of minority self-empowerment the world over: education. After a brief 
review of the growth of modern education in Lebanon, the favourite site 
of European missionaries’ activities in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the author concentrates on the process of educational develop-
ment in the Shiʿi community in the post-civil war period. She shows that 
the evolution of the Shiʿis from an economically and politically margin-
alized community in Lebanon to their present situation, as the largest, 
most dynamic, and best politically organized community, is taking place 
in tandem with the creation of a vast network of schools. Le Thomas sees 
a striking parallel between this development and the self-empowerment 
of the Maronites in the nineteenth century. Chapter 12, by Ali Çarkoğlu 
and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, deals with the Alevis, arguably the most invisible 
of all the Muslim minorities in the region. While the invisibility of Mus-
lim minorities in the Arab States studied so far arises primarily from the 
reluctance to admit divisions within Islam, the invisibility of the Alevis in 
Turkey results from both this reluctance and the deeply secular nature of 
the Turkish State. For Alevis, state secularism is their only hope for security 
and integration, hence their staunch support not only for nationalism in 
general but also for Atatürk’s particular brand of republicanism. Following 
the worldwide demise of secular, leftist ideologies, the growing Islamiza-
tion of Turkish politics and society, and not least, their own migration 
to the cities, more and more Alevis today are preoccupied with identity 
politics, while trying to reposition themselves in an increasingly religious 
political landscape. Nationalism, whether Arab, Turkish or Iranian, was 
characteristically secular in the first part of the twentieth century. With 
the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, another form of nationalism arose. Eliz 
Sanasarian (chapter 13) describes it as religious, or more precisely ‘Twelver 
Shiʿi’ nationalism as opposed to earlier ‘Persian’ nationalism, with its secular 
overtones and many Zoroastrian elements, under the monarchist regime. 
Iran’s religious minorities are both Muslim and non-Muslim, some of whom 
are recognized, others not. Sanasarian’s overview over the conditions under 
which these various groups live in Iran today raises interesting questions 
about the differences between the Islamic Republic and the Sunni States 
in the region regarding the treatment of religious minorities.
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In the concluding chapter, Elizabeth Picard argues that the minority 
problem in the post-colonial Middle Eastern States has two dimensions, a 
structural and a cultural, and that both need to be addressed simultane-
ously. Central to the analysis is the state, not least its modern avatar, the 
nation-state. The governments that emerged upon its importation and 
adaptation to the region in the early twentieth century had the choice 
between two constitutional alternatives: demographic majority (‘Toc-
quevillian democracy’) or consensus democracy. Most states opted for the 
former, and thereby all claims to identity differences were dismissed and 
banned. Recently, however, a significant shift has taken place: following 
the dismal failure of national development policies, states are increasingly 
investing in the previously neglectged cultural and religious sectors, and 
we are now witnessing the competing constructions of we-groups by both 
the majority (i.e. the state), and the minority groups. The author looks into 
these processes from an analytical perspective which, while attentive to the 
historical specificity of the region, also seeks to override the exceptionalism 
thesis which has been too often used in the study of this region.
For several decades Middle Eastern societies have lived under the rule of 
entrenched authoritarian regimes. Among the justifications these regimes 
have given for the suppression of political freedom is the danger of sec-
tarian conflicts. While justifications of dictatorship are always dubious, 
to say the least, clashes in which minorities are the designated victims 
have been frequent enough to lend a measure of credibility to this claim. 
The uprisings which are ongoing across the Middle East and North Africa 
since the beginning of 2011 and which, in some cases, have succeeded in 
bringing down the old regimes, is being heralded as the beginning of a new 
era. Whether this prediction will be fulfilled or not depends, among other 
things, on whether the states and majority societies in the region are ready 
to treat the people on the periphery, including followers of non-dominant 
faiths, not as minorities but as full-fledged citizens.
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MILLETS: PAST AND PRESENT
Maurits H. van den Boogert
The concept of ‘millet’ is central to the debate about the historical dynam-
ics between states and minority groups in Middle Eastern societies, and it 
continues to be relevant for their legal status in several countries today. 
‘Millet’ is generally associated with the Ottoman system for dealing with the 
Empire’s non-Muslim subjects, but modern historians have also used the 
term to designate non-Muslim and even ‘heterodox’ Muslim communities 
elsewhere, e.g. the Kizilbaş-Kurds in modern Turkey and the Assyrians in 
Iran (Bumke 1980: 551–553; Nab7 1977: 237–249; Halliday 1992: 159–176). It 
is often unclear, however, what the word exactly means outside the Otto-
man context: Does it refer to organized, state-recognized communities, 
or not? And did these groups refer to themselves as millets? Did the state 
use the term? In the field of Ottoman studies these questions have largely 
been answered now, but, even there, scholars do not always use the term 
‘millet’ unambiguously. The fact that the system remains relevant today, 
but almost exclusively as a legal phenomenon, further complicates the 
matter. This also applies to the debate about the status of non-Muslims in 
the modern Middle East, where new terminology (‘neo-millet’) has been 
introduced which may obscure rather than explain historical continuities. 
For these reasons a solid understanding of millets in the Ottoman Empire 
is required.
This chapter offers a survey of the debate about millets and their evolu-
tion in two parts, the first focusing on the period until the Age of Reforms, 
the Tanẓimāt, and the second on the Decrees of 1839 and 1856 which 
constitute their backbone. We end with an analysis of the remnants of the 
millet system in the present day, with particular reference to Egypt.
Historiography and Semantics
In 1950 the first volume of Gibb and Bowen’s influential Islamic Society 
and the West was published in London and Oxford. Part two contained the 
authors’ views on the millet system. Despite their own acknowledgement 
© Maurits H. van den Boogert, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_003
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that their description was methodologically flawed, Gibb and Bowen’s 
views on millets have acquired a near-canonical status. They presented 
the millet system as a rigorous hierarchy in which the Sultan assigned the 
management of non-Muslim communities to their ecclesiastical leaders, 
the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs and the Jewish Chief rabbi, who were 
granted legal jurisdiction and to whom the collection of communal taxes 
was delegated. According to Gibb and Bowen these divisions between the 
non-Muslim communities extended to their economic activities and were 
a reality in everyday life too (Gibb and Bowen 1950: 211–212).
The notion that the Ottomans implemented the millet system from the 
beginning of their rule was supported by Halil İnalcık. For example, in his 
article about the status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under Ottoman 
rule, İnalcık argued that the millet system had been part of the Ottomans’ 
policies from the very beginning. After discussing the early period of Otto-
man expansion, he states that “the second period for the so-called millet 
system began with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453”, when the conqueror 
“made the capital (i.e. Istanbul) the seat of the heads of the three recog-
nized non-Muslim communities, Orthodox Greek, Armenian and Jewish” 
(Inalcik 1991: 407–436).
İnalcık has even suggested that the millet system predated the rise of 
the Ottomans on the basis of the diploma issued in 1138 on behalf of the 
Abbāsid Caliph al-Muqtafī li-amr Allāh (r. 1136–1160) to the Nestorian Patri-
arch ʿAbdīshō III Bar Moqli (r. 1138–1148). The document recognized the 
Patriarch as the head of the ṭawāʾif (communities) of the Greeks (al-Rūm), 
the Jacobites (al-Yaʿāqiba), and the Melkites (al-Malika). According to 
İnalcık, the diploma then “enumerates the rights granted to him and to 
the members of his milla” (ibid. 200). This wording suggests that the word 
milla was already used in 1138 in the way the Ottomans employed it later. 
However, neither Alphonse Mingana’s translation of the diploma, nor the 
facsimile of the original Arabic document he has published, contains the 
word milla, the diploma consistently speaking of ṭawāʾif (sg. ṭāʾifa) only 
(Mingana 1926: 127–133).
With his implicit1 endorsement of Gibb and Bowen’s portrayal of the 
millet system, İnalcık ignored a thought-provoking article by Benjamin 
Braude. Focusing on the Ottomans’ own use of the word millet and related 
terminology like ṭāʾifa and cemaʿat, Braude concluded that “the millet 
system” is a twentieth-century historiographical construct, which should 
1 There is no reference to Gibb and Bowen’s work in İnalcık’s article. 
 millets: past and present 29
not be applied to the Ottoman period prior to the nineteenth century. 
According to Braude, it was only during the Tanẓimāt—from 1839 until 
sometime between 1871 and 1881—that the Ottoman government clearly 
had a policy for millets which could be called systematic. In the earlier 
periods, Braude argued, the situation of non-Muslim communities in the 
Ottoman Empire was variegated and diverse, a result of the plurality of the 
Ottomans’ approach vis-à-vis their Christian and Jewish subjects. Braude 
also pointed out that the Jews in the Ottoman Empire lacked a pyramidal 
organization until 1835 (Braude 1982: 69–88).
Braude’s article is arguably the most important contribution to the debate 
about the millet system. His conclusion that there was no coherent Otto-
man policy to create empire-wide administrative and fiscal communities 
of Christians and Jews from the beginning of Ottoman rule is compelling. 
Braude’s approach has two disadvantages, however. Firstly, his efforts seem 
to be directly and principally against the views of Gibb and Bowen, all ele-
ments of which Braude has attempted to counter.2 This effectively limits 
the discussion about the millets to a historiographical debate of which Gibb 
and Bowen inadvertently established the parameters. Secondly, Braude’s 
emphasis on the usage of certain terminology (the words millet, ṭāʾifa, etc.) 
has placed semantics at the heart of the discussion.
Many scholars have since accepted the gist of Braude’s arguments, but 
few have engaged in the debate with him. A notable exception is Michael 
Ursinus, who distinguishes three meanings of the term milla/millet: 
1) “religion, confession, rite”; 2) “religious community, community of the 
same confession or the same rite”; and 3) “[sovereign] nation, part of a 
people” (Ursinus 1993). The second section is particularly relevant for the 
debate about the millet system. Braude claimed that, prior to the nineteenth 
century reforms, in the Turkish sources the word millet mainly refers to 
“the community of Muslims” (Braude op. cit. 79). Disagreeing with this 
view, Ursinus refers to a number of (published)3 documents issued by the 
Sublime Porte in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. For example, in 
a document dated 1159/1746 “the millet-i Ermeniyan is already designated 
as an empire wide religious community (memālik-i marūsede sākin millet 
Ermeniyān)”. Ursinus also notes that, towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, the Ottoman fiscal administration already used the term milel-i 
thelāthe, “the three (non-Muslim) religious communities”. Because this 
2 This is particularly clear in Benjamin Braude 2000.
3 Ahmet Refik [Altinay], On altıncı ʿaṣırda İstanbul ḥayātı (1553–1591) (Istanbul 1917).
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reference concerns taxes on alcoholic beverages, this could only have 
referred to the Orthodox, the Armenians, and the Jews (Ursinus 1993: 62).4 
Ursinus concedes that the term ‘millet’ was not used systematically before 
the nineteenth century, but his evidence contradicts Braude’s boldest 
claim “that there was no overall administrative system, structure, or set 
of institutions for dealings with non-Muslims” (ibid. 64).
In 1993, two years after Ursinus’ entry, an article by Hidemitsu Kuroki 
about the Orthodox-Catholic community in Aleppo in the early nineteenth 
century was published. On the basis of research in the qāḍī archives of 
Aleppo, Kuroki supplied new evidence that the term ‘millet’ was already 
used by the provincial and local authorities, as well as by non-Muslims 
themselves, in first decade of the nineteenth century. For example, in a 
conversation with the Ottoman governor of Aleppo, a Catholic Christian 
stated that the Orthodox metropolitan he and his fellow Catholics had 
been ordered to obey was “not our metropolitan nor do we belong to 
his millet.” (Kuroki 1993: 15). Furthermore, Kuroki reports that the qāḍī 
of Aleppo issued an order in April 1818 in which he spoke of the “millet-i 
ermeniyān” (the Armenian millet) and the “mārūnī milleti” (the Maronite 
millet) (ibid. 18). Braude has argued that the meaning of ṭāʾifa and millet 
were interchangeable prior to the 1820s, when on the local level virtually 
only ṭāʾifa was used. On the basis of local sources Kuroki, however, suggests 
that in some cases “ ‘ṭāʾifa’ was a sub-category of ‘millet’ ” (ibid. 12–15).5
Kuroki’s findings push back the earliest attested usage of millet in the 
provinces to the early 1800s. The provincial and local sources may well 
contain earlier evidence, but this remains unclear, because many scholars 
who have consulted them fail to provide the dates of each archival docu-
ment they refer to. This also affects our ability to answer the question 
which should be more central to the millet debate: How were non-Muslim 
communities in the Ottoman Empire actually organized?
Imperia in Imperio? Self-Governance and the State Until the Tanẓimāt
We should distinguish at least three domains in which autonomy, or at least 
self-governance, was important for non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 
and remains so for Christians and Jews in the Middle East today.
4 The date is erroneously given as 1591/746. This should be 1159/1746.
5 Especially p. 13, where several concrete and dated examples are listed. 
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The first domain is that of religious theory and practice, i.e. anything 
from pure theology to liturgy, church services, and processions. Although 
the Muslim rulers did not interfere in purely theological or liturgical mat-
ters, the Islamic environment encroached on any other aspect that took 
place in public: the restoration of churches and chapels was restricted, as 
was their maximum height, because the non-Muslims’ buildings should 
not tower over those of the Muslims. During the nineteenth century 
other buildings also became relevant, e.g. hospitals and schools. In the 
public space, Christians and Jews also had to take Muslim sensitivities 
into account, which had an effect on the number of religious symbols car-
ried along in processions (for funerals, at Easter, etc.). The availability of 
(kosher and communion) wine, kosher meat, and specific kinds of bread 
(matza, but also communion wafer) partly depended on the non-Muslims’ 
relations with the Muslim rulers, who had to allow either their produc-
tion or importation. This was also was true for clothing, sumptuary laws 
forbidding Christians and Jews wearing green clothes, or white turbans. 
Even though these laws were seldom strictly upheld, it was unwise for 
non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire to disregard them altogether, and 
they must have been a constant reminder of the balance of power. At the 
same time, within these parameters Jews and Christians were free to wear 
their own traditional clothing, which, particularly in the case of the Jews, 
enabled them to foster their group identity.6
The second domain is that of administration and taxation. Throughout 
the Ottoman non-Muslim communities tended to have both an ecclesi-
astical and a lay leadership at the same time. The lay leaders, who were 
generally elected by the community, were responsible for administrative 
and financial matters. All arrangements with regard to taxes were thus 
made by the lay elites. The jizya, the poll-tax levied on all adult non-Muslim 
males, was the most symbolically charged example of such a communal 
levy. Although there was no uniform way of collecting it throughout the 
empire, the poll-tax was generally levied by the Ottoman state as a lump 
sum (maqṭūʿ) per community on the local level (Vatin and Veinstein 2010). 
This changed at the end of the seventeenth century, when payment of the 
tax was emphasized as an individual obligation. Even then, however, most 
communities continued to coordinate the collection of the tax among 
6 Alexander Russell (1794) speaks of Jewish dress in Aleppo around 1750. According to 
the Russell brothers, all Jewish men had beards, and even the European Jews “are obliged 
by the Khakhan [i.e. chief rabbi] to comply with the custom”. In general, they noted, the 
Jews lived very much “under the eye of their Khakans”.
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themselves. This enabled them to exempt some of their members (e.g. 
rabbis, and the poor) from payment altogether, while allowing others, who 
were formally exempt, voluntarily to make contributions nonetheless (ibid. 
563; van den Boogert 2009). In the Balkans their role in the collection of 
communal taxes was an important factor in the rise of non-Muslim lay 
leaders (who had various titles, including koca-bashıs, çorbacıs and knez 
[EI2: 563; Karpat 1982])7 as a “local aristocracy” in the eighteenth century, 
and the same was probably true for the Asian provinces, where lay elites 
among the Jews and Christians became more prominent during the same 
period (Masters 2001).8
The third “autonomous” domain concerned the non-Muslim communi-
ties’ legal jurisdiction. Under certain conditions, the Jews and Christians 
were allowed to adjudicate legal disputes among members of their own 
community. We know more about this aspect of non-Muslim life in the 
Ottoman Empire from Jewish sources than from Christian accounts. In 
Jewish communities the rabbi also served as the head of the rabbinical 
court (Hebr. av bet din). Its jurisdiction included criminal cases, in the 
adjudication of which he was assisted by two other judges. Most of the 
larger Jewish communities had several of these courts, which tended 
to attract cases from smaller villages in the vicinity too. In addition, ad 
hoc courts were held in remote areas and at regional markets, on which 
occasions the head of the court was often a learned layman (Bornstein-
Makovetsky 2010: 293). In general, however, this domain was dominated 
by the ecclesiastical leadership.
Although the laws of several Eastern churches have been studied well, 
we know much less about the actual Christian legal courts.9 Their juris-
diction was probably limited to matters of personal statute, e.g. birth and 
death, and marriage and divorce, but it is not clear when proper courts 
were established among the Ottoman Christians, and this may well have 
differed from region to region. Bernard Heyberger has observed that, in 
7 Karpat uses the unfortunate term ‘primates’ (from the Latin primus, but with biological 
connotations which are as inappropriate as they are inevitable) when referring to notables 
in the Balkans. 
8 Masters mentions the titles of nasi (secular leader) among the Jews (p. 62), and speaks 
of the “chief deputy of the four communities” (tevaif-i erbaa baş vekili or dört milletler vekili) 
among the Christians in the mid-eighteenth century (pp. 64, 65). In the Arab provinces, the 
title wakīl (lit. ‘proxy’) was generally used; see Bernard Heyberger, 1994.
9 On the laws of the Maronites, for example, see Féghali 1962; Aouad 1933; Sfair 1933. 
For the (Catholic) Armenians, see Amaduni 1932, 1940 and Ghedighian 1941. Also see 
Wilmshurst 2000).
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Greater Syria, Christian legal jurisdiction remained ill-defined until the 
beginning of the eighteenth-century (Heyberger 1994). During this period 
several Christian legal manuals were also published. The Maronite bishop 
of Beirut, ʿAbdallāh Qarāʿalī (1672–1742), for instance, composed two which 
were modeled on Muslim examples; around 1720 his Mukhtaṣar al-sharīʿa 
was published, and his Pandectes, al-Fatāwā al-khayriyya followed in 
1733–1735 (ibid. 70–71). Until that time, the communities’ legal jurisdiction 
appears to have been exercised on an ad hoc basis by their ecclesiastical 
leader, i.e. the bishops and patriarchs. They probably decided such suits 
on the basis of church laws, but in the absence of documentary evidence 
our understanding of Christian judicial practice remains limited. It is clear, 
however, that neither Christian nor Jewish leaders could prevent members 
of their communities taking their lawsuits to Islamic courts, although this 
was clearly discouraged (Gradeva 1997; al-Qattan 1999). The fact that non-
Muslims indeed turned to the Muslim courts may partly be explained by 
the anticipation of a more favourable ruling under Islamic law (e.g. in the 
cases of divorce or divisions of estates),10 but may also have been due to 
the limitations of the rabbis’ and bishops’ ability to enforce their decisions. 
For non-Muslims the question of whether to take a lawsuit to their “own” 
court or to that of the qāḍī was therefore not a foregone conclusion in 
favour of the former.
The notion that the Jewish and Christian communities under Ottoman 
rule constituted “empires with the Empire” (Sanjian 1965) is clearly an 
exaggeration. While the privileges of non-Muslims in each of these domains 
were based on solid legal precedents, in their practical implementation they 
sometimes had to be renegotiated, occasionally with the central Ottoman 
authorities themselves, but more often with provincial or local officials. It 
is with this process of local negotiations in mind that we now turn to an 
analysis of the Tanẓimāt, their effect on the status of non-Muslims in the 
nineteenth century, and their relevance for the situation in the modern 
Middle East.
The Edicts of 1839 and 1856
France traditionally styled itself the protector of all Catholics in the Levant, 
but until the nineteenth century this had a greater symbolic than political 
10 For a case study of the division of a non-Muslim inheritance in accordance with Islamic 
law, see van den Boogert, 2005.
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value. The “protection system” remained limited to individual members 
of non-Muslim communities, and even within that system the French did 
not only select Catholic protégés; in 1789, for example, some 14 percent 
of those under French protection were Jews (van den Boogert 2010). The 
nature of the protection system only changed gradually after the Treaty of 
Küçük Kainarca of 1774 ostensibly gave the Russians the right to intercede 
on behalf of all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians’ 
ploy—their claim was based on a deliberately inaccurate French transla-
tion of the Turkish text (Davison 1976)—foreshadowed their activities in 
the Balkans and the Greek Islands, where they would later seek to extend 
their sphere of influence. In 1852 the Russian claim to be entitled to protect 
all Greek Orthodox subjects of the sultan would be one of the casus belli 
for the Crimean War.
Russia’s policies also led other powers to become more assertive in 
their advocacy of sectarian causes. While France continued to support the 
Catholics, and particularly the Maronites, Great Britain eventually focused 
on the Jews. The decision to establish a British consular agent in Jerusalem 
in 1838 was a result of this process (Hyamson 1939).
Being ‘different’ from the Muslim majority, in the religious, legal, and social 
sense, had long been associated principally with the non-Muslims’ status as 
dhimmīs, but from the late eighteenth century this changed for some—but 
not all—of them; their differentness now made them eligible for foreign 
protection, which significantly altered their relations with the Ottoman state. 
The advantages for the foreign powers and the non-Muslim communities 
involved were clear: the interests of the protected groups formed the pretext 
for Western political interventions, while foreign action on their behalf gave 
the Jews and Christians concerned leverage over state officials.
During the same period several non-Muslim communities were becoming 
more organized, either at their own initiative or at the state’s behest. In the 
course of the eighteenth century Christian judicial procedures had increas-
ingly been developed and refined—possibly, as Ursinus has suggested, in 
response to the rise of Catholicism and the concomitant religious strife 
(Ursinus 1993: 64)—and the lay leadership had strengthened its position. 
In the case of the Jews, the state intervened more directly by reinstituting 
the office of Haham başı, the Chief Rabbi in Istanbul, as the formal leader 
of all Ottoman Jews in January 1835, and recognizing the Jews as one of 
the one of the four “official” communities (millets). The government thus 
imposed the millet structure on the Jews, undermining their privilege of 
self-governance in the administrative domain. This was almost five years 
before the haṭṭ-ı hümāyūn (imperial edict) of Gülhane was proclaimed in the 
Rose Chamber of the Sultan’s Palace in Istanbul on 3 November 1839.
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Sultan ʿAbdülmecīd I (r. 1839–1861) had ascended the throne earlier the 
same year in a particularly tumultuous period. Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt 
was increasingly posing a threat to Ottoman stability, and Russia made 
no secret of its ambitions to increase its influence on the Balkans. The 
Ottomans, who could no longer rely on the Janissary corps which had 
been abolished in 1826, needed support from France and Great Britain 
to turn the tide, and the Edict of Gülhane’s emphasis on equal rights for 
Muslims and non-Muslims reflects this. As Hurewitz has pointed out, the 
edict “was essentially the handiwork of Reşid Paşa, who sought by this 
means to wheedle concrete material assistance out of Britain.” With an 
audience which included several Western representatives, Reşīd Pasha 
therefore proclaimed that
The Muslims and the non-Muslim subjects of our lofty Sultanate shall, with-
out exception, enjoy our imperial concessions. Therefore we grant perfect 
security to all the populations of our Empire in their lives, their honor, and 
their properties, according to the sacred law (Hurewitz 1975).11
The concept of legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims was a radical 
departure from the precepts of Islamic law, on which the dhimma had been 
based.12 In theory this also meant that ‘discriminatory’ taxes like the jizya 
were or would be abolished, but in practice the Gülhane Edict affected 
the status of Ottoman non-Muslims not nearly as profoundly as another 
decree issued more than a decade later.
The Reform Decree (Iṣlāḥāt fermānı) of 1856—which is often referred 
to in Western sources as a haṭṭ-ı hümāyūn too—was issued in the name of 
Sultan ʿAbdülmecīd on 18. February, but it had been prepared largely by the 
British and French ambassadors in Istanbul (Zürcher, EI2: 484–486). Again 
international circumstances undoubtedly influenced both the contents of 
the decree and its timing, just before the 1856 peace conference in Paris 
which would formally conclude the Crimean War. The decree, which does 
not have numbered articles, affected all three domains of non-Muslim 
‘autonomy’ identified above. Starting with an explicit reaffirmation of its 
1839 predecessor, the text states that
All the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by my ancestors ab antiquo, 
and at subsequent dates, to all Christian communities or other non-Muslim 
persuasions established in my empire, under my protection, shall be con-
firmed and maintained (Hurewitz 1975, 2: 150).
11 I have slightly modernized the translation by Halil İnalcık, substituting, for example, 
Muslims for Musselmen. 
12 The dhimma is discussed in more detail in the chapter by Longva in this volume.
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The aim was to emphasize that the Porte was not adopting new measures, 
but merely codifying existing, legitimate policies. Nevertheless, the decree 
constituted a significant departure from established policies.
With regard to religious theory and practice—the first ‘autonomous’ 
domain—the 1856 decree stated that
In the towns, small boroughs, and villages where the whole population is 
of the same religion, no obstacle shall be offered to the repair, according to 
their original plan, of buildings set apart for religious worship, for schools, 
for hospitals, and for cemeteries. The plans of these different buildings, in 
case of their new erection, must, after having been approved by the patri-
archs or head of communities, be submitted to my Sublime Porte, which 
will approve of them by my imperial order, or make known its observations 
upon them within a certain time. Each sect, in localities where there are no 
other religious denominations, shall be free from every kind of restraint as 
regards the public exercise of its religion.
At first glance, these clauses seem an alleviation of the previous regime 
concerning the restoration of churches and other buildings with religious 
purposes, like schools. Previously, permission had to be obtained for each 
restoration, but the 1856 decree appears to abolish this rule, on the con-
dition that “the whole population is of the same religion”. The fact that 
this was not a blanket permission for the future construction of churches, 
however, is clear from the phrase “or make known its observations”, an 
obvious euphemism for a denial of permission. Moreover, a more lenient 
interpretation of this element of the 1856 decree depends on the readings 
of the word ‘religion’ as referring to Christianity or Judaism in general. The 
last sentence of the second clause speaks of ‘sects’, which suggests that 
the presence of more than one sect in any location nullified the beneficial 
effects of the decree. What if more than one Christian community lived 
in a given location? Or if a single Christian community had become split 
into an Orthodox and a Catholic faction? Long before the Ottoman govern-
ment formally accepted these divisions by establishing a Catholic millet (in 
1831), Catholics had presented themselves as different communities, and in 
regions like Syria and Lebanon this may well have worked against them in 
the Ottoman authorities’ interpretation of the 1856 decree.
The clause which follows immediately after the two quoted above adds 
that
In the towns, small boroughs, and villages where different sects are mingled 
together, each community inhabiting a distinct quarter shall, by conforming 
to the abovementioned ordinances, have equal power to repair and improve 
its churches, its hospitals, its schools, and its cemeteries. When there is ques-
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tion of their erection of new buildings, the necessary authority must be asked 
for, through the medium of the patriarchs and heads of communities, from 
my Sublime Porte, which will pronounce a sovereign decision according that 
authority, except in the case of administrative obstacles (ibid. 151).
Again, this seems favourable for Christians and Jews—but was it? Even in 
cities like Aleppo, where Judayda and Banqūsa were known as a Christian 
and a Jewish quarter, respectively, most (possibly all) parts of the town 
did remain mixed, i.e. there were always a few Muslims who resided in 
these areas too (Marcus 1989). Might their presence have constituted one 
of these undefined “administrative obstacles”?
The 1856 decree also had an impact on the Christians’ and Jews’ freedom 
to organize their communities as they saw fit. In 1835 a pyramidal structure 
had already been imposed on the Jews, but now all non-Muslims had to 
reform themselves:
Every Christian or other non-Muslim community shall be bound within a 
fixed period, and with the concurrence of a commission composed ad hoc of 
members of its own body, to proceed, with my high approbation and under 
the inspection of my Sublime Porte, to examine into its actual immunities 
and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms 
required by the progress of civilization and of the age. The powers conceded 
to the Christian patriarchs and bishops by the Sultan Mahomet II and by 
his successors shall be made to harmonize with the new position which my 
generous and beneficent intentions insure to these communities.
In response to the edict, several communities formulated reforms which 
they submitted to the Porte. In 1863, for example, the Ottoman government 
accepted the Armenians’ proposal for a “constitution” (Niẓāmnāme-i Millet-i 
Ermeniyān) of their own in 1863.13 Two years later, in March 1865, the Haham-
hane Niẓāmnāmesi (General Regulations of the Rabbinate) were accepted as 
a blueprint for the reform of the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire 
(Levy EJIW: 323–326; Erbahar EJIW: 326–327). Already by the 1856 decree, 
however, the Ottoman government introduced some new procedures for all 
millets, even if the wording appears to single out the Christians:
The principle of nominating the patriarch for life, after the revision of the 
rule of election now in force, shall be exactly carried out, conformably to the 
tenor of their firmans of investiture.
13 The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire started to reform their communal admin-
istration in 1840s and submitted a first draft of the ‘constitution’ in 1857. For details, see 
Masayuki Ueno 2007.
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Moreover, all clerics should henceforth take an oath, and receive a fixed 
salary:
The patriarchs, metropolitans, archbishops, bishops, and rabbis shall take an 
oath, on their entrance into office, according to a form agreed upon in com-
mon by my Sublime Porte and the spiritual heads of the different religious 
communities. The ecclesiastical dues, of whatever sort or nature they be, shall 
be abolished and replaced by fixed revenues of the patriarchs and heads of 
communities, and by the allocations of allowances and salaries equitably 
proportioned to the importance, the rank, and the dignity of the different 
members of the clergy (Hurewitz 1975: 151).
The income of the clergy used to consist of ecclesiastical dues, which were 
levied internally in accordance with the community’s own traditions, but 
now the Ottoman government forced them to accept fixed salaries. Not only 
did the Porte abolish the clergy’s right to levy ecclesiastical dues as they 
were used to, it also forced the rabbis and priests to share the administra-
tion of their property—including, undoubtedly, pious endowments—with 
laymen from their communities:
The property, real or personal, of the different Christian ecclesiastics shall 
remain intact; the temporal administration of the Christian or other non-
Muslim communities shall, however, be placed under the safeguard of an 
assembly to be chosen from among the members, both ecclesiastics and 
laymen, of the said communities (ibid.).
While it is true that the decree of 1856 abolished the jizya, it introduced 
the tax payable in lieu of military service (first called iʿāne-i ʿaskeriyye, 
later bedel-i ʿaskerī) at the same time (Bowen, EI2: 855). The fact that the 
jizya was no longer levied, may well have been perceived as an important 
symbolic step towards full legal equality, but financially one tax had merely 
been replaced with another.
The impact of the Reform Decree on the administrative and fiscal domain 
of the non-Muslim communities was thus severe, particularly with regard 
to their organization. Nor did their legal autonomy remain unaffected , 
because the haṭṭ-ı hümāyūn of 1856 stipulated that
All commercial, correctional, and criminal suits between Muslims and 
Christians, or other non-Muslim subjects, or between Christians or other 
non-Muslims of different sects, shall be referred to mixed tribunals. The 
proceedings of these tribunals shall be public; the parties shall be confronted 
and shall produce their witnesses, whose testimony shall be received without 
distinction, upon an oath taken according to the religious law of each sect. 
Suits relating to civil affairs shall continue to be publicly tried, according to 
the laws and regulations, before the mixed provincial councils, in the pres-
ence of the governor and judge of the place (Hurewitz op. cit. 151).
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These provisions did not constitute a major change. After all, commercial 
disputes were already brought before the qāḍī on a regular basis, unless 
both parties belonged to a single community and both agreed not to involve 
the Ottoman authorities. The fact that, in the mixed courts, non-Muslim 
judges also presided—publicly!—over commercial disputes may well have 
been perceived by Christians and Jews as advantageous. The same was 
true of the mixed provincial councils, which also included non-Muslim 
members. Such potentially positive aspects were not so easy to detect in 
the next clause, which held that
Special civil proceedings, such as those relating to successions or others of 
that kind, between subjects of the same Christian or other non-Muslim faith, 
may, at the request of the parties, be sent before the councils of the patriarchs 
or of the communities (ibid. 151–152).
Until 1856 inheritance law had been one of the few domains in which the 
non-Muslim communities had truly been autonomous. In principle, inheri-
tance law fell under the jurisdiction of the patriarchs and rabbis, unless 
(one of ) the parties concerned chose to involve the Ottoman authorities. 
The decree of 1856 reversed the common procedure; now, matters of 
inheritance in principle fell under the state’s jurisdiction, whether in the 
form of the qāḍī courts or the mixed tribunals is not specified, unless the 
parties concerned requested that their case be transferred to the jurisdic-
tion of their patriarch or chief rabbi.
The Iṣlāḥāt fermānı of 1856 touched all three domains in which non-
Muslim Ottomans had previously enjoyed some degree of autonomy: 
religious theory and practice, administration and taxes, and jurisdiction. 
The Porte intervened the most directly in the way the Christian and Jew-
ish communities were organized, forcing new appointment procedures on 
them as well as introducing fixed salaries for the clergy.
Millets in the Modern Middle East
In 2005 Paul S. Rowe coined the phrase ‘neo-millet’ to describe the dynamics 
between authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and their non-Muslims 
subjects today (Rowe 2007). What exactly is ‘neo-’ about the Egyptian system 
Rowe does not say. To be precise, in 1914 Egypt became a British protector-
ate and de facto independent from the Ottoman Empire. Independence 
did not make Egypt lawless; the new state merely had to pass new laws 
or confirm existing legal practices. With regard to the regulation of the 
status of non-Muslims the Egyptians chose to do the latter, declaring the 
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continuing validity of the Tanẓimāt decrees through Egyptian Law no. 8 of 
1915 (ibid.). The millet system was thus not reinvented, or even modified, 
in modern Egypt; the existing system simply remained in place.
Although new laws and regulations have increasingly limited the applica-
bility of non-Muslim law in Egypt, some remnants of the millet framework 
are still in place today. With regard to the basic legal status of individuals, 
for example, Berger explains that
in contemporary Egypt, the Muslims, Christians and Jews are governed by 
the personal status law of their respective communities. This implies that 
the personal status of Egypt’s legal subjects is based on their belonging to 
a religious community. In this respect, a person without religion is a legal 
non-entity (Berger 2001: 88).
This does not mean that the system has remained static for almost a cen-
tury, despite Rowe’s claim, that “the status of Christians under Egyptian 
law has never changed except in response to external stimuli” (Rowe 2007: 
349). Rowe’s apparent denial of Egyptian law’s capacity to develop out of its 
own initiative suggests that he is ignorant of developments which affected 
the status of non-Muslims both in Ottoman civil law, and, more recently, 
in Egypt. For instance, towards the end of the Tanẓimāt, on 2 September 
1881, the Porte issued a document called Sicill-i Nüfus Niẓāmesi (Regula-
tion on Registration) which ordained that the performance of weddings 
among both Muslims and non-Muslims henceforth required the permission 
of the leaders of their religious communities, and that both these leaders 
and those concluding the marriage must inform the Population Office, a 
state institution, about it. In the same year all male heads of households 
were compelled by law to register all cases of death or divorce with the 
Population Office. Previously Christians and Jews had been welcome to 
register marriage contracts in Islamic courts and to make arrangements 
for the division of estates there. Originally estates in principle fell under 
the authority of the rabbis and patriarchs, but in 1856 the mixed courts 
were in principle assigned jurisdiction over such cases, except when the 
parties asked for them to be transferred to the church or rabbinical court. 
The 1881 obligation to register these cases with the Ottoman authorities 
strengthened the earlier trend towards state centralization, and further 
undermined the non-Muslims’ autonomy (Ortaylı, 1990).
In modern Egypt the state has progressively limited the legal autonomy of 
its Christian and Jewish subjects, restricting the application of non-Muslim 
personal status laws to marriage and divorce, i.e. family law (qānūn al-usra) 
(Berger 2001). Non-Muslims had their own courts, known as Millī courts, 
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until 1955. In that year Law 462 on the Abolition of the Sharīʿa and Millī 
Courts was passed, article 6 of which states that
With regard to disputes related to the personal status (aḥwāl shakhṣiyya) of 
non-Muslim Egyptian [couples] who share the same sect and rite (al-muttaḥidī 
al-ṭāʾifa wa l-milla), and who at the time of the promulgation of this law have 
[their own] organized sectarian judicial institutions, judgments will be passed 
in accordance with their law (sharīʿati-him), all within the limits of public 
policy (al-niẓām al-ʿāmm) (ibid. 93).
Although the terminology of this law from 1955 links it to the Ottoman 
millet system, it curtails the applicability of non-Muslim law in modern 
Egypt considerably. As Berger has argued, the concept of public policy has 
been interpreted in a restrictive manner with the aim of “unifying” Egypt’s 
multiple personal statute laws. As part of this policy, the Family Courts 
were merged into the national court system in 1956. In preceding decades, 
Egyptian legal practice had already removed the following aspects from the 
realm of “special law” and reclassified them as falling under “general law”: 
guardianship (1925, 1952); intestate succession (1943); bequest (1946); and 
family names, family ties and legal capacity (1949) (ibid. 94).
Even with regard to marriage and divorce, the application of Christian 
law (the number of Jews in Egypt dwindling to insignificance in the second 
half of the twentieth century) has been narrowed down to cases in which 
both parties belong to the same sect and rite. “This means that non-Muslim 
law does not apply to the marriages of non-Muslim spouses who are of 
different religion (e.g., Christian and Jew), of different rite (e.g., Catholic 
and Protestant), or even of different sect (e.g., Coptic-Orthodox and Greek-
Orthodox)” (ibid. 97). At the same time, in cases where Christian family law 
does still apply, Egyptian legal practice has denied the parties involved the 
right to opt for Islamic law. Thus, for example, modern Egyptian law does 
not permit Catholic Egyptians to divorce, because Catholic law does not 
allow divorce (ibid. 122). Thus only a few vestiges of the Ottoman millet 
system remain, but these are defended by the highest Egyptian court.
Conclusion
There are two turning-points in the history of the legal status of non-Muslim 
communities in the Islamic Middle East. The first is the Reform Decree of 
1856, which represented a significant departure from established legal prac-
tice. The decree had an impact on all three domains of autonomy: religious 
theory and practice, administration and taxation, and legal jurisdiction. 
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The second turning-point was the end of the Ottoman Empire, or in some 
cases independence from it at a slightly earlier stage. From that moment 
each successor state has developed its own approach to its non-Muslim 
subjects, but the millet system probably survived the political transition 
at least for a while.
The decades before the official start of the Tanẓimāt constitute a turning-
point which is less tangible, but it was crucial for later developments. 
During this period the Western Powers increasingly intervened with the 
Ottoman authorities on behalf of the sultan’s Christian and Jewish sub-
jects, insisting on an amelioration of their legal status. The non-Muslims’ 
inequality was the West’s principle pretext for giving these groups foreign 
‘protection’. Foreign support undoubtedly also fanned Christian and Jew-
ish self-consciousness, strengthening their ambition for a better position. 
The demand for equality before the law of all Ottoman subjects became 
stronger, and the Gülhane Edict of 1839 was the Ottoman answer. Few 
would have predicted its outcome. While Christian and Jewish communi-
ties were increasingly defining—or ‘inventing’ to use Benedict Anderson’s 
term—their own traditions and ambitions, the Ottoman authorities set 
about implementing its policies of equality before the law. Just when the 
non-Muslims were fostering their specialness, they lost more and more of 
their autonomy as their ‘special laws’ were gradually stripped.
Legal developments with regard to non-Muslim subjects differed from 
one successor state of the Ottoman Empire to another. In some cases, 
large parts of the millet system have survived until today. In Lebanon, for 
example, article 9 of the constitution “guarantees that the personal status 
and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they 
belong, is respected.” In Israel, too, the legal system for non-Muslim mar-
riage and divorce continues to be based on the Ottoman millet system 
(Hofri-Winogradow 2010). In other cases, successor states have gradually 
done away with the old arrangements and passed new laws on the status 
of non-Muslim subjects. This is the case in Egypt, where the Ottoman 
system was confirmed by law in 1915, but was dismantled gradually in the 
course of the twentieth century. Step by step, legal issues which originally 
belonged to the realm of “special law”, i.e. Egypt’s Christian laws, were 
moved to that of “general law”. Today, only a limited application of Chris-
tian family law is all that has remained in Egypt of what was once the 
Ottoman millet system.
Ironically, the conclusion of these legal developments, which started in 
the early 19th century, now coincides with the feeling among many non-
Muslim communities in the Middle East that they are entitled to maintain 
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their own group culture and identity, including a number of “special” legal 
practices. This feeling of entitlement feeds emotional debates in which 
moral views tend to take precedence over dispassionate arguments. To 
portray the Christians of the modern Middle East, and other ‘minorities’ 
for that matter, solely as victims of these developments (Phares 1999; Bat 
Ye’or quoted in Phares 1999 and Rowe 2007) is historically incorrect. The 
process was characterized by constant negotiations and renegotiations 
between the state and the non-Muslim communities, who were not pow-
erless to resist the State. In several instances, the perceived benefits for 
the non-Muslims of individual steps in the process are easy to identify. 
Such internal dynamics should also be taken into account if we want to 
understand the mechanisms of power. In the modern period the process 
was continued between new nation states and their non-Muslim popula-
tions. The outcomes in various successor states of the Ottoman Empire are 
discussed in several chapters of this book below.
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CHAPTER TWO
FROM THE DHIMMA TO THE CAPITULATIONS:  
MEMORY AND EXPERIENCE OF PROTECTION IN LEBANON
Anh Nga Longva
Introduction
In November 2007, the mandate of Lebanon’s president Emile Lahoud 
came to an end, and the National Assembly was scheduled to elect a new 
president. As political disagreement worsened and the election kept being 
postponed, the Lebanese capital witnessed a constant flow of foreign 
dignitaries who came to express their support to the pro-Western Siniora 
government. The then French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, flew 
in from Paris no less than five times between May and November 2007. 
Several of his European and Arab counterparts followed suit, albeit at a 
slower pace. These diplomatic activities were meant as warning signals 
to the Iranian and Syrian allies of the Hizbollah-led opposition. The rival 
Lebanese parties have once again mobilized powerful external allies in 
their internal struggles.
Much has been written about the complexity of Lebanon’s political 
life and its capacity to weather the most violent crises. Observers have 
occasionally remarked on the Lebanese’s resort to foreign intervention in 
their domestic disputes, but there are few in-depth analyses of the phe-
nomenon. And yet foreign intervention with the aim of protecting one of 
the contending parties runs like a red thread through the narratives on 
Lebanon’s political and social life, in particular as regards some Christian 
communities. The first overt European intervention in Lebanon took place 
in 1860 after a series of severe clashes between Druzes and Maronites, when 
the European Powers pressured the Ottoman authorities to turn Mount 
Lebanon into an autonomous district under international supervision. Half 
a century later, at the end of World War I, intervention took the form of 
a decision by the League of Nations to give the mandate of Greater Syria 
to France. This intervention culminated when France severed Lebanon 
from Syria and placed political power in the new republic in the hands 
of the Maronite Catholics. The above processes were all part and parcel 
of a wider European policy of pro-Christian  intervention in the Ottoman 
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Empire, starting from the seventeenth century. A blend of religious solidar-
ity and political imperialism, this policy must be viewed in relation to a 
practice which had prevailed in the region for more than a thousand years: 
from the seventh to the early twentieth century, Christians, Jews, and to a 
certain extent, Zoroastrians, known collectively as the Peoples of the Book 
(ahl al-kitāb) lived under a particular regime of Islamic protection arising 
from the dhimma, a ‘contract’ between the Muslim rulers and their non-
Muslim populations. European intervention took place toward the end of 
this period, in the last 150 years or so before the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. During that period, the Christians experienced another form of 
protection, arising this time from the capitulations, bilateral treaties signed 
between the European Powers and the Porte.
Over the centuries the condition of being protected had become not 
only a way of life but also a social characteristic of the ‘protected’ popu-
lations. Protection, with all its ambiguities and complexities, not only 
shaped ways of being in daily encounters; it also defined the existential 
horizon of those to which it applied. Today a thing of the past, protec-
tion or memory of it, still plays a role in the construction of Christians’ 
collective identity. But we must beware of generalizations. The Christian 
communities in the Middle East are a highly diverse world. Regarding 
memory of protection, there are perceptible differences between the two 
largest Christian communities in Lebanon, the Maronites and the Greek 
Orthodox. While it is a well-known fact that memory is always subjective 
and that the memory of an experience is not the same as the experience 
in itself (see i.a. Ricoeur 2004), I argue in this chapter that the discrepancy 
between the Maronites’ experience of Muslim protection and their memory 
of it is particularly striking, much more so than in the case of the Greek 
Orthodox. The Maronites were the Christian community which had the 
least direct experience with the status of protected people, yet they are 
also the community whose recollection of it is most vivid and bitter. In 
comparison, the Orthodox, whose forebears had a greater experience of 
the dhimmi status, seem to recall Muslim protection in a more nuanced 
fashion, if at all. And while present-day Maronite political and religious 
leaders are often preoccupied with securing the support or protection, of 
Western countries, this does not seem to be a matter of particular concern 
for most Greek Orthodox.1 To understand this state of affairs, we need to 
1 No social groups are homogeneous, and both the Maronite and the Greek Orthodox 
communities are internally diversified, also regarding views on protection. I am fully aware 
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compare the workings of the dhimma and the capitulations, and their 
impact on two Christian communities whose original historical differences 
were significantly sharpened by events in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the results of which are still visible today.
The Dhimma
‘Dhimma’ is an Arabic word denoting a covenant of protection modeled 
on the way the Prophet Mohammed dealt with non-Muslims in his early 
conquests in the Arabian Peninsula. Through the dhimma, Muslim rulers 
grant hospitality and protection to members of other revealed religions, on 
condition that the latter acknowledged the domination of Islam.2
The dhimma grants non-Muslims the public right to live in Muslim ter-
ritories, and the private rights to buy, sell, and own; to marry, have children, 
and inherit; and to have access to courts of law. Through the dhimma, 
Muslims promised not to harm the protected non-Muslims, not to infringe 
on their properties, and to protect them when they were attacked. In return, 
the dhimmis must meet a number of obligations, such as the payment of 
the poll-tax ( jizya) and the land tax (kharāj), and loyalty to the Muslim 
commonwealth (umma) and its leaders. They also had to submit to a series 
of legally, politically and socially discriminating rules; they could not, for 
example, testify in court against Muslims, and they were excluded from 
high public offices. There were also rules about clothing and transportation 
(they were not allowed to use the green colour and to ride horses). Besides, 
dhimmis were not allowed to carry weapons, and they were exempted from 
serving in the Muslim army. Freedom to publicly perform their religious 
rituals was limited to certain occasions, and display of Christian or Jewish 
religious symbols was restricted. Finally there were regulations about reli-
gious buildings: repair and maintenance of existing churches/synagogues 
was allowed, but it was forbidden to build new ones.
of the problem of using ‘Maronites’ and ‘Greek Orthodox’ as collective terms of reference, 
as they inevitably suggest uniformity of views and consensus. When I nonetheless do so, it 
is because comparative social analysis requires a degree of generalization about the objects 
of the comparison, as long as what is being generalized is treated as context-related trends 
and patterns and not as primordial traits.
2 As Rabbath (1986) reminds us, the dhimma regime is not so much an expression of 
religious tolerance towards the ahl al-kitāb as a legal mechanism to justify their existence 
within a state which is exclusively Muslim.
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In theory these legal restrictions were universal, but in practice their 
implementation varied considerably (Joseph 1983). It depended on the 
prevailing socio-economic and political circumstances as well as on the 
leaders’ interpretation of the rules and their personal inclinations. Historical 
evidence shows that only a handful of the regulations, such as those about 
taxes, the prohibition to carry weapons, and exemption from conscription, 
were strictly and consistently observed; others were observed on and off; yet 
others were deliberately overlooked, for example the law against employ-
ing dhimmis in high state positions.3 Likewise, the prohibition against the 
construction of new churches was frequently waived (Ma o͗z 1968, Faroqhi 
1994, Fattal 1995, Masters 2004). Of particular interest is the implementa-
tion of the dress code imposed on dhimmis. This is a major theme in most 
studies on the dhimma, and much has been written about the humiliating 
effect this had had on the dhimmi population. The existence of such a code 
is beyond doubt,4 but there are indications that its implementation was 
often lax. According to Masters “the fact that the dress code was frequently 
invoked by governors eager to extract bribes from wealthy non-Muslims 
suggests [that] even in their daily costume Muslims and non-Muslims were 
not always easily identifiable to the outside observer” (2004: 43). In support 
of his claim, Masters cites the reaction typical for most European visitors 
to the region: “Whether Christians or Jews, [they] frequently noted with a 
degree of disgust and alarm that their erstwhile coreligionists were ‘Turks’ 
in all but name” (ibid.).
Officially the dhimma regime ended with the Tanzimat reforms of the 
mid-nineteenth century. Included in the reforms was the introduction of 
equality before the law for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. By the early 
twentieth century the rules regulating the dhimmis’ dress-code and trans-
portation, as well as all the restrictions to their freedom of worship had 
been officially abolished.5 Non-Muslims were granted the right to testify 
in mixed courts in 1847, and the jiziya poll-tax was abolished by law in 
3 Practically all the caliphs surrounded themselves with Christian secretaries, advisors, 
governors, even ministers (Braude & Lewis 1982, Inalcik & Quataert 1994).
4 The use of clothing to distinguish between social categories and reinforce social 
hierarchies was common in pre-modern societies. Most well-known in Europe were the 
measures devised to distinguish Jews from Christians, e.g. the Jewish cap ( Judenhut) and 
the yellow badge (rota). See Piponnier & Mane 1997.
5 The construction of new churches in areas where Muslims lived was still subject to 
Istanbul’s approval (Masters op. cit.).
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1855 (Ma o͗z 1968: 27).6 Not unexpectedly, such radical and comprehensive 
reforms were difficult to implement throughout the vast Empire in a uni-
fied manner, and in many places they were not implemented at all. For the 
Tanzimat reforms were rejected by the majority population, who were Sunni 
Muslims. The reforms, which came amidst the general and steady degrada-
tion of the population’s living condition throughout the Empire, triggered 
a series of sectarian violence. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
from Mosul to Jedda, through Nablus, Aleppo, Damascus, and Mount 
Lebanon, incidents were registered in which non-Muslims were attacked 
and killed, their properties looted and destroyed (Masters 2004). The most 
violent episodes occurred in Aleppo in 1850, in Mount Lebanon in 1840 and 
1860,7 and in Damascus in 1860. In Aleppo and Damascus, the Christians 
bore the brunt of the attacks, more so than the Jewish communities (Baron 
1932–1933, Joseph 1983). This suggests that it was not the dhimmis’ enjoy-
ment of their newly obtained rights in itself that provoked the Muslims. 
Rather, there was a perception among the latter that the real authors of the 
reforms, of which the Christians were clearly the major beneficiaries, were 
their European protectors whose powerful presence was particularly felt in 
Syria and Palestine (Schlicht 1980, Makdisi 2000, Traboulsi 2007). Aleppo 
was then the headquarters of the European Catholic missions, while on 
the coast, Beirut, Sidon, Acre were not only the seats of European consular 
offices, but also export trade centres dominated by Christians almost to 
the exclusion of either Muslims or Jews (Masters op. cit.). Inland, Mount 
Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1860 events became, upon the demand 
by the European Powers,8 a quasi-autonomous district under a new regime 
known as the mutasarrifiyya. The Mountain had now its own independent 
budget and administration, and its entire population, Christians as well as 
6 Conscription of the dhimmis was not envisaged by the reforms, however, non-Muslims 
were still exempted, but now they had to pay a tax (the bedel tax). Not unjustifiably, critics 
have described the bedel as a post-Tanzimat avatar of the jizya (Ma’oz 1968).
7 The conflicts in Mount Lebanon pitted the ever more prosperous Maronite peasants 
against their Druze landlords for economic and social reasons which were not related to 
the Tanzimat reforms. However, in 1860 the conflicts culminated in the massacre of not 
only Maronites but also other Christians at the hands of not only Druzes but also Sunni 
and Shiʿi Muslims (Fawaz 1994). The alliance between the three Muslim groups, which 
otherwise were separated by long, solid, mutual hostility, against the Christians in gen-
eral is testimony to the widespread anger and frustration in large sections of the Muslim 
population, nurtured by decades of developments in favour of the Christians, especially in 
matters of trade and economy. The concretization and finalization of a long and complex 
process, the Tanzimat reforms seem to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
See Ma o͗z 1968, Fawaz 1983, Masters 2004.
8 These included France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 
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Muslims, was exempt from conscription (Salibi 1971). By law, it was to be 
governed by a Catholic governor appointed by the Porte and approved by 
the European Powers. It was plain to everyone that the Christians in Greater 
Syria enjoyed the backing of their powerful European protectors, who did 
not hesitate to interfere in local disputes, not only between Christians and 
Muslims but also between specific Christian Churches and even between 
factions within these Churches (Kuri 1991, 1996).
The Capitulations (al-imtiyazāt al-ajnabiyya)
The meaning of the international law concept of capitulation does not 
derive from the verb to capitulate but from the Latin word for chapter or 
heading (capitula)—a capitulation being a text organized under distinct 
headings. The word ‘capitulation’ is often confusing. The Arabic term 
al-imtiyazāt al-ajnabiyya, lit. foreign privileges, gives a more accurate 
description of what it is we are dealing with: originally, the capitulations 
gave non-Muslim foreign merchants living and trading in Ottoman ter-
ritories generous fiscal privileges.9 They also exempted them from the 
taxations imposed on Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, in particular the 
jiziya poll-tax. The capitulations also protected non-Muslim merchants 
from the sultan’s justice as long as the crimes committed were not against 
the sultan’s subjects.
At first, the capitulations were purely commercial treaties.10 After 1517, the 
rationale behind the capitulations changed in keeping with the position of 
the Ottoman Empire on the international stage. From the sixteenth century 
onwards, the sultan sought to build political and military alliances with 
powerful European states to counter his main rivals, the Austro-Hungarian 
and the Russian Empires. Capitulatory privileges were increasingly granted 
in exchange for political and military support. Most outstanding among 
the sultan’s Western allies was France, with whose king Suleyman the 
 9 During the Ottoman period, the customs duty for Muslim subjects was 2.5 percent 
of the value of the commodity (Inalcik 1994). Different rates were imposed on foreigners, 
which could reach 5 or 6 percent depending on the country to which they belonged. The 
capitulations brought that rate down to 3 percent, almost equal to the one paid by the 
sultan’s subjects (Inalcik 1994, van den Boogert 2005).
10 Although the capitulations are famously identified with the Ottoman Empire, they did 
not originate with the Ottomans. As early as 1082, the Byzantines granted Venetian mer-
chants preferential treatment in trade and exemptions from tariffs paid by natives. Similar 
privileges were also granted by the Mamluks to France, Venice and Florence (Inalcik & 
Quataert 1994).
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Magnificent signed the first politically motivated capitulation in 1536. The 
other European states quickly followed the French example and, by the 
nineteenth century, most of the major countries around the world, including 
the United States and India, had entered into capitulatory relations with 
the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, Russia signed its first capitulation treaty 
with the sultan in 1774, two hundred and fifty years after France. As will 
become clear, this difference was to have important consequences for the 
positions of the Maronite Catholic and the Greek Orthodox communities 
in Lebanon. As time went and the European Powers sought to weaken 
the Ottoman Empire, they pressed for the extension of fiscal privileges 
and capitulatory protection to the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan as 
well. Protection was given the Ottoman dhimmis by the European chan-
ceries on the basis of religious identification. Thus France, Italy, Austria 
and Spain were protectors of the Catholics, Russia the protector of the 
Orthodox, and Great Britain, the protector of the Protestants and, from 
1860, of the Jews as well.11 From the late nineteenth century onwards, the 
small Protestant community would benefit from American, in addition to 
British, protection.
It is not quite clear when or under what pretext capitulatory protection 
was extended to Ottoman non-Muslim subjects. McGowan (1994: 695) sug-
gests that this took place around 1740 when pashas in the major Ottoman 
ports extorted the illegal levies known as avanias from the communities of 
European merchants living in their jurisdiction. Also victims of this extor-
tion were the Ottoman Christians who acted as their agents. The foreign 
embassies stepped in, and exercising their consular jurisdiction, extended 
legal protection over an ever growing number of protégés from the Chris-
tian minorities. Included in this capitulary protection were tax-exemption 
and other fiscal privileges (ibid: 696). Regardless of when the practice was 
initiated, it must have spread quite rapidly in the Ottoman trading centres 
for, by the late eighteenth century, it was observed both in the Balkans 
and the Middle East (van den Boogert 2003, Faroqhi 2004). From then 
on there grew around the European diplomatic missions throughout the 
Empire large communities of Ottoman protégés who availed themselves 
of their identification with their powerful foreign protectors to build 
11 Earlier, Arabic-speakers customarily referred to the Protestants as ta ʾifat al-ingliz (the 
English sect) and to the Catholics as taʾifat al-afranj (the French sect) (Masters 2004). The 
only European support (though not protection in the sense used here) that was unrelated 
to religious affiliation was the one given briefly by Britain to the Druzes of Mount Lebanon 
in their war against the Maronites in the mid-nineteenth century.
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successful careers and prosperous lives. Through the principles of immunity 
and extraterritoriality many were also beyond the reach of Ottoman jus-
tice (Masters 2004). European ambassadors and consuls became powerful 
patrons surrounded by a community of protégés the size of which became 
a matter of jealous competition among the European diplomatic missions 
in the Ottoman cities and ports (Faroqhi op. cit.: 60, 144 ff ). In addition to 
the task of adjudicating disputes between members of their communities, 
the consuls also oversaw the maintenance and running of schools and 
other social institutions funded and established by the community and for 
the community (orphanages, dispensaries). They also kept close contact 
with the leaders of the Church associated with their country; the consuls’ 
views were crucial in the selection of these leaders, and more often than 
not they interfered directly in the local conflicts, usually at the request of 
the Ottoman protégés themselves.
Experiencing the Dhimma and the Capitulations
Little is known about the non-Muslims’ experience of the dhimma 
protection before the seventeenth century. Available studies, many of 
them authored by Westerners, deal with the later period. While the best 
academic literature on the restrictions of the dhimma underscores the 
difference between theory and practice, publications aiming at a wider 
popular readership regularly fail to do so. They tend to oppose Muslims and 
 Christians/Jews as monolithic categories, and little effort is made to place 
the studies in their proper historical, sociological, and political contexts. The 
legal restrictions of the dhimma being devised to draw a clear distinction 
between Muslims12 and non-Muslims, it follows that their implementation 
was more common in cities and towns with a mixed population than in 
isolated rural villages, as these were practically always religiously homo-
geneous. In the case of Maronites and Greek Orthodox, Mount Lebanon 
and Beirut respectively provide typical illustrations.
Nineteenth century Beirut had a population consisting largely of Sunni 
Muslims and Greek Orthodox. Whereas there are a good many studies on 
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in key cities like Aleppo and 
12 Under Ottoman rule, ‘Muslims’ means ‘Sunni Muslims’; the non-Sunni, ‘heterodox’, 
branches of Islam did not enjoy official recognition. 
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Damascus, evidence of the same is sparser regarding the periphery of the 
Empire, such as the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre. Nev-
ertheless, instances of tension between Muslims and Christians in Beirut, 
especially in the mid-nineteenth century, are mentioned in the literature. 
Ma o͗z quotes a report written by an unnamed European in 1853 according 
to which “thirteen years of peace, commercial emulation and industry had 
contributed to soften down the intolerance and hatred which the Mussul-
man of Beyrout were wont to exhibit towards their Christian countrymen 
and the foreigners” (Ma o͗z 1968: 201). We are also told that when violence 
erupted in the Mountain between Druzes and Maronites in July 1860, the 
atmosphere was tense in Beirut and “many Christians locked themselves 
in their homes, awaiting to be slaughtered” (Fawaz 1994: 75). No massacres 
ensued, but when the body of an assassinated Muslim was found near 
the souks, the mob reacted by killing a Maronite passer-by (Kassir 2003: 
274). In his study of class in Beirut from 1840 to 1985, Michael Johnson 
writes that “communal fighting between Beiruti Christians and Muslims 
seemed a fact of life” (1986: 19). The sources seem to agree that there were 
tensions between Muslims and Christians, especially among the working 
class, in Lebanese urban centres in the turbulent late nineteenth century, 
but they do not tell us whether the dhimma regulations were imple-
mented before the Tanzimat reforms and, if they were, how strictly. The 
Levantine ports have always had a religiously mixed population. This, and 
the fact that they were not, before the Tanzimat, important administra-
tive centres on the par with Aleppo or Damascus, seems to indicate that 
the implementation of the dhimma regulations may have been lax, and 
that only the basic discriminations, such as the payment of the jizya, the 
inability to testify in courts, and the prohibition against carrying weapons, 
were observed. On the other hand, identification of self and others in the 
Levantine ports could not have differed from other towns through the 
Empire, and was premised, here as elsewhere, on religious belonging and 
on the rights and duties, roles and statuses that went with it. That the 
Christians of Beirut, most of whom were Greek Orthodox, feared for their 
security in times of heightened tension in the Mountain is an indication 
of their collective self-awareness as dhimmis. It shows that the social 
organization of urban life, rather than underplaying the religious identity 
of the interacting groups, threw it more sharply into relief. Life in multi-
confessional towns required that the inhabitants be constantly aware 
of others’ values and sensibilities, and of the place each group occupied 
in society.
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The Maronites did not suffer from similar restrictions and have always 
taken pride in their history of independence. Prior to the 1830s, the 
Maronites were a rural population that, in their large majority, inhabited 
Mount Lebanon (Touma 1986). This 3.000 metres high, rugged mountain 
was of difficult access, and few Muslim rulers had tried to govern it directly. 
The Mountain therefore provided an ideal sanctuary for splinter groups. It 
is no coincidence that the local inhabitants (Shiʿis, Druzes, and Maronites) 
were all considered as belonging to sects more or less condemned by the 
ruling orthodoxies, whether Muslim or Christian. The Mountain was always 
under the control of the central powers, be they Byzantine, Mamluk or 
Ottoman. After the conquest of Syria by the Ottomans in 1516, the Porte 
was, on the whole, content with indirect rule through local leaders whose 
task was to collect taxes and forward them to the Ottoman governor 
in Tripoli or Saida (Touma op. cit.). As long as these expectations were 
met, the inhabitants of the Mountain, especially the Maronites, were left 
alone,13 and the negative aspects of the dhimma impinged minimally on 
their existence (Fawaz 1994). An account by the French poet Lamartine, 
an admirer and friend of the Maronites who visited Mount Lebanon in the 
1830s, describes them as
a happy nation. They are feared by their masters who do not dare to settle 
down in their provinces; their religion is practised freely and is respected; 
their cloisters and churches cover the top of the hills; their [church] bells, 
which are loved because they are an expression of liberty and independence, 
announce prayer times day and night [to the people] in the valleys; they 
are ruled by their own leaders who are chosen according to tradition or are 
issued from the most important families (quoted in Touma op. cit.: 21, my 
translation).
In the words of Bruce Masters, “the elites of the [Maronite] community 
could flaunt in their mountain redoubts their disregard for many of the 
legal restrictions imposed on non-Muslims elsewhere—building new 
churches and monasteries, openly carrying arms, and riding horses” 
(Masters 2004: 43). And Masters concludes: “[W]hat was unthinkable in 
the rest of the sultan’s domains could occur almost seamlessly in Mount 
Lebanon”, and the Maronites exhibited, “in the eyes of the Sunni Muslims, 
13 According to Salibi (1988) Ottoman punitive expeditions against the Shiʿis and the 
Druzes were more common. The Maronites were treated with greater caution because of 
their European connections.
 from the dhimma to the capitulations 57
an arrogance unknown among, or undreamed by Christians elsewhere in 
the Arab world” (op.cit: 44).14
The Maronites’ migration from Mount Lebanon to the coast, which 
was at first insignificant and gradual, happened in conjunction with the 
development of export trade to Europe. They came to Beirut around 1830, 
originally to work in the silk industry, which developed in response to 
French commercial interest in this raw material (Salibi 1988). It was the 
1860 sectarian conflict in Mount Lebanon that triggered the biggest wave of 
Maronite migration to Beirut, a move which was later accelerated by famine 
during World War I. Can we assume that, once in Beirut, the Maronites 
experienced the humiliations from which they had been previously spared, 
and that this explains why the dhimma has left such a negative imprint 
on their collective memory? This is unlikely for two simple reasons: by 
1860 the Tanzimat reforms had been introduced, and Beirut was one 
of the places where the reforms were actually put into practice (Kassir 
2003). Besides, whereas the last half century of the Ottoman Empire was 
a time of turmoil and sectarian conflicts in several Ottoman provinces, 
not least Eastern Anatolia, for Lebanon the years under the mutasarrifiyya 
(1861–1915) were a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity (Akarlı 
1993). It was during this peaceful interval that the Maronites rose to social 
and political prominence (Touma 1986, Salibi 1988), a fact that would have 
been unlikely if they had been subjected to discrimination on account of 
their being Christian.
It seems safe to conclude that, comparatively speaking, the Christians 
of Lebanon were less exposed to the dhimma than their coreligionists 
elsewhere in the Empire. In so far as any Christian community in today’s 
Lebanon had had direct experience of the dhimma regime before the 
Tanzimat, it was the town-dwelling Greek Orthodox along the coast rather 
than the rural Maronites in their confessionally homogeneous villages in 
Mount Lebanon.
14 While most writers agree with Masters, Touma gives a more qualified picture. Under 
the rule of some governors, he writes, Maronite villages could be pillaged, their churches 
destroyed, and their leaders massacred. Nevertheless Touma acknowledges that on the 
whole “in their domains, the Maronites were almost independent”, thanks partly to their 
strategic decision not to build roads in the Mountain, thus making it practically impossible 
for anyone to reach their villages (Touma 1986).
58 anh nga longva
Two Different Church Histories
A comparison between the Maronite and the Greek Orthodox communi-
ties must take into account the vastly different histories of their Churches. 
The Maronites were, until the seventeenth century, a small, isolated local 
Church, a product of the series of Christological conflicts which divided 
Christianity in the fifth century. Originating in the Orontes Valley in 
Northern Syria around the same period, the followers of Saint Maroun, 
fleeing from Byzantine persecution, gradually moved to Mount Lebanon,15 
and have ever since regarded the Mountain as their home territory and 
the cradle of their religious and cultural tradition. It was through contacts 
with European Catholics, first the French crusaders then the Vatican, with 
which their Church entered in a Union in the twelfth century, that the 
Maronites eventually emerged from their isolation and acquired a role on 
the regional stage.16 But the Maronite Church always remained a Lebanese 
Church, geographically centred upon Lebanon, and united under a patri-
archal leadership that has been Syro-Lebanese from the beginning. With 
a strong clerical leadership that was socially and culturally close to its 
flock, a distinctive liturgical language (Syriac), a territory of its own (the 
Northern part of Mount Lebanon), and a membership nearly entirely con-
centrated within this territory,17 the Maronite Church was, from early on, 
well equipped to instil a strong sense of collective identity in its followers. 
Being the only Catholic ‘nation’ in the Middle East before the very end of 
the seventeenth century, the Maronites were a minority not only in relation 
to Islam but also to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. In a sense, they suffered 
from a double religious marginalization within their immediate environ-
ment, which explains why they have tended to look for protectors from 
outside the region. The support they received from the Vatican—pope Leo X 
15 In espousing the doctrine of monotheletism which was condemned as heresy by Byz-
antium, the Maronites became one of the multiple outlaw Christian communities exposed 
to the wrath of Orthodox officialdom. 
16 Allegiance to the Vatican was rewarded by the creation in 1584 of the Maronite Col-
lege in Rome, where Maronites priests were sent to be trained in the Roman ecclesiastical 
disciplines. These clerics were, upon their return, the first agents of Westernization in 
Mount Lebanon (Haddad 1970, Kuri 1991).
17 There are small Maronite pockets in Syria, Palestine, and Cyprus. Besides, the Lebanese 
diaspora throughout the world comprises a large number of Maronites within its ranks. But 
all Maronites acknowledge the authority of the Patriarch whose see is in Bkirké, North of 
Beirut. As a Catholic Church, the Maronites owe allegiance to the Vatican, but, for many, 
the Pope is a rather distant figure while the Patriarch is considered as their real leader, not 
only spiritually but also politically.
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in 1510 described the Maronite Church as ‘a rose among thorns’ (Valognes 
1994), the thorns being not the Muslims but the Orthodox Christians—and 
from France, whom the Maronites used to refer to as ‘the tender loving 
mother’ (al-umm al-hanun) (ibid.), played a crucial role in the Maronites’ 
self-perception as different but by no means inferior. This collective self-
perception was strengthened when, in the aftermath of the massacres of 
Christians by Druzes in 1860, France despatched 6000 troops and numerous 
Catholic missionaries to Beirut to assist the victims. With the post-1860 
developments in Mount Lebanon, self-awareness among the Maronites took 
a more political turn. The successful experience of the mutasarrifiyya led 
the religious and intellectual elite to thirst for complete autonomy. Thereby, 
the ground for a Maronite brand of nationalism, nurtured by strong ethnic 
awareness, was laid. When the ideology of nationalism was introduced to 
the Middle East around World War I, its defining demand, that the political, 
territorial, and cultural boundaries of the state be identical, was not only 
in tune with the Maronites’ self-perception; it was also a project whose 
achievement could realistically be considered, thanks to the groundwork 
done over the centuries by the Maronite Church.
The situation is very different for the Greek Orthodox Church. We are 
dealing here with not one but four autocephalous Churches practising 
the Byzantine rite. Although united under the same denomination (‘the 
Eastern Orthodox Church’), each Church has its own patriarchate—
Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Istanbul—the last one being primus 
inter pares in relation to the other three.18 In a region with a vast number 
of both Muslim and Christian religious splinter groups labelled ‘heterodox’ 
or even ‘heretic’, the two undisputed orthodoxies have been Sunni Islam 
and Orthodox Christianity. Unlike the Maronite Church, which had been 
persecuted by the Byzantines on the one hand, and repeatedly summoned 
by the Vatican to give proof of its obedience to the true Roman Catholic 
doctrine on the other hand, the Greek Orthodox Church was never called to 
doctrinal account by anyone in the Middle East. On the contrary, its brutal 
and relentless persecution of ‘heretics’ drove the dissenting Churches to 
welcome the Islamic conquest (Joseph 1983, Runciman 2000). In the eyes 
of Muslims and Christians alike, the Greek Orthodox Church was first and 
foremost an imperial Church, associated with the Byzantine Empire, hence 
18 Syria and Lebanon, but also Iraq and Kuwait are part of the patriarchate of Antioch. 
This makes Antioch the prime Arab Orthodox patriarchate. On the ethnic nature of the 
Orthodox patriarchates see Valognes 1994.
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the adjective ‘Melkite’, from Arabic malaki (royal), traditionally applied to 
it. Even after the fall of Byzantium in 1453, it did not lose its characteristi-
cally privileged relationship to the ruling powers: the Ottoman sultans 
granted the Greek Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul full recognition, and, by 
investing him with politico-religious jurisdiction over the whole Orthodox 
community, they gave his Church a legitimate position within the Ottoman 
imperial system. Hence this Church’s tendency, according to its critics, 
to enter into compromises with the Muslim power-holders (Valognes 
1994). Even though the series of Russo-Ottoman conflicts from the latter 
half of the nineteenth century onwards placed the Greek Orthodox in an 
uncomfortable position, it was first and foremost the Armenians, not the 
Arab Orthodox, whose loyalty was questioned by the Porte. As long as the 
Ottoman Empire existed, the problems faced by the Orthodox Church of 
Antioch thus did not lie primarily in its relations with Muslims but with 
other Christians.
The major problem was the ethnic gap between the Antioch Church 
leaders, who between 1725 and 1900 were entirely Hellenic, and the ordinary 
Church members, who were entirely Arab. As a result, patriarchs and bish-
ops shared neither the language nor the culture of their flock. They were 
in fact rather ignorant of the latter’s living conditions and, on the whole, 
indifferent to their daily concerns (Hopwood 1969, Salibi 1988).
A second problem was the challenge of the Roman Catholic Church. For 
historical reasons, which date back to the Great Schism between Rome and 
Constantinople in 1054 and the sack of Constantinople by the crusaders in 
1204, relations were strained between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic 
Church. When the Catholic missionaries returned to the Middle East in the 
seventeenth century after an absence of several centuries, it was with the 
unflattering perception of Eastern Christians as ‘heretics’. Their pronounced 
aim was not to convert Muslims but to cleanse the Eastern Christian doc-
trines and rituals, said to be tainted by centuries of coexistence with Islam, 
and put them back on the right Catholic path. The animosity between the 
two Churches worsened as the Catholics’ work among the Orthodox began 
to bear fruit: what started as a trickle of individual conversions turned into 
wholesale defection when large groups, usually among the wealthiest, in 
the various Eastern Orthodox Churches seceded to establish the so-called 
Uniate Churches (Haddad 1970, 1982, Joseph 1983).19 Within approximately 
19 The Uniate Churches sought Union with Rome and bear the official adjective ‘Catho-
lic’, but kept their own liturgies in their respective languages and their own hierarchical 
organization with their different patriarchs.
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one hundred years, from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth century, 
all the Eastern Churches went through a momentous split, each of them 
having as a result an Orthodox and a Catholic branch.20 The seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which corresponded respectively to 
the introduction, development, and triumph of the capitulatory regime, 
thus witnessed the weakening and division of the Orthodox Church, the 
erstwhile powerful face of Eastern Christianity. During the same period, 
the Maronite Church went from being a local, inward-looking Church hid-
den in the inaccessible gorges of Mount Lebanon to being a Church with 
a political voice which ultimately would secure the Maronites a state of 
their own.
Not surprisingly, the substantial differences in the two Church histories 
impacted on their communities’ self-perception and self-definition. The 
Orthodox Church has always looked upon itself as a truly Eastern Church, 
and most Middle Eastern Orthodox see themselves as Arab, ethnically 
and culturally.21 Although the Maronite Church also calls itself an Eastern 
Church, its early affiliation to the Vatican and the benefits it has consistently 
drawn from this privileged relationship do speak for its being placed in a 
distinct category. The Church’s connection to the European Catholic world 
has always featured prominently both in the Maronites’ self-perception and 
in their perception by other Christians. Unlike most Greek Orthodox Leba-
nese, many Maronite Lebanese claim to be of non-Arab descent,22 a claim 
that harmonizes with several of their historical choices. When conflicts 
arose between local Muslims and Western outsiders, the Maronites have 
tended to side with the latter. An example of this is the Maronite strong 
support for the French mandate after World War I. As head of the Lebanese 
delegation at the 1919 Peace Congress in Versailles, the Maronite patri-
arch Elias Howayek (1889–1931) vehemently argued against the  inclusion 
of Lebanon in a planned Arab kingdom centred on Damascus (Longrigg 
1972). He instead advocated the creation of a sovereign Lebanon, distinct 
20 The Chaldean Catholic Church was formed in 1692, the Greek Catholic Church, in 1726, 
the Armenian Catholic Church in 1742, the Syriac Catholic Church in 1781, etc. (Valognes 
1994). Only the Maronite Church, which officially proclaimed its doctrinal allegiance to 
Rome in the twelfth century, does not have an Orthodox branch.
21 The Arab Orthodox call themselves Rum; in Lebanon, another common self-designation 
is Bani Ghassān, i.e. descendents of the pre-Islamic invaders of Syria who founded the 
Christian kingdoms of Hira and Ghassan between Mesopotamia and Damascus. Lebanese 
(and other Levantine) Orthodox thus reject the thesis according to which they were origi-
nally Greeks who had lost their language and become Arabized (musta’arabun) (Hopwood 
1969).
22 They claim to descend from the Mardaïtes or from the Phoenicians. See Firro 2003.
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from Syria and with close ties to France (Zamir 2000). The majority of the 
Orthodox meanwhile tended to support the integrity of Greater Syria, and 
their intellectual elite championed the ideology of Arabism against the 
Maronites’ ‘Lebanonism’.23 Michel Aflaq, the major founder of Baʿthism, 
was a Syro-Lebanese Greek Orthodox. During the 1975–1990 Civil War, 
prominent figures of the Orthodox Church supported the Palestinian cause, 
while the Maronite patriarchs have always opposed the prospect of Lebanon 
being turned into a battleground between Palestinians and Israelis. In the 
course of the twentieth century both Greek Orthodox and Maronites took 
active part in various nationalist movements. But while the former have 
tended to support universalist ideologies, the latter have tended to sup-
port ideologies built on particularistic, especially confessional, identities. 
Strictly speaking, the choice between the two forms of nationalism is not a 
Church matter. But as the history of the communities is closely intertwined 
with the history of their Churches, and as politics in Lebanon is routinely 
conducted along confessional lines, the ideal shape of the state for many 
is modelled on the actual shape of the Churches.
The Construction of Collective Memory
Church histories are of undeniable importance, but they are not the only 
constitutive element in the formation of popular memory. We also need to 
take into account people’s experience of daily life in the course of which 
individuals, families, communities deal with their limitations and exploit 
their possibilities in a specific context shaped by material and political 
circumstances over which they have little or no control. One could have 
expected the Maronites who, for centuries, led a quasi-autonomous exis-
tence in Mount Lebanon, and who are the only Christian community in 
the Middle East to have genuine access to political power in a post-colonial 
state, to hold memories of the dhimma that are neither particularly vivid 
nor particularly negative. Yet they are the Christian community in Leba-
non whose charter of identity gives a critical place to the dhimma and its 
indignities. It was a Maronite, Beshir Gemayel,24 who allegedly coined the 
23 We are dealing here only with trends, not with wholesale communal positioning. There 
were Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Sunnis and Shiʿis among supporters of both Arabism and 
Lebanonism. See Eddé (2010). 
24 Beshir Gemayel was Lebanon’s president-elect when he was assassinated in 1982 at 
the height of the Civil War. He was a prominent member of the Maronite Kataeb party 
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term ‘dhimmitude’ (‘oppressive protection’). In his biography of the assas-
sinated president-elect, Selim Abou writes:
Attempts at Islamizing Lebanon [. . .] reminded Bechir of the tales of humili-
ation suffered by Christian dhimmis under the Ottomans. These tales, all 
the Christian youths of Lebanon have heard them told again and again by 
their grandparents. They are deeply rooted in the collective unconscious of 
Lebanese Christians, just as the massacres of 1840 and 1860 and are part of the 
tragic legacy [of Eastern Christianity]. In his last improvised speech, Bechir 
[said that Lebanon], without being necessarily a ‘Christian national home’ 
must be “a real country for the Christians, where we can hold our heads high, 
without anyone telling us [. . .] ‘walk on the left side’, as we used to be told in 
the days of the Turks, because we were Christians; without anyone telling us 
to wear a distinctive sign or clothing to distinguish us as Christians; without 
our being subject to the ‘dhimmitude’ of others. From now on we refuse to 
live under any one’s dhimmitude. We no longer want to be under anyone’s 
protection” (p. 308, my translation).
While the dhimma protection is depicted as oppressive, French protection, 
as we have seen, is compared to a mother’s tender loving care. In the corpus 
of French-language literature on the Maronites, written by both Lebanese 
and French authors prior to the Civil War, France is often depicted as a 
selfless protector of the weak. In reviewing the reasons which prompted 
the French to lend their support to the Maronites in the past, a Lebanese 
writer includes in the list France’s “undying ideal of protecting the weak 
and assisting the oppressed” (Chebli 1984: 40). But as we have seen, the 
Maronites were among the least oppressed Christian communities in the 
Middle East,25 and, according to their own sources, they were certainly not 
weak. How then do we explain the discrepancy between the experience 
and the memory of the dhimma among Maronites?
As the only Christian community in the Middle East with genuine politi-
cal power, the Maronites may feel that it is their duty to speak up on behalf 
of all Christians, and to take upon themselves the burden of keeping alive 
the memory of past discriminations and subjugation, regardless of their 
own historical experience. Another reason may be that the Maronites, 
unlike the Orthodox, are equipped with formal political parties, especially 
(founded by his father Pierre), and commander of the Lebanese Forces, the powerful 
Christian militia.
25 This is, of course, not the same as saying that the Maronite villagers enjoyed absolute 
peace and freedom in the Mountain. Their history was marked by conflicts and tyranny. But 
until at least the late eighteenth century, the conflicts were often internal, and the tyranny 
was mostly at the hands of Maronite feudal lords. See Traboulsi 2007.
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the Kataeb (Phalanges) and, during the 1975–1990 Civil War, with armed 
militias as well. These organizations need a clearly formulated ideology and 
an identifiable enemy to motivate their members and keep up their fighting 
spirit. As their opponents were Muslims under various political denomi-
nations, the dhimma and its litany of humiliations fulfilled this function 
rather effectively. This being said, talk of the dhimma humiliations is not 
limited to Maronite politicians or to the war period; it is still familiar among 
ordinary Maronites today. To explain the Maronite memory of the dhimma 
by appealing to its instrumental function is relevant but insufficient. Selim 
Abou writes of “tales of humiliation” which Lebanese youths have been told 
“again and again” by their grandparents, and which are “deeply rooted in 
the collective unconscious of Lebanese Christians”. His description echoes 
narratives which are still current in some Maronite milieux. There is no 
dearth of tales of dhimmi humiliation and suffering in the Middle East. 
The persecution and massacres of Christians in the unravelling years of 
the Ottoman Empire constitute one major source. In the past, these tales 
were no doubt widely circulated in all Christian circles, Catholic as well 
as Orthodox. Yet they appear to be most vividly remembered among the 
Maronites, to the extent that one of their leaders had felt the need to coin 
a special word to sum up the feelings depicted in these tales. I suggest that 
a good deal of the explanation for this lies in education.
Before the seventeenth century, the Western world could not and did 
not claim superiority over the Ottoman world. The first signs of change 
appeared in the latter half of the sixteenth century, and from then on, 
Europe surpassed its rival by all accounts, economically, militarily, politi-
cally. As the Europeans made their presence increasingly felt in Levantine 
trade, and merchants and missionaries became more or less permanent 
features of Ottoman society, Westernization, i.e. the ability to understand, 
communicate, and interact with Europeans, became not just a valuable 
asset but also a cultural trait used for defining, categorizing, and assessing 
the various communities among themselves. The main way to acquire this 
asset was through education. Prior to the nineteenth century, education in 
the Ottoman Middle East had been religious (Davison 1961).26 What people 
wanted from now on was a pragmatically devised education, which would 
allow them to improve their living standard and deal with the rapidly 
changing circumstances.
26 For more on education in the Middle East, see Le Thomas, this volume.
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Modern education, which in the early nineteenth century meant first and 
foremost the acquisition of European languages (Italian, French, English) 
and accounting skills, came to the Middle East through a major chan-
nel, Christian missionaries (Labaki 1988).27 Whether they were Catholic, 
Protestant, or Orthodox, these missionaries’ presence and activities in the 
Ottoman territories were made possible through the capitulations. Access 
to education, like access to European protection, depended largely on the 
dhimmis’ confessional membership. It is widely agreed that the Catholics 
had a clear advantage over the other communities in this regard. Catholic 
schools were oldest, most numerous, and they were the most effectively 
organized. A distinctive feature of Catholic education in Lebanon is the 
extent to which it penetrated the local society at a time when most of the 
rest of the population was still illiterate. The activities of European (mostly 
French) missionaries are often cited as the main reason for this feat. Indeed, 
from early on, so-called petites écoles, mountain village elementary schools, 
were launched, especially by Jesuits, to teach Maronite children even in the 
remotest corners of the Mountain. They were run by itinerant European 
priests and the local population together (Verdeil 2003), and theirs was a 
modest but realistic ambition—basic literacy. We must not, however, forget 
that the Maronite Church itself also played an important part in this pro-
cess. In 1736, it declared education to be one of its major tasks and had been 
working accordingly since then. As a result, by the late nineteenth century, 
a relatively large number of Maronites had had a degree of schooling. In 
their case, modern education, no matter how basic, was not limited to the 
wealthy few in the towns; through the conjugated activities of European/
French missionaries and the local Church, quasi-universal literacy among 
Maronites was within reach by the early twentieth century.
Inevitably, the education imparted by Catholic missionaries came with a 
normative subtext, even when what was being taught were down-to-earth 
subjects such as computing and accounting. This was even more the case 
when the subject was religion which, naturally enough, was an important 
subject in all mission schools. This subtext is about the uniqueness of 
Christian values and identity, the position of Christians in a Muslim State, 
the relations between Muslim majority and Christian minorities, and the 
consequences of these relations on the dhimmis’ individual life-chances 
27 In the late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries, the Ottomans did open schools which 
imparted modern education along European lines. But they were few and mostly attended 
by Ottoman youths destined for a career in the military or state administration. See Shaw & 
Shaw 1977, and Le Thomas in this volume. 
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and their collective identities. The more exposed to Western education a 
Christian youth was, the more likely s/he was to espouse the view of the 
dhimmi condition as a social handicap, even a severe existential hinder. 
Being the community which had had the longest and closest contact with 
European mission educators, the Maronites were also the community most 
acutely sensitized to the problem of the dhimma.
The Orthodox, meanwhile, drew little benefit from Catholic schools; at 
the same time they did not have many educational establishments of their 
own. In the nineteenth century Russia did finance the building of a few 
so-called moskobiyya (Moscovite) schools for Orthodox children in Beirut 
and other Syrian cities (Hopwood 1969), but this assistance was a mere 
trickle compared to the vast amount of educational activities deployed by 
the Catholic missions, notably the French Jesuits (Kuri 1991, 1996). Besides, 
teaching in the ‘Moscovite’ schools was dispensed in Arabic, and the foreign 
language taught was Russian. The well-to-do Orthodox families preferred 
to see their children learn French or English, therefore many chose to send 
them to the American Protestant schools. The Protestant missions in the 
Levant had two major aims, both closely interrelated: to make converts 
through education and the distribution of welfare, and to beat the French 
Catholic missions on their own turf. The Protestant educational policies 
were designed to serve these purposes. While Catholic education, directed 
overwhelmingly at the Maronites, insisted on Catholic exceptionalism 
within the local context—‘a rose among thorns’—Protestant education, 
directed to all non-Catholics including Muslims, placed emphasis on 
the students’ Arab identity. Each of the narratives corresponded to the 
experience and self-perception of the students, which made it all the 
easier for them to accept the message. Although the Protestants did not 
succeed in making many converts, their teaching helped sow the seeds 
that in time would contribute to the development of Arab nationalism 
(Salibi 1988).
The ethnic gap between the Hellenic hierarchy and the Arab followers 
of the Orthodox Church of Antioch mentioned earlier explains why the 
Orthodox patriarchs and their bishops showed little interest in the educa-
tion and welfare of their flock, in striking contrast to the Maronite Church. 
Faced by their leaders’ indifference, the Orthodox community pinned its 
educational hopes on Russia; but Russia was always more interested in 
the Balkans than in the Arab world, with the exception of the Holy Land 
(Hopwood 1969). Besides, the frequent wars between the Russians and 
the Ottomans put severe limitations on the Russians’ ability to intervene 
on behalf of their Arab coreligionists. In the end, Russia’s support to the 
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Orthodox in Lebanon and Syria was too little and too late. During the 
capitulations era European education, mostly through Protestant channels, 
reached the Orthodox in a limited and selective way.28 We are not dealing 
here with efforts aiming at quasi-universal literacy, as in the case of the 
Maronites. The education imparted by European missions to the Maronites 
strengthened their perception of being different from, and un-integrated 
in, the local society, a state of affairs for which the practice of the dhimma 
was largely blamed. For those Orthodox who attended Protestant mission 
schools, such a message probably would not have had the same impact, 
as it ran counter to their understanding of their place in the world, and a 
self-awareness developed under very different historical circumstances.
Conclusion
For thirteen centuries the Christians in the Middle East were looked upon 
and treated as protected people. The dhimma meant group survival, but 
even though the treatment of dhimmis varied in time and place, the concept 
has become associated with legal vulnerability, political marginality, and 
social inferiority. The notion of protection has an ambivalent connotation 
for religious minorities in the Middle East, not least the Christians. Because 
historically they had been through not one but two different regimes of 
protection, one experienced as disabling and the other as empowering or 
potentially so, ‘protection’ elicits images of both domination and empow-
erment. The features of each regime are thrown into stark relief when 
seen in contradistinction to the other. The more the capitulatory protec-
tion yielded concrete improvements of the community’s condition, as in 
the case of the Maronites, the more the dhimma protection is negatively 
portrayed. In this case, the empowering nature of the capitulations under-
scores all the constraining aspects of the dhimma. But when capitulatory 
protection yielded meagre and sometimes even negative results, as in the 
case of the Orthodox, the dhimma protection is remembered as just one 
social condition among others, with its advantages and disadvantages, its 
possibilities and its limitations. The experience of capitulatory protection 
is thus constitutive of the memory of dhimma protection. We should 
not disregard this dialectical relationship lest we deprive ourselves of an 
28 Western education did not, for example, reach the Orthodox peasants of the Kura 
district or those in Hasbaya and other villages in Southern Lebanon with a strong Greek 
Orthodox component.
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important perspective from which to comprehend and assess the role that 
protection still plays in the social imagination of several Christian minori-
ties in the Middle East today.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS IN EGYPT:  
LOCAL DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES
Grégoire Delhaye
Introduction
Although they represent less than six percent of the Egyptian population, 
with some 4.5 million members, Copts are by far the largest Christian 
community in the Middle-East.1 Ninety-five percent of them belong to the 
autonomous Coptic Orthodox Church, born of an early schism of Christi-
anity in 451 CE at the Council of Chalcedon (Meinardus 1999). Copts are 
present everywhere in Egypt but are a majority nowhere except for a few 
villages in the southern governorates of Minia and Sohag. Significantly 
over represented in the south and in large cities like Cairo and Alexandria, 
Christians are, on the other hand, few in the Delta region (Denis 2000).
While generally well integrated in society, Copts nevertheless face some 
legal but mostly social forms of prejudice. As one commentator rightly 
put it, the situation of Copts in Egypt is one of “subtle yet entrenched 
discrimination” (Khalil 1998). But the extent to which individual Chris-
tians are discriminated against varies greatly along geographic, social, 
and economic lines. Larger towns are usually more welcoming than rural 
areas, and wealthy Copts are much less likely to experience discrimina-
tion, if any at all.
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, Islamic groups contesting the legitimacy of what 
they denounced as a secular, ungodly government, orchestrated violent 
attacks throughout the country, and Copts were among the prime targets. 
Because of the official discourse emphasizing national unity put forward 
by the authorities, targeting Copts also served the purpose of indirectly 
attacking the government. The massacre of foreign tourists at Luxor in 
1 These figures are based on the 1996 Egyptian census, the last one for which religious 
data were made public. Higher numbers are often quoted by Copts and western media 
but demographers Courbage and Fargues, who have studied the issue, have confirmed the 
accuracy of the census figures (1998: 181).
© Grégoire Delhaye, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_005
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1997 marked a turning point in the evolution of Islamist violence. The 
gruesome killing of foreigners, in a country where numerous people drew 
their livelihood from tourism, contributed to radical groups losing popular 
support and Islamist violence subsided (Kepel 2001: 413–443).
Violence against Copts did not totally disappear though. At the turn of 
the millennium, in the southern village of El-Kosheh, an argument between 
two shopkeepers, a Muslim and a Christian, escalated into a full fledged 
pogrom. Twenty-one died, twenty of them Copts. In October 2005, a crowd 
of Muslims attacked a church in Alexandria after an inflammatory sermon 
at the local mosque. The preacher had mentioned the existence of a Coptic-
produced DVD of a play portraying a Christian youth converting to Islam 
for money before realizing his “mistake” (Roussillon 2006: 153–155). On 
January 7, 2010 in retaliation for a rape, the drive-by shooting of a Coptic 
Church in the southern town of Nag Hamadi claimed the lives of seven 
Coptic worshipers and a Muslim guard. On March 10, 2011, in the Moqatam 
neighborhood of Cairo, a pitchfork battle between Muslims and Christians 
protesting the earlier burning of a Church in another province left 13 dead 
and 140 wounded. Snowballing from seemingly minor events, a dispute, 
sometimes even mere rumors—such as recently about an affair between a 
Christian man and a Muslim woman—these clashes are examples of a type 
of sectarian violence that, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, is not political in 
nature. These events are indeed not fueled by a political project but stem 
from an underlying tension fueled by negative stereotypes.
These events are commonly perceived as the result of the recent 
(re)islamization of Egyptian society and its impact on a persecuted and 
powerless Coptic minority. Against this widespread view, I wish to argue 
that sectarian tensions are in fact the product of parallel, century-old Islamic 
and Coptic revivals in which both Muslims and Copts are active. As we will 
see, the recent political upheaval in Egypt makes few changes to a dynamic 
long in the making. I will then discuss attempts made by different actors 
in the Egyptian political system to tackle the issue of sectarian relations. 
Finally, I will analyze the role played by foreign actors in recent policy 
changes regarding this issue, and weigh in on the possible drawbacks of 
these foreign influences.
Parallel Religious Revivals
The current climate of sectarian tension cannot be understood without 
looking at a broader historical context marked by parallel Coptic and 
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Islamic revivals. Both were triggered by the colonial encounter, took shape 
in the late nineteenth century and accelerated after the defeat by Israel 
in 1967. This shared genealogy explains the homology of both revivals. 
As Martin points out, even though “the content of [both the Coptic and 
Muslim] renewal is different [. . .]. In both cases we find a rejection of a 
‘westernized modernity’, of its ideas and its praxis, while the intention is 
ad fontes, the return to the authenticity of one’s own sources” (1997). A 
concrete example of this homology can be found in the strikingly similar 
structure of the discourses of Coptic and Muslim preachers as noted by 
Radi (1997).
The Islamic Revival
Islam Never Really Went Away
Vatikiotis (1991) argues that, from its very inception, the Egyptian national 
movement had a strong Islamic dimension. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, resistance to European influence in general, and British tutelage 
in particular, was mostly framed in term of pan-Islamic solidarity and 
undergirded by allegiance to the Sublime Porte. But at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the inability of the Ottoman Empire to “assist its 
non-Turkish Muslim subjects in their opposition to European rule” became 
obvious. He refers here to the take over of Morocco by France and Libya by 
Italy. This, he argues “prompted the idea of territorial [meaning Egyptian] 
nationalism” (ibid.: 214). This idea imposed itself even more easily given 
that, since Mohamed Ali’s rule, Egypt was de facto an independently run 
administrative unit of the empire.
Even though a secular national movement in the 1920s and 1930s 
emerged, “this secularism was not marked by an abandonment of the 
Islamic faith” (ibid.: 218), and this period was one of ongoing debate 
regarding the relationship of religion and politics. In fact, the secularists 
were labeled as such because they were fighting first the influence of 
King Fouad then King Farouk, who both used religion to boost their own 
legitimacy and further their political aims (ibid. 1991; see also Aclimandos 
2001). It was not, therefore, a reflection of their own lack of religiosity per 
se but rather their resistance to the use of religion as tool by the ruling 
monarch. Overall, this period of Egyptian history is often remembered by 
today’s Egyptian secularists as a golden age, characterized by a unified 
(meaning non-sectarian) national movement. However, when viewed in a 
wider historical perspective, non-sectarianism can be seen as more of an 
74 grégoire delhaye
exception than the rule when it comes to the relationship of religion and 
in politics in Egypt.
Additionally, the success of the secular party Wafd in its struggle to wrest 
Egypt’s independence from the British did not necessarily mean that the 
Egyptian masses recognized themselves in its secularism. This partially 
explains why the Wafd struggled to rule the country once the constitu-
tional monarchy was established. Partly due to royal hindrance, the party 
of Saad Zaghlul alienated many, who went on to join the ranks of other 
organizations including the Muslim Brotherhood. By the time of the 1952 
revolution, the movement funded by Hassan El-Banna was enjoying the 
largest popular support of any other political organization in Egypt. In fact, 
without its tacit approval, the revolution/coup of the Free Officers could 
not have taken place (Aclimandos 2002). But the success, until today, of 
the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization reflects, rather than explains, 
the rise of the Islamic idiom in Egyptian society.
The Failure of Arab Socialism
The Arab socialist nationalism promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasser after 
1958 was not particularly religious in nature. During his successor’s presi-
dency, however, the Islamic dimension of Egyptian identity was more 
directly promoted, as Anwar Al Sadat allied himself with Islamist-leaning 
elites to bolster his power and undermine the still influential Nasserites. 
El-Khawaga sums up the changing role of Islam as a frame of reference 
during the post-Nasser period when she writes: “The media’s insistence on 
the Islamic identity of Egypt grew stronger, first to supplant the symbols 
of the Egyptian left (1972–1976), then to compensate for Egypt leaving the 
Arab League following the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel 
and then again to take the reislamisation slogan away from the Muslim 
Brotherhood or the [radical] Islamist groups (1978–1990)” (1993).
The failures of the now authoritarian Egyptian State were not limited to 
the military arena. Sadat’s attempt at liberalizing the Egyptian economy, by 
reducing subsidies and privatizing government services, led to the country’s 
failure to provide basic services to vast segments of the population. Sadat 
also failed dismally at curbing corruption. The Islamic opposition, on the 
other hand, showed itself as an honest and viable alternative to the secular 
and inefficient government. In the aftermath of the 1992 earthquake, as 
the authorities struggled to respond to the chaos, a multitude of Islamic 
charities coordinated by the Muslim Brotherhood sprang into action and 
quickly delivered food and shelter to thousands affected (Campagna 1996). 
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This display of efficiency helped build the credentials of the Islamic oppo-
sition as a whole.
The decline of popular support to the more radical Islamist groups in 
the late 90s mentioned earlier did not slow down the Islamic revival, far 
from it. The Muslim Brotherhood, who had publicly denounced the attack 
upon tourists in Luxor in 1997 and other similar violent incidents in the 
80s and 90s, emerged as a moderately Islamic alternative to the not so 
moderate authoritarianism of Egypt’s official government. In fact, because 
of the secular opposition’s collapse in the 1960s and 1970s, in part because 
of Nasser’s ideological intransigence, today the Brotherhood is, in terms of 
popular support, the only credible organized opposition in the country.
Islamization From the Top and the Bottom
The process of nationalization of Islam and of Islamization of the State 
accelerated after the resounding victory of Israel over the Arab armies in 
1967. With that defeat, the dominant Arab nationalist narrative championed 
by Nasser instantly lost credibility, leaving Egypt in an ideological crisis. 
Sadat’s economic policy of infitah consecrated the failure of Arab socialism 
as an ideology, leaving for most Egyptians the country’s Muslim identity as 
one of the few enduring ideas to hang on to and rally around.
This Islamic identification was furthered by Sadat’s tacit political alliance 
with the Islamists (Kepel 1984) as well as his policy of economic liberaliza-
tion, which had a significant impact on the Egyptian landscape; it opened 
the gate to mass production and consumption of religious commodities 
which quickly saturated the physical environment of Egypt (Starrett 1995), 
just as the Islamic discourse had saturated the cognitive environment. 
With time, economic liberalization led to what has been called Islamic 
consumerism (Haenni 2008). After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Mubarak’s 
efforts to nationalize Islam paradoxically further bolstered its pregnancy in 
Egyptian society. Indeed as Starrett suggests “the Egyptian government’s 
[. . .] efforts to use religious education in the public school system as part 
of a program to combat religious ‘extremism’ merely increase[ed] the 
emphasis on Islam in Egyptian culture” (1991).
The revival was also furthered by many Islamic moral entrepreneurs, 
ranging from the anonymous individual who posted stickers in Cairo’s 
subway inviting Egyptian women to don the Islamic headscarf, to clean 
shaven and suit-wearing Islamic televangelists such as Amr Khaled, whose 
modern preaching style appeals to an Egyptian upper class that previously 
did not recognize itself in the more traditional Azharite clerics (Haenni 
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2002). It must be noted, though, that the physical and discursive omnipres-
ence of Islam does not mean that all agree on a specific Islamic path. As 
Radi suggests, the shared use of the Islamic reference frame by a variety 
of Egyptian actors does not mean that they share an understanding of the 
content of that frame (1995). More likely, it is the very plasticity of the 
Islamic vocabulary that explains its wide appeal.
The Coptic Revival
During the same period that saw Islam slowly increase in visibility in 
Egyptian society, the Coptic community underwent profound changes as 
well. These were marked by the Coptic Church’s rise to preeminence, a 
process usually referred to as the ‘Coptic revival’ or ‘Coptic awakening’. 
Even though Sedra has shown that the dominant historical narrative of 
the awakening overemphasizes his role (2007), Coptic Pope Cyril IV is 
often credited with being its initiator, hence his nickname Abu Al-Ilsah 
(the father of reform). Contrary to popular belief, the ongoing process was 
not so much an answer to the Islamic revival (El-Khawaga 1993) as a fun-
damentally internal process. Like its Islamic counterpart, it was triggered 
by the colonial encounter and, more particularly in the Coptic case, the 
concomitant arrival of foreign missions in Egypt (Sedra 2004).
El-Khawaga showed that new generations of educated professionals came 
to replace the old untrained clergy and began to transform the Church from 
within (1993). While the dominant Church-centered ‘awakening’ narrative 
reflects otherwise, Sedra highlights the role of laymen in forging an educated 
Coptic community (2007). What is certain is that, as they rose through the 
ranks of the Church, educated Copts profoundly transformed the institution. 
The trajectory of the current Pope, Shenouda III, is a perfect example of 
this trend. Under this new, educated leadership the Church became what 
it is today, a well run, rich, centralized, and efficient organization. But this 
transformation did not stop at the institutional level: the relationship of 
the Church to the political realm changed as well. The “more educated and 
politicized” leadership saw its role as not only one of “religious representa-
tive of the Copts but was also trying to act as their political representative” 
(Farah 1986). For El-Khawaga this role of political representation acquired 
even greater importance when Sadat undertook the islamization of the 
national narrative, sidelining the Copts in the process (1993). Here again 
Shenouda’s initial vocal attitude towards Sadat’s policies was characteristic 
of the new breed of clergy brought about by the revival.
 contemporary muslim-christian relations in egypt 77
The transformation of the Church was not limited to its leadership. As the 
latter became savvier, it worked at expanding the outreach of the institu-
tion to its flock. The evolution of the role of the Coptic Orthodox Church 
Bishopric of Youth is an excellent illustration of this phenomenon. Initially 
in charge of teaching the Orthodox doctrine to the Coptic youth through 
a network of Sunday schools, it has become over time a vast network 
of exclusively Christian socialization spaces targeting Coptic youth. The 
activities it offers range from after school programs to Bible study to soccer 
leagues, all exclusively Coptic in practice if not in name. The growth of the 
Church did not stop there. The Bishopric of Social Services centralized part 
of the outreach to the less fortunate among the Copts. As the offer of social 
service expanded, it also provided opportunities of continued involvement 
for young Coptic adults who had ‘graduated’ from the youth programs, 
keeping them involved in Church-related activities. This opportunity to 
spend more time within their own community was particularly appealing 
to Copts at a time when society at large was becoming saturated with an 
Islamic discourse which they perceived as alienating. New generations of 
Copts grew up spending more and more time in exclusively Coptic spaces 
and away from more religiously mixed settings.
Behind its mere organizational aspects the revival has had, as was 
intended (Sedra 2007; El-Khawaga 1993), a profound impact on Coptic 
subjectivity. As the Church grew stronger, so did Copts’ sense of pride 
in their Church and heritage, and also in their ‘Copticness’. As Sedra 
shows, starting in the 1970’s, Egypt witnessed the emergence of an 
“explicitly sectarian political discourse among groups of middle-class 
Copts and the related spread of an ethnic consciousness through the 
Coptic community” (1999). This ethnic consciousness and the renewed 
feeling of Coptic pride born of the revival has given birth, in segments 
of the Coptic community, to what can be described as a form of Coptic 
quasi-nationalism. This discourse insists, for example, that Copts are the 
“true sons of the pharaohs”, implicitly relegating the Egyptian Muslims 
to being mere descendants of inferior, non-indigenous Arab invaders 
(Delhaye 2007). This type of quasi-nationalist discourse is mainly vis-
ible abroad, where a more open and freer environment allows Coptic 
activist organizations in the diaspora to operate without fear of govern-
ment harassment. Even though only a minority of Copts abroad openly 
sympathize with this discourse, the silence of the diasporic Coptic clergy 
allows it to blossom unchallenged in the host society public space. And 
while it is seldom publicly heard in Egypt, there is little doubt that this 
discourse also exists there and that supporters of such an understanding 
78 grégoire delhaye
of Coptic identity provide diasporic organizations with information that 
serve their exclusionist agenda.
In 1986, Nadia Ramsis Farah wrote that “[t]he disaffected Copts turned 
to religion in the same way their Muslim peers did. However heightened 
religiosity within the Coptic community did not produce the formation 
of politically militant movements independent from the Church [. . .]. 
Organized militancy was confined to a section of the Coptic Church itself ” 
(1986). Recent events seem to have proved her wrong. Diaspora groups 
have definitely adopted a militant tone, and the renewed sense of Coptic 
pride, combined with a broader upsurge of political activity in Egypt in 
the past 10 years, has given rise to spontaneous public displays of Coptic 
anger outside of the framework of the Church. This latter phenomenon is 
particularly striking, as Coptic street protests were largely unheard of until 
very recently. (Guindy 2004).
The first sizable occurrence took place in 2001, after Al-Nabaa, a tabloid 
newspaper, published blurred screen copies of a video of a defrocked monk 
having sex with different women. In an unprecedented public display of 
collective anger, Copts took to the streets and threw rocks at the police in 
front of the Patriarchate in Cairo. In November 2004, when the wife of a 
Coptic priest ran away with her Muslim lover, again the Coptic youth started 
a protest that forced an overwhelmed Pope to retreat to a monastery. In 
yet another interesting parallel with Muslim rioters, during these protests, 
Copts paraded religious symbols such as crosses and icons while singing 
religious songs illustrating the centrality of the religion in Coptic identity. 
Since then, similar if smaller, public displays of discontent by Copts have 
taken place on a regular basis, usually triggered by conversion issues.
A Growing Alienation Between the Two Communities
Both the violence against Copts and their public displays of dissatisfaction 
with what they see as attacks on their religion are symptoms of a deeper 
and, until recently, mostly silent malaise that punctual precipitants and 
a somehow more open political environment have rendered visible. This 
malaise is the product of a growing isolation of the two communities that 
increasingly live, work or study side by side but with limited contact and 
knowledge of each other.
As mentioned earlier, the failure of Arab socialism as an economic 
system and ideology has led to the popular embrace of the Islamic ethos 
by Muslims and of the Coptic ethos by Christians. More importantly 
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there are signs that younger Copts and Muslims have, compared to their 
parents’ and grand-parents’ generations, more limited social interaction, 
and therefore know little about each other. This is in part due to the 
Copts turning inward. El-Khawaga has described in detail the emergence 
of what she refers to as a “closed communitarian space” (1993). My own 
fieldwork at the Coptic Patriarchate in Cairo suggests a tendency to more 
exclusively Coptic socialization especially among the younger generation. 
Recent ethnographic studies conducted on Coptic families and commu-
nities in different Cairo neighborhoods also identify this trend. Vivier, for 
example, describes how the multitudes of activities available (soccer, Bible 
study, school tutoring . . .) in an urban Cairene parish led Coptic children, 
teenagers and young adults to socialize mostly among themselves (2000). 
Working in a different and less privileged neighborhood, Oram points 
out that “for these new generations the Coptic Church has become an 
important new site for bringing together Copts for service, education and 
recreation. While it is still important for this new generation to maintain 
certain kinds of basic alliances in their neighborhood, their most important 
ones are now formed in the context of the church” (2004). By emphasizing 
religious belonging the two revivals have alienated both communities from 
each other. Keeping to themselves, both Copts and Muslims know little 
about each other and this proves a breeding ground for stereotypes and 
intolerance. Numerically inferior, Copts always end up the victims of the 
rising tension between the two communities.
The increasing insulation of the two communities from each other is 
furthered by the emergence of exclusively Muslim and Coptic mediascapes. 
As Elsässer points out, for years “the lack of choice forced Egyptian Muslims 
and Copts to consume the same media, which in turn guaranteed them 
sharing to some extent the same horizon—including their perception 
of the Coptic question” (2010). The government exerted tight control on 
mass media, in particular on television. Because of self-censorship, but 
also because of their own secular leanings, producers of series for the 
state television did not portray religion as a source of morality and were 
silent regarding the Islamist movement (Abu-Lughod 1993). But in the past 
15 years things have dramatically changed. The development of satellite 
television opened up a new media landscape outside the control of the 
Egyptian State. This had two important effects. First, among the channels 
available were Islamic ones that catered to audiences whose worldview 
was already shaped by religion. That segment of the viewership now had 
access to basically communitarian media that reflected an understanding 
of the world shaped by Islamic values and from which Copts were absent 
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or portrayed as “others”. Second and more importantly, because Copts are 
present almost exclusively in Egypt, pan-Arab satellite channels have few 
incentives to portray Copts or sectarian issues involving them in the fictions 
they broadcast, for most non-Egyptians could relate only slightly, if at all, 
to them . Overall this means that Copts disappeared from the screens of 
many Egyptians, who had switched to satellite television because of the 
paucity of state run media.
If the disappearance of Copts from the media landscape of many Egyp-
tians, because of their switch from Egypt-based state controlled media to 
Gulf-based media, was not a conscious, voluntary, and organized phenom-
enon for the most part, the emergence of Coptic media was. Churches and 
monasteries became distribution venues for all kinds of Copt-related books 
and pamphlets. With the evolution of technology the offer quickly came 
to encompass “cassettes of liturgical chants, of sermons or talks, and now 
also videos and posters” (Martin 1997). And in reaction to the decreased 
presence of Copts in “mainstream” satellite programming, recently we have 
seen the emergence of a Coptic film industry (Doss 2004). Another step was 
reached in 2005 when the Coptic Church started its own satellite televi-
sion Channel Aghapy TV. The channel was partly an answer to previously 
created Arabic-speaking non-Orthodox Christian satellite channels such as 
SAT7 and Al-Hayat that targeted, among others, Egyptian Copts.
The Politics of Sectarian Relations in Egypt
To fully understand the politics of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt, 
one must also look at the evolution of Egyptian nationalist discourses. The 
nationalist ideology, the idea that the people living in a given territory, 
usually that of a state, form a nation with a common past and a shared 
culture, is a rather recent phenomenon in human history. Usually consid-
ered to have taken shape on a global scale in the mid-nineteenth century, 
it played a decisive role in the formation of anti-colonial movements. 
If the progress of multiculturalism has made the exclusivist nationalist 
ideology somehow less legitimate, especially in the west, the ‘one nation, 
one state’ motto remains very much influential everywhere, including in 
the Middle East.
At the core of each nationalism lies an ethno-national narrative, defined 
as a set of founding myths and official discourses on the nation-state, its 
unity, its history, its identity, its characteristics, its destiny. The ability 
of political elites to set forth such a narrative is one of the ways through 
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which nation-states’ rulers or would-be rulers legitimate their mandate. 
This is congruent with Gellner’s conception of nationalism as “a theory 
of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not 
cut across political ones and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a 
given state—a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its 
general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from the rest” 
(Gellner 1983: 1). In the case of Mubarak’s Egypt, the control of the ethno-
national narrative was of particular importance because his government 
lacked other commonly recognized sources of legitimacy. It not only had 
less than stellar democratic credentials, but the roll back of the social poli-
cies that had characterized the early period of independence also stymied 
the legitimacy to be gained from the ability to redistribute wealth.
The Staging of National Unity
Until the 1990s the official stance had been to deny the very existence of 
any sectarian tension. Problems, when they occurred, were often blamed 
on foreign powers meddling in Egyptian affairs or trying to undermine 
the progress of the country. The ethno-national narrative put forward by 
authorities claims that Muslims and Christians are, both in law and in 
reality, equal citizens of the benevolent Egyptian State. This discourse can 
be referred to as the national unity narrative or the national fabric narra-
tive to use one of the most common metaphors (see for example Khusak 
1999). It has been present in the Egyptian public sphere since the rise of 
the Egyptian nationalist movement in the late nineteenth–early twentieth 
century and has been dominant since the rise of secular nationalist move-
ment in the 1920s. It argues that Muslims and Christians are, both in law 
and in reality, equal citizens of the Egyptian State. When problems between 
Copts and Muslims occur, their magnitude is downplayed: they are char-
acterized as exceptional, their religious nature questioned or denied, and/
or they are attributed to the malicious work of fundamentalist elements or 
foreign powers. After the events of El-Kosheh mentioned earlier, secular 
Egyptian intellectuals typically wrote numerous articles in that spirit in the 
Egyptian press. Even before the killings of El-Kosheh, the denial of even 
the possibility of a problem was so pervasive that it was openly challenged 
by Egyptian journalists who asked the government for more transparency 
(e.g. Huwaydi 1998).
To reinforce the image of an idyllic relationship between the religious 
communities, the government regularly organizes public displays of 
‘national unity’. Officials invite the religious leader of both religions, the 
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Sheikh of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Pope, to well publicized events where 
they ostentatiously demonstrate their friendship and respect for each other. 
During major Christian religious holidays like Christmas and Easter, govern-
ment officials sit prominently in the front row of the Coptic Cathedral in 
Cairo during mass. During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Christian 
figures will attend official iftars, and the Church itself will organize well 
publicized charity banquets. The idea behind all this ostentatious display 
of brotherly love is of course to send the message that Copts are an integral 
part of the Egyptian citizenry. Yet as one author rightly puts it, “the very 
fact that this is stated so insistently shows that a problem does exist” (van 
Niespen tot Sevenaer 1997).
The Coptic Pope is Aligned with the Mubarak Government
The contemporary position of the Coptic Church can be summarized by that 
of its potent Pope, Shenouda III, who has been at the head of the institu-
tion since 1971 and has, throughout his reign, reinforced the power of the 
papacy over the community. Placed under house arrest by Sadat in 1981 
for openly criticizing his policy of Islamization of the country, embodied 
by the enshrining of the Shariʿa law in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitu-
tion, the patriarch was released by Mubarak in 1985. From then on, he was 
highly supportive of the Mubarak regime, endorsing him during several of 
his presidential bids. This non-confrontational attitude allowed the Pope to 
gain significant access to the executive and gave him leeway to approach 
officials about issues dear to the Church.2 In May 2008, the Egyptian daily 
Al-Masry Al-Youm announced that Pope Shenouda and the Holy Synod of 
the Coptic Orthodox Church had secured from the government the nar-
rowing of the grounds for divorce for Christians—basically codifying into 
the law of the land the conservative dogma he had long been advocating 
as a spiritual leader (Al-Khatib 2008). In the past, the Pope has also sought 
to gain censorship power on movies and books dealing with Christianity 
equivalent to that of Al-Azhar on material deemed related to Islam. This 
relationship of unconditional support in exchange for political gains has 
been described has a sort of neo-millet system (Rowe 2007; Sedra 1999). 
This privileged access to the executive and policy initiative, gained from 
his loyalty, helps explain the Pope’s stubborn and very public endorsement 
2 On the evolution of the relationship between the Coptic Church and the Egyptian 
executive see Tadros 2009.
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of Mubarak during the events that led to his recent stepping down from 
the presidency.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the National Unity Narrative
As mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood, although officially banned, 
is a major player in the Egyptian political system. Even though radical 
groups have targeted Copts during the 70s and 80s, overall the organiza-
tion has not been publicly hostile to Copts, especially under the leader-
ship of former Brotherhood supreme guide Mustafa Mashhour. As part of 
its strategy of normalization and entry into the political mainstream, the 
Brotherhood has embraced the national unity narrative, a litmus test of 
sorts of its commitment to democratic ideals. In the 2000 election cycle 
the Brotherhood tried to have a Copt run on its electoral lists. On several 
occasions also, its leaders have spoken in favor of freedom of religion. After 
a sectarian flare up that claimed the life of one Copt, in the town of Odaysat 
in 2006, Essam Erian, a top member of the Brotherhood, told reporters, for 
example, that “People should be able to worship freely”. He then went on 
to criticize the government for having Copts “wait endlessly for [church 
building] licenses to be issued” (quoted in Williams 2006). Finally, during a 
recent victory party organized at the Brotherhood headquarters to celebrate 
Mubarak’s departure, a Coptic priest was ostensibly visible on stage.3 This 
type of public display of sectarian correctness and support for Coptic claims 
targets two audiences, one domestic and one international, and sends to 
both the message that the Brotherhood is a ‘normal’ and moderate political 
organization and should therefore be treated as such (Legeay 2004).
The End of a Taboo and the Nuancing of the National Unity Narrative
For many years, sectarian issues were among the few red lines that jour-
nalists should not cross if they wanted their articles to make it past the 
scissors of the Egyptian government censors (Middle East Times 2005). As 
discussed earlier, plagued by corruption and inefficiencies, the authorities 
could draw little legitimacy from its democratic credentials (or lack thereof) 
or from its ability to redistribute wealth, and the taboo surrounding sectar-
ian tensions kept alive the idea that at least it could maintain social peace 
and order. Yet, since the late 1990s, there has been a loosening at first and 
3 I wish to thank Samer Shehata for sharing this information with me.
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then a clear collapse on the unofficial ban on the topic in the media. The 
depiction of Muslim-Christian relations is no longer idyllic and has, as we 
will see, recently evolved so as to recognize, albeit minimizing, existing 
problems. In general, coverage of Coptic issues has exploded. This has 
not gone unnoticed by Copts, and in 2007 the English edition of Coptic 
newspaper Al-Watany started running a column discussing the coverage 
of Coptic issues in the Egyptian press (Al-Faris 2006).
Multiple Factors
The crumbling of the long lasting taboo was the product of a combina-
tion of more profound changes. First, the end of the 1990s was marked 
by the withering of the violent radical Islamist threat and the slow entry 
(with ups and downs) of the Muslim Brotherhood into the mainstream. As 
attacks subsided, the authorities had to unclench their fist, partly because 
they could not justify, both domestically and internationally, the lack of 
liberty by invoking their fight against a vanishing radical Islamist threat. 
Also important was the increasing pressure by the United States including 
the surprisingly principled, if not the most subtly executed, Bush admin-
istration’s push for democracy in the Middle East. Furthermore, the rise 
of satellite channels and then of the internet, which contributed to the 
emergence of separate Muslim and Coptic mediascapes, also greatly eased 
the circulation of information regarding sectarian relations both within and 
without Egypt. Outside the influence of the state, foreign-based channels 
do not have to fear the repercussions that local television and print media 
face. This and the slow democratization of internet access, through the 
opening of a large number of cyber cafés throughout the country, made it 
harder for the government to control the flow of information and to prevent 
news of sectarian incidents from reaching the wider population. Addition-
ally, there were changes in the domestic print media environment. In the 
past ten years or so, and in an effort to bolster its democratic credentials, 
the Egyptian authorities have allowed the emergence of an independent, 
if not yet totally free, press. Of particular significance was the licensing 
and creation, in 2004, of the privately owned and run daily newspaper 
Al-Masry Al-Youm. Even though large segments of the printing press in 
Egypt remain under state control, the entry of new players, in particular 
of Al-Masry Al-Youm, has had a positive impact on news coverage. On the 
matter, Hazem Abdel Rahman, managing editor of the state-controlled 
powerhouse newspaper Al-Ahram, candidly declared that “The emergence 
of the private and independent press in the last four to five years has raised 
 contemporary muslim-christian relations in egypt 85
the limits of the press freedom which we are practicing in the Egyptian 
press” (quoted in Cooper 2008).
Greater Visibility
The fall of the taboo regarding the existence of sectarian tensions in Egypt 
had a positive impact, because it triggered some debate among journalists 
and intellectuals regarding the real state of sectarian relations in Egypt. 
More generally, it also allowed greater visibility to Coptic issues in the 
public sphere, and state run media played their role in this. On May 30th 
2002, the daily newspaper El-Gumhuriya, the government’s mouthpiece, 
published a well- publicized two full-page interview with Coptic Pope 
Shenouda. The journalistic powerhouse Al-Ahram has also recently started 
to publish a weekly column by Pope Shenouda (Al-Faris 2006). But, more 
importantly, Copts and the issue of sectarian relations have started to 
appear in television and in movies.
This greater visibility of Christians in popular culture is not always 
welcome by Copts who sometimes have issues with what is depicted and 
how. One such occurrence took place during the holy Muslim month of 
Ramadan 2000 when state television aired a series entitled Awan Al-Ward 
that depicted the family life of a mixed couple and the struggle and dilemma 
of a Christian mother raising her daughter as Muslim. More recently, even 
though it was written and directed by Christians, the release in 2004 of the 
autobiographic movie Bahibb Es-Sinema also triggered angry responses 
by Copts who had issues with the portrayal of a bigoted Christian father 
preventing his son from watching the movies he loved.4
In 2008, Hassan and Morqos, a film starring the famous Egyptian humorist 
Adel Imam and Egyptian born Hollywood star Omar Sharif addressed the 
issue openly. It told the story of the friendship of two unlikely neighbours, 
an imam and a priest who, in order to escape harassment by extremists of 
their respective religions, had to pretend to be of the other faith. Symp-
tomatic of the new discourse on sectarian relations, the movie showed the 
two as getting along regardless of religion, while acknowledging problems 
but blaming them on “extremists” on both sides. Since they are the ones 
facing the discrimination and bearing the brunt of the attacks when they 
occur, most Copts take issue with the idea of sharing the blame for sectar-
ian tensions.
4 On this controversy see Mehrez, 2008, p. 188.
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Opening Pandora’s Box
The relaxed censorship on Coptic related topics also had some less welcome 
consequences. As Elsässer suggests, “[d]isplaying matters of religious ten-
sion between Muslims and Copts in a sensationalist manner is obviously 
perceived as a good selling strategy by a considerable segment of the press” 
(2010). I would even argue that any issue dealing with Christianity can be 
turned into sales. A particularly creative episode of this trend occurred on 
December 16, 2005, when the once reputable magazine Rose Al-Yusef con-
flated in a single article two sales-boosting topics: modesty and Christian 
doctrine. The front page of the magazine read: “The Faculty of Theology 
declares that Jesus Christ was not crucified naked”. This example of the 
commercial exploitation of minority religious issues by the press is rather 
benign, yet it is infuriating for many Copts. More worrying is the habit of 
the weekly tabloid press of running much more destructive stories that 
reinforce stereotypes and perpetuate prejudices against Copts (Elsässer 
2010). The sensationalist coverage of minority religious issues sometimes 
triggers outrage from both Christians and Muslims. In 2004 for example, 
rumors that Wafaa Constantine, a priest’s wife, had converted to Islam, led 
to a protest by Coptic youth in front of the Patriarchate in Cairo. Weeks 
later, Muslims protested when the woman was returned, probably against 
her will, to the custody of the Church. The Egyptian press covered the 
affair assiduously, with extensive use of alarmist titles invoking the fear 
of sectarianism, or even civil war, effectively turning what was probably a 
mere conjugal issue into a national media circus (Klaus 2005).
A Series of Government Gestures
It is clear that the Egyptian government has played a role in the Islamiza-
tion of society yet it is hard to argue, as some Coptic activists do, that the 
authorities have “Islamist” tendencies. In fact except for a brief period 
under Sadat, the State has spent most of the past 50 plus years going after 
its Islamist opposition. On the other hand, in order to appease a majority 
and preserve the little legitimacy it had, the State has for many years not 
done much to address real issues pertaining to the Copts.
Since the mid-1990s though, there has been a noticeable change, marked 
by ostentatious goodwill, in the attitude of the government towards Coptic 
claims. The administrative hurdles to build and repair churches are a case 
in point. This had been a long lasting point of contention between the 
authorities and the Church. In 1998, the burdensome Humayun decrees, 
legislations dating from the Ottoman era, were quietly amended so that 
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presidential approval was no longer required to issue repair permits to 
non-Muslim places of worship. Now delegated to governors, also a way of 
conveniently deflecting future criticism to lower ranking officials, repair 
permits have started to be issued more liberally (Rowe 2007). In 2005, the 
process was overhauled again, making basic repairs subject only to writ-
ten notification to the local authorities. The new decree also extended to 
governors the power to grant permits for expanding and rebuilding existing 
churches and mandated that permit application be examined within 30 days 
and that refusal be formally justified (U.S. Department of State 2008).
Police response to sectarian flare-ups has also dramatically changed. As 
soon as any sign of sectarian conflict emerges, sometimes even before any 
violence has been reported at all, police forces are deployed to the area. 
The swiftness and force of the crackdown by the authorities against the 
Muslim rioters in the port city of Alexandria in 2005 are in that regard to be 
contrasted with the State’s delayed reaction five years earlier to the violent 
events in the southern village of El-Kosheh. In Alexandria, a much more 
populous city, there were only 3 victims, all Muslims, and they were killed 
by the police; in El-Kosheh 20 of the 21 killed were Copts. Even judicial 
responses to sectarian incidents have started to change. In January 2011, 
a death sentence was handed down by an Egyptian court to one of the 
Muslim perpetrators of the deadly drive-by shooting at a church, a year 
earlier, in the southern city of Nag Hamadi.
Another government gesture came in December 2002, when President 
Mubarak announced that January 7th, the day Copts, who follow the Julian 
calendar, celebrate Christmas, was to become a national holiday. Also, in June 
2003, the Shura Council, the Egyptian legislature’s higher chamber, approved 
the creation of the Egyptian Council on Human Rights (ECHR) in charge of 
investigating charges of human right abuses, including claims made by Copts. 
Prominent Egyptian Christian and Former UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali was quickly named president of the newly created entity. The 
greater Coptic presence in state controlled media and the nomination in 2006 
of the first Coptic governor in 30 years are other signs that the authorities 
are trying to address some of the long standing claims of Copts.
Foreign Influences
Catering to a Foreign Audience
There is no doubt that, by partly relieving the Egyptian government from 
the constant need to display its “good Muslimness”, the withering of the 
radical Islamist threat, starting in the mid 90’s, has given some leeway to 
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the authorities to address Coptic grievances. But even mainstreamed, the 
Muslim Brotherhood remains the strongest opposition and still challenges 
the Mubarak regime in the name of Islam in a country that is 95 percent 
Muslim. So why did the government move beyond the existing status quo? 
I agree with Mehrez when she suggests that part of the answer lies beyond 
the borders of Egypt. When dealing with the issue of sectarian tension, she 
describes the Egyptian government attitude as a difficult balancing act that 
tries to “cultivate a dual image of secularism (for global consumption) and 
religious nationalism (for the local one)” (2008). Egypt is publicly defensive 
of its sovereignty, but in today’s globalized economy, it has to be mindful 
of its foreign image, in particular in western countries. Indeed, tourism, 
mostly from western countries, is a prime source of foreign currencies for 
the country (Mansour 2002). Egypt is also the recipient of large amounts 
of foreign aid, again from mostly western and majority Christian countries 
(Moisseron and Delhaye 2004), whose public opinion tends to be supportive 
of Christian minorities, especially since 9/11.
The U.S.—Official Ally and Media Scapegoat
The U.S. is the largest foreign donor to Egypt with a yearly military and 
civil aid package averaging 2 billion dollars over the past decade (Mark 
2005). This aid is conditioned mainly on Egypt maintaining peace with 
Israel. Only once has the U.S. publicly threatened to use the aid package 
to gain leverage in another issue: in 2002 for the liberation of Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, a prominent Egyptian democracy and human rights advocate. The 
aid, and the special relationship between Egypt and the United States that 
partially stems from it, nevertheless allows the U.S. to voice its concerns 
and to be listened to. The regular and very public calls by some congress-
men to cancel or to put conditionalities on Egypt’s generous earmarks also 
give greater credence to U.S. diplomats’ quieter demands.
U.S. pressures on Egypt regarding Coptic issues have also increased 
towards the end of the 1990s because of a campaign that led to the passing 
in 1998 of the International Religious Freedom Act or IRFA (U.S. Congress 
1998). Born of an initiative taken by a few well-connected activists to address 
Christian persecution abroad, the IRFA only came into being because of 
a very domestic partisan dynamic that had nothing to do with Egypt.5 As 
a result of this campaign, between 1997 and 2001, a number of American 
5 On the act itself, see Decherf 2001. On the politics surrounding the passing of the act, 
see Delhaye 2009, pp. 99–102.
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politicians and delegations visited the country and inquired about the situ-
ation of the Copts. These visits spurred strong negative reactions in Egypt. 
Many politicians and intellectuals, including Coptic ones, boycotted the 
American delegations and denounced the visits as unwelcome meddling 
in Egyptian domestic affairs. But the process and the debate it triggered 
helped bring down the taboo that surrounded sectarian relations and put 
the issue on the media’s agenda.
The IRFA formally made the promotion of religious freedom abroad a 
priority of U.S. foreign policy and created a formal framework within which 
to address the issue. In the following years, U.S. officials started raising the 
issue more prominently with their Egyptian counterparts, who were not 
always pleased with the increased scrutiny.6 Yet the Egyptian authorities 
seem to listen, as there are hints that suggest some of the measures taken in 
recent years to address Coptic claims were not only domestically driven. For 
example, for Copts Easter is a more important religious holiday than Christ-
mas, yet it was the latter, a much more universally celebrated holiday in the 
west, that was made a national holiday by Mubarak in 2002. The naming of 
Boutros Boutros Ghali as the head of ECHR is another example. A former 
U.N. secretary General and a Copt, he has his permanent residence in Paris, 
not Cairo where the Council meets. This also suggests that his nomination 
was a symbolic move intended to give foreign credibility to the ECHR and 
to increase the visibility of the Coptic community to foreign observers.
The Role of Coptic Activists in the Diaspora
As mentioned earlier, since his release from house arrest in 1985 by Muba-
rak, Pope Shenouda III has adopted a conciliatory approach in his dealing 
with the government. Not all Copts agree with this approach though, and 
activist organizations abroad, mainly in the United States, have adopted a 
much more critical tone. Coptic activism is not a new phenomenon. The 
first documented occurrences date back to the late 70s (Abdelnour 1993). 
However it was the demoting of Pope Shenouda in 1981 and his placement 
under house arrest by Sadat that triggered the first significant mobiliza-
tion from diaspora Copts, with the clergy abroad throwing its weight and 
influence behind the call to free the Patriarch. For 10 years after the Pope’s 
release, things remained mostly quiet. Even though a handful of Coptic 
6 Interview with U.S. diplomats who requested anonymity, carried out in Cairo on 
June 16th 2003.
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activists were still trying to mobilize, nobody really listened. The U.S. media, 
in particular, were not interested.
Things changed significantly in the mid-1990s due to the movement that 
led to the passing of the IRFA. Even though, as mentioned earlier, originally 
it had nothing to do with Egypt, “Coptic persecution” quickly became a 
handy illustration of the push for political action. Joseph Assad, a Copt, 
had recently joined the staff of Freedom House, an organization that, at the 
time, was at the forefront of the religious freedom initiative. The entry of 
the lobbying and activist organization U.S. Copts, as a new player on the 
Coptic activism scene, also played a role. Based in the Washington D.C. 
metropolitan area, in close proximity to decision makers, U.S. Copts was 
created by Michael Meunier, a politically and technologically savvy young 
Copt, who helped convince some U.S. politicians to champion the Coptic 
cause while creating an internet-based Coptic information network to 
collect and spread information and calls for action.
Coptic activism within the diaspora is diverse, with different organiza-
tions and individuals competing for the legitimate representation of Coptic 
claims and the attention of the host society’s political institutions. Follow-
ing Dufoix, it can be described as an exopolity (2002). What most activists 
share, though, is a specific diagnosis of the situation of the Copts in Egypt. 
They understand it as “persecution” at the hands of an oppressing Muslim 
majority. Their discourse is also characterized by a victimo-nationalist struc-
ture. I suggest that this type of narrative is not unique to Coptic activists 
but is shared with other U.S. based diasporic activist groups like, among 
others, Armenian nationalists and Jewish Zionists.
This discourse challenges the national unity narrative and is enmeshed 
in an understanding of history that sees Copts as the true descendents of 
the pharaohs and distinguishes them not just religiously but ethnically, 
culturally and linguistically from their Egyptian Muslim fellow citizens 
(Delhaye 2007). Once made known in Egypt, these discourses reinforce 
the alienation of both communities and impair the dialogue needed to 
find workable solutions and address the problem of Coptic discrimina-
tion. Coptic activists abroad, the most vocal of whom are in the U.S., also 
keep lambasting Egypt’s political leadership. If more moderate Coptic 
activists limit themselves to denouncing the government’s inaction, more 
radical elements suggest that the Egyptian authorities are masterminding 
a vast anti-Coptic conspiracy.7 They call for the U.S. to exert pressure on 
7 For a similar dilemma among Christian Palestinians in Bethlehem, see Kårtveit, in 
this volume. 
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the country and advocate for the withholding of U.S. foreign assistance 
to Egypt. These calls do not fare well in a country whose economic situa-
tion is far from perfect. The diagnosis of the Coptic situation put forward 
by the more radical elements is often quite dramatic, and to achieve 
their goal they are keen on using moving, yet often inaccurate, stories 
such as that of “the forced conversion and marriage of Coptic girls” 
(Delhaye 2008).
Unholy Alliances?
Because it was driven by partisan politics more than by the issue itself, 
interest in the Coptic cause quickly subsided in the U.S. after the IRFA 
passed. But in the process, the Coptic cause had found new advocates 
within the U.S. political system, congressmen and senators, who remained 
committed.8 Using the clout given to them by their office, they regularly 
release statements and hold formal or informal hearings on issues pertain-
ing to the situation of the Copts in Egypt. Thus two sympathizers, Wolf 
and Brownback, who both belong to the Human Right Caucus, co-hosted 
an informal hearing in Congress during the Second Coptic Conference, 
a gathering of Coptic activists from around the globe that took place in 
Washington D.C. in 2005. These hearings and the statements released by 
congressmen do not represent the official position of the United States on 
the issue and are fairly inconsequential in the U.S. In fact, they received 
very little attention from the American media. Yet in Egypt, they are often 
portrayed in the press as yet another sign of US “meddling” in Egypt internal 
affairs under pressure from “misguided” Copts living abroad.
Even more alienating is the embrace of the Coptic cause by a number 
of American civil society organizations and activists with islamophobic 
and/or anti-Arab discourses if not agendas, most of them with pronounced 
Zionist sympathies. In 2004, when Adli Abadir, an old time Coptic Egyptian 
immigrant but a newcomer activist, decided to hold a conference on the 
situation of the Copts in Zurich, he invited the hawkish, islamophobic, 
and hardcore Zionist political commentator Daniel Pipes to give the key-
note address (Pipes 2004). Self-declared anti-terrorism expert, anti-Arab 
islamophobe, and former Lebanese phalangist Walid Phares is also a regular 
defender of the Copts, and so are a number of personalities close to the 
8 The most potent allies of Coptic activists for the time being are Representatives 
Frank Wolf, Joe Pitts and Tom Tancredo in the House and Senators Tom Lantos and Sam 
Brownback in the Senate.
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Evangelical and or Christian Zionist movement. These organizations and 
individuals regularly use Coptic claims of persecution to further their own 
agenda, sometimes twisting facts in the process. For example, regarding, 
the Wafaa Constantine affair mentioned earlier, Robert Spencer, co-founder 
of the Zionist mouthpiece Front Page Mag and the islamophobic blog 
Jihad Watch wrote: “Wafaa Constantine Messiha, wife of a Coptic priest in 
Egypt, was abducted by jihadist Muslims and forced to convert to Islam. 
The Mubarak regime has done nothing” (Spencer 2004).
The alliances of a few Coptic activists with, and the exploitation of the 
Coptic cause by, islamophobes and Zionists, do not go unnoticed in 
Egypt. Even though a very small portion of Coptic immigrants are politi-
cally active and many do not subscribe to the persecution narrative put 
forward by Coptic activists, the Egyptian press will regularly chastise them 
with blanket statements turning “diaspora Copts” into a convenient media 
scapegoat for all kind of Egyptian ills (Elsässer 2010). These denunciations 
do not help foster the image of the Egyptian Christians as loyal Egyp-
tian citizens, and they contribute to furthering the alienation of the two 
communities.
Conclusion
Christians in the Middle East are sometimes paternalistically portrayed 
as weak or persecuted and therefore in need of protection. In the case of 
Egypt, one look at the incredible transformation of the Coptic Church in 
the past 150 years should suffice to disperse the idea of Copts as a powerless 
minority. During that period the number of Copts more than quintupled, 
and the Coptic Church transformed itself from a dilapidated institution, 
whose clergy was barely more literate than its flock, to a thriving and 
strong Church, capable of enforcing its vision of orthodoxy, providing social 
services to the poor, and socializing its youth. Once decrepit monasteries 
now buzz with activity, welcoming new well-educated monks in their 
cells as well as thousands of pilgrims seeking to deepen their spirituality 
in large modern facilities. Christianity, just like Islam, has, in the case of 
the Copts, benefited from the new triumph of religion in the region. But 
the resurgence of the Church does not mean that all in the community 
are thriving. While some Copts have benefited from the liberalization of 
the economy, many have not, and in that they share the fate of many of 
their Muslim fellow countrymen and women. In addition to their shared 
issues of poverty, middle class and impoverished Copts also have to deal 
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with discrimination and a growing sense of alienation from an Islamized 
Egyptian society.9
As the Coptic Church grew stronger, demands for its services surged 
in an Egyptian society marked by the failure of the State to provide for 
its citizens, but also by a process of Islamization. Even though the Coptic 
revival was originally an internally driven process, independent from the 
process of Islamization of the society at large, over time the latter helped 
turn the Church into a “communitarian space essentially perceived [by 
Copts] as a counter space” (El-Khawaga 1993). Producing specifically Coptic 
cultural goods, this ‘counter space’ can be assimilated to what Fraser (1992) 
has called alternative counter publics, where alternative visions of Egyptian 
identity are articulated. Even though this was not necessarily its intention, 
Hasan suggests that “the church under Pope Shenouda [. . .] capitalized on 
the great value placed on religious identity in fin de siècle Egypt, to outbid 
the state for the loyalty of its beleaguered Christian citizens” (2003).
Foreign involvement has helped address the symptoms of rising sec-
tarian tensions in Egypt by contributing to the collapse of the taboo that 
surrounded the issue and shaming the government into action. This is not 
a new phenomenon, and Rowe has pointed out that historically “the status 
of Christians under Egyptian law has never changed except in response to 
external stimuli. [. . .] So long as Coptic interests remained unimportant to 
transnational public opinion [. . .] there were no new innovations” (Rowe 
2007). This has created incentives for some disgruntled Copts to seek for-
eign allies, and Coptic activists in the diaspora have done just that. From 
the safety of their host country they call for sanctions against Egypt and 
sometimes embrace an anti-Arab and islamophobic discourse. This foreign 
scrutiny has forced a Mubarak regime protective of its international image 
to address long standing issues while denouncing these pressures.
As Iskandar has argued regarding the broader Egyptian democratic 
experiment, “its success will depend in large part on the public’s perception 
of its domestic character. Thus foreign intervention may derail this delicate 
process” (2006: 22–23). The same can be said of the Egyptian authorities’ 
attempts at addressing Coptic grievances. This has probably not escaped 
Pope Shenouda. By adopting a conciliatory stance while mildly denouncing 
pressure from abroad (he never excommunicated Coptic activists), he seems 
to try to capitalize on what is known in the social movement literature as 
9 Here again, their situation shows similarities with that of Christian Palestinians in the 
occupied West Bank, see Kårtveit in this volume.
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the radical flank effect (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Distancing 
himself from Coptic activists in the diaspora reinforces his image as a patri-
otic and moderate representative of the Coptic community. Shutting them 
down would probably reduce his usefulness for an Egyptian government 
currently keen on showcasing his support. Most likely, it would also alienate 
segments of the community in Egypt who, as recent Coptic street protests 
have shown, are more than ever eager to adopt a more vocal approach. As a 
long sitting Pope and an historical figure of the revival, Shenouda has been 
able to maintain dissent at a minimum, but his stubborn endorsement of 
Mubarak, until his departure, has no doubt eroded Copts’ confidence in 
his political leadership. Furthermore, his declining health, the prospects 
of his upcoming succession, as well as the loss of the Church’s privileged 
access to the Egyptian executive with the departure of Mubarak, all augur 
a period of great uncertainty for the political representation of Copts in 
an Egyptian political landscape that itself is highly uncertain.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LAND, LAW, AND FAMILY PROTECTION IN THE WEST BANK
Bård Kårtveit
In early May 2002, Israeli forces withdrew from Bethlehem, ending a brutal five 
week military siege of the city. For the first time in more than a month, people 
could leave their houses, walk around, and stock up on food from the shops 
without fear of being shot by Israeli soldiers. Ameer, a Christian businessman 
living in the city, was relieved like everyone else. His relief would turn to shock 
as he learned that, without his knowledge, a man had made legal claims to a 
large piece of land that belonged to him, and that this claim had already been 
supported in court. Ameer’s land was now the property of another man.
Since its establishment in 1994, the Palestinian Authority has struggled to 
build a functioning judicial system and provide adequate legal protections 
for Palestinians under its rule. One of the problems emerging from this 
has been a notable increase in land disputes throughout the West Bank. 
Theft of private property and manipulation of land documents have raised 
widespread concerns in the West Bank, in particular among Christian 
landowners in Bethlehem, who have been the main targets of these crimes. 
For a Christian minority whose presence has been gradually shrinking, this 
is an issue that has fuelled worries about their future within a Palestin-
ian community. Based on ten months of fieldwork in the West Bank, this 
chapter will be centred around three main points: First, the issue of land 
disputes is part of a wider picture, where a weak and dysfunctional legal 
system under the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the absence of the rule of 
law have left Palestinians dependent on family and community networks 
for security and protection. Second, due to their social and demographic 
characteristics, this leaves Christian Palestinians in a protection gap and a 
position of structural vulnerability that is further intensified by continued 
emigration out of Palestine. Finally, in spite of these difficulties, prominent 
Christians are reluctant to utilize international contacts and to seek external 
intervention in defence of their own rights and interests. This reflects both 
en enduring commitment to an ethos of national unity, and a clear prior-
ity on the use of ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970) among Christian Palestinians. 
© Bård Kårtveit, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_006
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The issue of land disputes in particular, and law enforcement in general, 
will be explored in relation to emigration, Christian—Muslim relations 
in Bethlehem, and the role of the family as a source of social order and 
protection in the West Bank.
Christians in Bethlehem
Christian Palestinians include some of the oldest Christian communities in 
the world, and their presence in Palestine1 dates back to early Christianity 
(Pacini 1998). As a resourceful minority, they have been instrumental in 
the shaping of Palestinian national identity, and have enjoyed a political 
and cultural influence within Palestinian society that far exceeds their 
numbers (Aburish 1993; Ayyad 1999). They have a strong presence within 
the leftwing factions of the PLO and within the Palestinian Authority. By 
presidential decree, six seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council are 
reserved for Christians, as is the office of Mayor in ten towns, including 
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho (Lende 2003; Sabella 2003). Within the 
Palestinian Authority, they have held at least one cabinet position in each 
government. In addition, local Christians have a strong presence in health 
and educational institutions, as well as within the local civil society. How-
ever, due to more than a hundred years of large-scale emigration, their 
number has dwindled, and they now have a total population of approxi-
mately 49,000 in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem altogether. Some 
22,000 live in Bethlehem and the neighbouring towns of Beit Jala and Beit 
Sahour (Soudah 2006).
Under Ottoman rule, Christians were formally confined to a second 
class citizens status, and were subject to a number of legal restrictions 
within the framework of the millet-system (Gonzalez 1992; O’Mahony 
2003). Nonetheless, the Christians of Bethlehem established themselves as 
a resourceful, enterprising elite, thanks to valuable international contacts, 
trading privileges obtained through the system of Capitulations (Musal-
lam 1992; Arab Educational Institute 1999), control of the local pilgrimage 
industry, and privileged access to Christian mission schools funded by 
Western Churches (Sabella 2003: 86). Due to these and other factors, the 
Christian community in Bethlehem flourished, and prominent Christian 
families would dominate local commerce and tourism as well as cultural, 
1 Here I refer to the areas covered by the British Mandate of Palestine, roughly compris-
ing today’s Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. 
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especially educational, institutions in the region (Gonzalez 1992; Raheb 
1995). The Ottoman land reform of 1858 lifted restrictions on Christian 
landownership, allowing wealthy Christians to purchase land within the 
Bethlehem district, further reinforcing the Christian prominence in the 
area (Gonzalez 1992: 50).
Throughout the twentieth century, their prominence gradually dimin-
ished, as thousands of local Christians migrated to the Americas, often 
selling their land in the process (Gonzalez 1992; Sabella 1998). A lot of 
land was sold to Muslim families from other parts of the West Bank, 
such as the Hebron-area, and from the rural areas around Bethlehem. 
After the 1948 war and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in 1967, this 
development was further intensified. As a result, the Muslim presence in 
Bethlehem increased, gradually changing the social character of certain 
neighbourhoods. With time, this has become a cause of friction between 
more recent arrivals and the older families of Bethlehem. Members of the 
older families frequently complain that their town has been “taken over” 
by outsiders, and that Bethlehem is no longer “their town”. The Hebron 
region in particular is seen as more culturally conservative than Bethlehem, 
and the ‘Hebronites’ are perceived as being very traditionally oriented in 
matters of family and gender norms. Historically, Bethlehem Muslims have 
looked upon themselves as being less traditional in their way of life than 
other Muslims—more in tune with the lifestyle of their Christian neigh-
bours. As large family groups from Hebron and other parts of the West 
Bank make their presence felt, Muslims of Bethlehem origin2 sometimes 
complain that the “Hebronites” have redefined what it means to be good 
Muslims in terms of dress codes, family structure and norms of everyday 
social conduct. Such nuances are often lost on local Christians, who find 
themselves losing their position to a rising Muslim middleclass (Lybarger 
2007). In addition to this, the growing strength of Islamic movements and 
the decline of secular ideologies have served to create an atmosphere where 
tensions between old Bethlehemites and newcomers from other parts of 
the West Bank are increasingly described in sectarian rather than regional 
terms. One should however bear in mind that, historically, other sources 
of identity and social boundaries have converged with and occasionally 
transcended those of religious affiliations in the Bethlehem area.3
2 One Muslim family clan, the Fawaghreh, came originally from a village near Hebron 
and settled in Bethlehem in the middle of the eighteenth century. Along with six Christian 
family clans, they are generally seen as one of the original family clans of Bethlehem. 
3 One source of affiliation that has held social importance throughout Palestine is the 
ancient division between people who originated from Southern Arab tribes, referred to 
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Local Christians take great pride in Bethlehem’s biblical heritage, and 
they feel a strong sense of collective ownership and responsibility for the 
Christian holy sites of the Bethlehem area, in particular the Church of 
Nativity (Raheb 2004). This creates a heightened sense of urgency about 
maintaining a strong Christian presence in Bethlehem, a town where they 
are outnumbered three to one by a growing Muslim population. In this 
context, many Christians see the purchase of Christian-owned land by 
Muslim families as part of a collective effort at marginalizing an already 
weak Christian presence.
Among local Christians, the sale of family land to Muslim buyers is 
not uncontroversial, but as such transactions have grown more common, 
those who sell their land do so at little risk of moral condemnation and 
social sanctioning.
Allegedly funded with money from Saudi banks, families of Hebron-
origin have bought a substantial amount of land in Bethlehem and Beit 
Jala (Lybarger 2007). Such transactions are increasingly seen as indications 
of territorial aggression against Christian land ownership. In Beit Jala, The 
Orthodox Club has taken steps to prevent such transactions, raising funds to 
make counter-offers, and block the sale of Christian land to Muslim buyers. 
Further alarm has been caused by incidents of land theft through fabrica-
tion of property documents, and manipulation of the legal system.
Internal Land Disputes in the West Bank
Since the PA was established in 1994, property scams and land-document 
forgery have emerged as a serious problem in Bethlehem, and in other parts 
of occupied Palestine.4 After 40 years of Israeli occupation and continued 
confiscations, land is an increasingly scarce resource, and even within a 
as the ‘Yamani’, and the Northern Arab tribes, known as ‘Qaysi’. In the Bethlehem area, 
the Christian clans of Bethlehem and Beit Sahour were perceived to be of Yamani origin, 
while the clans of Beit Jala were Qaysi (Elali 1991; Musallam 1999). During the late Ottoman 
period, between the late seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries, conflicts would 
erupt and alliances would be mobilized in accordance with these ancient tribal divides. 
On several occasions, the clans of Beit Jala aligned themselves with Qaysi clans from the 
Hebron area, when confronting the Christian Yamani tribes of Bethlehem and Beit Sahour, 
or when confronting Muslim Yamani tribes in Jerusalem (Musallam 1999: 13). 
4 According to local real estate lawyers, similar problems of land theft are found in other 
parts of the West Bank as well, such as the cities of Jenin and Ramallah. 
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context of economic depression, property prices are rising, making land 
theft a very lucrative enterprise.
In 1996, two years after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, 
the Palestinian Ministry of Justice established Land Registration Offices 
throughout the Palestinian Territories (Fischbach 1996). These offices 
were assigned the task of updating the registry of land ownership handed 
over from the Jordanian period, registering formerly undocumented land 
ownership and settling disputes over land in cases where sufficient docu-
mentation on land-ownership was lacking or out-dated, or where different 
principles and claims of ownership might conflict with each other (LEI 
2007). This initiative carried great symbolic weight: for the first time the 
Palestinians would take control of the administration of their own land 
(Fischbach 1996). But there were problems ahead. Building on a legacy 
of numerous land-reforms and shifting legal regimes, land registration in 
Palestine turned out be a messy affair.
Land Ownership in a Historical Perspective
In 1858, as part of the Ottoman Tanzimat-reforms, Ottoman authorities 
issued a Land Reform, which, among other things, instructed landowners to 
have their private properties inscribed in a public land register, referred to 
as the Tapu. Within the framework of this law, agricultural land was largely 
defined as government land, essentially belonging to the Ottoman Sultan, 
and populated land was mostly defined as private land, to be registered 
in the name of individual landowners (Falah 1983; LEI 2007). Ottoman 
attempts at registering the use of agricultural land, as well as individual 
ownership of private land were resisted by farmers who wanted to avoid 
taxation for the use of agricultural land, and who found that a focus on 
individual land ownership conflicted with traditional notions of land as 
the collective property of family clans and village communities (Tamim 
1995; LEI 2007: 26–27). As such, the authorities were unable to establish 
a full registry of land ownership in Palestine (Falah 1983). In the urban 
centres, individual landowners would have their land registered. How-
ever, once registered in the names of individuals, land would still be seen 
locally as the collective property of the families to which they belonged. 
Once the registered landowners passed away, their lands would be divided 
between family members, often without an update of ownership in the 
land registry. The collective organization of land was especially strong in 
the villages, where land could be sold or re-distributed within the family 
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without any formal registration of such agreements. To complicate matters 
further, some families systematically under-registered their lands to avoid 
taxes imposed by the late Ottoman Authorities (Tamim 1995; LEI 2007). 
A family owning some 200 dunums5 may have been registered with only 
40 dunums, although everyone in the local community would know what 
land belonged to which family.6
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, parts of the Land Registration 
archives for the area were lost, and some ended up in Turkey. During the 
Mandate Period, the British authorities introduced the ‘Land Settlement 
Ordinance’ in 1928, in an effort to establish a complete land registry in 
which all types of land, including agricultural land would be registered in 
the names of individuals (Tamim 1995; LEI 2007). Again, this was fiercely 
resisted by Palestinian villagers as a violation of their tradition of communal 
ownership (Falah 1983). In some cases, all land belonging to a village would 
be formally registered in the name of the mukhtar, the head of a village or 
family clan, only to be redistributed and treated as communal land within 
the village itself. In this way, old and new concepts of landownership would 
be reconciled on a practical level, and control of the land would be kept 
within the community (Falah 1983; Tamim 1995).
After the 1948 war, the West Bank came under Jordanian rule, and in 
1952 the Jordanian authorities started to establish an updated registry of 
landownership in the urban centres of the West Bank (Fischbach 1996). 
In the following years they completed an updated registration of land-
ownership in Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah, dividing properties registered 
in the names of deceased family patriarchs among their descendants. They 
started making a new land-registry for Bethlehem in 1967, but this work was 
aborted with the eruption of the Six-Day War a few months later. When 
Israel took control of the West Bank, the Jordanians were expelled, and 
the new land registry for Bethlehem was never completed.
Since 1967, Bethlehem has seen a dramatic loss of land due to Israeli 
confiscations for the building of settlements, military installations, 
 by-pass-roads, and most recently, the Separation Wall. Within the com-
5 Dunum or dunam is a unit of land measurement that dates back to the Ottoman period. 
The dunum referred to different measures in various countries. In Palestine, one dunum 
was equal to 920 square meters. Since 1928, the metric dunum, which equals 1000 square 
meters or 0.1 hectares has been in force.
6 This information and accounts of local practice are based on interviews with local 
real estate lawyers and individual landowners who have lost their land through different 
means, and local ‘town historians’ in Bethlehem. 
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munity itself, Christian families continued to sell their land, and most of 
these families have also left the country to settle in other parts of the world. 
In 1994 the main cities of Palestine, including Bethlehem were turned 
over to the Palestinian Authority (PA), within the framework of the Oslo 
Agreement (Farsoun and Aruri 2006). The PA established its own legal 
system, which would include the Land Registration Offices, also known 
as the Tapu Departments (Fischbach 1996). With time, an incomplete and 
chaotic system of land registration led to an explosion of land disputes that 
ended up in the Civil Court system (Fischbach 1996). In 2002, the Land 
Registration Offices were placed under the Palestinian Land Authority, 
but internal land disputes have remained a major problem throughout the 
Palestinian territories. In 2007, a government report estimated that “nearly 
25 percent of the court disputes in the West Bank today are land related” 
(LEI 2007: 11). In the Bethlehem district, this situation has enabled certain 
individuals to claim other people’s land through fabrication of land docu-
ments, and sometimes with the help of officials in the Land Registration 
Office and the Civil Courts.
A Bethlehem Land Scam
An example of one such land scam illustrates the complexity and scale 
of the problem. In the early 1980s, Ameer,7 a Christian businessman from 
Bethlehem bought a large piece of land covering 8 dunums in a central part 
of Bethlehem, close to the Bethlehem Intercontinental Hotel. In the follow-
ing years, and especially after the Oslo Agreement, the commercial value of 
this property multiplied. In 2000 a group of investors that owned the Beth-
lehem Intercontinental Hotel made a generous offer to buy the property, 
but Ameer turned it down, as he had his own plans for the land. However, 
during the spring of 2002, he faced a counter-claim to the land from a man 
who asserted to have bought this piece of land from its previous owner at 
an earlier stage. This claim was brought before the Land  Registration Office 
a few days prior to Israel’s military siege of Bethlehem in March 2002, a 
siege that would paralyze the city for 39 days (Sennott 2003). By the time 
the siege was lifted, and Ameer was informed that someone else had made 
a claim for his land, the claim had already been accepted by the Land Reg-
istration Office, the entire process had been finalized, and Ameer’s land was 
7 The names of individual characters have been changed throughout the text. 
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now the property of another man. After contacting a lawyer, Ameer was 
eventually confronted with the sales documents of the claimant. According 
to Ameer’s lawyer, these documents were poor fabrications, printed on a 
type of paper that was not in use at the time when these documents were 
supposedly dated. Ameer then appealed to the Land Registration Office to 
have the case re-opened, but his appeal was denied.
However, the case did not end there. Being a resourceful and well-
connected man, Ameer was determined to reclaim his land. While in his 
20s and 30s, Ameer had studied and worked in the US and obtained an 
American passport. This enabled him to use the American consulate to put 
pressure on the PA and have his case reopened. He also had high ranking 
connections within the PA who could speak on his behalf. As a result, the 
case was eventually re-opened, and it was decided that the land documents 
involved would be thoroughly re-examined. According to his lawyer, the 
opposing claimant to his land also had valuable connections, allowing the 
case to be stalled for years. Nonetheless, after six years, the case was finally 
settled, and Ameer got his land back.
This case is not unique. According to real estate lawyers, public officials, 
and community activists in Bethlehem, there have been numerous cases 
in which people have lost their land to illegitimate claimants. The case 
described above illustrates the acquisition of land through mere fabrication 
of land-documents. Another common practice has been for two individuals 
to make conflicting claims to the same piece of land. Such cases have been 
examined within the Civil Court system, and decisions have been made, 
granting ownership of land to one of the claimants. In many such cases, 
the land in question has not belonged to any of the claimants. According 
to local sources, the real owners have often been out of the country, and, if 
present, they may not have been informed that someone else have claimed 
their land.8 There are also cases in which people have faced illegitimate 
claims to their land from members of their own extended families. In the 
summer of 2007, Khader, a Christian landowner in Beit Jala, experienced 
this when some distant members of his family clan laid claim to a large 
piece of land to which he held legal title. When facing these relatives on his 
land, he started picking olives from his trees in a symbolic gesture assert-
ing his claim to the land. He was then physically assaulted, and suffered 
minor head injuries caused by several blows. To avoid further physical 
8 This information is based on interviews with local real estate lawyers and individual 
landowners who have lost their land through a variety of ways. 
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confrontations, outsiders were brought in to mediate between the parties. 
A meeting was arranged, in which Khader presented documents from the 
Tapu-register, proving that he held title to the land in question. Nonethe-
less, the issue remained unsettled. Khader suspected that his relatives had 
made a deal to sell his land to a network of well-connected people and, if 
this was the case, that their claim to the land would be supported by the 
Land Registration Office. His fears were confirmed. The court dismissed 
his documents of ownership, and the land in question was handed over 
to his relatives.
A variety of strategies has been used to acquire land by dubious means, 
and it is widely believed that the majority of such land scams have depended 
on the complicity of officials within the Civil Court system. According to 
local real estate lawyers, the victims of such land scams have often made 
futile efforts at reclaiming their land before giving up, realizing that they 
have lost their land to people more powerful than themselves. Those in 
charge of these land scams are commonly referred to as the ‘Land Mafia’. 
Their numbers are disputed, but in general they are assumed to be a group 
of people, some based in refugee-camps, some in the villages of Taʿamre 
next to Bethlehem, and some based in Bethlehem itself but belonging to 
families of Hebron origin. It is claimed that some of them work in the 
Palestinian Security Services, the Bethlehem Governorate, and the Civil 
Court System in Bethlehem; they are all said to be connected to Fatah, 
the ruling party within the PA. People in Bethlehem know who the key 
players are, and they also know that they cannot be held accountable for 
their actions, because of their connections within the PA, or because of 
their families’ position. A fact that has not gone unnoticed is that the vast 
majority of those who have lost their land belong to Christian families, 
while the perpetrators are mostly of Muslim background.
Due to possible underreporting and the disputed nature of such cases, it 
is difficult to estimate how many families have lost their land to illegitimate 
claimants. Some locals argue that close to a hundred Christian families 
have lost land under questionable circumstances, while real estate lawyers 
dismiss these figures as widely overblown. It is important to point out that 
Christian families have been, and still are the biggest landowners in Beth-
lehem, making them the natural targets of such land-grabs. Nonetheless, 
many Christians see this phenomenon in sectarian terms, explaining the 
theft of land as part of an effort to marginalize the Christian community. 
As one Bethlehem landowner put it: “If they cannot buy our land, they just 
take it!” Though not shared by everyone, such interpretations are easily 
resorted to in a context of marked Christian-Muslim tensions, where local 
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Christians are increasingly concerned with their own demographic vulner-
ability. However, in the following, it will be argued that these land disputes 
must be understood as part of a wider picture, with reference to the state 
of law enforcement under the Palestinian Authority, and the primacy of 
family and community relations as a source of protection.
Law and Order Under the Palestinian Authority
Since the PA took control of parts of the occupied territories, its govern-
ing institutions have been ridden with corruption, incompetence, and a 
systematic misuse of economic funds and human resources (Amundsen 
2004; Khan 2004). Due to a combination of internal and external factors, 
the Palestinian Authority has failed to establish a functioning legal system 
and the rule of law in the occupied territories (Kelly 2004; Kelly 2006). 
With all its shortcomings, the Palestinian Authority, and especially its 
institutions of law-enforcement have enjoyed little trust and legitimacy 
among local Palestinians. Some of these shortcomings are the result of 
structural limitations to the coercive powers of the Palestinian Authority 
as defined by the Oslo Agreement (Kelly 2004). Within the parameters of 
the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided in three areas with different 
judicial status. In area A, which includes Palestinian urban centres, the PA 
would enjoy full civil and military jurisdiction; in Area B, which includes 
the areas surrounding most Palestinian towns, the PA would enjoy civil 
but not military control; finally, Area C, the most rural areas, and those 
surrounding Israeli settlements and military installations, would be under 
full Israeli jurisdiction. As such, the Palestinian police have limited legal 
right to apply coercive power in their efforts to enforce the law. Even 
though Palestinian Civil Law applies to area B, it is only in Area A that the 
Palestinian police can actually enforce the law. In Area B, any Palestinian 
police actions would require close co-ordination with the Israeli army. 
Since 2001, this coordination has broken down, leaving large areas of the 
West Bank in a legal vacuum (Kelly 2004: 8). In the Bethlehem region, this 
means that many of the areas outside of Bethlehem itself are beyond the 
reach of Palestinian law enforcement.
To make matters worse, the Palestinian legal system is ridden with 
internal flaws. Palestinian police forces are underpaid, poorly trained, and 
generally perceived as lacking respect for the legal rights of those who find 
themselves at the centre of their attention. Historically, Palestinian society 
is structured around patrilineal family-clans, hamulahs, that unite groups 
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of families based on assumptions of shared origins, mainly along patrilineal 
lines (Rothenberg 1999). These clans have served several functions. First, 
clans are a source of individual and family security. Outsiders will think 
twice before attacking members of a powerful clan, knowing that revenge 
will be taken. When states are strong, and can protect their citizens, clans 
weaken. When states are weak, clans take on a heightened importance. 
According to Glenn Robinson, this dynamic has allowed clans to flourish 
and establish their neighbouring communities, especially after the break-
down of the Palestinian Authority under the second Intifada (Robinson 
2008). This, however, is not a new phenomenon in the Bethlehem area. 
Lawlessness and insecurity are recurring themes in descriptions of the 
Palestinian central highlands. Ali Qleibo writes about the security situation 
in Jerusalem and its hinterlands in the late Ottoman period: “Peasants in 
their villages were not safe, neither were city people outside the walls, for 
the marauding Bedouins, in the absence of a strong central government, 
raided and looted towns and villages and abducted women and children 
to be sold as slaves” (Qleibo 2009: 145–146).
In the Bethlehem area, the terror inflicted on Bethlehem and its nearby 
villages by raiding Bedouins has a central place in local folklore and local 
history from the late Ottoman period (Gonzales 1992: 51, 88). People speak 
with some resentment about the vast areas of land stretching towards the 
Judean desert that used to belong to Bethlehem, but that were forcibly 
taken over by Bedouin tribes as they settled down and established their 
own villages around Bethlehem. According to some sources, a certain level 
of security and rule of law was installed when the British Mandate took 
control of Palestine after World War I (Gonzalez 1992; Qleibo 2009). This 
was also the situation after 1948, when the West Bank was subjected to 
the rule of a centralized, strong Jordanian state.
The Politics of Tribalization
Among the Christians of the West Bank, there were high hopes that the 
Palestinian Authority would be able to protect vulnerable local communi-
ties. Instead, already powerful family clans have grown more powerful since 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. This was partly a result of 
the politics of tribalization instituted by Yassir Arafat as President of the 
Palestinian Authority (Robinson 2008). In his efforts to bolster his own rule, 
and stem the influence of the new generation of political  leaders known 
as ‘the Intifada elite’, Arafat sought to undermine institutional politics and 
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strengthen the politics of personality, family, and patronage (Robinson 
1997; Amundsen 2004). Through a few important steps, Arafat secured his 
own powerbase and strengthened the influence of powerful family clans 
(Robinson 2008).
The first step was the adoption of an election law dividing the West Bank 
and Gaza into 16 electoral districts, where all parliamentary representatives 
had to be elected from their own district. This allowed large family clans to 
determine who would be elected from each district, creating a Parliament 
of clan leaders who were obedient to Arafat and his Cabinet.
The second step was to establish a Department of Tribal Affairs, encourag-
ing the use of tribal law and sulha—traditional means of  reconciliation—to 
resolve conflicts instead of turning to formal institutions of law enforce-
ment. The Palestinian Authority has even made efforts to integrate tradi-
tional institutions of tribal law within its formal system of law enforcement 
(Frisch 1998; Bowman 2001). At a local level, the Palestinian Authority has 
encouraged people to settle conflicts and handle minor offences through 
the use of tribal law and family council, rather than involving the police. 
Traditional means of conflict resolution are used to deal with a whole range 
of problems, ranging from petty theft to more serious cases, sometimes even 
homicide (Bowman 2001). This is not a new phenomenon. In coexistence 
with centralized systems of law enforcement, the institutions of tribal law 
and family councils have been utilized to handle internal disputes among 
Palestinians under Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Israeli rule (Birzeit 
University 2006). Still today, sulha is widely used in societies throughout the 
Middle East. Under some circumstances, tribal law, and other traditional 
means of conflict resolution may prove effective in containing or resolving 
social conflicts. However, these methods seek reconciliation based on some 
form of consensus, and according to local sceptics, as well as recent stud-
ies on informal justice, they tend to do so to the benefit of more powerful 
clans, and at the cost of weaker clans and individuals belonging to smaller 
families (Birzeit University 2006: 108–110).
A third step in Arafat’s empowerment of family clans was to allow for 
clan-based recruitment to his various security forces—14 at the most—which 
turned the security forces into vehicles of clan power and politics (Robinson 
2008). The same pattern is evident within the regular police forces. In various 
districts of the West Bank, the police forces tend to be strongly dominated 
by specific clans, while other clans are so powerful that their members are 
beyond the reach of the law. As a result, the law is unevenly and arbitrarily 
enforced, and in some areas not enforced at all. The absence of the rule of 
law, and the impunity enjoyed by certain groups has been addressed by 
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researchers (Frisch 1998) as well as international reporters (Sennott 2003; 
Rees 2004). Some have emphasized the growing informal power of clans of 
Hebron origin in Bethlehem and other parts of the West Bank. Others have 
described how certain groups of people, due to the size of their family clans, 
or their status as resistance fighters, have been allowed to operate as Mafia-
like networks within the Bethlehem area. Whether or not an incident can 
be treated as a criminal incident is not decided by the police, but depends 
on the identities of the actors involved.
The Limits of Formal Law Enforcement
An incident that took place during the summer of 2007 can serve as 
illustration. In a Muslim village close to Bethlehem, a bitter dispute over 
distribution of family land reached a violent conclusion. At close range, 
and in broad daylight, a man shot and killed his two nephews outside their 
home. The killing had been witnessed by a number of people, some of whom 
reported the incident to the police. Having obtained detailed accounts of 
the event, Palestinian police officers came to arrest the perpetrator. The 
man was apprehended in his home and brought to a police van. But there, 
the police were confronted by a large group of men from the village. One 
of the village elders came forth, and told the police officers that they would 
not be allowed to arrest the perpetrator. The villagers demanded that they 
let him go, and made it clear that this tragic incident would be dealt with 
by the villagers themselves. The police had no choice but to let the man 
go, and they made no further attempts to arrest him.
This episode demonstrates some of the insufficiencies of PA law enforce-
ment capacity.9 In some cases, the Palestinian Authority does not have the 
capacity and authority, or the will, to enforce the law if this involves con-
fronting certain community leaders and family clans. In Beit Sahour, a mixed 
Christian-Muslim town where I lived at the time, people referred to this case 
with great concern. When talking about the case, a local asked rhetorically: 
9 This episode also illustrates some of the problems resulting from the transition to a 
new system of land registration. Within the local community, the attempt by the two young 
men to reclaim the land already sold by their father, was seen as a gross violation of local 
notions of honour and decency. For these young men, permanently based in Jordan, the 
transition to a new property system opened up opportunities for great economic gains at 
the expense of family honour and unity. The killing of these young men may have been 
seen as a rather dramatic reaction within their local village, but also as a timely warning 
to anyone else who might feel tempted to take advantage of the new system. 
110 bård kårtveit
“If they can kill each other, and the police do nothing, what will they do if 
they kill one of us?” The assumption was that the police would be unable 
to react to such a crime against Sahouris as well and, as such, unable to 
provide any form of meaningful protection for the community. This reflects 
a general concern that both traditional means of conflict resolution and the 
absence of formal law enforcement tend to favour those who already are 
in a position of power. Under these circumstances, people depend on their 
own families and local communities for protection, and those belonging to 
large kinship groups are in an advantageous position compared to those 
belonging to smaller clans and less close-knit communities.
During the Second Intifada, the PA institutions of law and order col-
lapsed rapidly, largely because they were the primary targets of Israeli 
military activities. During the first few years of the Intifada, the institu-
tional framework of the Palestinian Authority was destroyed. This further 
strengthened the importance of clans as a source of protection. Robinson 
argues that the absence of any state authority left Palestinian society in a 
“near Hobbesian state” where “primordial groups—clans—were best suited 
to provide security and other basic social functions to their members” 
(Robinson 2008).
The Fear of Powerful Clans
A few years into the Intifada, the institutions of the PA, including its police 
forces, were gradually rebuilt. However, local power relations based on clan 
and community affiliations can be seen in all aspects of law enforcement. 
In the Bethlehem area, the most feared clan is commonly referred to as the 
Taʿamre. Taʿamre is the name of a stretch of villages close to Bethlehem and 
settled by a clan of Bedouin origin. Within the Bethlehem region, the people 
of Taʿamre are notorious for being clannish, for sticking to their group, and 
for being fiercely resistant to interventions by any kind of external author-
ity (Sennott 2003; Rees 2004). People in the Bethlehem area—regardless 
of their sectarian background—approach them with fear and caution, and 
in some cases try to minimize their contact with them. There is a general 
impression that if you find yourself on bad terms with someone from 
Taʿamre, you may face reactions from their entire community in the form 
of violent retribution. These perceptions are fuelled by actual events, as 
well as widely held prejudices against Bedouin communities. Due to their 
regional notoriety, the people of Taʿamre, as well as other communities 
with a similar reputation, can do much as they please without being held 
accountable by the law. Local policemen can be very blunt about this, and 
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they readily confirm that people from certain communities, in particular 
the Taʿamre are regarded as “special cases”, and that staying out of their 
way makes their job as policemen a lot easier.
A dramatic example of this was seen a few years ago, when a Christian 
man from Bethlehem accidentally bumped into a young woman from 
Taʿamre while driving his car. The woman was not injured, but the driver 
had her taken to a doctor, where she got a thorough examination before 
she was brought home to her own family. Afraid of facing any acts of ret-
ribution from the woman’s family, the driver agreed to pay her family a 
sum of 300 Jordanian Dinars in compensation—the equivalent of a month’s 
salary for most Palestinians. A year later, the brother of the unlucky driver 
had an encounter with the same family from Taʿamre. His daughter was hit 
by a car and killed instantly in the middle of Bethlehem. The driver had 
been driving recklessly, well above the speed limit and was apprehended 
by the police at the scene. After being brought into custody, he spent the 
following night in jail. The next day, the local police contacted the girl’s 
father and informed him that the driver was the son of a powerful man 
from Taʿamre. The police then argued that this had been a tragic accident 
and that the driver wasn’t really to blame for it. The girl’s father found 
himself under heavy pressure to drop the case, and the driver was free to 
go. Among local Christians, some see the contrast between the two epi-
sodes as an example of the impunity enjoyed by members of the Taʿamre 
clan, as well as the relative powerlessness of local Christians. However, in 
this particular case, people would add that the outcome would have been 
the same if the girl had belonged to a Muslim family, as long as the driver 
belonged to the Taʿamre clan.
Christian Vulnerabilities
These tendencies can shed some new light on the issue of land-disputes 
in the Bethlehem area. As mentioned earlier, most of the victims of these 
land scams have been Christians who owned land within the town limits 
of Bethlehem and neighbouring Beit Jala. However, Bethlehem’s other 
neighbouring town of Beit Sahour has a higher population of Christians, 
who own large areas of undeveloped land;10 yet they have not faced similar 
10 More dunums of land belong to Bethlehem and Beit Jala than to Beit Sahour, but a 
larger share of this land has been confiscated by Israel for the construction of settlements, 
Israeli-only bypass-roads and the Separation Wall.
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problems of land theft. According to real estate lawyers based in Bethle-
hem, there have been internal family disputes over land in Beit Sahour, 
but no incidents of people losing land to the so-called “land mafia” by way 
of document fabrication.
The Special Case of Beit Sahour
Within the Bethlehem region, Beit Sahour has been attributed with certain 
social characteristics that may partly explain this difference. Until recent 
years, the people of Beit Sahour have refused to sell land to outsiders, 
leaving them much less vulnerable to the kind of land claims that have 
taken place in Bethlehem. Beit Sahour has also been known for its internal 
unity and its tribal characteristics as a community still structured along 
family and hamulah-lines, but also with a strong sense of community and 
solidarity against outside forces (Bowman 2001).
When conflicts have erupted between people from Beit Sahour and 
people from other nearby communities, Christians and Muslims from Beit 
Sahour have united against the external ‘others’. A well-known incident 
took place in 2004, in which a young man from a nearby village used his 
cell-phone to take pictures up the skirts of a Christian girl who was standing 
in a clothes shop in Beit Sahour. The man was caught by the girl’s fiancé, 
and an ugly fight broke out between the two. After a while, the man from 
the nearby village was joined by friends and relatives from his own village. 
They were, however, hugely outnumbered by a large group of Sahouris, both 
Christians and Muslims, who came to support the girl’s fiancé. In the end, 
the men from the nearby village were sent running out of town. The man 
who started it all lost an eye in the fighting, and he had his car physically 
carried to the outskirts of Beit Sahour by a group of young men, and then 
put on fire. The Palestinian Authority—fearful of an inter-village fight that 
might escalate further—bought a new car for the original perpetrator, and 
the Presidential office made an appeal to the two communities, urging 
them to put an end to the dispute.
This incident along with histories of confrontations between young men 
from Beit Sahour and from the Hebron area are held up as illustrative of a 
kind of community solidarity that is attributed to Beit Sahour, and that may 
discourage attempts at taking land belonging to the community.11 This kind 
11 In addition, Beit Sahour enjoys a reputation as a community of resilience and internal 
solidarity after a famous campaign during the first Intifada, where the entire community 
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of solidarity is also ascribed to the many villages surrounding Bethlehem, 
but less so to Bethlehem itself.
In addition to large-scale emigration, the towns of Bethlehem and Beit 
Jala have undergone sweeping demographic changes from which Beit 
Sahour has been spared. This includes the building of three refugee-camps 
between Beit Jala and Bethlehem after the 1948 war, and the steady influx 
of internal migrants from the Hebron-area and from nearby villages. As 
a result, these communities stand out as deeply fragmented and marked 
by a series of tensions, between old families and new-comers to the area, 
between city-dwellers, villagers, and camp-based refugees, and between 
Christians and Muslims. This is where the land scams of the Bethlehem 
area have taken place, and those who lose their land are often families that 
have already left the country, or families that still live in the communi-
ties, but whose local presence has been substantially weakened through 
emigration.12 These are families that find little protection within their local 
communities. They appear to be targeted because of their social vulner-
ability, and when well-connected people try to take their lands, they find 
themselves on their own.
If a long history of large-scale emigration has made certain families 
easy targets of land theft, the same set of mechanisms has left the wider 
Christian community of the Bethlehem area vulnerable to physical abuse, 
burglary, and other violations against their rights and properties. In a 
society characterized by lawlessness, local Christians find themselves in a 
protection gap, as the official system of law enforcement is too weak and 
unreliable, their own families too small, and their communal networks too 
fragmented to offer them adequate protection and security.
Abusive Law Enforcement
This collapse of the rule of law is a source of insecurity and alienation 
among some Christians in Bethlehem. People find that representatives of 
the legal system are not only unable, or unwilling to protect them, but that 
refused to pay taxes to the occupying government, and systematically disengaged from the 
Israeli economy by boycotting Israeli products.
12 To make matters worse, families with a long history of emigration are also especially 
vulnerable to land confiscations at by the Israeli authorities. Since 1967, the State of Israel 
has applied the 1950 Absentee Property Law to justify the confiscation of Palestinian land 
that has not been used regularly, and properties that have not been inhabited for longer 
periods of time. Many of these families would have lost their land anyway, but their absence 
or limited presence in the area has provided Israeli authorities with a ‘legal’ pretext for 
confiscations. 
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they often abuse what little power they have. The Palestinian Authority is 
expected to serve and protect the rights of ordinary Palestinians, so when 
people find that their police forces neglect their duties or abuse their 
authority this is a source of profound disappointment.
One evening during the summer of 2007, two policemen entered a res-
taurant in Bethlehem. There were only a handful of guests, including two 
women, who are were in the company of two men. One of the women 
caught the attention of one of the policemen, who tried to engage her in a 
conversation. Failing to get her attention, the police officer started to make 
a scene and asked for the women’s ID. The man running the restaurant 
tried to intervene, and asked the policeman if there were any trouble. The 
policemen then called for back-up, and decided to arrest the staff and all 
the guests in the restaurant, including a young man who was sitting at the 
bar, and who had not been involved in the encounter with the police. They 
were all put behind bars without any charges, and only after three days 
were they released from custody. In the meantime, the police have put 
out a rumour that the restaurant was closed and the guests were arrested 
because the female guests were prostitutes. Though this rumour was widely 
dismissed, it had a devastating effect on the restaurant, as most of the local 
people were reluctant to visit the place in the following month.
The restaurant is run by a Christian family, most of their guests are local 
Christians, and they serve alcohol as well as non-halal food to their guests. 
As such, the restaurant is largely seen as a fully Christian arena, where 
most local Muslims are unlikely to spend much time. By closing down the 
restaurant and spreading rumours about prostitution taking place there, 
the police greatly damaged the reputation of the establishment, making 
it a socially risky place for local Christians to visit. By arresting the entire 
staff and the guests without making any charges, the policemen were also 
demonstrating the practical extent of their powers as officials working 
within a system where they cannot be held accountable for their actions. 
Sami, who runs the restaurant on a daily basis, is reluctant to talk about 
sectarian tensions; he used to argue that local conflicts are largely class-
based and political in nature. In this case, however, he states with great 
resentment that the policemen, who are all Muslims,13 chose to treat them 
this way because he and the owner of the restaurant are Christians.
13 There are very few Christians working as police officers or low ranking public servants 
within the PA apparatus. According to themselves, this is mainly based on self-exclusion. 
Since wages within the PA apparatus are relatively poor, most Christians are not interested 
in working within the public system. 
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Sami is a committed veteran in the Fatah movement, and a dedicated 
Palestinian nationalist. He is also personally acquainted with the regional 
leader of the Palestinian security forces in Bethlehem. Nonetheless, in the 
last ten years he has experienced first-hand the absence of the rule of law 
in the Bethlehem district, and the culture of corruption and abuse that he 
feels has taken root among PA officials. With time, this has strained his 
faith in the Palestinian Authority. The episode when he was arrested while 
working at the restaurant was a turning point. Since then, he has tried to 
get a visa for the USA for himself and his family.
Elias is another local Christian who has lost faith in the local police 
forces. He works at a crisis centre in Bethlehem that shelters women in 
need of protection from members of their own families. Occasionally, the 
centre, the women it shelters, and the staff all face serious threats and 
assaults from the women’s male relatives. The police have been unwilling 
to offer much in the way of protection for the centre and its employees. 
From Elias’s perspective, this shows the reluctance of the police to address 
issues of genuine urgency.
When the Palestinian Authority was established, people had hoped that it 
would represent the Palestinians’ interests, protect their rights, and establish 
an internal rule of law from which everyone would benefit. Instead, PA rule 
has only involved new forms of insecurity and powerlessness.
The Problem of Foreign Intervention
Under these circumstances, local Christians experience a deepening sense 
of insecurity as their local strength and presence continue to decline. The 
absence of the rule of law combined with their own numerical inferiority 
fuel their worries about their own future in the area. However, the Chris-
tians of the Bethlehem area are far from powerless, and they do have one 
important asset at their disposal. Local Christian have strong ties to the 
Western world, and local clergy, politicians, academics, and civil society 
activists enjoy extensive connections with financial donors, media outlets 
and diplomatic representatives from European countries. However, they 
are very cautious about using international contacts to deal with their 
internal problems.14
14 Local Christians are cautious about attracting international attention, but they do not 
entirely refrain from doing so. Internal concerns such as the issue of land theft have been 
raised with foreign authorities, such as the US Consulate in Jerusalem. This is reflected in 
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As Palestinians, they find it hard to engage in public criticism of their 
own community, as there are always those waiting to use such criticism to 
further dismiss Palestinian national demands and question the legitimacy 
of their cause. Christian leaders are worried that an international focus on 
conflicts along sectarian lines may harm the standing of the Palestinian 
community abroad. It is also feared that an international focus on internal 
tensions may divert attention away from the Israeli occupation and its crip-
pling effect on the Palestinian economy, widely seen as the main source of 
worries among Christian Palestinians (Soudah 2006). Within the Bethlehem 
region, Israel has confiscated large areas of land—much of it from Christian 
families—to expand Jewish settlements, and to build the Separation Wall in 
a half circle around Bethlehem, devastating the city’s economy (UN OCHA 
2004; Bowman 2007; UN OCHA 2009). These violations represent a far 
greater assault on Bethlehem’s Christian presence and land rights than the 
issue of internal land disputes. Although they are concerned about internal 
corruption, land theft, and the failure of  functioning law-enforcement under 
PA rule, leading Palestinians do not trust international media to present 
such issues in a responsible manner and to place them within the right 
context. They know from earlier experiences that  international reporting 
on internal problems of a sensitive nature, such as the issue of land theft, 
can be used against the  Palestinian Authority, to create an alarmist image of 
Muslim extremists driving Christians out of Palestine (Cook 2008: 238). One 
example of this was seen in June 2006, with the proposal for a resolution 
in the U.S. Congress that accused the Palestinian Authority of prosecuting 
and discriminating against Christian Palestinians: it called for tougher US 
sanctions against the Hamas-led government in power at the time.15 No 
representatives of the local Christian community had been consulted in 
preparation for this proposal. Once publicized, the proposal was widely 
condemned by local Church leaders and political figures that identified 
the State of Israel as the primary aggressor against local Christians.
the section on Israel and the occupied territories in the International Religious Freedom 
Report 2008, issued by the US. State Department: “The PA did not take sufficient action dur-
ing the reporting period to remedy past harassment and intimidation of Christian residents 
of Bethlehem by the city’s Muslim majority. The PA judiciary failed to adjudicate numerous 
cases of seizures of Christian-owned land in the Bethlehem area by criminal gangs. PA officials 
appeared to have been complicit in property extortion of Palestinian Christian residents, as 
there were reports of PA security forces and judicial officials colluded with gang members in 
property extortion schemes.” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108484.htm accessed 
17.11.2009.
15 A website that contains link to the the full text of the resolution, and to some local 
responses to it: http://imeu.net/news/article001823.shtml accessed 17.11.2009.
 land, law, and family protection in the west bank 117
An Ethos of National Unity
Most importantly, prominent Christians have reservations about criticizing 
Muslim Palestinians in general, worried that this may reflect poorly on the 
Christian minority. Based on their historical prominence, the Christians of 
Bethlehem—especially the old landowning families—are seen as a privi-
leged upper and middle-class minority of superior wealth and education. As 
such, claims of discrimination or anti-Christian hostilities can be perceived 
by many local Muslims as the self-serving and unfounded whining of a 
spoiled Christian elite. Raising such concerns internationally is also seen 
as violating an ethos of national unity, the obligation to address internal 
differences in internal forums, while projecting national unity outwards. 
This ethos is based on a rationale that national liberation can only be 
achieved through unity, and that internal differences can be dealt with 
once the national struggle has been won. This rationale is eagerly exploited 
by government officials, who often discourage Palestinians from claiming 
their rights through the legal system in the name of “national unity” (Kelly 
2006). The public discourse on sectarian relations is very much shaped by 
such political concerns and ideals of self-restraint. At the same time, many 
Christians feel that unless these internal problems are discussed openly, 
they cannot be dealt with in any effective manner. Within the community, 
this stands out as an enduring dilemma of whether to stay silent for the 
sake of national unity, or speak out about internal concerns, and invoke 
external interventions on behalf of their sectarian community.
Writing on Lebanon, Longva (in this volume) contrasts the positive 
attitude among Christian Maronites towards the interventions of foreign 
powers on their behalf, against the more sceptical attitude found within the 
Greek Orthodox community. She explains this difference with reference to 
the historical narratives and aspirations for the future that are held within 
the two communities. Among Christian Palestinians, external interven-
tions have been a source of privilege and protection, as well as alienation 
from their home community. Reservations about utilizing international 
connections reflect concerns about the prospects of a Palestinian national 
project, as well as their own place in it. Historically, Christian leaders, both 
local Church leaders and political figures, have been heavily committed 
to a secular nationalist vision of a Palestinian community, and many of 
them have been actively engaged in left-wing political factions such as the 
PFLP and the DFLP as well as Fatah (Aburish 1993; Lybarger 2007). As they 
see it, the secular nationalist project depends on a convincing projection 
of cross-sectarian Palestinian unity, both internally, and in relation to the 
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international community. What is at stake here is the very notion of a 
national ‘We’ in which they, as Christian Palestinians, can claim a sense 
of belonging.
However, not all local Christians share these concerns. Following the 
first Intifada, there has been a growing split between a secular camp and 
an Islamist camp within the Palestinian territories. The popular growth 
of the Islamist camp, the malgovernance of the PA, and the failure of the 
peace process have disillusioned and alienated many Christian Palestin-
ians who once identified with the secular nationalist camp. Writing about 
political identities among West Bank Palestinians during the Oslo Years, 
Lybarger identifies three distinct identity orientations among Christian 
Palestinians who had their political awakening during the first Intifada. 
One involves the continued perpetuation of a traditional secular national-
ism, one advocates a Christian religio-communal revitalization that mirrors 
the Islamist revitalization, and one involves an apolitical escape into an 
otherworldly religious piety (Lybarger 2007). As already mentioned, many 
prominent Christians still retain a strong commitment to secular national-
ism, and their reservations about speaking out on internal differences can 
be seen as a reflection of this. By contrast, those who belong in the religio-
communal camp are less troubled by such reservations. In fact, some are 
quite eager to focus on sectarian tensions, and on internal problems faced 
by Christians in the region. One of them is Khalid, an old Fatah veteran 
who returned to Bethlehem in 1994 after two decades in Kuwait. Back in 
Bethlehem he founded a Christian media centre that focuses on news and 
religious broadcasting. He has been very concerned with what he sees as 
the informal discrimination and lack of legal protection for Christians under 
the Palestinian Authority. For years, he has accused Muslim Palestinians 
of trying to drive out local Christians through violence, intimidation, land 
theft, and violations against their properties. He has also accused the 
Palestinian Authority of wilfully allowing such abusive practices to take 
place. This has caused some alarm among other Christians, who see him 
as a sectarian alarmist and a liability to themselves, as Christians and as 
Palestinians. His most ardent opponents have accused him of playing the 
“persecuted Christian-card” in his efforts to secure international funding for 
his media centre. During the fall of 2007, Khalid had an interview appoint-
ment with a news crew from a German TV-network, in which he planned 
to talk about the internal problems facing Christian Palestinians. Local 
Christians working with other media centres and NGOs in Bethlehem were 
informed about this. Fearing that he would give an overly one-sided and 
dramatic presentation of local realities, they contacted the German TV crew 
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and talked them into  cancelling the interview. In this particular case, they 
were worried about what kind of image would be presented to a European 
audience, and less about the effect such a report could have within the 
local community.16 As such, this intervention from other members of the 
Christian community may be seen as an expression of enduring commit-
ments to secular nationalism, and to an ethos of national unity.
This commitment can be both principled and pragmatic in nature. 
Christians who are active in local politics argue that turning to foreign 
governments or international media will only backfire, whereas trying 
to address problems like land theft and the rule of law through internal 
political structures may actually lead somewhere. On the issue of land theft, 
efforts to work within the system have had some effect.
In the spring of 2007 efforts were made by the Palestinian Authority to 
address the issue of land theft. A handful of people associated with land 
scams were arrested, and a few properties were returned to their rightful 
owners. Sceptics then said that those who were arrested where peripheral 
to the network, that key players would go free and that a lot of land would 
remain in the wrong hands. Later on, in November 2008, the Palestinian 
Land Authority started a long-term investigation aimed at determining the 
rightful ownership of disputed land in the West Bank. This process, which 
involves a re-examination of questionable land claims over the last 15 years, 
was started in Bethlehem Governorate, and the process in Bethlehem alone 
is expected to take several months. This investigation has been met with 
local optimism and hopes that, in time, most of the disputed properties 
will be returned to their rightful owners.
Whatever the outcome of this process, the Bethlehem land disputes 
illustrate some of the flaws and shortcomings of law-enforcement in the 
Palestinian Authority. With a legal system ridden with corruption and 
dictated by informal power-structures, family and community networks 
remain important as sources of security. Unless the general inadequacies 
of the legal system are addressed more forcefully, Christian Palestinians 
may be left with a continued protection gap, at risk of further violations 
against their rights and properties.
16 Whereas English-language channels based in the USA or the United Kingdom are 
seen and understood by many within the Bethlehem community, German TV channels 
are less available, and certainly less watched, in spite of a sizeable Bethlehem diaspora 
in Germany. It is therefore assumed that a news report on German television could pass 
almost unnoticed within the local community.
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Conclusion
The situation of Christian Palestinians on the West Bank is characterized 
by a mix of structural power and powerlessness. On the one hand, they are 
a resourceful minority, with an over-representation in public offices and in 
educational and cultural institutions throughout the West Bank. As such, 
they enjoy cultural influence and a political voice in Palestinian society 
that far exceed their numbers. At the same time, they are vulnerable to 
land theft, extortions and other criminal activities that are not dealt with 
in a satisfactory manner by the Palestinian Authority. This paradoxical 
situation reflects an on-going struggle within Palestinian society between 
a social order built around family clans, in which Christians are largely 
powerless and unable to defend their own rights, and one built around 
formal institutions, where they possess the right resources to be in a posi-
tion of strength. Under these circumstances, the PA’s efforts to incorporate 
a clan-based order within an institutionally based legal order have served 
to increase Christian vulnerabilities to land theft and other violations at 
the hands of more powerful groups.
In spite of this, prominent Christians are reluctant to utilize Western 
contacts in their efforts to deal with these problems, seeing this as harmful 
to their own standing within the Palestinian community, and to the inter-
national standing of a Palestinian national project to which they themselves 
are committed. In general, Christian leaders find that that their interests as 
a community are best served by framing their problems in non-sectarian 
terms, with reference to lawlessness and clan-rule, and to work through the 
institutional and political channels of the Palestinian Authority to address 
these issues. In this context, many local Christians see their own rights and 
security depending to be dependent on the development of a Palestinian 
Authority with a functioning legal order with formal institutions that can 
confront, rather than incorporate, a traditional clan-based social order.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONVIVIALITY AND CONFLICT IN CONTEMPORARY ALEPPO
Annika Rabo
Aleppo is a city with a long history of religious, linguistic and ethnic het-
erogeneity. Five hundred years ago the city was a node in a vast network of 
trade stretching across Asia and Europe and it was well-known to seekers of 
fame and fortune. This is no longer the case, and although Aleppo’s inhabit-
ants and daily visitors exhibit ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity, 
the city can be said to have become increasingly parochial and homogenous 
in the last decades. There is a particular kind of Sunni Muslim Arab public 
dominance in the city, but ‘minorities’ still publicly manifest their various 
identities in their ‘own’ urban quarters. There are also nostalgic memories 
of ‘before’, when everyday-life was more ‘open and carefree’.
The co-existence of diverse urban populations is a highly debated and 
urgent issue in the contemporary world. In these debates Middle Eastern 
cities can be used either as a model to emulate or as a warning example. 
Both the historical and present-day Middle East can be—and are—utilized 
in such discussions. In this chapter I will draw on anthropological field-
work in Aleppo from the late 1990s and onwards to discuss and analyse 
discourses on interethnic/religious co-existence between Sunni Muslim 
Arabs and Kurds, and between Muslims and members of various Christian 
sects. Cosmopolitanism is a concept often used to capture the ability to 
handle and accept differences associated with urban life and urbanity. 
Cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanism have clearly become buzz-words in 
many kinds of debates and in many academic disciplines. Ingvild Gilhus 
notes that cosmopolitan ideas took root in antiquity, where the Stoics 
departed from the ideal of man as rooted in a narrow polis. Migration from 
the city-states and social and political unrest were important factors in the 
development of a cosmopolitan culture. The cosmopolis came to designate 
“a city of the world in which all people were equal, independent of race 
and class” (Gilhus 2006: 12).
In this chapter I will instead use the term conviviality to capture an 
everyday ‘living together’ commonly found in Aleppo. Paul Gilroy uses 
conviviality in the context of urban postcolonial cities, and understands it 
© Annika Rabo, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_007
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as the process of cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture 
an ordinary feature of social life. Conviviality “makes a nonsense of closed, 
fixed, and reified identity” (2004: xi).The conviviality of Aleppo, however, 
is different. It is not based on the fusing or merging of persons with vari-
ous religious or ethnic backgrounds. Instead, it is historically rooted in the 
Ottoman organization of taʾifa whereby some (religiously based) ‘sects’ 
were recognized by the sultan and given certain kinds of intra-communal 
autonomy (cf. Longva, this volume). In the nineteenth century the recog-
nized ‘sects’ came to be called millet (Yapp 1987: 6). The Ottoman way of 
dividing its subjects according to religious/national affiliation has both 
survived and been transformed in independent Syria.
I will also argue that the role of the Syrian state is crucial for both the 
transformation and survival of the pre-independence ‘millet system’. The 
state is also directly implicated in the discourses on conflict and conviviality 
in contemporary Aleppo. Issues of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity 
are highly sensitive among Syrian power-holders, partly due to the heritage 
of Arab nationalism. The popular memories of the so called ‘Events’ of the 
late 1970’s, when Syria was caught in a bloody conflict between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Syrian armed forces, are still very vivid in Aleppo 
and play an important role in how my informants categorize themselves 
and others.1
Aleppo, the Syrian State and Heterogeneity
Syria is, and has been, an area of great ethnic, religious and linguistic 
heterogeneity. The ethnic and religious composition of Syria is in many 
ways guesswork because official statistics on such issues are not available. 
However, an educated guess is that Christians constitute about 12 percent, 
divided into at least fourteen sects with the Greek Orthodox as the largest. 
Most Christians describe themselves as ‘Arab’, but there are also Armeni-
ans. Besides, many Syrian Orthodox Christians regard themselves as both 
an ethnic and a linguistic group.2 Most Muslims are Sunni, perhaps 60–65 
1 This article does not cover events of the Syrian revolt in 2011, the outcome of which is 
not clear at the time of writing. It can, however, be read as a background to that revolt.
2 It is extremely difficult to claim with certainty the size of the various Christians com-
munities in Syria. I follow the book Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East. The 
Challenge of the Future (ed. Andrea Pacini 1998). The numbers given are, approximately, as 
follows (Appendix 3, pp. 312–326): Greek Orthodox 503.000 members, Armenian Orthodox 
112.000 members, Melkite 111.000 members, Syrian Orthodox 89.000 members, Maronites 
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percent. Many of the Sunni Muslims are Kurds, but Kurds are also Yezidi, 
and some are Shiʿa Muslim. The Druzes consider themselves as ‘Arab’, as 
do the Alawis, both of whom are Muslim splinter sects, regarded by many 
Syrians as special ‘ethnic’ groups. There are also various kinds of Shiʿa 
Muslims. Finally there are small ethnic/linguistic minorities like Turkmen 
and Circassians.
Many minorities have clustered in specific regions, but most towns and 
cities today have attracted migrants from all kinds of ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. The ‘ethnic-religious mix’, however, differs from one region to 
another and from one city to another. There are no rural Kurdish or Alaw-
ite clusters in the south of Syria, and no rural Druze clusters in the north. 
The variety of Christian sects is greater in the north than in the south. The 
Druzes are concentrated in the southwest mountain region of Syria. Many 
have become refugees following the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights 
in 1967. The Alawis’ ‘original’ area is the northwest mountain region.
Questions of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity are highly complex 
in Syria, and the use of terms like majority or minority are both sensi-
tive and imprecise. ‘Minority’—aqalliyya—is not used in official Syrian 
discourse. Both power holders and citizens-at-large tend to stress that 
‘we are all Syrians’ (cf. Migliorino 2007: 99). The same seems to be true 
for other parts of the Arab world/ Middle East. Seteney Shami (2009: 151) 
notes that in Egypt
the translation of ʿaqalliyya for ‘minority’ is straightforward enough. Difficul-
ties arise when it comes to deciding whether the word applies to Egyptian, 
Arab, and Muslim societies—and if so which groups should be designated as 
such—and whether acknowledging the word ‘minority’ necessarily implies 
a political and social ‘problem’.
In Syria the ruling Baʿth party embraces an ideology of pan-Arab secularism, 
whereby all ethnic and religious differences are publicly under-commu-
nicated. The very concept minority is often said to be a Western colonial 
device to divide people of the Middle East into a myriad of competing 
groups. All Syrian citizens are said to be equal and—very importantly—
all are supposed to be equally Arab. A large ethnic and linguistic minority 
like the Kurds in northern and northeast Syria, with possible irredentist 
28.000 members, Armenian Catholics 25.000, Syrian Catholics 23.000, Assyrian Church of the 
East 17.000 members, Roman Catholics 11.000, Chaldean Church 7.000 members,  Protestants 
2.000. Courbage (2007: 189), however, calculates considerably fewer Christians. It can be 
argued that this preoccupation with numbers and percentages is part and parcel of the 
construction of such contested terms as majority/minority.
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ambitions, is viewed as a potential threat to Arab unity.3 Yet if the Baʿth 
party was originally more successful among Syrian (rural) minorities like 
the Druzes, the Alawis, and the Christians, it was because it aimed to 
overthrow the mainly Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslim urban elite with vast 
interests as landowners in the countryside. Since the Baʿth takeover in 
1963, the ethnic composition of party members has both broadened and 
narrowed. More and more public employees have been obliged to join the 
party for career purposes, thus broadening the membership. At the same 
time putsches have narrowed the ‘membership’ of the behind-the-scene’s 
power holders.4 Analysts and popular opinion, both inside and outside 
Syria, have for decades claimed that the Baʿth party, the army, and the 
secret services are under the control of the Alawis.5
The sectarian composition of the regime and its possible ‘ethnic inter-
ests’, are thus a highly complex issue. Here I simply want to stress that 
the ruling party, and the regime, have not been successful in their goal of 
eradicating religious and ethnic differences in Syria. On the contrary, people 
in Syria, especially in the cities, are exceedingly aware of such differences. 
They also produce and reproduce such differences through talk in their 
daily lives. Official policies in which ethnic and religious differences are 
ignored or negated have, I contend, contributed to turning religious and 
ethnic sensitivities into vehicles for the presentation of selves and others. 
In such presentations gender plays a central role, which will be explored 
in more detail below.
Muslim Arabs and Muslim Kurds
Compared to a hundred years ago, Aleppo is less ethnically, linguisti-
cally and religiously heterogeneous. The Jewish population has all but 
3 For analysis on the invisibility or visibility of the Kurds in Syria see Jordi Tejel Gorgas 
(2007).
4 Most Syrians make little distinction between the ruling party and the regime. However, 
according to most observers and Syrians at large, the importance of the Ba’th party has 
decreased in the past decade.
5 The scope and meaning of Alawi dominance in Syria is contested among researchers. 
Some in a rather ‘primordialist’ position see Syrian politics as—more or less—the outcome 
of ethnic and sectarian struggles (e.g. Nikolaus van Dam, 1981). But most see sectarian 
issues in a more ‘instrumentalist’ vein, as the effect of political struggles. Derek Hopwood 
notes that “Sunnis tend to exaggerate the Alawi nature of the regime” but stresses that this 
perception in itself “can foment discontent” (1988: 98). 
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disappeared,6 and in the old city the bazaar traders predominantly present 
themselves as urban Arab Sunni Muslim. However, Aleppo is still a poly-
glot, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian city. Kurds are the largest ethnic and 
linguistic minority in the city, most of them quite recent migrants from the 
predominantly Kurdish rural areas to the north and northwest of Aleppo.7 
There are large concentrations of Kurds in quarters on the northwest edge 
of the city. Many semi-rural Kurds, with no Aleppo abode, live with their 
families on construction sites as guards and caretakers. Many of the Kurds 
who live in the northwest quarters of the city work in construction and 
stone-masonry, often as free-lance labourers. Local lore claims that almost 
all waiters in restaurants and a great many taxi-drivers are Kurds. Kurdish 
women work in all kinds of domestic service and in home industries. Many 
of the rural customers in the medina are Kurds coming to shop. Arab Alep-
pians often stereotype Kurds as rural, poor and uneducated, and clichés 
about Kurdish stubbornness are common.8 Kurdish women, whether rural 
visitors or urban dwellers, do not, in general, cover their faces, nor wear the 
long black coat typical of contemporary Aleppo female Sunni Muslim Arabs. 
Well-off or middle-class and educated Kurdish women veil themselves to 
a lesser extent than Arab women. My Kurdish informants in Aleppo, for 
their part, stereotype Arabs as small-minded and fixed on controlling the 
female use of space.
The presence of many Kurds in Aleppo has a profound impact on ethno-
religious relations in the city. The Kurds are not Christian, but neither do 
they typify a Muslim urbanity. Kurds and Christians are, in a sense, jointly 
able to challenge Sunni Arab dominance in public space.
6 There are still many older inhabitants in Aleppo with clear memories of Jewish presence 
in the city and their importance in the market. For the importance of Aleppo in the memory of 
its Jewish diaspora see Walter Zenner (2000) and Haim Sabato’s novel Aleppo Tales (2005).
7 Many Kurds from the Jazeera do not have Syrian citizenship. This is not the case for 
Kurds from the Aleppo region. But migration from the Jazeera to Aleppo means that today 
there are stateless Kurds also in Aleppo. 
8 Such clichés are typically expressed about all rural migrants. Some of my informants 
expressed the view that the influx of rural migrants had destroyed the fabric of urban life. 
Aleppo streets and the ‘popular’ quarters are dominated by people who lack sophistication 
and ‘culture’ “They are like ants. They are everywhere and they have too many children 
and no plans for their future” one informant told me in the late 1990s, when complaining 
about the changes in Aleppo. Many who classified themselves as urban Aleppians char-
acterized people they despise as ‘rural’ or ‘tribal’ to rob them of their urbanity and urban 
belonging. Complaints about the rural influx into Aleppo are also a way of complaining 
about the regime. ‘Rural’ or ‘tribal’ is a common metaphor in many larger Syrian cities for 
either Alawis in general, or for Ba’th party members, as well as for the armed forces, or for 
people working in the security agencies.
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Arab Christians and Armenian Christians
In the seventeenth century Christians constituted about a fifth of the Aleppo 
population. Today the percentage is smaller, but is still higher than the 
Syrian average of perhaps 12 per cent, and—according to common Syrian 
knowledge—higher than the share found in Damascus. Aleppo Christians 
are divided between more than a dozen denominations, each with its 
separate Churches. The largest group is the Greek Catholic followed by 
members of the Armenian, Syrian and Greek Orthodox Churches. Aleppo 
Christians are ‘ethnically’ divided into Arabs and Armenians. While Kurds 
are not allowed to establish separate schools or to teach Kurmanji, the 
dominant Kurdish language in Syria, Armenians have been allowed to set 
up their own separate schools.9 Armenians have lived in Aleppo as traders 
since the Middle Ages. Larger communities, mainly from present-day Iran 
and Turkey, settled in the city from the seventeenth century onwards. But 
the large influx of Armenians came at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, when the persecution of Armenians took place in present-day Turkey 
(cf. Migliorino 2007: 99). The Arab attitude towards Armenians in Aleppo is 
somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, people are impressed by what is 
seen as the fantastic work ethos and skills of Armenians. Many Christians 
admire and envy their ability to set up schools, newspapers, mutual aid 
groups, and culture clubs. On the other hand, they are often seen by all 
others as clannish and self-contained, since Armenians rarely intermarry 
with other Christians.10
Christians in Aleppo, more than the Kurds, have varied backgrounds 
and life-styles. There are poor Christians living in close proximity to, 
or inter-mixed with, Kurds. There are very rich Christians who live in 
Christian ‘enclaves’, but also in ‘mixed’ quarters, or in an old bourgeois 
quarter nearer to the centre. Muslims tend to classify Christians as ‘well-
off ’, because some of the extremely rich Aleppians are from well-known 
Christian families. Christians tend to see themselves as better educated 
than Muslim Aleppians, and many Muslims would agree with this. Before 
the nationalization of the private schools, Aleppo Christians had access to 
a great number of schools under foreign and often religious sponsorship. 
 9 Nicola Migliorino (2007: 104 ff.), however, argues that education in Armenian has 
suffered from Syrian state policies.
10 Nicola Migliorino (2007) has an interesting discussion on the activities of the Armenian 
diaspora in Syria and its relationship to the Syrian state.
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Today this is no longer so,11 but the idea that ‘Christians love education’ still 
prevails in Aleppo (and in many other parts of Syria). From the middle of 
the nineteenth century the old, rich Christian elite families amassed their 
fortunes in trade, industry and real estate. In the early 1960s in connection 
with the takeover by the Baʿth party, large private enterprises were nation-
alized, and Christians and Muslims alike were affected by these policies. 
The Christian ‘new rich’, who have benefited from Open Door policies of 
the 1980s and the 1990s and from connections with the political elite, are 
traders/industrialists, just like their Muslim counterparts. 
A few decades ago retail shops in the predominantly Christian quarters 
of Aleppo were generally owned and managed by Christian themselves. 
Some of these quarters—quite in the centre but outside the old city—
became the first ‘modern’ shopping areas of Aleppo in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. They were especially geared towards female shoppers. 
One area (along Tellal street) has now become a shopping area mainly for 
Muslim lower and middle-class customers, while another (Aziziyye and the 
surrounding area) is more mixed. Its back streets are where many young 
male and female Christians take a stroll in the evening, buying soft drinks 
or snacks from the numerous stands. According to Christian informants, 
many of the shopkeepers in these ‘Christian’ quarters are now Muslim, 
partly due to the increase in the number of shops in general, but also to 
the decrease in the ratio of Christians to Muslims. They also underline 
and complain that Christians, in general, marry later and have fewer 
children than Aleppo Muslims, and that they have migrated and left Syria 
at a greater rate. But there are also different opportunity structures for 
Muslims and Christians, with the latter, where possible, seeming to pre-
fer to open offices or workshops, rather than to work in retail. Christian 
traders—from all sects—in the old bazaar have all but disappeared. Only 
a few decades ago, for example, Christians in general, and Armenians in 
particular, used to dominate the large gold market in the central bazaar. 
Now Sunni Arab Muslims dominate this market. There is still, however, 
a majority of Christian/Armenian silver- and gold-smiths in the historical 
Christian quarter (Jdeide/Saliba).
11 Since the early twenty-first century private schools (and even universities) are re-
emerging at an amazing speed in Syria, and private entrepreneurs see such institutions as 
good investments. There are now new schools owned and operated by Christian organiza-
tions but open to all pupils. There are also many primary schools and kindergartens based 
on an Islamic ethos.
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Public Display of Religious Belonging
Friday is the official day off when all public offices and most shops are 
closed. In the Christian quarters, traders and shopkeepers may close 
on Sundays instead. Many shoppers, especially women, find this very 
convenient and on Fridays the streets in these quarters are usually very 
crowded. Shops should be closed one day a week, but many shops actually 
open every day. Shopkeepers can claim that they have both Muslim and 
Christian employees and that these choose when they want to be free. 
Christian traders may elect to close on Friday because their partners and 
customers take that day off, and for some Muslim traders Sunday is a slack 
day because their trade might be connected more to export. But generally 
speaking, the daily and the weekly rhythm of the city are marked by the 
Islamic calendar. The calls to prayer, the weekly Friday off, the official 
holidays, all underline that Islam is the dominant faith in Aleppo. But the 
Islamic rhythm also serves as a social boundary against followers of other 
faiths and the less religiously inclined.
The Christian minority put their religious paraphernalia on public display 
in the predominantly Christian quarters, before and during Christmas and 
Easter celebrations. The ‘religious’ Christmas decorations of the Christians 
in Syria have acquired a distinctly ‘Western’ touch and now include Christ-
mas trees and Santa Claus. Christmas is celebrated on the same dates by 
all Syrian Christians except the Armenians, who use the Julian calendar 
and celebrate Christmas on January 6. This date is also the ‘real’ Church 
feast for the Greek Orthodox, but they have joined the Catholic Churches 
in order to have a common ‘popular’ celebration of Christmas. But Easter is 
only intermittently celebrated on the same dates by the Eastern Orthodox 
and the Catholic Churches.12 Some Christians, on the other hand, argue 
that it is better when all celebrate at the same time, because they can then 
manifest a sense of Christian unity, and processions and feasting are much 
nicer when all their friends take a holiday at the same time. 
All public employees—Muslim and as well as Christian—are allowed 
one day off for Christmas and two days off for Easter (as well as three 
days off for ʿid al-adha and ʿid al-fitr respectively). During the year each 
Church has its own rules for fasts and its own series of saintly holidays 
12 Since Easter is the most important religious holiday, the Orthodox stick to their own 
calculation of when it can be celebrated, i.e. only after the Jews have celebrated Pesach. 
However, about every four years the Catholic and Orthodox Easter celebrations coincide.
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and celebrations, but many celebrate Saint Barbara’s day in early Decem-
ber as a festival for children. Muslims and Christians in Aleppo exchange 
greetings on each other’s religious feasts, and may visit each other. Older 
traders told me that when the old central bazaar had more Christian (and 
before the late 1940s and early 1950s, Jewish) traders, they always used to 
greet each other and pay their respects on the various holidays. It is obvi-
ously hard to know the scope and extent of such mutual civilities. But such 
comments at least indicate a perception of good neighbourliness which, 
generally speaking, has been perpetuated until today as a standard for 
proper public behaviour. There is still a widespread idea—and ideal—that 
in Aleppo people should be civil and civilized, and take a certain interest 
in the public rituals of others.
Muslim and Christian religious holidays are thus publicly and mutually 
acknowledged in Aleppo (as elsewhere in large Syrian cities). The ruling 
Baʿth party embraces the ideology of Pan-Arabism in which all potential 
religious and ethnic conflicts are under-communicated in public political 
life, as mentioned above. Initially the party recruited heavily from the 
various Syrian minorities and, in the eyes of many Sunni Muslims, the 
regime itself came to be regarded as anti-religious, despite the fact that 
the Syrian Constitution requires the President to be Muslim. In the late 
1970s President Hafez al-Asad, an Alawi, started to cultivate a public air 
of Sunni religiosity. On all major Muslim religious holidays he, and other 
high-ranking members in the government and the Baʿth party, prayed in 
the large Ummayad Mosque in Damascus. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
after a near civil war in Syria (euphemistically called al-hawaadeth, ‘the 
Events’) resulting in the brutal eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Islamic aura of the regime increased. The state supported the building of 
new mosques and encouraged Muslims to follow a non-political religious 
path. Many Syrians of all faiths have been, and are still, highly critical of this 
change of policy, which is commonly considered as insincere and shaped 
by political expediency. Today there is still a strong prejudice among urban 
Sunni Muslims, not least in Aleppo, against Alawis. At the same time Sunni 
Muslims enjoy the increased public religious opportunities.
The increasingly ‘Islamic’ character of public space in a city like Aleppo, 
epitomized by increased female veiling and an emphasis on gender differ-
ences, heightens the fears of many Christians who have come to regard the 
‘minority’ character of the regime as a safeguard against increased Islamic 
public dominance. During Christian feasts the President will visit, or be 
visited by, major Christian patriarchs and bishops, and church ceremonies 
are broadcast to the public on radio and television, underlining the equal 
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value of all Syrian citizens, regardless of their faith. There is one major 
celebration in Syria which is studiously ignored, however. The Kurdish New 
Year celebration (nauroz) takes place at every spring equinox. In Aleppo, 
with its large Kurdish population, and in the Kurdish villages in the Aleppo 
hinterland, this is an important day which receives no official recognition, 
but which, on the contrary, is carefully supervised and at times repressed. 
Kurds, when publicly celebrating the New Year, express their Kurdishness 
outside the fold of officially cultivated Arab unity.
An ‘Open’ and a ‘Closed’ City
Aleppo of the early twenty-first century is an open city with no visible 
boundaries, or borders, restricting individuals’ use of ‘public’ space. In 
principle any Aleppian (or visitor) can move about town at any hour of 
the day. According to all my informants, public security is very good. Dur-
ing my various fieldwork periods since the late 1990s, this has often been 
stressed as something particular for Syrian cities in general, and for Aleppo 
in particular. Informants underline that women can leave wedding par-
ties in the early hours of the morning, wearing jewellery worth a fortune, 
without fear of being robbed. Assault is said to be a very unusual crime, 
and people in the bazaar casually carry large sums of money in the ubiq-
uitous Syrian black plastic bags. Public theft is rare, and city inhabitants 
say that they appreciate the level of public security, to which they claim 
they contribute by caring and looking out for each other. Many in Aleppo, 
however, underline that the ability of the state to protect its citizens and 
their property is crucial to retaining its last vestiges of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizens.13
There are, however, numerous invisible boundaries working to police 
access to and utilization of public space. Space managed or owned by the 
Syrian state or the Aleppo council, such as streets, squares and gardens, 
can be defined as ‘public space’. But this delineation covers only a small 
part of such a concept. While mosques are publicly managed, churches 
are not, yet churches are clearly not ‘private space’. Most mosques are 
not open to the general female public, but are very accessible to the male 
13 Aleppo and, notably, Hama were not open cities in the early 1980s when they were 
beleaguered by special army units trying to root out the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
opposition groups. The scars inflicted on most Syrians and most Aleppians by the repressive 
policies of the state are by no means healed. 
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public. Aleppo Christians do not visit mosques, except as tourists, and 
very few Muslim Aleppians have ever visited a church. The public-ness or 
the private-ness of place is relative to who uses it and for what purpose. 
Aleppo is a spatially complexly differentiated city where gender, age, class 
(or occupation) and ethnic and religious affiliations have an important 
bearing on who moves where and why, and who stops where and why. 
The most differentiated city is that between men and women. Male and 
female Aleppo are almost two different cities. It is ‘right’ for men to publicly 
appear in most parts of the city. Their presence in streets, parks or public 
buildings is seldom questioned, while women typically need a purpose to 
appear in public. But Aleppo space is not gendered in any uniform way. 
Women orient their use of space or signal this orientation according to 
the boundaries of propriety set by the ethnic or religious group they are, 
or want to be, identified with, or the stratum/class they identify with, or 
aspire to. Among Arab Muslims, for example, pre-puberty girls and older 
women can be much more mobile than young women. Young unveiled girls 
are sent on errands in the quarter. Older women control their time more 
than women of child-bearing age. Poor women and highly educated (and 
sometimes rich) women are more mobile than others. Highly educated 
women can move around the city for job or professional purposes. Kurdish 
women move around the city more than Arab Muslim women, due partly 
to poverty, but also to differing notions of gendered space. The ‘ethnic 
composition’ of public space in Aleppo is thus both complex and dynamic. 
While Aleppo can be characterized as a divided city, it is important to 
underline that class and the rural-urban division in many ways cross-cut 
religious and ethnic affiliations.
Discourses on Equality and Difference
On an overarching level, my informants in Aleppo all stress the unity of 
mankind beyond cultural, religious and ethnic affiliations and particulari-
ties. All are equally human and equally created by God. Many also act on 
this conviction in their daily lives. People display urbanity—or the lack of 
it—in daily encounters in traffic, queues, in shops, or public offices. The 
enactment of this civic and civil (or uncivil) unity is quite in line with the 
official ideology and Constitution of Syria, according to which all citizens 
are equal. Religious and ethnic affiliation is not officially recorded in Syria 
and does not appear on identity-cards, passports or in demographic sta-
tistics. The exception, as mentioned, is the requirement that the Syrian 
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president be a Muslim. All my Aleppo informants laud this official unity 
and equality beyond particularism, and claim that it is important that 
the stability and unity of Syria are preserved. The history of the bloody 
conflict in Syria in the late 1970s and early 1980, and the developments 
in Lebanon and Iraq serve as frightening examples to my informants (cf. 
Shami 2009: 153). While some claim that these foreign examples help a 
corrupt, unrepresentative and ‘ethnic’ regime to stay in power, they would 
still not wish upon themselves the situation of their neighbours. And when 
the regime simultaneously lauds the unity of Syria and its religiously (but 
not ethnically) varied population, most of my informants do the same. 
“Here Muslims and Christians live side by side” and “Here Muslims and 
Christians respect one another” are typical statements in Aleppo (and in 
Syria in general).
Cultural or historical associations and societies in Aleppo illustrate such 
unity and conviviality. They are allowed to exist to the extent that they do 
not make overt political or economic claims on behalf of their members. 
They are even appreciated when, and if, their purpose is to glorify and 
stress the rich cultural heritage of Syria. Many in Aleppo with heritage 
interests are members of the Archeological Society of Aleppo. This society, 
established in 1924 by Kamel al-Ghazi, a well-known Aleppo historian, is 
one of Syria’s oldest non-governmental organizations. Lectures and semi-
nars on historical, archeological, and cultural topics are given almost every 
week at its headquarters. The society also arranges popular guided field 
trips to various parts of old Aleppo, as well as to other parts of Syria and 
to neighbouring countries. The society is one of the few formal organiza-
tions in Aleppo which attracts both Muslim and Christian members. During 
Ramadan, for example, it always sponsors a breakfast for members where 
both a sheikh and a priest will talk about peaceful co-existence and good 
neighbourliness between Christians and Muslims. All my Aleppo infor-
mants knew of the society and held it in high regard. Other organizations, 
or civil society initiatives, will often be talked about as being ‘owned’ by 
particular individuals, or as too closely connected to the regime. This kind 
of suspicion leads to a passivity for public concerns.
Ideals of national unity, essential similarities or enriching varieties 
and differences do not, however, preclude informants from simultane-
ously slotting citizens into a number of scales of rank and distinction. In 
Aleppo (as elsewhere in Syria) people are keen classifiers of themselves 
and others. They are able to assess the background of others already at 
the first encounter. With some information on family origins, for example, 
the discerning Aleppian can quickly gauge significant facts about who a 
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person ‘is’ and how one can, or should, relate to this person. And although 
all citizens are equal, and feel themselves to be equal to one another, on 
one level, they do not talk about religious and ethnic differences in equal 
ways. Not surprisingly, minorities often form ‘alliances’ against the Arab 
Sunni Muslim majority. The ascent of the Baʿth party can be said to be 
due to such alliances.
In Aleppo, Kurds occupy the bottom rung of the hierarchical cultural 
ladder. Some non-Kurds also claim that Kurdish nationalist aspirations are 
or could develop into a threat against the unity of Syria. But although the 
vocabulary against Kurds in general is quite demeaning, individual Kurds 
can be equally admired. There are rich or landowning Kurds in Aleppo 
with ‘good names’ recognized by all. There are religious leaders admired 
for their integrity. Many of my Christian informants have Kurdish friends 
and vice-versa. In Aleppo certain neighbourhoods are dominated by Kurds, 
interspersed with Christians, as mentioned above. Many of these Christians 
are members of the Syrian Orthodox or ‘Assyrian’ Churches and originate 
in the so called Jazeera in northeast Syria. With the Aleppo Armenians they 
share a history of persecution in the early twentieth century, the Armenians 
often directly at the hands of Kurds.14 But this is not the history which is 
remembered or put to use in these quarters or in the Kurdish-Christian 
friendships. This could be explained by the fact that most of the Kurds in 
these quarters are not from the northeast but from the Afriin district close 
to Aleppo. In intra-Kurdish narratives about self and others, differences 
between Jazeera and Afriin Kurds are sometimes stressed. The former are 
(by the latter) said to be more ‘brutal’. They have a nomadic and roaming 
past and are less educated, while the Afriin Kurds are said to be rooted in 
their villages, more gender equal, and more educated. I have heard wealthy 
Jazeera Kurds talk about Afriin Kurds as ‘stupid and poor but loyal and 
kind-hearted’. But I do not think that these intra-Kurdish differences are 
relevant for the Christian-Kurdish conviviality in Aleppo. Rather it is the 
fact that both are part of minorities with similar social habits that makes 
living close to each other quite common. There are many neighbourhoods 
where poor Kurds could live with poor Arab Muslims. But Kurds often 
claim that they do not feel comfortable among the gender-segregating 
14 The history of these persecutions and the various Christian churches in theses bor-
derlands is exceedingly complex and contested and outside the scope of this article. For 
succinct introduction to these issues see Björklund (1981: 15–48).
136 annika rabo
Sunni Arabs of Aleppo.15 Although most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, they 
are typically classified—and classify themselves—into an ethnic rather 
than a religious slot. But the complex relationship between Kurds—an 
‘ethnic minority’ and Christians—a ‘religious minority’—underlines the 
interdependency of these two classificatory principles and how they feed 
into each other in the particular location of Aleppo.
Discourses on the Faith of Self and Others
Muslims constitute the vast majority of Aleppo inhabitants. Compared 
with many other Syrian cities, religion is commonly felt to play a large part 
in daily life of its inhabitants. Most of my Sunni Arab Muslim informants 
claim that they are ‘traditional and conservative’ and that this is due to their 
‘fear of God’. Christians in general were often referred to as ‘our Christian 
brothers’ in a warm and slightly paternalistic way, indicating a Muslim 
obligation to safeguard the ‘Peoples of the book’. Aleppo Arab Muslims 
know that they dominate the city socially, culturally and economically. 
Some male informants who worked in business and trade had Christian 
partners. Many stressed that Christians are good to work with because “they 
are more honest than Muslims.” But the commonality with Christians did 
not make these informants talk of the two religions as equal. While they 
stated that each believer must hold on to their particular religion, they also 
stressed that Islam was the most complete religion. In the last few years the 
religiously interested and concerned Sunni Muslim informants in Aleppo 
(and elsewhere) have developed anti-Shiʿa narratives. At the same time 
these informants may extol the national and military virtues of Hizbollah 
in Lebanon. While many of my Muslim informants have tried to engage me 
in discussions on comparative religion (e.g. Jesus of the Bible compared to 
ʿIsa of the Qurʾan) or the theological differences between various Christian 
Churches (e.g. the Swedish Lutheran creed versus the Greek Orthodox) not 
one of my Christian informants has tried to do so. Some Christians voice 
the opinion that their religious devotion is different from that of Muslims. 
Butrus, a middle aged businessman explained:
When I studied at university many of my Muslim friends were politically and 
socially radical. But now they have all become devout Muslims. They pray, 
15 The same gender-segregation argument is heard as the reason why Christians and 
Druzes inhabit the same suburbs in Damascus.
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they fast, and they lock their women in. For us it is different. Even if we are 
no longer politically radical, we cannot become religious that way. For us 
faith is more on the inside . . . Actually Christians believe less, I think.
On the one hand, thus, Aleppo Christians express that Muslims are their 
brothers. But, on the other hand, most of my informants also expressed 
strong feelings of being under threat, and fears about constituting a numeri-
cally decreasing religious minority. I have never heard a Muslim talk about 
Christians with hostility or anger, but I have heard the reverse on many 
occasions. Christians commonly lament that they, as mentioned, marry too 
late, have too few children, and migrate to a higher degree than Muslims. 
One Christian man, who had been a public employee until retirement 
and now worked in trade, often discussed what he felt to be the underde-
velopment of Syria. He claimed that his countrymen constantly blamed 
non-Syrians for their own faults. Furthermore, he emphasized that the 
Muslim majority lacked a scientific attitude to life, and instead based all 
their arguments on religion and tradition. Like other Christians in Aleppo, 
he associated himself with modernity and development, and saw his own 
lifestyle as much more cultured than that of the majority. A Christian 
elderly lady with a long professional career complained about the bishop 
of her Church. He was well-known among the city’s Christians as a cultured 
person, and one who was an excellent spokesperson for his flock. He also 
frequently took part in various gatherings devoted to inter-faith dialogue. 
This lady claimed that meeting the Mufti of Syria (who is from Aleppo and 
with an image as a ‘liberal’ and anti-fundamentalist)
and talking about co-existence and mutual interests is not leading us any-
where . . . I don’t believe in this dialogue. Look at our streets. With all these 
veiled women, we, Christians, no longer feel at home. We are moving back-
ward instead of forward. What is there to have a dialogue about?
Discourses on Gender Differences
Among Aleppo inhabitants, there are various—but in many ways also over-
lapping—categorizations of others, based on religion, ethnicity, language, 
perceptions of family and origin. In all of them, however, gender relations 
constitute an organizing principle for exclusion and inclusion. This can be 
understood in terms of the plurality of Syria’s so-called personal status law. 
As described above, all citizens as citizens are equal in the Syrian Constitu-
tion. Citizens, however, have to have a religious affiliation in order to marry 
and have children. Religious affiliation (and Syrian citizenship) is inherited 
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from one’s father. The State thus organizes its population into separate cat-
egories and does so in a gendered way. This legal ordering and separation 
can, of course be seen as inherited from the millets of the Ottoman Empire, 
where non-Muslim communities were both protected and separated from 
the Muslim majority. In Syria today there is a ‘state’ personal status law 
which in its totality covers all citizens classified as Muslims (Sunni, and 
various Shiʿa, including Alawis)16 and from which the Syrian Druzes, Jews, 
and Christians are partially exempted. They instead have their own courts 
regulating betrothal, marriage and dissolution of marriage. The Christian 
sects recognized by the State and with their own separate courts are the 
Greek Orthodox, the Syrian Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, the various 
Catholic Churches,17 and the Protestants. The Christian courts are religious 
courts dominated by clergy.18 There is considerable debate among Chris-
tians concerning their religious courts.19 The courts ensure the survival 
of Christians from generation to generation, since they have to marry in 
church as Christians in order to have their marriage (and their children) 
recognized by the State. At the same time, many Christians are critical of 
the way the clergy run these courts.
My Christian informants in Aleppo also often underlined the basic legal 
asymmetry between themselves and their Muslim compatriots. By Syrian 
law Muslim men are religiously permitted to marry Christian women, but a 
Christian man has to convert to Islam to marry a Muslim woman. A Chris-
tian woman marrying a Muslim may retain her religion but will not inherit 
her husband. The children—who automatically are regarded as Muslims— 
will not inherit their mother. Intermarriages between Aleppo Muslims 
and Christians are very rare but a number of my Muslim informants had 
married foreign non-Muslim women whom they had met when studying 
abroad. Most of these women have converted to Islam.
16 The Syrian personal status law is a codification from mainly Hanafi rulings. But influ-
ence of the Code Napoleon is also discernible. For more detailed analysis of the Syrian 
‘family law’ see Rabo (2005a: 71–87). 
17 The Catholics/followers of Rome are divided into the Greek Catholics (Melkites), Syr-
ian Catholics, Roman Catholics (called latiyin in Arabic), Armenian Catholics, Chaldeans, 
and Maronites. All these Churches are present in Aleppo, and they have organized them-
selves into a common religious court. The Greek Catholics are the largest Christian parish 
in Aleppo, but in Syria in general it is the Greek Orthodox who dominate. This causes a 
certain friction in Aleppo.
18 The state courts for personal status issues are called ‘shariʿa, courts’ but their judges 
have a ‘secular’ legal training with no instruction in the classical jurisprudence.
19 For more detailed discussion about such debates among Christians see Rabo (2011).
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What issues become crucial when a Syrian Christian woman marries a 
Syrian Muslim? Jeanette is a native of a small Syrian town; she moved to 
Aleppo to study and work more than two decades ago. She met and fell 
in love with a Muslim, and they decided to marry. When I got to know 
Jeanette, her children were still fairly small. She admitted that it would 
have been better to marry a man with the same religion, but she was still 
hopeful that Syria would open up to more marriages of her kind. At that 
time the most important issue for her was that her children would learn 
to love and respect the families of both parents.
I have not become a Muslim because I love my parents and a conversion 
would mean that I negated my own past and my own roots. My husband and 
I try to bring up our children to have respect for all people.
But a few years ago this kind of respect was bringing problems to one of 
her children. “Things are getting much worse here,” she said, and told me 
that her eldest son had had a clash in school with his teacher of religious 
education. This is a subject which depends on the religious affiliation of the 
pupil. Muslim children have instruction in Islam, and Christian children 
have instruction in Christianity.
My son was told by his teacher that a Muslim who dies as a martyr for his 
religion will go straight to Paradise. My son then asked where a Christian 
martyr will go and the teacher answered him: “To hell”. The State does not 
like to have bigoted persons as teachers, but these attitudes are increasing 
in schools. My son felt terrible.
Jeanette further told me that also her daughter, who studies engineering, 
was having a tough time at university.
There are sixty young women in her class. All but eight cover their hair in 
quite an Islamic fashion. Two of those are Kurdish girls, two have foreign 
mothers, one is a Christian and then there is my daughter. Everybody knows 
about her background.
She concluded by saying that also her husband is criticized by people who 
hint that he has betrayed ‘his own people’ by marrying a Christian and by 
letting her remain Christian. “This is becoming a strain on our marriage.”
Marriages across the religious divide are rare in today’s Aleppo. But when 
Christians talk about such unions, their inferior legal position is highlighted. 
Many male Aleppo Christians told me that they feel disadvantaged com-
pared to Muslim men. Christians do not practise the same kind of gender 
separation as has become typical in Aleppo public life. “Young Muslim men 
visit our quarters and stare at and bother our unveiled women, while we 
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cannot do the same,” one informant said. Another told me that friendships 
between Muslim and Christian men are never fully reciprocal nowadays: 
“When we have Muslim friends we take them home to meet our mothers 
and sisters, but we never get to meet their female relatives.”
Majority-Minority Imbalances
The following stands out in Aleppo: for inhabitants with a ‘minority’ affilia-
tion, the Muslim/Arab ‘majority’ (and those who do not talk of themselves 
as conservative, traditional, and deeply religious) is extremely significant. 
This ‘majority’ constitutes a mirror for reflection. People with ‘minority affili-
ation’ can claim that ‘we are not as religious as they are’, or ‘we are more 
rational and scientific than they are’, or ‘we don’t oppress our women the 
way they do’. For the ‘majority’ the ‘minorities’ are also significant but in a 
totally different way. In discussions of morality, ethics and gender relations. 
the minorities are neither invoked nor mirrored. The continued presence of 
‘minorities’ is instead a source of self-gratification for the ‘majority’. Their 
continued presence in Aleppo reaffirms the Islamic openness and accep-
tance of others, different from oneself. At the same time it is important to 
stress and reconfirm, as stated above, that although the religious/ethnic 
affiliation of an individual is very important in Aleppo daily life, they are 
not ‘totalizing’ identifications in each and every encounter.
Amira, a Christian woman, wanted me to get to know all her close 
friends at work; they included people with very varied ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. Her family has strong ties to Aleppo but comes from the 
Jazeera. There I have heard Amira’s relatives express great anxiety over 
the increased presence of Kurds in that area in comparison to what they 
felt to be the decrease of Christians. But Christians’ anxiety over Muslim 
presence is highly contextual. The family demolished their house in Aleppo 
because they wanted to build a larger one, and Amira needed to be close 
to the building-site. A devoted and veiled Muslim elderly woman across 
the street took her in and gave her a room. Amira told me that her family 
felt very secure and comfortable about her staying with this woman and 
sharing her kitchen and bathroom. The two families have been neighbours 
for a long time and the married sons of the elderly lady also live in the 
same house. In this case I think the religiosity of the Muslim woman and 
her whole family was an asset for Amira’s family. People who are religious 
in the ‘correct’ way can be counted on to have high morals. And obviously 
the ‘correct’ way includes tolerance towards persons of other faiths.
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In the last two decades an increasing social and religious conservatism, 
outwardly expressed in gender segregation and veiling, has been noticeable 
in most Syrian cities, particularly Aleppo and Hama. The public behaviour 
of ‘the Sunni majority’ has affected others as well. Some informants see 
this as a consequence of the political convulsions in Syria of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, when the Muslim Brotherhood was crushed as a politi-
cal force but where ‘non-political Islam’ was later allowed to flourish, as 
briefly mentioned above. Other informants link the growing public gender 
segregation and the lack of critical public debates on religion to political 
trends in the region as a whole, and even globally. In Damascus, however, 
this conservatism is not as publicly dominant as in Aleppo.
There is an often rather friendly competition between Damascenes and 
Aleppians. They compete over which city has the longest history of con-
tinuous human habitation, or which city contributes more to the economic 
development of the country. And when discussing religion, gender and 
ethnic relations in Syria, and the interrelationship between gender, ethnic 
and religious categorizations, many of my informants—Arabs, Armenians 
and Kurds, Muslims and Christians—typically stress that Aleppo differ from 
Damascus. The capital, they said, is a city of bureaucrats and employees 
where everybody has moved in from somewhere else; there are thus few 
original Damascenes in Damascus. In such a city, nobody knows the fam-
ily of others and nobody cares about the origin, behaviour, or religion of 
others. Aleppo is different, they concur, contributing to the conservative 
atmosphere in the city. Many of my friends and informants in Damascus 
agree with this analysis and bless the fact that they live in the capital. “This 
is the only city in Syria worth living in”. They say that in Aleppo people are 
very hemmed in by their religious and ethnic affiliations and that there is 
a general lack of common public life. “Aleppo Christians are very socially 
conservative, just like Aleppo Muslims”, a female Christian high govern-
ment employee insisted. “Aleppo people—Muslims and Christians alike— 
only think about money. It is a merchant city”, a Damascene Muslim 
man emphatically stated. In the opinion of many Damascenes, Aleppo is 
a parochial city, while the capital could be classified as more open and 
even cosmopolitan.
Cosmopolitanism From Above and From Below
“ ‘Cosmopolitanism’, along with ‘empire’ and ‘globalization’ ”, as noted by Seyla 
Benhabib, “has become one of the keywords of our times” (2006: 17). She, 
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and others, stress that in its modern usage cosmopolitanism is indebted to 
Immanuel Kant and his idea of the die vollkommene bürgerliche Vereinigung 
in der Menschengattung (cf. Bauman 2006: 33) and Weltbürgerrecht (Ben-
habib 2006: 21)—the right of the world citizen, or the cosmopolitan right, 
based on the duty of hospitality. This hospitality is a right for all human 
beings and thus, in Hannah Arendt’s term, the basis for a right to have 
rights (1973: 296). But cosmopolitan is also a rather vague term and “used 
in a range of overlapping but not always coinciding meanings” (Zubaida 
1999: 15). Is the concept at all useful in the social sciences today?20
Anthropologists Nigel Rapport and Ronald Stade debate whether cos-
mopolitanism sheds new light on contemporary phenomena or if concepts 
like multiculturalism, hybridity and the like are sufficient. Nigel Rapport 
argues that cosmopolitanism “usefully identifies a certain anthropological 
agenda” (2007: 223) which stresses the unity of humankind above and 
beyond cultural particularities. He uses the figure of Everyone, “a univer-
sal figure in possession of general capabilities and liabilities which are 
lived out in particular sociocultural settings” (2007: 224). Ronald Stade, 
while endorsing this idea in principle, underlines that the cosmopolitan 
in anthropology ought to be delineated more sharply. For anthropolo-
gists cosmopolitanism may be a research method; that is an open way 
to approach our objects of study, or an object of study. In the latter case 
the focus of research can either be on cosmopolitanism as an ideology 
or on cosmopolitans as a social group (2007: 227). Rapport, commenting 
on Stade’s arguments, concurs that it is important to make a distinction 
“between cosmopolitanism as an everyday practice and cosmopolitanism 
as a social-scientific ethos” (2007: 230).
This position is in line with Asef Bayat who argues that in the Middle East 
cooperation and sharing across religious and ethnic divides is as important 
features as conflicts. He defines everyday cosmopolitanism as
the idea and practice of transcending self . . . to associate with agonistic others 
in everyday life. It describes the ways in which the ordinary members of dif-
ferent ethno-religious and cultural groupings mix, mingle, intensely interact, 
and share in values and practices . . . (2008: 5).
These practices can, I think, be called cosmopolitanism from below in 
contrast to a kind of cosmopolitanism from above (cf. Hannerz 2005: 202) 
20 See Hannerz (2004) for a discussion on why cosmopolitanism is a very useful concept 
and how it has, and can be put to use in social anthropology. 
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where cosmopolitanism is an ideology propagated by a powerful elite 
(cf. Yerasimos 1999: 39). Following Bayat we do find instances of cosmo-
politanism from below in Aleppo. There are Aleppians who constantly 
reiterate they oppose any kind of religious and/or ethnic division of citi-
zens and underline that this is part of a deep-rooted conviction. During 
a friendly and relaxed get-together in Aleppo between three professional 
women of different minority backgrounds, one of them complained about 
the position and treatment of minorities. One of the others immediately 
responded in a loud voice:
I hate the word minority. Where does it come from? We don’t have minorities 
in Syria. We are all Syrians. The transformation of ‘Syria’ to ‘the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ was very wrong. Syrians are not Arabs. The Arabs arrived here quite 
late, when Christians and others of various origins were already here. The 
great thing with Syria is that all these people with different origins live side 
by side. You find everything here. We have the richest history in the world. 
We are an example for the world. We have no problem with each other. It 
is the state which has created these problems.
In her reaction to the concept of ‘minority’ this woman underlines that 
ethnic and religious differences can be part of an overarching Syrian same-
ness. This is the politics of recognition (cf. Taylor 1994) in everyday life.
‘Cosmopolitanism from below’ is, however, not easy to exactly pin-
point and delineate. How much interaction and sharing is needed for us 
to identify cosmopolitanism as an everyday practice? On what scale and 
with what scope do people have to endorse interaction and sharing for 
them to be classified as cosmopolitan? Is consistency needed in the way 
individuals talk and act, or in the way representatives of various groups 
talk and act? It is, for example, equally possible to classify Aleppo as a city 
greatly lacking in cosmopolitanism. Take the following example where a 
middle-aged Christian man in Aleppo tells me that the attitude of his son 
dismays him.
He expresses great dislike of Muslims and claims that he cannot stand living 
in this country . . . Well, it is not Muslims as such he hates but the ‘funda-
mentalists’. I am worried. I have many very close Muslim friends. Where are 
we heading?
Everyday Conviviality in Aleppo
In Syria cosmopolitanism (in the sense of recognition and appreciation 
of otherness) ‘from above and below’ interacts in an interesting and 
144 annika rabo
 paradoxical way. There is an official ideology of inclusion and equality 
between citizens with different religions. Although the doctrine of the 
Baʿth party with its ‘eternal message’ in many ways privileges the ‘Arab 
nation’ (with its varied population), it simultaneously acknowledges that 
this particular nation is also one of many. From an Islamic point of view 
it is possible to argue that the variety and difference of people on earth 
is part of God’s larger scheme. In the Qurʾan (49: 13) it is said that people 
were divided into nations and tribes so that they “might get to know one 
another.” This line was quoted now and then by my Muslim informants. 
In a seminal article on cosmopolitans and locals Ulf Hannerz argues that 
“the perspective of the cosmopolitan must entail relationships to a plurality 
of cultures understood as distinctive entities” (1990: 239). From this point 
of view Aleppians as well as representatives of the State and the ruling 
party are all cosmopolitans. Those resisting the practice of the State—
rather than its ideals—do not deny the sui generis existence of distinct 
and various Aleppo cultures. Instead they typically claim that in an ideal 
world such distinctions will disappear. And as shown above, all my Aleppo 
informants in principle endorse the coexistence and presence of religious, 
ethnic, and linguistic variety in their city. But in the actual practice of this 
co-existence, the ‘minorities’ express that they often feel less than equal 
to the ‘majority’. Marriage across the religious divide could be seen as an 
important indicator of cosmopolitanism. But this is discouraged both from 
above and from below. It is discouraged from above because it goes against 
the logic of official bureaucratic classifications. And it is discouraged from 
below by the religious minorities because it is perceived to be a threat to 
their survival.
The Syrian State, as explained above, simultaneously orders and orga-
nizes its citizens in an equal and unequal manner. This affects people in 
Aleppo in different ways, and they interpret this ordering in highly diverse 
manners, as I have argued. Yet, Aleppians (and other Syrians) find it very 
hard to resist this ordering in an open, civil, and public manner because 
they do not have the tools to do so.
There is, for example, no civic education in Syrian schools where all 
pupils are taught something about the diversity of the country. Most 
Muslim children, for example, know of Christianity only from an Islamic 
point of view. Christians know much more about Islam because they are 
exposed to Islam and expressions of Muslim-ness in public life. But it is 
also important to underline that all Muslims are not treated equally in 
the educational system. Shiʿa Muslims—including Alawis—and Druzes 
have no place in the instruction in schools. The ethnic and religious varia-
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tion of the country is totally silenced in the curricula of history, national 
education, and geography. Officially it is argued that, by ignoring ‘divisive 
elements’ in the public sphere, the unity of the country is retained. But in 
this way schools do not provide means to teach pupils how to critically 
reflect on themselves and others, nor how such classifications may shift 
contextually. From this point of view there is no cosmopolitanism from 
above in Syria.
In Aleppo (and Syria) we find that reflexion on, and resistance against, 
the state ideology and its practice are carried out subversively. Resistance 
from ‘Arab Muslims’ may be based on the conviction that the State itself 
represents a minority (and typically an ungodly one at that). On the other 
hand resistance may also be based on the conviction that the practice of 
the State actually exacerbates ethnic and religious divisions in the country. 
‘Cosmopolitanism from below’ implies that there is a non-cosmopolitanism 
from above to which people react in the form of a counter-culture. This 
is certainly not the case in Aleppo. Hence cosmopolitanism is not such a 
fruitful concept when it comes to discussing and interpreting the every-
day civility and co-existence we actually do find in Aleppo. Conviviality, 
I would argue, captures more closely this everyday living together. The 
idea of conviviality does not exclude the presence of conflicts, expressed 
both discursively and in practical action. Paul Gilroy, with a concern over 
postcolonial cities different from Aleppo, writes that conviviality “does 
not describe the absence of racism or the triumph of tolerance” but he 
hopes that “an interest in conviviality will take off from the point where 
‘multiculturalism’ broke down” (2004: xi).21 Conviviality is, I argue, a fruit-
ful concept to interpret everyday civility and co-existence also in Aleppo. 
People do not have to love one another but must accept that they share 
certain spaces. Conviviality can be understood as aspects of the way people, 
unencumbered by ‘cosmopolitanism from above’, can organize their local 
communities when left in peace. But, as I have suggested in the case of 
Aleppo, it is equally plausible to interpret conviviality—i.e. everyday civil-
ity and co-existence—as both part of, and as resistance against, one-sided 
ideologies. 
21 Multiculturalism is not used in Syria—neither as a descriptive nor as a normative 
concept. It is, however, striking that the British colonial and postcolonial political catego-
rization and organization of ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ or religious ‘groups’ bear a strong resemblance 
to the organization of millets in the late Ottoman Empire.
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CHAPTER SIX
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN SUDAN
Anne Sofie Roald
Introduction
The multiplicity of ethnic and religious communities has created divi-
sions in the social setting in Sudan.1 The present social tension is first and 
foremost portrayed in religious terms; there is an assumption that the 
Muslim-Christian division is the main cause of instability and that the 
basic line of demarcation goes between followers of these two religions. 
Moreover, Christians in Sudan are often depicted as the weaker part, and 
there is a tendency to single the ‘Southerners’ out as the Sudanese Christians 
par excellence. In February 2007, I conducted a fieldwork in Khartoum 
together with a colleague; the task consisted in interviewing Muslim and 
Christian leaders, as well as western representatives, particularly from 
Christian organisations responsible for aid programs among Christians in 
Khartoum and in Southern Sudan (Tønnessen and Roald 2007).2 Contrary 
to the claim of the Christian-Muslim religious opposition, our findings 
point to cultural differences between the mainly urbanised population in 
Northern Sudan and the mainly rural population in the South, as well as 
those between the Africanised South and the Arabised North, as important 
reasons for the social tensions. In both cases, the differences are unrelated 
to religious affiliation. A third reason is the variation in religious practices 
among Christians coming from the South and the long-established Chris-
tian communities in the North: the Sudanese Copts and the European and 
Middle Eastern Christians.
All the Sudanese constitutions after independence in 1956 have taken 
religious differences in Sudan into consideration. Even the 1998 Constitution, 
1 This article is part of the research project Moderation of Islamists Movements at the Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, funded by the Norwegian Research Council.
2 The following is built on a fieldwork conducted by myself and Liv Tønnessen in 
Khartoum in February 2007 (see Tønnessen and Roald 2007). This study deals thus with 
the situation before the partition of Sudan into Sudan and Southern Sudan. ‘Sudan’ in this 
article therefore refers mainly to Sudan before the partition.
© Anne Sofie Roald, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_008
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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which was designed by the Islamist ideologue, Hasan al-Turabi, at the time 
Speaker of the National Assembly and a close ally to the President Umar 
al-Bashir, uses the term religiousness rather than Islam, in an attempt to 
avoid stirring tensions between religious groups. Because Sudan ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR [1966]) 
in 1986, the regime which came to power in 1989 was committed to grant 
citizens freedom of religion. Article 18 in the Covenant states:
1.  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2.  No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.3
This chapter explores the topic of freedom of religion according to the 
UN conventions. The focus is directed at how various religious communi-
ties in Khartoum perceive and assess the way their freedom of religion is 
guaranteed in the State of Sudan.
The Coming of Monotheistic Religions
Both Christianity and Islam were introduced into the region in the sixth 
and seventh centuries (Holt and Daly 2000). At the time of the Ottoman-
Egyptian invasion in 1820 the Northern part of the country was Arabized 
and Islamized, and during their reign (1820–1881) Middle Eastern Catholics 
started to settle in Northern Sudan, establishing small Christian minority 
Churches in the then mainly Muslim area (Holt and Daly 2000: 22–37). 
Although the Ottoman-Egyptian rulers never controlled Southern Sudan, it 
was formally included in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, British mission-
aries entered Southern Sudan from the South of the region and converted 
3 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr.htm.
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many tribes to Christianity in the late nineteenth century. The Mahdists 
(1881–98), meanwhile, made a great effort to Islamize the South of Sudan 
(Fluehr-Lobban 1991: 76), and, judging from the large Southern Sudanese 
Muslim community, this effort has been successful. Although the British-
Egyptian administration controlled the whole of today’s Sudan, they treated 
the North and the South as two different regions. The British planned to 
add the South of Sudan to the British East African colonies, and in 1922 
the Closed District Ordinance was passed, requiring permits for travelling 
between the North and the South. The division between the two parts 
was reinforced by allowing Christian missionaries to work in the South, 
whereas Islamic mission was strictly forbidden in this area. At the same 
time, the British neglected the development of the South and focused on 
the strengthening of administration in the North (Fluehr-Lobban 1991: 
77–79; Rolandsen 2005: 24; Nyang and Johnston 2003). As the time for self-
rule approached, however, the British decided to integrate the two parts 
(Nyang and Johnston 2003). From 1948 the whole of today’s Sudan came 
under one administration. Arabic was the administrative language in the 
North, and English in the South. The Southerners could not participate in 
the political process for lack of proper Arabic knowledge. The Southerners’ 
marginal position in central governing institutions, combined with their 
historical separation from the North, did not support Sudanese nationalist 
sentiment in the South, and by the time of Independence the civil war had 
already begun (Nyang and Johnston 2003).
Religious Communities
Sudan is a multi-religious, multiethnic and multilingual country. Tribalism is 
an important feature of social life on the micro- as well as the macro-level.4 
Besides the distinction along religious lines, most Sudanese also distinguish 
between affiliation to African and Arab cultural traditions. Estimates of 
adherents to the various religious groups in the whole of Sudan vary in the 
different sources; Muslims are estimated to represent between 50 and 70 
percent, adherents to African tribal religions between 25 and 35 percent 
and Christians between 4 to 15 percent.5
4 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/sudan_4.htm
5 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/sudan_4.htm At US government webpage for instance, the 
figures of Christians are given as 5% in 2004 (www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrtp/2004/41628 
.htm).
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It is generally estimated6 that before Numeiri’s introduction of the shariʿa 
in 1983, there were approximately 400,000 Christians in Khartoum; the 
Copts and other Orthodox were the largest communities, followed by the 
Catholics and the Anglicans. The Northern Christian groups have decreased 
considerably after 1983. The Coptic community has, for instance, nearly 
dimidiated, according to a representative from the Coptic Church.7 The 
Greek-Orthodox community, which had approximately 12–15 thousand 
members before 1983, is now reduced to a couple of hundred individuals.8 
However, many of the displaced persons living in camps on the outskirts of 
Khartoum are Christians, and it is commonly agreed that before the parti-
tion in 2011 there were approximately 4 million Christians in the North. The 
Christians thus constituted nearly 20 percent of the 22 million inhabitants 
in the Northern states of Sudan at the time.9
Historically speaking, Sudanese Islam was influenced by Sufism. More-
over, nearly all Muslims today belong to the Sunni branch of Islam.10 Within 
the Christian minority in the North today, the Roman Catholic Church is the 
largest congregation, followed by the Episcopal Church.11 Various Orthodox 
Churches, such as the Coptic, the Ethiopian and the Greek-Orthodox, and 
various Protestant Churches, such as the Presbyterian and the Pentecostal, 
are also present. The African traditional religions are mainly practiced 
in Southern Sudan, but due to the war, traditional beliefs are now also 
common in areas of displaced persons in Khartoum. Although traditional 
religious faiths, most of which are non-scriptural, differ between the vari-
ous ethnic groups, there are common traits, such as worship of ancestor 
spirits and belief in a supreme God (Ray 1976).12
In Sudan the millet or rather the neo-millet system (see van den Boogert 
in this volume) in personal status matters re-emerged through the Non-
Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance in 1906 (Tier n.d.: 4). Even after the 
British gained control of Sudan in 1899, two sets of courts were in function; 
 6 Personal communication with Christian and Muslim leaders.
 7 Interview with Father Antonius, Deputy Bishop in the Coptic Orthodox Church in 
Omdurman, February 25, 2007.
 8 Interview with a member of the Greek-Orthodox community in Khartoum in the 
25th of February 2007.
 9 U.S. Department of State “Background: Sudan”. See www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424 
.htm.
10 According to the Encyclopaedia of the Orient there might be a small minority of Shiʿa 
Muslims in Sudan. See http://lexicorient.com/e.o/sudan_4.htm. However, this possible 
minority is not mentioned in any statistics.
11 www.anglicannifcon.org/SudanPF.htm 
12 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/sudan_4.htm
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questions related to personal status were dealt with in religious courts, 
whereas other matters were handled in what the British called the civil 
law courts (Fluehr-Lobban 1987). In contemporary Sudan, Personal Status 
legislation is still based on religious and tribal/ethnic affiliations and dealt 
with by the community leaders. It is important to note that also on the 
political level individuals compete for positions along tribal/religious lines. 
Sudan is thus a society where citizenship is constituted through com-
munity affiliation and collective rights rather than individual rights. It is 
interesting to note that the legal advisor to the president, Farida Ibrahim, 
regarded the neo-millet system as the evidence that freedom of religion is 
highly developed in Sudan.13
Freedom of Religion in Sudan
The Initial Constitutions
Sudan’s first Constitution, with minor amendments, has been in force since 
independence, but was suspended several times (1956, 1964 and 1985), 
until the coup d’etat in 1989. It was founded on the ideal of a secular state, 
with citizenship as the basis for rights and freedoms, and on the prohibi-
tion against all discrimination based on religion, ethnic origin or gender 
(Abdelmoula 1997). Despite this ideal of individual rights, the Personal 
Status legislation was still placed under religious community authorities. 
In 1968 a provision was introduced through a constitutional bill making 
Islam the source of law. Article 113 of the bill states that “Islamic shariʿa is 
the basic source of law in the State”.14 This bill also made Islam the official 
religion and Arabic the official language of Sudan. And since the bill was 
introduced as a reaction to the influence of the Communist Party, “propa-
gation of communism and atheism” was outlawed.15
When Numeiri introduced his ‘Permanent Constitution’ in 1973, after his 
dispute with the Communists in 1971, and despite his close ties with the 
West, he maintained the 1968 provision. Thus Islamic shariʿa remained the 
source of law and Arabic the official language of Sudan. Sudan continued 
to “endeavour to express Islam’s values”.16 Nevertheless, the Constitution 
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does explicitly, albeit vaguely, state that “[d]ivine religions [i.e. Christianity] 
and honourable spiritual beliefs [i.e. the tribal religious traditions] of the 
citizens should not be insulted or degraded”; neither should such beliefs be 
“misused” or politically exploited.17 It is not clear what is meant by ‘values’, 
and the claim of non-discrimination of “honourable spiritual beliefs” is 
rather vague. The question to pose is which Christian and ‘spiritual’ beliefs 
are “honourable” and which are not? In this Constitution, which remained 
in force for nearly ten years after the coup d’etat in 1989, freedom of religion 
for all the three main religious communities is explicitly stated along the 
line of “intolerance towards the intolerants”, as stated in Article 16 (e).
The 1998 ‘Islamist’ Constitution
al-Turabi was the major entrepreneur behind the Constitution that came 
into force the 1st of July 1998. In this Constitution, the term ‘shariʿa’ 
(Islamic legislation) is mentioned only once, namely in the chapter on 
amendments to the Constitution. In this part the fundamentals of the 
Constitution are stated to be first and foremost Islamic legislation, then 
the consensus of the people on the basis of their referendum [the Arabic 
word used is shura, which means consultation], or their constitutional 
law [regulations] or their customs (urf ) (Constitution of the Republic of 
Sudan 1998: Article 139: 3a). The word Islam is also mentioned only once, 
in Article 1, in which it is stated that “Islam is the religion of the major-
ity of the population” and that “Christianity and customary creeds have 
considerable followers”. It is interesting to note how the aspects of ‘Islam’ 
and ‘Islamic legislation’ have been de-emphasised in the 1998 Constitution 
in comparison with the former Sudanese Constitutions. In contrast, this 
Constitution accentuates religiousness. In Article 18 it is stated that “those 
in service in the State and public life shall envisage the dedication thereof 
for the worship of God”. Moreover, the same article asserts that “religious 
motivation” should guide:
planning, legislation, policies and official business in the political, economic, 
social and cultural fields in order to prompt public life towards its objectives, 
and adjust them towards justice and up-rightness to be directed towards the 
grace of God in the Hereafter.
It is noteworthy that in order to provide a standard Islamic orientation 
and to prevent deviation from the main Islamic orientation of the state, 
17 www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/abdelmoula.html
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Article 18 stipulates specifically that as for the worship of God, “Muslims 
stick to the Koran and Sunna (Muhammad’s normative custom)”. The stress 
in the Constitution on religiosity rather than on Islam is also valid for the 
presidential office, as there is no requirement for the president to be a 
Muslim (Article 36). Even in the presidential oath, the dedication to God, 
is mentioned in neutral religious terms such as ‘God the Almighty’ (allah 
al-azim) (Article 40), a term also used by Christians in the Arabic language. 
This feature reflects al-Turabi’s suggestion in 2006 that even a Christian 
can be a president of Sudan.18 It seems obvious however, that al-Turabi 
speaks of “a Northern Christian”. In our discussion he consistently referred 
to Christians living in the North, seeing them as ‘civilized’, in contrast to 
the ‘backward’ Christians in the South.19 This view indicates that the ten-
sion between the Arab urban North and the African rural South is better 
analysed in terms of ethnicity and social development than in terms of 
religious opposition between Muslims and Christians.
Article 24 in the “al-Turabi” Constitution provides for freedom of religion 
under the heading “Freedom of creed and worship”. It is stated that
Every human being shall have the right of freedom of conscience (wijdan) 
and religious creed and he [sic] shall have the right to declare his religion 
or creed, and manifest the same by way of worship, education, practice or 
performance of rites or ceremonies; and no one shall be coerced to adopt 
such faith as he does not believe in, nor to practice rites or services he does 
not voluntarily consent to; and that is without prejudice to the right of choice 
of religion, injury to the feelings of others, or to public order, all as may be 
regulated by law.
Indeed, Article 24 adheres to the wording of Article 18 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In this Covenant freedom 
to not have a religion was not explicitly stated. Furthermore, the text in 
Article 24 in the “al-Turabi” Constitution is fairly similar to Article 18 in 
the Declaration of Human Rights. However, regarding the possibility of 
not having a religion, an implication of Article 18 in the Declaration of 
Human Rights,20 this seems at first glance also to be an option in the 1998 
Constitution. The English text in Article 24 might give the impression that 
18 http://www.sudantribune.com/Next-Sudan-s-president-could-be.16048
19 Discussion with Hasan al-Turabi in Khartoum, February 2007.
20 Article 18 on the Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”.
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it is possible “to not believe” or not to profess belief in any religion, as the 
English translation of the Arabic text speaks of freedom of “conscience” 
(wijdan), which implies both the freedom to believe and not to believe.21 
‘Conscience’ can, however, also have an explicit religious meaning, as the 
wijdan indicates a link between the individual’s inner feeling and this indi-
vidual’s moral values based on religious or moral systems.22 When Article 24 
is read in light of other passages in the “al-Turabi” Constitution, however, 
it becomes clear that freedom of conscience in the Sudanese context is 
meant only in relation to religious systems and not to atheistic, agnostic, 
or non-religious moral worldviews. The Sudanese concept of freedom 
of religion in this Constitution thus only means freedom to religion, not 
freedom from religion.
Another important aspect of Article 24 of the “al-Turabi” Constitution lies 
in the phrase “all as may be regulated by law”. Article 24 does not mention 
the possibility or the prohibition of converting to another religion or leaving 
a religious tradition, but the 1991 Criminal Act explicitly prohibits apostasy 
from Islam, and the punishment for this offence is the death penalty.23 This 
prohibition and its punishment contradict Article 18 of the ICCPR which 
explicitly states that “no one shall be subject to coercion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or a belief of his choice”. 
In this regard the 1998 Constitution, due to its reference to “all as may be 
regulated by law”, is not compatible with the international covenants to 
which Sudan committed itself when it ratified the ICCPR.
Moreover, also regarding religious freedom for religious minorities in the 
“al-Turabi” Constitution, there seems to be a problem due to the phrase “all 
as may be regulated by law”. This is because prior to 2005 non-Muslims all 
over Sudan were obliged to follow the shariʿa law, except in personal status 
affairs. However, this changed after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005. In this agreement non-Muslims are exempted 
from being ruled according to Islamic law.24 The Interim Constitution of 
2005, which builds upon the CPA, stipulates also that in the states outside 
Southern Sudan the sources of legislation are “shariʿa and the consensus of 
the people”, whereas “nationally enacted legislation applicable to Southern 
Sudan . . . shall have as its sources of legislation popular consensus, the 
21 Wijdan is translated as “conscience”. According to Wehr’s dictionary, however, wijdan 
means sentiments or emotions. (Wehr 1994: 1231).
22 For a discussion on conscience (Arabic: damir), see Leirvik 2002.
23 Sudan Department of Justice; Criminal Act Chapter 13: 126.
24 http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/Sudan/darfur/cpaprov.htm
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 values and the customs of the people of the Sudan, including their tradi-
tions and religious beliefs, having regard to the Sudan’s diversity”.25
Freedom of Religion in Sudan After 2005
According to Farida Ibrahim, the religious minority ‘right’ of the neo-millet 
system is also extended to the ‘traditional religions’. Sudanese Personal 
Status Law, whether Christian, Muslim or traditional tribal, builds on the 
patriarchal system of gender inequality. Thus, the legal pluralism in Per-
sonal Status Law is not compatible with the Declaration of Human Rights, 
especially the principle of equality. However, as Sudan is one of the few 
UN member countries26 which have not signed the CEDAW (Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women), it is 
not particularly bound by the principle of gender equality.
Islamists, both those close to the regime and those with a more critical 
view of the official policy, claimed that the Muslim majority have sur-
rendered to minority claims inside Sudan as well as to international 
pressure, and have given up much of their majority privileges after the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement came into force in 2005. Quite a few 
Christians living in Khartoum, on the other hand, contended that many 
of the shariʿa laws apply to Christian citizens despite the Interim Consti-
tution’s emphasis on religious minority rights and its claim that shariʿa 
shall not apply to non-Muslims. In particular, it is the shariʿa prohibition 
of alcohol many Christians find offensive. But even non-legal issues, such 
as difficulties in building churches and marginalization from the public 
space, such as the representation of Christians in the media, were viewed 
by many representatives of Christian Churches in Khartoum as restrictions 
on their freedom of religion.
Since Sudan has ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), I will, in the following, discuss three issues linked to 
religious freedom for religious minorities in Sudan: restrictions on the 
building of churches, the prohibition of alcohol, and representation in the 
public sphere. I will further discuss two restrictions on religious freedom, 
25 Interim Constitution of Sudan 2005: Article 5.
26 Iran and Somalia are among the countries which have refused to sign CEDAW. It is 
interesting to note that, although the United States has signed the treaty, it is one of the 
few countries which have not ratified CEDAW.
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this time regarding the Muslim majority: apostasy and compulsory female 
dress code.
Freedom of Religion for non-Muslims
Under the regime led by Umar al-Bashir there have been frequent reports 
on how Christian women trading in alcohol were jailed in Sudan due to 
the shariʿa prohibition. Although the 2005 Interim Constitution claims 
that Islamic law shall not apply to non-Muslims, there are indications 
that Southern women from various religious denominations continue 
to be charged and jailed for trading in alcohol after 2005.27 The trade in 
alcohol is common among refugee women living in the displaced areas 
in the outskirt of Khartoum, as many of them are the main breadwinners 
for large families, and job opportunities are scarce.28 Besides, the prohibi-
tion against the trade in alcohol makes it difficult for Christian Churches 
to purchase wine for the Holy Communion. Representatives from various 
Christian denominations complained that even though, in principle, there 
is no prohibition against non-Muslims drinking alcohol, the Sudanese 
authorities do not accept any kind of private use of alcohol. This criticism 
was rejected by Helen Louise Olear, Member of Parliament for the ruling 
party, the National Congress and a Christian from the South. She claimed 
that the prohibition of alcohol is not a problem for Christians as they, 
unlike Muslims, are allowed to drink alcohol in private gatherings. “Before 
the gathering the Christians have to inform the police, and the drinking 
of alcohol will be accepted”, she claimed, “as it is the trading of alcohol 
which is forbidden”.29 Olear’s contention must be assessed in view of her 
being a representative of the ruling party. Moreover, she did not mention 
the practical problem of how to have access to alcoholic beverages if trade 
is prohibited. And how can Churches perform Holy Communion accord-
ing to ritual rules if it is impossible to get hold of wine due to the trade 
prohibition? One of the Christian representatives, however, claimed that 
some Churches do have wine for ritual purposes, but they have to get hold 
of the wine illegally, mainly through smuggling. Christian Church leaders 
27 See for instance “Sudan jails ‘harsh and crowded’ ”, 30/11–2007, at: http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7120615.stm.
28 Interview with Sabah Muhammad, journalist at the newspaper al-ayam, February 26, 
2007 in Khartoum. See also articles in the newspaper al-ayam: 1 March 2006; 17 May 2006; 
31 October 2006; 22 November 2006.
29 Interview with Helen Louise Olear, Member of Parliament for the National Congress 
Party, February 14, 2007 in Khartoum.
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thus have to break Sudanese laws in order to fulfill their ritual obligations 
towards their congregations. There is an obvious contradiction between 
the Sudanese principle of freedom of religion and the “al-Turabi” Constitu-
tion’s emphasis on religiosity and the fact that trade in alcohol, even by 
Christians, is forbidden. Thus in this matter the Sudanese authorities fail 
to adhere to the principle of freedom of religion stated in the ICCPR.
As for the building of churches, there has been a slight improvement 
lately. Due to the efforts of the non-governmental organisation SIRC 
(Sudan inter-relations Council), the Guidance and Endowment Ministry 
has decided to raise three new churches in Khartoum.30 The SIRC is an 
organisation consisting of Muslims and Christians. The Secretary General 
is at present a Muslim, al-Tayyib Zain al-Abidin, and the vice Secretary 
General is a Christian. “SIRC tries to protect the non-Muslims, but there is 
still much to do”, Abidin stated. He was critical to the fact that Christians 
are not given free plots of land to build their churches, whereas Muslims 
get land for mosques. The government’s rationale for this unequal treat-
ment is because it assumes that the presence of the Southern Christian 
population in Khartoum is temporary; “The authorities therefore see no 
need to offer possibilities for authorized churches in Khartoum, as most 
Christians will return to the South”, said Abidin.31 On the other hand, he did 
not believe that the government deliberately impedes the establishment of 
unauthorized worship buildings, as some Christians have claimed, saying 
that many such buildings are situated in the areas of the displaced camps, 
and these camps are often in unplanned areas. “Khartoum is expanding, 
and whenever the governmental urban planning office arrives at such an 
unplanned place in order to start building new houses, they will destroy 
all unauthorized buildings in the area.”32
One of the community worker from Europe affiliated to a Western 
Christian organisation believes Christians are exaggerating the problem of 
church construction. He questioned the Christians’ demand that the state 
take responsibility for building churches, as in his view Christians should be 
responsible for raising their own churches. According to him, the state also 
restricts the building of mosques, particularly those belonging to Muslim 
groups which the authorities mistrust, for instance the salafi movement, 
30 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007. Several church 
leaders confirmed Abidin’s claim that it is due to SIRC that the government has accepted 
to raise the three churches. 
31 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
32 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
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Ansar al-Sunna.33 Father Antonius, a Coptic priest, is among those who 
complained about the difficulties of building new churches.34 Yet, at the 
same time he claimed that the Coptic community has decreased dramati-
cally since the 1970s. Indeed it is a problem for the Coptic community if 
the State does not offer economic support for the maintenance of churches. 
However, the fact that the priest used the argument about ‘the building 
of churches’ indicates that he resorted to a discourse common among 
Christians, even though this is not necessarily a problem within his own 
specific community. Recently, the authorities allowed the building of three 
new churches. In view of the discussion above, it seems safe to conclude 
that, as far as the construction of worship buildings is concerned, Sudan 
respects the principle of freedom of religion as defined in the ICCPR.
In our discussions with Christians, the lack of media representation for 
non-Muslims came up as an important aspect of freedom of religion in 
Sudan. Sister Margareth, a Sudanese Catholic nun with Syrian ancestors, 
is the vice-chairperson of CAMP (Christians and Muslims for Peace), an 
organisation which came into being through governmental initiative. She 
complained that on the national radio and television Christian issues would 
be aired only one hour a week. “On Sundays”, she said, “there is a Christian 
sermon on the radio, whereas the Islamic call for prayer (adhan) is aired 
both on radio and television five times daily”. Moreover, “recitations of the 
Qurʾan and religious Islamic programs are superfluous in the media”, she 
exclaimed. She was further critical to the national educational curriculum 
which is compulsory for all pupils in order to get a Sudanese exam:
The government wants to force upon us [the Christians] Islamic education. In 
the curriculum everything deals with Islam; Islamic history, Islamic geography, 
and even Islamic maths. They want our children to learn the Koran by heart. 
What do the Muslims want? Do they give out their holy texts to dogs? We the 
Christians do not care about the Koran, so we do not venerate this text.35
The lack of Christian representation in the national media is by many 
regarded as a political issue. One of the Muslim informants, a person active 
in a grass-root peace group, stated that since 1983 Islam has been promoted 
in national media, and this results in Muslims feeling superior in society 
and in Christians feeling oppressed. In the matter of public representation, 
33 Interview with a European Community worker affiliated with a Western Christian 
organisation, who prefers to be anonymous.
34 Interview with Father Antonius, Deputy Bishop in the Coptic Orthodox Church in 
Omdurman Sudan, February 25, 2007.
35 Interview with Sister Margareth in Khartoum, February 26, 2007.
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taking into account the relative number of non-Muslims in Sudan, and 
unlike in the matter of church construction, the authorities do not seem 
to respect the principle of freedom of religion contained in the ICCPR.
Freedom of Religion for Muslims
The issue of Islamic law and apostasy has been at the centre of worldwide 
discussions over the last years. The right to change religion is a major theme 
in the international freedom of religion discourse. As freedom of religion 
in most secular states has come to mean not only the right to religion but 
also the right to not belong to a religion, the apostasy law in countries 
such as Pakistan and Sudan has gained international attention. In Sudan, 
conversion from Islam to another religion is forbidden according to the 
1992 Criminal Act. In the discussion with Abidin I asked what the SIRC is 
doing to protect individuals who convert from Islam. He answered:
In the Constitutions [of 1998 and 2005] there is nothing about apostasy, as 
both include the principle of religious freedom. Moreover, today apostasy is 
not an issue. If we raise the issue, a new problem will be created, as theoreti-
cally speaking there is a problem [due to the apostasy law in the Criminal Act]. 
Practically, however, apostasy is not a problem. No one has been punished 
according to this law. If this happens we will work against it.36
According to Abidin, the execution of the politician and scholar Mahmoud 
Muhammad Taha in 1985 was not a religious but a political decision. Abidin 
elaborated on his view:
Taha criticized Numeiri’s religious laws, and Numeiri looked for a junior judge 
to take the case and get him executed. It was not at first about apostasy. Taha 
refused to appeal, so the Court itself decided to appeal. This procedure in 
itself is rather uncommon. The appeal was brought to the special court cre-
ated by Numeiri for Islamic laws, and they changed the charge to apostasy. 
But, in my view, it was not about apostasy, it was a political issue.37
As apostasy is a crime according to Sudanese law, it is obvious that the 
Sudanese authorities do not keep to the principle stated in ICCPR Article 
18: 1, namely that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion and that this right includes the freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his/her own choice. However, the text in ICCPR Article 
18: 3 is ambiguous. It says:
36 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
37 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
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Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.38
This can be interpreted as saying that limitations prescribed by law are 
acceptable. One can thus argue that the criminalization of apostasy is 
acceptable in accordance with the ICCPR. However, if these limitations 
are read in connection with the last part of the sentence, “to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others”, it would be harder to argue that the criminalization of conver-
sion from Islam is compatible with Article 18. In pre-modern states when 
religious affiliation was an important aspect of power relations, apostasy 
on a larger scale from the majority religion would affect the balance of 
power in society. Sudan, however, is a nation-state where membership is 
based on citizenship rather than religious affiliation, except in the family 
legislation.39 The criminalization of apostasy in today’s Sudan would thus 
have to be legitimated in terms of the protection of public security, order, 
and behavior.
The restriction of freedom to change one’s religion is applicable for Mus-
lims only. Christians are, according to Sudanese law, free to embrace Islam 
or any other religion. Conversion to Islam or Christianity happens all the 
time among those who belong to traditional tribal religions.40 However the 
matter of not belonging to a religion seems to be a taboo topic in Sudanese 
society. When asked about atheists and their rights in this society, Abidin 
answered that he does not believe there are atheists in Sudan, “at least”, 
he says, “if there are any, they do not declare themselves to be atheists”.41 
“Atheists would be afraid to declare to be atheists” as this “will create a 
bad image for them”, Abidin says. The general religious character of the 
Sudanese people, he believed, will make people shun atheists. “There are 
no atheists in Sudan. Even the communists believe in God, as in the last 
Sudanese election in Sudan the communist party’s political meetings would 
start with recitation of the Koran.” It is symptomatic that Abidin associated 
38 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr.htm.
39 It is important to be aware that although legally employment in the state is based 
on citizenship, practically speaking the authorities tend to favour professionals with an 
Islamist orientation. It is also important to point out that in contrast to other countries 
with Muslim majorities, the Sudanese Constitution opens up for a non-Muslim being the 
highest leader (al-qiyada al-ʿulya) in the country.
40 Interview with Church leaders in Khartoum, February 2007.
41 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
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atheism particularly with the communist movement, a view common in 
other parts of the Muslim world as well, including among Christians in this 
region. In a discussion about how Christian children have to learn about 
Islam, sister Margareth declared:
I never teach Muslim children in our school about Christianity. Do we 
want Sudan to be a communist society? If we teach the children various 
religious traditions they will end up not believing in anything and become 
communists.42
The tendency to link non-belief and atheism with communism is thus not 
a specifically Muslim trait; rather it seems to be a phenomenon culturally 
shared by Christians and Muslims alike. Moreover, the right to not belong 
to a religion is not explicitly mentioned in the Sudanese law; it is only 
referred to implicitly by linking “freedom of conscience (wijdan)” to reli-
gious system, as discussed above, and it is obviously socially unacceptable 
in Sudan to not have a religion.
According to Abidin, apostasy has not been an issue in Sudan. It is, how-
ever, hard to overlook the fact that apostasy is a criminal offence according 
to Sudanese legislation. The question is why there have not been any legal 
cases against apostasy (if we accept Abidin’s notion that the Numeiri-
Taha case was political)? Is it because Sudanese Muslims do not convert 
to other religions? Or, if Sudanese Muslims do convert, do they do this 
secretly? Whatever the answer to this question, it is obvious that the law 
of apostasy might at any time be activated, for purely religious reasons or 
for political reasons.43 When freedom of religion is defined as the right for 
individuals to freely choose to embrace or abstain from religion, in Sudan 
there is no such freedom.
Before the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in 2005, the regime made it compulsory for Muslim women to adhere 
to the female Islamic dress code, with covering of the body and the hair. 
Non-Muslims were not forced to wear a headscarf, but they were expected 
to wear “decent” clothing, meaning that the body, but not necessarily the 
hair, should be well covered. Muslim women I interviewed claimed that, 
after the CPA, the authorities are less prone than before to punish women 
who do not follow the strict Islamic dress code. A Muslim woman working 
in the government stated that before the CPA came into being she would 
always wear a tight headscarf under her thawb (the long piece of cloth 
42 Interview with Sister Margareth in Khartoum, February 26, 2007.
43 For a discussion on apostasy see Longva 2002.
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Sudanese Muslim women wrap around their bodies and loosely over the 
head). After 2005 she has, however, often taken off her headscarf; instead 
her head is loosely covered by part of her thawb only. Although to take off 
the headscarf is not a legal offence, she claims, social control makes it hard 
for women who want to dress less strictly. She experienced that colleagues 
and relatives commented on her “loose” clothing style in the beginning, 
when she took off her headscarf. But the last year, she claims, even social 
control has decreased in this matter. The story of the 13 women who were 
arrested for ‘indecency’ in 2009 for wearing pants indicates, however, that 
the strict female dress code is not only a matter of social control, but has 
also legal implications. Of the 13 women 12 accepted their fines and the 
flogging, whereas one woman, a journalist, went to court. She was spared 
the 40 lashes but had to pay the fine. This event reinforces the impression 
that the right not to belong to a religion or not to practice a religion is 
unacceptable in Sudan, and this implies a violation of freedom of religion 
not compatible with the ICCPR.
In Sudan there are clearly certain restrictions of freedom of religion as 
defined in the ICCPR’s Article 18. The prohibition against trading in alco-
hol restricts the Christian minority’s possibility to perform the religious 
rituals. Another violation of Art. 18 is the fact that Islamic education is 
compulsory for Christian children. As for representation in the public space, 
e.g. in the media, and restrictions in the building of churches, however, it 
is important to view these issues in a broad comparative perspective. In 
most western44 societies the official holidays follow the Christian calendar, 
despite these states’ overt secularism. Nor are Muslim children in many 
European countries, automatically given permission to attend the weekly 
Friday prayer, and some would even not get permission at all. We also find 
certain restrictions against religious buildings, in Scandinavia for instance. 
As for public representation, all religions have limited representation in 
the public space, as religion in European countries is supposed to belong 
to the private sphere. The fact that countries in the West have restrictions 
on religious freedom similar to those in Sudan does not mean, of course, 
that these restrictions are not violations of the ICCPR’s Article 18. Rather 
it means that to guarantee freedom of religion for minorities is always 
problematic, as religion, socio-cultural structures, politics, and power are 
interlinked. Besides, it is difficult to differentiate ‘pure’ religious phenomena 
from social, cultural, and political aspects.
44 I use “western countries” to denote Europe, USA, Australia, and New Zealand.
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It is also obvious from the discussion above that neither the religious 
minorities nor the Muslims in Sudan enjoy full freedom of religion. The pro-
hibition of conversion from Islam seriously restricts the Muslims’ freedom 
of choice in matters of religion. Thus, there are restrictions on freedom of 
religion in the State of Sudan for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Religious Freedom in the South?
The 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan also refers to religious 
freedom in the South. Article 8 affirms that religion and state shall be 
separated in Southern Sudan; all religions shall be treated equally, and 
religious belief shall not be used for divisive purposes. Abidin claimed, 
however, that such equal treatment of religious followers in the South does 
not exist “despite the words on tolerance between religious followers in the 
Southern Sudan Interim Constitution”.45 He claimed that there have been 
several cases of violence against Muslims in the South, such as a decree 
preventing women from wearing a headscarf and the closing down of Zakat 
institutions in the South.46 The discrimination of Muslims in the South 
was unintentionally confirmed by the Christian editor of the newspaper 
Khartoum Monitor, Alfred Taban, himself of Southern origin.47 When asked 
about the number of Christians and Muslims in the South, he stated that 
there are 18 percent Christians and 19 percent Muslims.48 “However”, he 
goes on, “I believe that after the partition of Sudan the Muslims will be 
reduced in number. They will be afraid, and they will conceal that they 
are Muslims, or they will turn away from Islam. The Southerners will treat 
them badly. The Southerners are so suspicious, and some people [Muslims] 
might be spies.” In his statement it is obvious that he sees ‘Southerners’ as 
Christians and people adhering to traditional beliefs. That Muslim South-
erners encounter discrimination in the South was further confirmed by a 
ommunity worker from Europe engaged in Christian-Muslim relations in 
the South.49 Thus, violations of Article 18 of the ICCPR take place not only 
45 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
46 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
47 Interview with Alfred Taban in Khartoum, February 24 2007.
48 A European informant, working for a Western organisation confirmed this number, 
saying that “the Southern Christians and Westerners believe that the Christian community 
is the biggest in the South. This is probably not true. The Mahdi [in the late nineteenth 
century] had an aggressive Islamization policy in the South, and I believe there are as 
many Muslims as Christians”.
49 Interview with a community worker from Europe affiliated with a Western Christian 
organisation, who prefers to be anonymous.
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at the hands of the Islamic regime in Northern Sudan, but also at those of 
non-Muslim authorities in the South as well.
Protection of Non-Muslims in Khartoum
Article 157 of the Interim Constitution of 2005 deals with the issue of 
protection of non-Muslim rights in the North. Abidin linked this article 
to the establishment of the Commission for Protection of non-Muslims in 
the National Capital, of which he is a member, stating that this was a 
step towards ensuring that the rights of non-Muslims are protected and 
respected in accordance with the guidelines mentioned in the Constitution. 
On the 8th of February 2007 the government appointed the Southern Chris-
tian, Joshua Dao to head this commission. At first, his appointment was 
favoured by many Christian intellectuals. Taban, for instance, welcomed 
Dao’s appointment in his February 13th editorial, but after the names of 
the members of the commission were announced, he wrote a critical edi-
torial about the composition of the commission. He saw the Commission 
as “a great disservice to non-Muslims”, and he called for its dissolution 
(Khartoum Monitor February 17 2007, page 2). His main argument was that 
there were 15 Muslims and only 13 non-Muslims in the commission. He 
discussed the Muslim members and claimed that they are “predominantly 
fundamentalists who would like to see Sudan become an Islamic state.” 
“Thus”, he declared, “the so-called rights of non-Muslims which the com-
mission is supposed to protect are actually what the shari´a law permits.”50 
Taban further regarded the appointment of the commission as “a political 
ploy meant to reassure non-Muslims that they, in theory, are most welcome 
in their own capital city. In practice, however, the non-Muslims, who by 
definition do not believe in Islamic laws, have to live according to the 
Islamic shariʾa law!”51 Taban added that many of the Muslim members are 
staunch Islamists. “What is the point?” he exclaimed. “The committee is 
just a show-off!”
Whereas Taban sees the commission as a show-off case, and is critical 
to how non-Muslims are treated in Khartoum, Abidin, as a Muslim and a 
member of the commission, has a far more positive view of the rights of, 
for instance, the Christians in Khartoum. According to him, the CPA and 
the Interim Constitution have secured the protection of the minorities in 
the North. When asked specifically whether Christians after the imple-
50 Interview with Alfred Taban in Khartoum, February 24 2007.
51 Interview with Alfred Taban in Khartoum, February 24 2007.
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mentation of the CPA are judged according to shariʿa law, he stated that 
earlier, shariʿa rules used to be applied to non-Muslims in certain hudud 
crimes such as murder and theft, whereas they did not apply to crimes 
such as apostasy, wine drinking, fornication or qasf [bringing false wit-
nesses to fornication]. He believed that it was difficult for non-Muslims 
to comply with the shariʿa prohibition against theft and alcohol selling, as 
many Christians were displaced and poor and have to find a way to make 
a living (see discussion above). He claimed, however, that “now [in 2007] 
Christians are no longer punished for these offences in accordance with 
the shariʿa”.52 Taban admitted that, although it is true in practice that non-
Muslims are no longer judged according to the hudud laws, theoretically 
there is still a problem. “The laws remain”, he stated, “and the only reason 
for the Sudanese authorities to postpone the hudud punishments are the 
international reactions against them. The punishments might, though, be 
re-applied at any moment.”
Many Christian leaders referred to the event in December 2006, when 
the police entered the All-Saints Cathedral and attacked worshippers, as 
a violation of freedom of religion. The mass was attended by individuals 
belonging to the Southern elite, including the former vice president Abel 
Alier. The newspaper The Citizen saw in the assault a case of Christian-
Muslim hostility, stating that the assault on the All-Saints Cathedral was “an 
indication of religious fanaticism, if not outright hostility towards Southerners, 
inculcated by the regime into the psyche of the police [our italics].”53 The 
journalist obviously associated hostility towards the Christian Southerners 
with ‘religious fanaticism’, implying, as Taban above, that all Southerners 
are Christians. However, given the fact that the number of Muslim south-
erners is approximately to equal to that of Christian southerners, and that 
they are both minorities in the South, followers of the traditional tribal 
religions being the majority there, there are good reasons to interpret 
the hostility between Southerners and Northerners in socio-political and 
cultural, rather than in religious terms. The leadership in Southern Sudan 
is Christian, however, as Mordechai Nisan has noted. He stated that the 
Southern African elite is particularly “a Christian vanguard”, with “higher 
educational standards derived from missionary-school education, which 
offered religious instruction, the English language, and a worldly outlook” 
(Nisan 2002). The hostility between the political leadership in the South 
52 Interview with al-Tayyib Zain Abidin in Khartoum, February 11, 2007.
53 The Citizen on 12 February, 2007 Vol. 2 No 52. See also The Citizen on 24 February 
2007. Vol. 2. No. 64.
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and the North is thus portrayed in religious terms; the Christian leadership 
in the South versus the Islamic regime in the North, whereas the reality 
is much more complex.
Conclusion
Sudan has signed the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966 (ICCPR) and is also committed to guarantee religious freedom as 
stated in Article 18 of the Covenant for Sudanese citizens. As the discussion 
above indicates, prior to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 
2005, the Umar al-Bashir regime flouted the principle of religious freedom, 
not least by applying shariʿa law to non-Muslims. After 2005, the situation 
of rights has improved to a certain degree. However, as trade in alcohol 
is still prohibited after the CPA, also including non-Muslims; some Chris-
tian communities have difficulties in performing their rituals. Nor do the 
authorities live up to their commitment to the ICCPR in matters of reli-
gious education. Religious freedom is not fully guaranteed in the case of 
Muslims, because the right to not belong to a religion is not respected. The 
criminalization of conversion constitutes a serious violation of freedom of 
religion proclaimed in the ICCPR. Against this background, the widespread 
claim that only the Christians in Southern Sudan are victims of violation 
of religious freedom and powerlessness needs to be challenged. Moreover, 
the present study shows that political, cultural, and social divisions in 
Sudanese society have to be considered seriously when looking into the 
issue of religious freedom in Sudan.
The case of religious minorities in Sudan is complex and multifaceted, as 
ethnic boundaries between the communities are not drawn merely along 
religious lines. As a result of the tribal nature of the society and the complex 
cultural differences between the South and the North, any social demarca-
tions and divisions are bound to be the product of more variables than the 
much publicized religious and political conflicts in Sudanese society.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FROM POWER TO POWERLESSNESS: ZOROASTRIANISM IN  
IRANIAN HISTORY
Michael Stausberg
The present chapter discusses a relevant, but generally neglected case of 
a religious minority in what is generally referred to as the ‘Middle East’, 
namely the case of Zoroastrianism. This is one of the oldest religious tradi-
tions of the world, with roots in the second millennium BCE and primordial 
ties to Iranian history and the country of Iran, where Zoroastrians until 
well after the Arabic-Islamic conquest in the mid-seventh century CE 
constituted the majority religious group.1 While focusing on more recent 
developments,2 the present chapter will put the minority question in a 
more long-term perspective. It starts with some reflections on terminology, 
before giving the argument a historical twist and looking at the historical 
origin of the majority/minority configuration, which is shown to have pre-
Islamic antecedents. The conclusion will briefly wind up the argument by 
pointing to some dimensions of the core issue of this volume: power and 
powerlessness.
Speaking of Religious Minorities
The notion of ‘religious minorities’ rests on a double distinction: Speaking 
of religious minorities only makes sense when religion can be distinguished 
1 I wish to thank my colleague Jenny Rose for reading and correcting an earlier version 
of this essay. Thanks also to the editors of this volume for their careful editorial work and 
to Maurits van den Boogert for suggestions and comments. 
2 For general historical surveys of Zoroastrianism in modern Iran see Writer 1994; 
Stausberg 2002b: 152–262 (in German); Mehr 2002; Choksy 2006. Local ethnographic stud-
ies include Fischer 1973, who did fieldwork among the religious minorities of Yazd during 
the late 1960s; Boyce 1977, who paints a somewhat romantic picture of religious life in a 
remote village based on fieldwork in the early 1960s; Kestenberg Amighi 1990, on assimila-
tion and ethnic persistence based on fieldwork in Teheran in the early to mid-1970s. For a 
more recent sketch of Yazd, see Green, 2000. See also Sanasarian 2000, for a synoptic survey 
of the religious minorities. Sarah Stewart (SOAS) is currently engaged in a comprehensive 
study of contemporary Zoroastrianism, including oral history. 
© Michael Stausberg, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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as a recognizable, sufficiently differentiated sphere of social interaction—
implying that the different religions acting within a religious field recognize 
each other as specimens of the same category, even though they typically 
attempt to deny the status of other religions by polemically referring to them 
as ‘idol-worships’, ‘cults’, ‘sects’ or whatever derogatory label may come to 
mind. At the same time, speaking of religious minorities is predicated on 
the existence of (religious) majorities, even though such majorities typically 
exist in the singular, with one majority versus several minorities.
On the face of it, the relationship between a minority and a majority is 
of a numerical kind, pointing to the distribution of religious affiliation in 
a given demographic context. In scholarly and non-scholarly discourses, 
however, beyond the numerical facts, the very establishment of which 
often serves specific interests, speaking of minorities is entangled with 
notions of power. (The present volume is a case in point.) The influential 
Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth (1897–1952) of German-Jewish descent 
articulated that very clearly in a seminal article published in 1945, where 
he defines “a minority as a group of people who, because of their physical 
and cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in 
which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore 
regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination” (Wirth 1945: 347). 
The relationship between majority and minority here exceeds the purely 
numerical3 and is conceived as one of position and participation in soci-
ety, mutual perception and self-perception, attitudes and behavior. In this 
understanding, as articulated by Wirth, but apparently generally taken for 
granted, discrimination is a defining feature of being a minority.
Although the minority group discussed in the present chapter, namely 
the Zoroastrians of Iran, neatly fits the proposed scheme in various respects, 
for the sake of logical consistency and conceptual clarity I would prefer to 
disentangle the numerical from the discriminatory aspects. To my mind, 
the asymmetrical power-relations beyond the purely numerical and statisti-
cal facts (which can go along with various power-relationships) should be 
referred to as subordinate versus dominant groups.4 The dominant groups 
are powerful in that they, or allied forces such as the nation states, have 
the capacity “to decide what is decided” (Lukes 2005: 111), to carry out their 
3 Wirth 1945: 349: ‘. . . minorities are not to be judged in terms of numbers. The people 
whom we regard as a minority may actually, from a numerical standpoint, be a majority’. 
4 Another set of power relationships is hegemony, characterized by the subordinates’ 
consent. This does not seem to apply in the case studied in the following. 
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own will even against others and to frame the agenda for the others.5 While 
the agency of the dominant group is affirmed and enabled, the agency of 
the subordinate group is restricted. Turning to religion, this means that the 
religious field is regulated in such a manner as to benefit the dominant 
group(s) and to curtail the agency of the subordinate group(s).
The Historical Genesis of ‘Religious Minorities’ in Pre-Islamic Iran
The minority-question of the Middle East is typically identified with Islam 
as being the religious majority in question. Turning to Iranian history, in 
my interpretation (for more details see Stausberg, 2002a) it was during 
the reign of the Sasanians (224–651), the last of the pre-Islamic empires 
of Iran,6 that the religious field—the ensemble of religious expressions 
in a given territory—was reorganized in such a manner that we find a 
dominant majority religion and several subordinate religious minorities. 
Zoroastrianism, the dominant religion backed up by the Sasanian kings, has 
a history going back far beyond the Sasanian period, to the earliest times 
of the emergence of Iranian ethnogenesis, in the sense that the ancient 
Zoroastrian texts, collectively known as the Avesta, at the same time provide 
the earliest evidence of Iranian languages and cultural concepts. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that not all Iranian territories were ‘Zoroastrianized’ in the 
sense of exclusive religious adherence, and there is plenty of evidence of 
religious forms of expression that cannot be classified as Zoroastrian (in a 
wider or a more narrow sense).
It is only with the early Sasanians that one finds kings who actively 
and exclusively sponsored Zoroastrian religious institutions, apparently 
as part of their project to create a unified empire. Already half a millen-
nium earlier, Achaemenian kings had invoked Zoroastrian deities, most 
prominently Ahura Mazdā, and other elements of the Zoroastrian religion 
in their attempt to legitimate the creation and perpetuation of their empire 
(Lincoln 2007). Yet, it is the Sasanian kings who in their official proclama-
tions not only recurred to the protection and support of (Zoroastrian) 
deities, but even explicitly professed their adherence to Zoroastrianism 
as a religion. The Sasanian kings identified themselves and were identifi-
able as Zoroastrian kings roughly a century before Constantine became 
5 I follow Lukes 2005: 109 in his view that power refers to “an ability or capacity, which 
may or may not be exercised”. 
6 See Daryaee 2009 for a recent comprehensive portrayal of the Sasanian Empire.
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the first of the Christian Roman emperors. Besides the affirmation of 
religious identity, their use of religious symbols in official documents and 
their patronage of religious institutions such as ritual fires, religion was 
variously interlinked with the State in terms of administration and law. 
(This is why many scholars speak of a Sasanian ‘state church’.) The tight-
ening control over the religious field is also reflected in religious tensions 
aiming at the destruction of certain sanctuaries and at the elimination of 
religious variation (‘heresy’) and ‘irreligion’ and in reported codifications 
of the religious tradition. Zoroastrian religious texts from the Islamic era 
articulate the ideology of a ‘religiocracy’ by affirming the inseparable unity 
of kingship and religion. While this idea may well have had its supporters 
in Sasanian times, reality was more complex.
Besides unmarked or unnamed religious practices—i.e. religious prac-
tices, often of a local or regional nature, that cannot be identified in terms 
of an encompassing religious tradition—other groups with clearly marked 
religious identities had settled on territories that were (or were to become) 
part of the Sasanian Empire. Jews had been living on Iranian soil for many 
centuries, and Christianity took root there from early on in its history. No 
less than twenty Christian bishops were recorded in Iranian territory at the 
beginning of the Sasanian period. There were also other religious groups, 
and, with Manichaeism, a new, expanding, international religion came into 
being from within Iran in the early Sasanian period. In some regions of 
the Empire, especially in Mesopotamia (no longer a part of modern Iran), 
Zoroastrians never were the majority of the population. There is evidence 
that the different religious groups did not live isolated from each other but 
engaged in various forms of interaction and exchange, even though most of 
their normative documents tried to erect clear behavioral and ideological 
boundaries and often displayed critical or even hostile attitudes to each 
other. In fact, the reorganization of the religious field that occurred with 
the ascendance of the Sasanians swiftly led to unprecedented harshness 
in interreligious relationships. Mani, the apostle of Manichaeism, died in 
a Sasanian prison c.276 CE, and in his inscriptions a high-ranking (but 
later forgotten) third century priest proudly mentions that he instigated 
persecutions of several non-Zoroastrian religions. Sanctions like these were 
unheard of in pre-Sasanian times, not necessarily because people were less 
pious and aggressive or more tolerant, but because the religious field was 
not yet organized as an arena of competition between different, clearly 
identifiable, religious groups. Persecutions of Christians and Jews are also 
attested for later periods of Sasanian history, partly in conjunction with 
political events such as the wars with Rome.
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Beside persecutions, the novel minority politics also entailed elements 
of official recognition and representation. The Jewish Exilarch, for example, 
was recognized as the head of the Jews and in charge of dispensing justice 
and collecting taxes. In the fifth century CE there was an edict officially 
recognizing Christianity, and an independent Persian Church came to 
be established, the head of which had to be recognized by the Sasanian 
emperor. There were various interactions and bonds between Jews, Chris-
tians and the Sasanian emperors: Khusraw I (r. 531–578), one of the most 
important Sasanian kings, even had a Christian wife. Khusraw II (r. 590–628) 
had two Christian wives from different branches: Maryam, the daughter 
of Byzantine emperor Maurice, and Shirin, an Aramaean Christian. The 
increasing acknowledgment of Christianity in the Sasanian Empire was 
reflected in a saying attributed to king Hormizd IV (579–590), reported by 
the historian Tabari, who compared the different religions of the Empire 
to the four legs of the throne: deleting one of them would lead to the col-
lapse of the entire structure (Boswoth/al-Tabari 1999: 298). The king even 
advised the Zoroastrian priests that renouncing the desire to persecute 
the Christians and ‘to become assiduous in good works’ might in fact lead 
to the adherents of other faiths becoming attracted towards Zoroastrian-
ism (Boswoth/al-Tabari 1999: 298). Tolerance of the dominant versus the 
subordinate religions is here conceived of as a means to strengthen the 
position of the dominant religion by making it more attractive.
The Islamization of Iran and the Eclipse of Zoroastrianism
The Arab/Islamic conquest of the Sasanian Empire did not immediately 
translate into the Islamization of the country. It took several centuries 
before Islam became the majority religion of Iran, even though it had been 
the religion of the rulers right from the beginning. According to Jamsheed 
Choksy, it was only as late as around 1300 CE that Muslims had gained 
“complete control” over Iranian society (Choksy 1997: 143). Conversely, 
Zoroastrianism shrank into the role of a religious minority. More than 
that, Zoroastrians became a marginal group. Contrary to the Jews and the 
Christians, the Zoroastrians were virtually eradicated from the political 
scene in Medieval Iran (Khanbaghi 2006: 25). Concurrently with the entry 
of Iran into dar al-islam and the emergence of the Iranian shape of Islam 
(Yarshater 1998), or the Persianization of Islam, and despite the Zoroas-
trians’ primordial ties to Iran, they apparently became ever more isolated 
in Persian-Islamic society.
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While the Mongol invasion (1219–1224) gave fresh impetus to the Jews 
and the Christians in Iran, subsequent Mongol rule did not do much to 
alleviate the fate of the Zoroastrians, who perceived it as yet another major 
affliction. Also during the next main period, the reign of the Safavid dynasty 
(1501–1722), when Twelver Shiism was introduced as the official religion of 
the country, it seems that “the Zoroastrians were the least well accepted 
of all the non-Muslim groups” (Khanbaghi 2006: 97), even if they did not 
suffer hardship all over Iran. It must have been sometime during the early 
modern period that several Iranian Zoroastrian communities in Khorasan 
(northeast Iran) and Sistan (east Iran), as well as the Safavid Zoroastrian 
community of Isfahan, ceased to exist. In late Safavid times in the eigh-
teenth century, it seems that the Zoroastrians got involved in the armed 
conflicts between the Safavids and the Afghan invaders and between the 
Zand dynasty and the Qajars, leading to retaliations against the Zoroastrian 
communities (Choksy 2006: 140–141; Khanbaghi 2006: 156–157).
As is well-known, Islam has a developed corpus of legal regulations 
concerning the recognition and treatment of other religions. The Zoro-
astrians have a somewhat ambiguous status in this system, because their 
recognition as a protected people (dhimmi) is not unequivocal and therefore 
open to negotiation. The notion of subordinate versus dominant religions, 
as outlined above, seems to fit the model of the Islamic legal framework 
quite well. Besides legal regulations, such as the payment of the poll-tax 
and strict enforcement of community boundaries including prohibitions of 
intermarriages, interreligious interaction was governed by a series of codes 
of conduct, some of which—especially those concerning water, food, and 
eating—were grounded in rules of purity of the respective religions; others, 
notably the special colors of clothes and restrictions in modes of transporta-
tion imposed on the minorities, clearly served to mark and stigmatize them. 
Some rules—such as those forbidding Zoroastrians to carry umbrellas— 
were clearly “ludicrous” (Mehr 2002: 281). Some rules and laws, such as that 
privileging Muslim offspring in matters of inheritance, served to stimulate 
de-affiliation from minorities and conversion to Islam.
In the twelve centuries from the Arab/Islamic conquest of the country to 
Euro-Russian expansion during the period of the Qajar dynasty (1779–1925), 
Zoroastrianism was reduced from a diffuse and partly dominant majority 
religion to a compact, subordinate religious minority.7 In fact, apart from 
the Indian Zoroastrians, also known as Parsis, who had established indepen-
7 See Hourani 1982 [1947]: 14 for these terms; for a later discussion see Ben-Dor 1999: 
7–11. 
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dent and stable communities on the Indian West Coast concurrently with 
the increasing Islamization of Iran, in the nineteenth century the former 
diffusion of Iranian Zoroastrianism was reduced to two geographical areas 
in central and southeast Iran respectively: the cities of Yazd and Kerman 
and some surrounding villages. While Zoroastrians still constituted the 
majority in a number of such villages, the number of these insular major-
ity villages shrank in the long run; there were Zoroastrian quarters in the 
cities, but these were eventually infiltrated and reduced or even destroyed 
in the course of the centuries.
For the second half of the nineteenth century, available figures (Stausberg 
2002a: 365–366) indicate that the number of Zoroastrians in the Yazd and 
Kerman regions together was well below 10,000. Moreover, available reports 
show that the Zoroastrians were suffering from pervasive and persistent 
discrimination and humiliation on the part of the Shia-Islamic majority 
population. These took the forms of ‘ordinary’ rules and codes of conduct, 
including the levying of the poll tax (often resulting in crisis and violence), 
but also ‘extraordinary’ acts of violation such as blackmailing, raids, assaults, 
rape, abduction, and murder were far from uncommon (Stausberg 2002: 
368–372). There occurred a constant small-scale flow of conversions to 
Islam—partly enforced, such as when Zoroastrian girls were abducted and 
married off to Muslims against their will. Given the discriminatory laws of 
inheritance, according to which a Muslim descendent would inherit the 
entire estate of his minority parents at the expense of his minority siblings, 
conversions also threatened the material wealth of the community.
Colonialism, Legal and Political Changes
Unsurprisingly, the memory of this large-scale discrimination is still very 
much part of the collective identity of the present-day Iranian Zoroastrians. 
In retrospect, it could well seem that the very existence of the Zoroastrian 
communities would have been endangered in the long run, if they had 
had to continue struggling in isolation against the same odds. At that 
point, transformative change could only come from the outside—and so 
it did, as the direct and indirect consequences of colonialism. As a result 
of developments during the subsequent century (as outlined in the follow-
ing), the number of Zoroastrians tripled to some 25,000 (or even 30,000) 
in the mid-1970s (Stausberg 2002b: 240–241).
There had been occasional contacts between the Iranian Zoroastrians 
and the Parsis, their coreligionists in India. With the Indian West Coast 
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becoming part of colonial trading and political networks, and the Parsis 
getting increasingly involved in trade and establishing close ties with the 
British, contacts between Iranian and Indian Zoroastrians became more 
regular. In fact, something like a mass exodus of Iranian Zoroastrians to 
Western India started in the late eighteenth century, only to intensify 
during periods of the nineteenth century, and to continue down to World 
War II. This kind of refugee network again came in use after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. The Iranian Zoroastrians who migrated to India in the 
modern period have constituted something like a sub-group of Indian 
Zoroastrianism, known as ‘the Iranis’.
In part stimulated by the arrival of the Iranian refugees, in part by a 
continued attachment to their ‘original homeland’, and in part by the claim 
to the heritage of a glorious ancient civilization (Iran) that could enhance 
their cultural prestige in the colonial context, the Parsis not only accom-
modated Iranian Zoroastrian refugees (even if somewhat reluctantly), but 
they also directly intervened in Iranian affairs. One of the most effective 
ways of doing this was by founding, in 1853, an association that explicitly 
aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the Iranian Zoroastrians. In 1854, 
this association sent an emissary to Iran; he not only filed important 
reports about the miserable situation of the Iranian Zoroastrians (he also 
blamed their ignorance and lack of education and collaboration for their 
fate) but also coordinated a vast array of activities that served to relieve 
the distress of the Iranian Zoroastrians and to rehabilitate (and to update) 
their material culture, for example by renovating religious buildings; to 
some extent these activities can be described as foreign aid. Manekji Limji 
Hataria, the first Parsi emissary, who remained in Iran for almost 35 years 
and who married an Iranian Zoroastrian lady from Kerman, networked 
and campaigned widely, also involving foreign diplomats and international 
connections (Stausberg 2002: 154–164; Ringer 2009).
Manekji’s campaign resulted in a substantial legal change: in 1882, by an 
imperial decree, Zoroastrians were in perpetuity liberated from the payment 
of the poll tax, the levying of which had always caused serious problems 
and tensions. Apart from abolishing the jizya, the imperial decree put the 
Zoroastrians on equal footing with the Muslims in all matters of taxation. 
In 1898 another royal decree officially abolished all the discriminations 
suffered by the Zoroastrians (Stausberg 2002: 164–165). Even so, there was 
a great distance from the lofty promises of a royal decree to the day-to-day 
realities in the provinces, and Zoroastrians continued to be discriminated, 
and even the poll-tax was temporarily re-imposed (Stausberg 2002: 165–168). 
Now, however, circumstances had changed in such a manner as to allow 
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them to challenge their fate, and the royal decrees were a way to give 
legitimacy to their claims. Moreover, the Zoroastrian community of Kerman 
found itself in a special situation; the British consul had extended his good 
offices to the Zoroastrians, given that a vast majority of the Zoroastrians, 
namely the Parsis in India, were British subjects (Sykes 1906: 760). At the 
same time, as Jamsheed Choksy has rightly pointed out, unlike the close 
links between the Parsis and the British colonial power in India, there 
never developed very strong ties between the Iranian Zoroastrians and 
the British in Iran (Choksy 2006: 144–146).
While the contribution of the Indians, the work of the Parsi emissary 
and, regionally, the occasional intervention of the representative of British 
colonial power were crucial to open up the closed situation of powerlessness 
of the Iranian Zoroastrians, towards the end of the nineteenth century the 
Zoroastrians themselves started to affirm their own political agency. This 
was facilitated by the creation of new associations that served to regulate 
the internal affairs of the local Zoroastrian communities and to represent 
them to the outside world. Apart from providing forums for protest against 
maltreatment, this reorganization of the community administration obvi-
ously had implications for the power structure within the communities; 
collective effort replaced the will of the elders, mostly merchants and priests 
(Mehr 2002: 287). Moreover, since the late nineteenth century, Zoroastrian 
merchants managed to accumulate capital, and they started other ventures 
and enterprises, including banking; their capital and networks allowed them 
not only to react to injustice but to contribute more actively to influencing 
the political agenda and to developing a framework for the future develop-
ment of the Zoroastrian communities.
An important case in point is the early twentieth century Constitutional 
Revolution, where the leading Zoroastrians contributed by providing 
shelter, weapons and funds for the revolutionaries. Among many other 
things, the debate on the new Constitution, which was proclaimed in 1906 
(and mainly modeled on the Belgian Constitution from 1831), dealt with 
the position of Islam and the civil status of the religious minorities. Seen 
from the perspective of the minorities, the results were ambivalent. In the 
Supplementary Constitutional Law (1907) Islam in its Jafari (Twelver Shia) 
form, is affirmed as the official religion of the country (article 1), and while 
the existence or the rights of the other religions are nowhere affirmed, 
article 8 decrees that all people of the Persian Empire are to enjoy equal 
rights before the law—a wording reportedly smuggled into the text by an 
influential Zoroastrian; in the original draft that right was only granted to 
Muslims (Stausberg 2002b: 174–175). Articles 9 and 10 specify a series of 
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legal provisions concerning life, property, etc. This provision was soon to 
be tested when a prominent Zoroastrian banker and constitutionalist was 
murdered for political motives. While there was a public outrage demanding 
the execution of the murderers, the idea that several Muslims should be 
executed for the death of a single Zoroastrian was apparently inconceivable, 
and the murderers were punished by lashes and prison (Afary 1996: 138). 
While this was a high-profile case in the center of the Empire, for most 
minority people in the remoter provincial areas the provisions given in the 
constitutional laws remained lofty words only (Choksy 2006: 151).
It can be argued that, although the 1906 Constitution (which largely 
remained unchanged, but without being always in force, until 1979) does 
not mention Zoroastrianism as a religion, it does grant the Zoroastrians, as 
people of the Iranian Empire, fundamental individual rights.8 Nevertheless, 
individual Zoroastrians (or members of other religious minorities for that 
matter) are far from being on equal footing in the political system. Note 
that article 58 specifies that only Muslims can attain the rank of Minis-
ter. Moreover, a Zoroastrian cannot become an elected representative of 
Muslims in the parliament (majles). On the collective level, however, the 
non-Islamic religious minorities are implicitly acknowledged, since Jews, 
Christians, and Zoroastrians were given the right to elect representatives 
of their own—amounting to an indirect recognition of their existence and 
giving them a minimal loophole of participation in the political system. 
Even this minimal acknowledgment, however, was perceived as so prob-
lematic as to potentially jeopardize the nationalist movement, resulting in 
a ‘request’, in reality a threat, to the minorities not to execute their rights. 
While the Jews and the Christians complied, the Zoroastrians maneuvered 
their way around and got their representative, the merchant, estate owner, 
and banker Arbab Jamshid (1850–1932), admitted to the majles, otherwise 
an all-Muslim body (Afary 1996: 70; Stausberg 2002b: 173; Mehr 2002: 281). 
The Jewish and Christian representatives were admitted from the second 
period onwards. Now, however, it was stipulated that all candidates had to 
declare their adherence to Islam, and even the three minority candidates 
had to have a “sound” religious reputation in their respective religion (Afary 
1996: 263). Moreover, as in the case of the individual rights, while this 
scheme worked on the national level, it was not immediately transferable 
8 See Afary 2005, for a comparison of the Iranian Constitution with the Belgian, Bulgar-
ian, and Ottoman Constitutions respectively. For the status of the minorities, Afary notes 
that “the language of the law was less explicit and forthcoming” than that of the other 
Constitutions (Afary 2005: 158).
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to the provinces; hence, “[i]n Yazd, contrary to specific regulations from 
the Majles that the provincial anjumans [councils] must represent their 
regional constituencies, the anjuman refused to seat a Zoroastrian, since 
the ʿulama would not recognize the rights of the Zoroastrian community to 
public representation” (Afary 1996: 316). The political turmoil remained in 
the country until Reza Shah (1925–1941) effectively ruled out the enforce-
ment of the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.
The reign of Reza Shah brought important legal changes which can be 
described as a secularization and nationalization of the judiciary system. In 
the long run, “the uniform national nature of these civil codes . . . brought 
greater physical safety, increased access to education, enhanced opportuni-
ties for employment, and provided freedom of expression of religious and 
cultural practices for Zoroastrians” (Choksy 2006: 154). During the reign of 
Reza Shah some specific forms of discrimination were formally abolished, 
albeit not without resistance. Here are just two examples: Zoroastrian men 
were no longer forced to wear the yellow dress, and Zoroastrians were 
eventually allowed to ride on mules, donkeys, and horses (Stausberg 2002b: 
169–170, 180). When general conscription was introduced in 1925, at first 
members of the national minorities were excluded; this law was changed 
in 1938, and henceforth also Zoroastrians were allowed to fight for the 
country with which they identified (Stausberg 2002b: 180).9
In the early 1930s, the minorities were granted separate personal status 
laws, which took some time to be accepted by the government, mostly 
because of a specific rule in Zoroastrian law of adoption and divorce (Staus-
berg 2002b: 181). The Family Protection Law of 1967, which was applicable 
to all Iranian citizens and which also made it possible for Zoroastrian 
women to apply for divorce in civil courts (Mehr 2002: 295), brought the 
Zoroastrian community under closer patronage of the state.
The fact that in theory the Zoroastrians enjoyed equality under public 
law, on equal footing with the other people of the Empire (except in some 
matters of family law), went a long way to providing some amount of 
agency to minorities by putting an end to the subordinate position to which 
9 The inclusion of Zoroastrians in general conscription is generally celebrated as an 
achievement and not as an act of exploitation; Zoroastrians actively sought to be admit-
ted. In a speech in the Majles in March 1925, in the context of a debate on conscription, 
the Zoroastrian representative argued that this issue should not divide the Muslim from 
non-Muslims Iranians who must share ‘joy and sorrow’ with their Muslim Iranian brothers. 
In his eyes, not being considered for conscription would amount to being separated from 
the honour of ‘Iranianism’ (Shahrokh/Writer 1994: 136). 
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they had found themselves confined. The theory, however, was not always 
followed in practice; discrimination and prejudice remained “daily expe-
riences” for minority people living in the province (Sanasarian 2000: 56); 
Zoroastrian girls continued to be abducted, and insults and manhandling 
still occurred (Choksy 2006: 161). On a greater scale, the more stable and 
equal treatment of the Zoroastrians came into effect only in the final decade 
of the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (Choksy 2006: 154), shortly before 
the Islamic Revolution—and in a climate of general political repression. 
Zoroastrians experienced a more equal treatment especially in the capital, 
where, as a result of rapid urbanization, around half of the Zoroastrian 
population of Iran was living by the 1960s (Stausberg 2002b: 240).
Nationalism: Ideological Reassessment and Civic Zoroastrianism
Zoroastrians are the oldest religious community living in Iran, and Zoro-
astrianism can claim to be the original religion of the country.10 Already 
in apologetic and polemical texts in Middle Persian, written in the first 
centuries of Islamic rule, Zoroastrian theologians presented their religion 
as the Iranian religion per se, the given (natural) religion of the Iranians, 
contrasted to the foreign ones and to the religions of the non-Iranians. 
(Insofar as Iran is better than all the other countries, this also implied 
an ethnocentric and apologetic evaluation of the religion of the Iranians, 
namely Zoroastrianism.) About the texts written by Zoroastrians between 
the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, Aptin Khanbaghi has recently 
observed:
One of the most interesting features of the texts produced by the Zoroastrians 
in the Medieval period is their belief in their apanage of Iranian identity; 
Iranian and Zoroastrian are synonyms in these texts and it is only in the 20th 
century that Zoroastrian authors accept their non-Zoroastrian compatriots 
as Iranians (Khanbaghi 2006: 147–148).
Thus the Zoroastrians have a long history of religious nationalism, which 
they stubbornly maintained in spite of their increasing marginalization 
in Persian society.
10 Contrary to Christianity and Islam there are no direct records of the pre-Zoroastrian 
religious situation; the pre-Zoroastrian ‘paganism’ therefore needs to be reconstructed; this 
was done by Zoroastrian theologians in ancient times (see de Jong 2005) and is still being 
done by modern scholars (Stausberg 2002a: 115–117). 
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As a modern political concept, nationalism could engage various atti-
tudes to religion, from anti- or irreligion to various reinterpretations of tra-
ditional religion,11 from stressing continuity to rupture between pre-Islamic 
and Islamic Iran. An important ideological resource for nationalist identity 
myths (Smith 1991: viii) and discourses was recourse to pre-Islamic Iranian 
civilization. Since the mid-nineteenth century, one finds new systematic 
attempts at studying ancient Iranian history, and Manekji, the Parsi emis-
sary, actively involved himself in these projects (Stausberg 2003). Another 
central aspect of nationalism was language politics, i.e. the attempt to 
‘purify’ the Persian language by ‘cleansing’ it of Arabic elements and by 
‘restoring’ its ‘purity’. Moreover, in 1925, in the early period of Reza Shah’s 
reign, the calendar was reformed by introducing a solar year (with the Hijra 
as the starting point for the era), the twelve months of which were given 
the names of Zoroastrian deities and divine beings, in agreement with the 
Zoroastrian calendar. This is an example of an element of minority religion 
becoming part of mainstream civic culture. In the field of onomastics, in 
nationalist-minded circles one finds a preference for Iranian names, mostly 
taken from pre-Islamic history and epics—including the very name of 
the country which was changed from ‘Persia’ to ‘Iran’. When last names 
were introduced, people were exhorted to choose genuine Iranian names. 
Archaeological projects of recovery were started and symbols from pre-
Islamic Iran became prominent on public buildings.
Finally, the celebration of the ancient Iranian heritage, as a form of sym-
bolic capital, was an important maneuver for creating political legitimacy, 
especially by the second and last Pahlavi Shah. Some well-known instances 
include: Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi’s assumption of the fictive old 
Iranian title Aryamehr (‘Light of the Aryans’) in 1965/67; the pretentious 
and pompous feast to celebrate 2,500 years of kingship in Iran at Persepolis 
in 1971—an event which probably helped to end the tradition it sought to 
celebrate; and, in 1976, the replacement of the Hijra as the starting point of 
the era, substituting the alleged date of the founding of the Persian Empire 
by Cyrus the Great, which turned the year 1355 (solar Hijri) into the year 
2535 of the royal era (shahanshahi). This act of imperial hubris provided 
another attempt at ‘de-Islamifying’ public national culture, and it provoked 
outrage among opponents who, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, claimed that 
replacing the Islamic era amounted to a desire to abolish Islam. Acts such 
as these nourished rumors that the Shah—similar rumors had already 
11 For an early study of early Iranian nationalism, see Keddie 1962. 
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been circulated about his father—was secretly adhering to Zoroastrian-
ism (Stausberg 2002b: 211–214). Representing a source of symbolic capital, 
Zoroastrianism moved closer to power and its abuse.
As these (unfounded) rumors show, there was only a fine line dividing 
discourses on pre-Islamic Persia from discourses on Zoroastrianism. Declar-
ing an attachment to the pre-Islamic past can be positively or negatively 
related to a commitment to Zoroastrianism. While one can, theoretically, 
be interested merely in the artistic, martial, or political aspects of the pre-
Islamic past, aficionados of pre-Islamic culture would generally also hold 
a sympathetic attitude towards Zoroastrianism, since this religion was an 
integrated part of the whole. From being a marginal, marginalized, dis-
criminated, and suspicious minority, Zoroastrianism had moved into the 
core of mainstream discursive, imaginary, and symbolic representations of 
Iranian identity, giving it some degree of symbolic power. I suggest calling 
this ‘civic’ Zoroastrianism. It entails a discursive or symbolic attachment 
to a former national religion but not a commitment to a specific religious 
minority group, which did not derive any immediate benefit from its new 
symbolic representation. The community is of interest only insofar as it 
has kept the flame of memory alive. This becomes apparent, for example, 
when the main fire temple of Yazd is overcrowded by visitors during the 
New Year (norouz) celebrations. Others can proclaim themselves to be 
Zoroastrians at heart, even if they would not seek formal admission to the 
religion (but some covertly did and some still do). Especially in the Islamic 
Republic, proclaiming a Zoroastrian identity appears as a mode of cultural 
critique, as a third way between State-Islamism and Westernism. While 
there is also an Islamic Iranian nationalism, which tends to regard Islam 
as the fulfillment of ancient Iranian civilization (if a positive significance 
is ascribed to that at all) and thereby replaces Zoroastrianism as a point 
of reference, pre-Islamic Iranian nationalism tends to be secular, with an 
un- or even anti-Islamic flavor.
Diffusion, Education, and the Breakdown of Ritual Boundaries
Concurrently with Zoroastrianism moving into the symbolic core of 
Iranian nationalism, many Zoroastrians migrated to Teheran, the (new) 
capital of the state. As a result of this migration, in the period from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the 1960s, the percentage of the Zoroastrian 
population living in Teheran increased from one to over 50 percent of the 
entire Iranian Zoroastrian population, with the main increase occurring 
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since the 1950s (Stausberg 2002b: 239–241). This process has continued 
since then. Moreover, Zoroastrian villages have become parts of provin-
cial towns; many villages are by now only nominally populated, with the 
majority of the people who stay on being old members of the communities, 
while others maintain houses but de facto live elsewhere. From an over-
whelmingly agricultural community with some elements of trade, Iranian 
Zoroastrianis turned into something like an urban middle-class society. 
Some entered professions such as medicine, engineering, and architecture, 
or applied sciences. Some Zoroastrians even obtained prominent positions 
in the state bureaucracy and the army, but even during the reign of the 
Pahlavi-dynasty “Zoroastrians continued to be barred from the judiciary” 
(Mehr 2002: 299).
Although the Zoroastrian community of Teheran increased the Zoro-
astrians have remained a tiny minority in the ever expanding capital—
something like a drop in the ocean. While there is one residential housing 
colony, some residential buildings and some neighborhoods with a higher 
concentration of Zoroastrians, in general the Teheran community appears 
scattered in spatial terms. There is what can be described as kind of a com-
munity centre with a fire-temple, the seat and offices of the community 
organization and a hall to celebrate initiations and weddings in Teheran, 
but many Zoroastrians continue to regard the former settlements in the 
province as the more important ritual centers. From a compact minority, 
Zoroastrianism has turned into a diffuse/scattered one.
The mentioned changes in the occupational structure, correspond-
ing to a declining significance of land, which lost its value as a basis of 
agriculture (but remained an important capital for developers), are also a 
result of a greater importance of modern education. Emphasis has been 
laid on education since the work of the Parsi emissary, and this has been 
continued to some extent, leading to the creation of schools specifically 
meant for Zoroastrian children. While it would be wrong to say that Iranian 
Zoroastrians are a community of intellectuals, they seem to be a fairly well 
educated by Iranian standards, and this has enabled many among them to 
compete for modern white-collar jobs.
Until the twentieth century, the organization of the religious field oper-
ated with clear-cut boundaries between robust and compact religious 
groups. Several of the changes indicated above resulted in making such 
boundaries less visible and apparently less important (but far from non-
existent). This is also reflected in religious practice. In the key-period of 
the modernizing project—from the 1920s to the 1970s—some of the most 
distinctive ritual practices of Zoroastrianism were abolished (Stausberg 
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2004). Most visibly, the Zoroastrian funeral practice of exposing the dead 
to vultures in so-called towers of silence (dakhme) was done away with, 
and also some related elements of the funerals were discontinued. Their 
replacement by burial in cemeteries expressed a clear desire to become part 
of the cultural mainstream (even though the graves, in order to do justice 
to Zoroastrian purity rules, are constructed somewhat differently from their 
Muslim counterparts). Purity rules are an important mechanism of creat-
ing and maintaining boundaries between different religious groups. Purity 
rules are prominent both in Zoroastrianism and in Shia Islam. Accordingly, 
in tune with the decreased importance of community boundaries, purity 
rules were downplayed, important rituals of purification were no longer 
practiced, and the purificatory substance considered to be most efficient, 
namely consecrated bull’s urine (nirang), was no longer produced and 
applied. Educated Zoroastrians apparently found these practices embar-
rassing. In a similar fashion, the extended priestly rituals, often systemati-
cally connected to both the rituals of purification and the funerals, were 
shortened or discontinued. Related to this, the significance of the fire was 
redefined, and the fire cult was simplified. In a radical departure from 
previous stipulations, some fires and fire temples have to some extent 
been made accessible to people from other religions. At the same time, 
and often in reception of interpretations from Western and Parsi scholars, 
the foundations of the religious identity of Zoroastrianism have, often in 
reception of interpretations by Western and Parsi scholars, been redefined 
to consist of the alleged original message of Zarathustra, thus emphasizing 
ethics and monotheism rather than rituals and the variety of the presence 
of the divine (Stausberg 2002b: 219–234). To some extent, discourse has 
replaced ritual as the key-idiom of religious communication.
The Islamic Republic
During the 125 years from Manekji’s arrival in 1854 to the Shah’s departure in 
1979, the socio-economic situation of the Iranian Zoroastrians substantially 
improved: from being a subordinate minority group the Zoroastrians were 
on their way to becoming citizens of the Iranian empire, and their religion 
had received positive recognition in nationalist discourse. This does not 
mean that all Zoroastrians were uncritical supporters of the Shah. Never-
theless, once the revolution steered onto an Islamist path and the country 
turned into an Islamic Republic, the political change took a heavy toll on 
the situation of the Zoroastrians although the revolution as such did not 
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cause casualties among Zoroastrians. Khomeini, the leader of the revolu-
tion and the subsequent head of state, was highly critical of the pre-Islamic 
nationalist discourse. He held a traditional view of the religious minorities 
as impure heathens, and he kept on using derogatory vocabulary when 
referring to them, even though he made more accommodating statements 
after having come to power (Stausberg 2002b: 188, 190).
Paradoxically, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1979 
is the first legal document that officially acknowledges the rights of the 
‘recognized’ religious minorities, namely Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians 
(in this order). This “institutionalization of segmentation” under the label 
of aqaliat (‘religious minorities’) has become “a unique byproduct of the 
new regime”, as Eliz Sanasarian aptly puts it (2000: 154). According to the 
Constitution, article 13, “within the limits of the law” the religious minori-
ties “are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act 
according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious 
education”.12 It turned out that the seemingly innocent qualification “within 
the limits of the law” was to entail serious restrictions. The subsequent 
article (14) states that “the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethi-
cal norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect 
their human rights.” Taking past experiences with the interpretation and 
application of Islamic principles of justice and equity by Iranian Muslims 
into account, such a wording could not instil much confidence among 
the concerned parties. In continuity with the Constitution from 1906, 
minorities (including Zoroastrians) maintained the right to elect their 
own representatives to the parliament. On the other hand, a Zoroastrian 
cannot be elected to represent a Muslim electorate, and the Zoroastrian 
representative hardly has any significant power within the political system 
of the Islamic Republic.
Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates: “All civil, penal, financial, eco-
nomic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regu-
lations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely 
and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws 
and regulations”. Given that this reversed the secularization of the legal 
system, this stipulation turned out to have very serious ramifications for 
the Zoroastrians, especially with regard to the penal code and the law of 
12 All quotes from the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran are taken from http://
www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html (accessed May 18, 2009). 
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inheritance, which again makes conversion to Islam an attractive option.13 
Where they occurred, such conversions were publicized for propaganda 
purposes.14 A particularly sensitive issue has been the question of the 
compensatory blood money (die) that was denied in the case of murders 
of non-Muslims. In this question, however, the government changed its 
policy in 2002 by acknowledging an equal share of compensatory blood 
money for the recognized minorities.
Apart from the paradox of the simultaneous constitutional recognition 
and discriminatory legal stipulations, especially in the early period of the 
Islamic Republic, the subordinate minority status has once again char-
acterized the negotiations of daily life. Zoroastrians faced more hostile 
reactions, more limited public security, some amount of persecution and 
forced marriages, and occasional revival of the concept of ritual impurity 
(najes) as well as the use of insulting terms such as gabr and kafir (Choksy 
2006: 164–165), not to speak of the restrictions in public appearance and 
behaviour imposed on all inhabitants of the Islamic Republic. Given that the 
state obtained an explicit Islamic identity serving the interests of Muslims 
as its main constituency, careers in the army and the public sector were 
effectively blocked for Zoroastrians (Choksy 2006: 166). “Job discrimination 
became rampant throughout the 1980s” for all minorities, reports Sanasar-
ian (2000: 87). The war with Iraq and the perpetual economic crisis of the 
Islamic Republic, resulting in high unemployment and inflation, affected 
Zoroastrians as much as all ordinary Iranians without specific access to 
the networks of power. While it would be wrong to classify the Iranian 
Zoroastrians as a poor community by Iranian standards, there certainly is 
a fair amount of poverty in the community, and the emigration of wealthy 
members of the community occurred at the expense of networks of sup-
port, even though many of the rich people continue to provide various 
forms of aid from abroad.
Despite some misleading information contained in previous census 
records (which the Zoroastrian community did nothing to dispel),15 and in 
line with available information for the other recognized religious minorities, 
since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Zoroastrian population 
of Iran has declined by some 25–30 percent (to less than 20,000 adherents), 
and their birth rate is lower than that of the Muslim population.16 (I am 
13 See also Sanasarian, in this volume. 
14 See Sanasarian 2000: 130–131 for the example of a convert from Zoroastrianism.
15 It was also uncritically adopted by Hemmassi and Prorok 2002.
16 Richard Foltz (Montreal) informs me that the fertility rate is well below replacement 
level. 
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told that according to an internal census, there are at present some 18,000 
Zoroastrians in Iran.) Moreover, again as with all other religious minori-
ties (Hemmasi and Prorok 2002), urbanization has continued and even 
increased after the revolution; there was, and continues to be, a strong 
trend of emigration (which, together with the low fertility rate, is the 
main reason for the demographic decline of the community). The general 
prospects for the community appear to be grim, given the structural frame-
work of the Islamic Republic. While Zoroastrian spokespersons have not 
avoided criticizing the government right from the beginning (Sanasarian 
2000: 70–71), and while some continue to do so (Choksy 2006: 180–181), no 
Zoroastrians have become prominent in any sort of resistance movement; 
as a community the Zoroastrians keep a low-profile—everything else could 
easily lead to retaliations.
When it comes to religion, the trends observed for the Pahlavi period 
have continued; there has been no rise of any form of Zoroastrian fun-
damentalism. Members of the laity have been increasingly admitted to 
perform priestly duties. In general, religion has certainly attracted greater 
attention in the Islamic Republic than before, and the imposed sense of 
being part of a religious minority “has served to galvanize the community, 
strengthening its sense of identity, purpose and continuity” (Choksy 2006: 
172). The dominant religious idiom of public discourse has been appropri-
ated in that sense. On the other hand, the government heavily regulates 
the field of religious education (even within Zoroastrian schools) and does 
not give Zoroastrians access to the media in order to disseminate insider 
perspectives on Zoroastrianism, nor does it easily grant permission to 
erect new religious buildings. In spite of these restrictions, a number of 
smaller shrines have come into existence, and others have recently been 
renovated. One desert shrine some 50 km northeast of Yazd now functions 
as something like a national Zoroastrian pilgrimage centre, attracting large 
crowds during the annual pilgrimage in summer. Security police prevent 
Muslims from access to the shrine, thereby at the same time protecting 
and shielding the event.17 Given that religious rituals and feasts are the only 
legitimate occasions for relaxation of certain rules of conduct imposed by 
the Islamic Republic—at least as long as these events are shielded from 
the Muslim population and have been authorized by the government—
these have turned into important social celebrations and displays. Fifteen 
Zoroastrians who lost their lives as soldiers or in bombings during the war 
against Iraq are now generally acknowledged as ‘martyrs’ (shahid). This 
17 See Langer 2008, for an inventory of these shrines and pilgrimage-centres. 
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index of the sacrifice of Zoroastrian blood for their motherland is not only 
proclaimed in official pronouncements and to some extent acknowledged 
by the government, but also photographs of these martyrs are found in Zoro-
astrian public buildings and are displayed in public celebrations. There is 
an apparent mimesis of the martyr-discourse of the Islamic Republic, given 
that the concept of martyr had been absent in Zoroastrianism (Stausberg 
2002b: 218f; 2004: 533–534).
Some Conclusions and Prospects
In this chapter I argue that it is not the numerical size and distribution 
of religious groups that matters (minority/majority), what matters most is 
their relation in terms of domination/subordination: in other words, rela-
tionships of power. I furthermore contend that this sort of relationship is 
not a natural fact, but requires a specific organization of the religious field, 
which is a product of historical developments. In the case of Iran, I hold 
that the decisive developments into this direction occurred in the (early) 
Sasanian period, i.e. several centuries before the coming of Islam.
Zoroastrianism was at the forefront of this process, and the fate of 
this religion in the course of a millennium, from the third to the thirteen 
centuries CE, was to change from being a dominant majority religion to a 
subordinate religious minority. The subsequent six centuries reduced the 
spread of the religion to some limited geographical areas, to become a 
compact regional religion in the Iranian context. Larger-scale geopolitical 
developments and the modernizing project again changed the picture, 
and Zoroastrians successfully challenged their fate. They were on their 
way to becoming ‘ordinary’ citizens of the state, with a prospect of equal 
social and economic opportunities. With a limited adjustment in the form 
of de-emphasis of religious and ritual boundaries, and a reformulation of 
the doctrinal, ritual, and organizational structure of the religion in the 
nationalist context, Zoroastrianism moved upwards in the symbolical and 
discourse universe, so that both the religion and its adherents became 
part of Iranian civic culture. This process was stopped, and to some extent 
reversed, after the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic. Although some Zoroastrians bravely voiced criticism, often also in 
the name of the Iranian nation, which the Zoroastrians claim to represent 
in a primordial manner, there was neither militancy nor mobilization; the 
prevalent responses were submission and loyalty, emigration/exit, a “clan-
nish” (Wirth 1945: 360) withdrawal into themselves, and a return to more 
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group-specific identity projects, mainly with a religious focus. Throughout 
these twentieth century trajectories, Zoroastrianism sacrificed some of its 
distinct traits to this project of nationalist mimesis, and discourse replaced 
ritual as its main idiom.
Power and powerlessness are social and interactive categories which 
relate to a number of issues and aspects. As this chapter hopefully has 
illustrated, power is negotiated, produced and reproduced in discursive, 
economic, educational, geographical, legal, political, and symbolical forms. 
Power is exerted both in overt and more subtle forms. In extant scholar-
ship there is a tendency—call it implicit Marxism—to consider religion 
exclusively as the object, result, or symptom of non-religious relationships 
of power, be they of a political, economic, or otherwise nature. (As the 
attentive reader will have noted, the present chapter is not quite inno-
cent in this regard either.) Yet, religion in itself is an important arena of 
empowerment and disempowerment, by creating, regulating, and denying 
human and superhuman agency.18 Power is more than domination over 
others (Lukes 2005: 109).
Let me conclude with a final statement of a much more general nature. 
It may sound paradoxical, but may well be true: There will be no accept-
able solution to the minority question as long as there are minorities in the 
first place. There will always be majorities and minorities in the numerical 
sense—religions that are more or less efficient in attracting and sustaining 
adherence19—but it is only as long as the relations between (numerical) 
majority and minorities are conceived in terms of dominant vs. subordinate 
groups that there will be a ‘minority issue’. One solution is the abolishment 
of subordinate minorities altogether, not by way of their extinction, of 
course, but by the very idea of a pluralistic society, which has minorities 
in a numerical sense, but no subordinate ones. Yet, although there is no 
‘minority issue’ in a truly pluralist society, issues of power and powerless-
ness will not disappear in such a society either.
18 For supernatural agents as the cognitive and evolutionary cornerstone of religion, 
see Pyssiäinen 2009. Religion establishes ways to communicate with non-human agencies, 
but religions also restrict access to and certain forms of such communication, for example 
through gender rules and roles or by delegitimizing communication with some agents 
such as ‘demons’. 
19 Religions with more members or higher growth rates are of course no better than 
others; nor are they more successful, for it may well be possible that smaller religions do 
not regard growth as their main aim or mission. 
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BAHAʾIS OF IRAN: POWER, PREJUDICES AND PERSECUTIONS
Margit Warburg
This chapter presents and analyses the position of the Bahaʾis of Iran and 
their relationship with Iranian society, including the State and the Iranian 
ulama. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, the 
Bahaʾi minority has suffered from intensified persecutions, and the analysis 
deals primarily with these persecutions as seen in the light of the Bahaʾis’ 
historical relationship with the Iranian State and the ulama, respectively. 
The analysis includes the issue of the position of the Bahaʾi minority in 
Iran, the doctrinal tensions between the Bahaʾis and the ulama, and the 
different prejudices about the Bahaʾis, which fuel the popular support to 
the persecutions.
The Bahaʾis
The Bahaʾis constitute the largest religious minority group in Iran, with 
more than 300,000 followers by 1979 (Smith 1984; Smith 2000: 208).1 The 
religion has its background in heterodox movements in Shiʿa Islam in 
nineteenth-century Iran.2 In 1844 this milieu gave rise to an important mil-
lenarian movement, Babism. The leader of the movement, called the Bab 
(born 1821, executed 1850), saw himself as the gate to the Hidden Imam, 
and he succeeded in attracting quite a number of followers. In the following 
years the movement radicalised in religious terms, and in the summer of 
1848 the Babis abrogated the shariʿa officially and declared that the era of 
Islam was over and a new revelation had dawned (MacEoin 1986).
The Babi movement was soon perceived as a revolutionary threat, 
and the government attempted to suppress the movement by military force. 
The government’s fear of the Babis was not totally unfounded, because 
1 The number of Bahaʾis in Iran must have decreased to some extent since the revolution 
in 1979, because many Bahaʾis have fled from Iran, but no reliable census is available. 
2 For an overview of the rise and development of the Babi and Bahaʾi religions see Smith 
1987 or Warburg 2006: 6–15. 
© Margit Warburg, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_010
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already in a circulatory letter early in 1848, the Bab declared himself to be 
the Hidden Imam (MacEoin 1986; MacEoin 1992: 82). According to Shiʿite 
thinking, this announcement meant that the power of the ulama was 
nullified, and the shah himself should subordinate to the Bab, who was to 
lead the faithful in the final battle against the unbelievers (MacEoin 1982; 
Momen 1985: 170–171).
In 1852–53 after several years of irregular battles between the Babis and 
the governmental troops, all the main Babi leaders had been killed or exiled, 
and the Babi movement lost its impetus and went underground. In the 
1860s, the remnants of the movement developed into the Bahaʾi religion 
under the exiled Babi leader, Mirza Husayn-Ali Nuri (1817–1892), called 
Bahaʾu’llah. He attempted to uphold the delicate position of being in non-
violent opposition to the Iranian State wishing to change the perception of 
the Babis as religious revolutionaries. Instead, both Bahaʾu’llah and his son 
and successor Abdu’l-Baha (1844–1921) advocated in writing for political 
reform in Iran (Cole 1992; Cole 1998: 79–108). Apparently this policy helped, 
and in the 1880s and 1890s a number of Bahaʾis held high positions in the 
government (Cole 1998: 97). However, the improved relations with the 
State did not prevent the occasional eruption of mob riots with lootings 
of Bahaʾi property and killings of Bahaʾis. These local persecutions had a 
seedbed in the widespread public animosity against the Bahaʾis and were 
often encouraged from ulama circles (Amanat 2008).
In the same period, the religion began to spread outside Iran: in the 
beginning by mission among the expatriate Iranian communities in Iraq, 
Turkey, Syria, Egypt and India, especially in Bombay. A flourishing Bahaʾi 
community was established in Ashkabad in Russian Turkestan during the 
1880s by Iranian emigrants (Momen 1991). Bahaʾi missionaries also went 
to the USA and Canada in the 1890s, and to Western Europe around 1900. 
Effective growth in Europe did not occur, however, until after World War II, 
when Abdu’l-Baha’s grandson and successor, Shoghi Effendi (1897–1957), 
organised a Bahaʾi mission in Europe, assisted by American Bahaʾis who 
came to Europe as Bahaʾi missionaries. During the 1960s and 1970s the 
Bahaʾis of the USA grew to become a wealthy and most influential com-
munity among the Bahaʾis worldwide.3
According to Bahaʾi doctrines both the Bab and Bahaʾu’llah are proph-
ets and also “manifestations of God”, which is in conflict with the central 
Islamic doctrine of Muhammad as the seal of the prophets. The Bahaʾis 
3 The American Bahaʾi community grew from around 10,000 members in the beginning 
of the 1960s to 63,500 in 1975. See Warburg 2006: 215.
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believe that by following the revelations of Bahaʾu’llah, humankind will 
become religiously and politically unified into one future world civilisa-
tion based on world peace and the enforcement of international law. In 
line with this vision the Bahaʾis advocate a number of social and ethical 
principles which emphasise universalism, cultural diversity, gender equal-
ity, and equal opportunities for all.
On a world basis, the total number of Bahaʾis was less than half a mil-
lion in 1963, but in the subsequent decades the number of Bahaʾis outside 
Iran rose quite rapidly (Smith 2000: 137–154). Today, the Bahaʾis claim a 
membership of more than 5.5 million with Bahaʾi communities present in 
nearly all countries of the world.4
The rise of the Bahaʾi religion is extraordinary in the history of Islam. 
No other Islamic movement, whether emerging from a Sunni or a Shiʿite 
environment, has asserted its independence from its mother creed and 
claimed to be a religion in its own right (MacEoin 1990). For example, the 
Ahmadiyyas, who hold their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) 
to be a new prophet after Muhammad, regard themselves to be Muslims 
although they are not recognised as such by many influential Muslim cler-
ics and organisations.5 In contrast, both Muslims and Bahaʾis agree that 
Bahaʾi does not belong to the Islamic creed. Furthermore, Bahaʾi has also 
effectively transgressed the borders of its cultural homeland, Iran, so that 
the vast majority of its adherents have a non-Muslim background. From a 
sociological point of view, much speaks for regarding Bahaʾi as an independ-
ent religion and not as a derivative of Islam (Warburg 2006: 64–68).
Power, Prejudices and Persecutions
The Babi insurrections in 1848 and a couple of years after were undoubtedly 
perceived by the shah regime as a revolutionary threat, but it would be too 
simple to regard them on a par with the European secular revolutionary 
movements of the time (Warburg 2006: 147–153). After the crushing of the 
Babi movement in 1852–1853, neither the Babis nor their successors, the 
Bahaʾis, presented any objective threat to the Iranian government. However, 
the Babis were never forgotten in ulama circles, and the Bahaʾis were seen 
as a continuation of the Babi movement nourished by imperialist powers 
4 According to the Bahaʾi yearbook The Baháʾí World 2004–2005, p. 295.
5 For example, in 1974 the World Muslim League unanimously adopted a resolution, 
which demanded that Ahmadiyyas should be “declared non-Muslims and ousted from the 
fold of Islam” (Bashir 1974). See also Arzt 1996.
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hostile to Iran (MacEoin 1989: 6). As pointed out by Denis MacEoin, the 
Babi movement was essentially an expression of a conflict within orthodox 
Shiʿa Islam, which ultimately led to a religious schism from which Bahaʾi 
evolved (MacEoin 1990). From the perspective of the ulama the Bahaʾis are 
therefore apostates, in addition to being agents of foreign imperialism.
During most of the history of Iran, the State and the ulama were sepa-
rate and often conflicting pillars of power in society, but with the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, the two pillars of power merged into one totalitarian 
regime, which historically and doctrinally, was destined to be very hostile to 
the Bahaʾis (Amanat 2008; Arzt 1996). This created a new and qualitatively 
different situation for the Bahaʾis in relation to the Iranian State.
The new Islamic regime of 1979 soon initiated systematic persecutions 
of its Bahaʾi citizens with arbitrary arrests, confiscation or destruction of 
Bahaʾi property, torture and executions (Afshari 2008). The persecutions 
seriously drained the Bahaʾis in Iran of their human and financial resources: 
Thousands of Iranian Bahaʾi refugees sought new lives among the Bahaʾi 
communities of the West, and their fortunes and property were often left 
for confiscation. In fact, the persecutions of the Iranian Bahaʾis have had 
a profound demographic, economic, and cultural impact on the Bahaʾi 
communities both inside and outside Iran (Warburg 1995).
The first part of this chapter is an analysis of the relative power of the 
Bahaʾi minority in Iran, where I shall discuss not only their minority situ-
ation inside Iran, but also the consequences of the fact that the Bahaʾi 
leadership resides outside Iran and that the far majority of Bahaʾis today 
are non-Iranians. The second and larger part of this chapter deals with 
an analysis of the persecutions, their doctrinal justification by the ulama, 
and the popular prejudices against the Bahaʾis. Among Muslims, and in 
particular among the Shiʿa of Iran, anti-Bahaʾi sentiments and reactions 
constitute an analogy to European anti-Semitism, albeit less widespread 
and less known (Chehabi 2008).6 Like European anti-Semitism, the public 
and popular anti-Bahaʾi discourse tells more about the persecutors and 
their audience than about the persecuted. By analysing the persecutions of 
the Bahaʾis of Iran and their foundation in religious and popular prejudices 
we can therefore also obtain an insight which points to important aspects 
of Shiʿite self-images.
6 Outside Iran, anti-Bahaʾi attitudes and activities have been reported in several other 
countries with a Muslim majority, notably Egypt (U.S. Department of State 2008).
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Sources
The presented examples of prejudices and persecutions against the Bahaʾis 
of Iran are based on many and varied sources. The primary written sources 
are documentary material in the form of official documents, letters, and 
newspaper articles from Iran. In 1980–1982, I received a considerable 
amount of such early documentary material on the persecutions from 
Iranian Bahaʾis in Denmark, and many of these documents were translated 
with the help of my informants and published in Danish together with the 
Persian originals (Warburg 1985). Some of the examples in this book were 
later rendered in English (Warburg 2006). In the same period I conducted 
in-depth interviews with 20 expatriate Iranian Bahaʾis about their personal 
experiences of discrimination and persecutions back in Iran.7 Many of these 
informants also contributed with a number of second-hand accounts of 
persecutions. During my fieldwork at the Bahaʾi World Centre, Haifa in 
1988–89, I also interviewed about 10 Iranian Bahaʾis on the same topics. 
The interviews added significant, confirmatory details to the overall picture 
derived from the written sources.
An early report on the persecutions was issued by the London-based 
Minority Rights Group (Cooper 1982). The most extensive report was 
issued in 2006 by the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in New 
Haven, Connecticut (A Faith Denied 2006).8 The many other secondary 
sources include different international reports, in particular UN reports, 
reports issued by the International Bahaʾi Community, and a range of 
academic works on the topic. These sources are referred to where they 
are relevant.
Clearly, individual sources may be biased, but the evidence for the 
harsh persecutions of the Bahaʾis of Iran since 1979 is overwhelming and 
has not been disputed by independent observers. Iranian authorities have 
also themselves at several instances declared that the Bahaʾis are not to 
be tolerated in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sanasarian 2000: 114–123). 
The persecutions have regularly been denounced in international forums, 
7 These interviews were carried out in connection with a more comprehensive qualita-
tive and qualitative interview study of the Danish Bahaʾi community. 
8 According to its homepage, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center is an 
independent organisation with a Board of Directors comprising internationally recognized 
human rights experts and advocates, both Iranians and non-Iranians. The funding is varied, 
mostly private funds from the United States and Canada. It is clear that the center is not 
associated with the International Bahaʾi Community.
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primarily in the United Nations, seriously contributing to Iran’s bad 
standing with regard to human rights in general (United Nations General 
Assembly 2008).
Empowerment and Disempowerment: Compact and Diffuse Minorities
In the introductory chapter in Minorities and the State in the Arab World, 
political scientist Gabriel Ben-Dor discusses the issue of power and pow-
erlessness of the minorities in the Middle East (Ben-Dor 1999). He draws 
a distinction between what he denotes compact minorities and diffuse 
minorities—a terminology he borrowed from Albert Habib Hourani 
(1947: 14). A compact minority lives mainly in a geographically limited area, 
and here it may make up a significant proportion of the local population. A 
typical example of a compact minority is the Druze community in Lebanon. 
The position as a compact minority can give a certain base of power locally, 
and this power can be exercised to give the minority a considerable influ-
ence on the often relatively weak states of the Middle East (Ben-Dor 1999). 
As the term implies, a diffuse minority lives scattered over a larger area, 
and it is not demographically dominant anywhere. In the Middle East the 
Greek-Orthodox and the Armenians are examples of diffuse minorities. All 
other things being equal, a diffuse minority is in a less powerful position 
compared with the situation of a compact minority.
The Issue of Power Regarding the Bahaʾi Minority in Iran
In Iran the Bahaʾis must be characterised as a diffuse minority. This goes 
back to the time of the Babi movement, which was not a local movement 
but spread in the 1840s like a wild-fire over most of Iran. Although there 
were cities, such as Mashad, Yazd, and Zanjan, which were known as par-
ticular Babi strongholds, the Babis seemed in general to be of a very mixed 
background (Momen 1983). Geographically, they came from all parts of Iran, 
and they represented most of the Iranian society with respect to occupa-
tion (ibid.). Underrepresented groups among the Babis were primarily 
the nomadic tribes, who, at that time, made up one quarter of the Iranian 
population (Smith and Momen 1986). When the majority of the surviving 
Babis later rallied around Bahaʾu’llah’s leadership and became Bahaʾis, they 
were thus already living as a diffuse minority in Iran.
Bahaʾu’llah was in exile in the Ottoman Empire when, in 1863–1867, he 
proclaimed himself to be a new prophet and transformed Babism into the 
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Bahaʾi religion. He and his successors never returned to Iran but gradually 
established a Bahaʾi world leadership in exile. By a coincidence of history, 
this was in the area of Akko and Haifa in present-day Israel, because the 
Ottoman authorities had arrested Bahaʾu’llah in 1868 and transferred him 
to this then remote part of the Empire. This explains why the Bahaʾi World 
Centre today is situated on the northern slope of Mount Carmel in the city 
of Haifa. That the Bahaʾi headquarters is in Israel adds another twist to the 
relationship between the Bahaʾis and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as will 
be expounded on later.
Thanks to an effective network of couriers, Bahaʾu’llah kept contact with 
his adherents in Iran, and during the 1870s and 1880s, the Bahaʾis of Iran 
gradually gained a firm position in most parts of Iran (Momen 1998). They 
began to gain new followers, in particular among the better-educated or 
upwardly mobile strata of Iranian society (Smith 1987: 93–97). The Bahaʾis 
also had some success in gaining converts among other religious minor-
ity groups in Iran, specifically among Zoroastrians and Jews (Smith 1987: 
93–97; Stiles 1984; Vahman 2008; Fischel 1934).
The External Power Base of the Bahaʾis of Iran
In an empowerment perspective it was undoubtedly a great help to the 
Bahaʾi community of Iran that the supreme leadership of the Bahaʾi religion 
was in exile and therefore enjoyed the protection of other powerful states 
in the Middle East—first the Ottoman Empire, then the British during the 
mandate period and, lastly, Israel. When the persecutions were intensified 
after 1979, the Bahaʾis had already gained a strong resource base outside 
Iran, and Bahaʾis worldwide could support the Iranian Bahaʾis by publicly 
raising the issue of the persecutions and urging their governments to protest. 
This has had an effect: since 1979 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
has passed 18 resolutions on human rights violations in Iran, all mention-
ing the Bahaʾis, and since 1985, the UN General Assembly has approved 13 
resolutions (Warburg 2006: 165). As late as 30 March 2009, Canada’s House 
of Commons unanimously condemned the persecution of Bahaʾis in Iran 
and called on the Iranian government to release Bahaʾi leaders imprisoned 
in Tehran (Canada House of Commons 2009). Most observers agree that 
the appeals directed by the international community and the news media 
to Iran, calling for an end to the persecutions, have not been without effect 
(Affolter 2005). However, although the killings and executions seem to have 
come to a halt, the harassment of the Bahaʾis continues, and it has even 
been intensified during 2008 and 2009, with expulsions of Bahaʾi students, 
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arbitrary arrests, destruction of property, etc. (United Nations General 
Assembly 2008; United Nations General Assembly 2009).
The Bahaʾi representation at the United Nations has played a crucial 
role in providing documentation for the persecutions (The Baháʾí Ques-
tion 1993; The Baháʾí Question 2005). So, although the Bahaʾis, as a diffuse 
and relatively small minority in Iran, can appear powerless, they are not 
totally so in reality, thanks to their strong presence and political contacts 
outside Iran. Because the Bahaʾi supreme leadership historically has been 
located outside Iran, the Bahaʾis of Iran are accustomed to the international 
Bahaʾi community speaking on their behalf. Iranian Bahaʾis are also well-
represented on the supreme board of leaders of the Bahaʾis, the Universal 
House of Justice in Haifa, and among the high ranking staff. So there is 
little doubt that the international lobbyism is well coordinated with the 
interests of the Bahaʾi community of Iran.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Baha iʾs of Iran constitute a diffuse minority 
makes it difficult for them to mobilise strong local support. As scattered, 
individual families the Bahaʾis are vulnerable to informers and to mob 
persecutions.
Prejudices, Discrimination and Self-Images
It is well-known in both sociology and social psychology that prejudices 
and discriminatory attitudes toward a minority reveal, among other things, 
self-images and prevailing norms among those who express these attitudes 
(Greenberg et al. 2009). Typically, the minority is stereotyped to incarnate 
negative projections of virtues esteemed by the majority (Pickering 2001: 
69–78). In a broad sense stereotyping is a way for outsiders to condense 
perceived characteristics of a sub-group, whether these characteristics 
reflect a reality or not. In principle, stereotyping might be an unbiased 
characterization; however, in most cases stereotyping serves to picture 
the sub-group as inferior.
The underlying psycho-social mechanism of stereotyping is quite general. 
In cases where people classify other people as belonging either to their 
own kind, the in-group, or to an out-group, members of the in-group often 
enhance their self-esteem by derogating the out-group in generalised terms, 
thereby highlighting the (assumed) positive qualities of their own group 
(Greenberg et al. 2009). It should be added that it works both ways; also 
minorities have negative prejudices about the majority—prejudices that 
primarily are negations of virtues that the minority members  perceive to 
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share among themselves. Stereotypes, prejudices, discriminatory attitudes 
and persecutions may therefore be analysed as cultural mirrors of self-
understanding.
Such mirror stereotyping is quite common and not particular to major-
ity-minority relations in the Middle East, as the following brief example 
from European history will show. Religion also has a prominent position 
in this case.
The French and the Germans fought three major wars against each other 
before World War II: The War of Liberation 1813–15, the Franco-Prussian 
War 1870–71, and World War I (1914–18). During these wars Protestant 
pastors all over Germany held patriotic sermons directed against the 
moral defects of the French and contrasted them with the high morals of 
the Germans. The historian A.J. Hoover has analysed hundreds of these 
sources and found that the virtues claimed by the Protestant clergy to be 
held by the Germans were nearly always the opposite of the vices of the 
French (Hoover 1987). The virtues of the Germans were said to stem from 
a basic religious attitude and the vices of the French from an irreligious 
attitude. When Hoover summed up the priestly contemplations on national 
characters, a colourful contrast emerged:
the French were irreligious, godless people; this infidelity caused them to 
be lustful, sexually loose, superficial and frivolous, proud, vain and arrogant, 
sly, tricky and dishonest. The Germans in contrast were a religious, spiritual 
people, a basic fact that caused them to be honest, serious, upright and 
faithful, chaste and simple in tastes, frugal, industrious and skillful, brave, 
honourable, obedient and patriotic (Hoover 1987: 304).
Stereotypes and prejudices are often upheld against objective knowledge, 
and counterexamples exemplified by concrete out-group members are 
usually regarded as exceptions that prove the rule (Gaertner and Dovidio 
2009). It is also commonly observed that negative images of a particular 
group prevail also among those who do not have any contact with the 
group. An illustrative example is that anti-Semitism in Poland is still com-
mon long after about 90 percent of the three million Jews in Poland were 
killed in World War II.9
9 Nearly all of the rest of the Polish Jews emigrated after an anti-Jewish purging campaign 
in 1968, but Polish anti-Semitism did not disappear with them.
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Persecutions and the Bahaʾis’ Relations to the Iranian Ulama
While the Bahaʾi relations with the Iranian State gradually improved 
from the 1880s and until the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, the ten-
sions between the Bahaʾis and the Iranian ulama were lasting. The Babis 
were themselves strong opponents of the Iranian ulama, and the Bahaʾis 
maintained pronounced anti-ulama sentiments in line with their doctrinal 
abolishment of any kind of priesthood. The Bahaʾi leaders have repeat-
edly expressed anti-clerical views, and the ulama have been denounced 
in Bahaʾi literature with words such as “tyrants”, “vipers” and “wolves who 
had destroyed Iran” (MacEoin 1989: 18). Bahaʾu’llah also resorted to the 
classical accusation of greed:
Many ecclesiastics in Persia have, through innumerable designs and 
devices, been feeding on illicit gains obtained by usury. They have contrived 
ways to give its outward form a fair resemblance of lawfulness (Bahaʾu’llah 
1988: 134).
The ulama, on their side, have succeeded in maintaining and spreading 
anti-Bahaʾi feelings in Iranian society. The tensions between the two parties 
often led to local persecutions and even occasional lynching of Bahaʾis, but 
in general these persecutions were not actively encouraged by the State. 
In fact, during the Pahlavi regime (1925–1979), the Bahaʾis enjoyed longer 
periods of relative tolerance (MacEoin 1989: 19–24). The Bahaʾis were gen-
erally better educated than the average Iranian, and many Bahaʾis found 
employment within the educational and health care sectors. Some even 
gained high posts in business and state administration (Chehabi 2008).
Despite their gradual appeasement with the Iranian government the 
Bahaʾi position in Iran was often threatened because of the continued, 
general popular hostility against them, with periods of relative tolerance 
interrupted by periods of mob persecutions, arbitrary arrests, and killings 
(Momen 1986). In 1903 widespread persecutions took place, with mob 
riots and fatal assaults on Bahaʾis in several cities (Amanat 2008; Momen 
1981: 389–390). Furthermore, it did not improve the Bahaʾis’ situation that, 
although they were sympathetic towards democratic reform in Iran, they 
did not speak out against the unpopular shah regime during the consti-
tutional revolution of 1905 and its aftermath, but attempted to navigate 
along a course of non-involvement (Milani 2008).
Also in 1955, nation-wide persecutions broke out again, instigated by 
a number of ulama associated with Ayatollah Khomeini (A Faith Denied 
2006: 7–10). Bahaʾi centres were demolished, Bahaʾi property was looted, 
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and Bahaʾis were molested, raped, some killed and their dead bodies 
mutilated.10
There is no doubt that the rise of the Bahaʾis to middle class positions 
during the last shah has made them appear as supporters of the regime in 
the eyes of many Iranians. The 1955 pogrom against the Bahaʾis showed that 
anti-Bahaʾi feelings in the Iranian population were strong and widespread 
(Akhavi 1980: 76–90). When representatives of the ulama came to power 
with the Iranian revolution of 1979, these feelings were exploited once 
more and as vigorously as ever.
The Legal Status of the Bahaʾis in the Islamic Republic
The legal situation of the Iranian Bahaʾis changed drastically with the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, which gave the legal system of the country a 
stronger reference to religious law. For example, the judicial expression for 
‘illegal’, gheir-e qanooní, which literally means ‘without law’ in general, was 
changed to na-mashruʿ, which refers to something that is illegal according 
to shariʿa (Warburg 1985: 14–25). Both words are in common use, but by 
changing the term, it is stressed that offenders are not only offenders of 
any law; they have violated the law of Islam. This is an effective stereo-
typing of the Bahaʾis as a religious out-group versus the in-group of the 
Muslim majority.
From the perspective of the ulama, the Bahaʾis are regarded as apostates 
from Islam and, therefore, have violated the law of Islam (MacEoin 1989: 
4; Arzt 1996; Sanasarian 2000: 122).11 This is founded in the Babis’ official 
break with Islam in 1848 as mentioned above. Crucial to this schism was a 
meeting between several of the leading Babis in the summer of 1848 (the 
Bab himself was imprisoned at that time). For several days they debated 
whether the Babis should break with Islam or not; in the end the majority 
decided to declare the abrogation of shariʿa, and recognised the Bab as a 
source of new revelation (Amanat 1989: 325–328). According to a Bahaʾi 
historical narrative, Bahaʾu’llah played a key role in reaching this conclusion 
(Shoghi Effendi 1974: 292–298). The account of Bahaʾu’llah’s significance 
10 This can be seen from a survey of A Basic Baháʾí Chronology for the year 1955 (Cameron 
and Momen 1996: 320–327).
11 As remarked by Denis MacEoin, it does not seem clear, however, if Bahaʾi converts 
from Zoroastrian or Jewish background also are regarded as apostates in terms of Islamic 
law (MacEoin 1989: 4).
206 margit warburg
for this early radical break with Islam established a doctrinal continuity 
between the Babi movement and the Bahaʾi religion, which is emphasised 
also in later official Bahaʾi expositions of the religion (Shoghi Effendi 1995: 
32–33; Hatcher and Martin 1989: 29-30).
In classical Islamic penal code apostasy is considered an offense against 
God, and in practice it was often punished by death (Arzt 1996). So the 
Iranian government had its religious arguments for a harsh treatment of 
its Bahaʾi citizens, and these arguments were soon codified by law. Thus, 
in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was drafted in 
1979, it was specifically mentioned in Article 13 that Zoroastrians, Jews and 
Christians—the Peoples of the Book—were the only recognised religious 
minorities (Ghanea-Hercock 2002: 102–103).12 In principle these dhimmis 
(i.e. non-Muslim religious minorities) enjoyed protection of the Islamic 
State and were free to cultivate their own religion (Sanasarian 2000: 19–21; 
Arzt 1996). Government officials, including Khomeini himself, explicitly 
excluded the Bahaʾis from this category, denouncing them as a harmful 
political faction whose religious activities were not to be tolerated (Sana-
sarian 2000: 20–22; A Faith Denied 2006: 20).
The Iranian Bahaʾis’ inferior legal status may be exemplified by the so-
called ‘blood money’, which is an economic compensation to be paid by 
the offender to the relatives of a crime victim.13 However, if the victim is 
a Bahaʾi, the relatives of the victim are not entitled to this compensation. 
For example, in a court case involving a Muslim who had killed two Bahaʾis 
by careless driving, the judge ruled that “blood money is not applicable 
to them [the Bahaʾis].”14 Underlying the law of ‘blood money’ is the view 
that Muslims are superior humans to those who are regarded to have 
rejected Islam.
12 Also during the time of the shah, Bahaʾi was not one of the recognised religions, and 
according to the law, only members of recognised religions could be employed by the State. 
However, in that period, the law was not applied strictly and many Bahaʾis were employed 
by the government as mentioned above (Cooper 1982: 14). 
13 The tradition was that if the victim was a Christian, a Jew, a Zoroastrian, or a woman, 
the payment to the relatives was only half of the amount given to the relatives of a male 
Muslim victim. However, in 2003 a law was passed that provided equal compensation for 
male Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians (Payvand’s Iran News 27 December 2003).
14 Translation from the Persian of the Ruling of the Public Court (District One) in Minu-
Dasht, 10 March 2002. Enclosure, Lise Raben (the Danish Bahaʾi community) to Margit 
Warburg, 13 November 2002.
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State-Organised Persecution of Bahaʾis
One of the most efficient ways to persecute people is to deprive them of 
opportunities of education and employment through ministerial decrees 
and other “legal” measures. Such means provide an additional advantage 
for the regime in that such harassment draws less international attention 
than does physical persecution. Bahaʾi students and professors were barred 
from admission to or employment at any university in Iran according to 
a decree issued in 1979 shortly after the revolution (Warburg 1985: 77–87; 
The Bahaʾi Question 2005: 24–25; A Faith Denied 2006: 20). In response, 
the Bahaʾis established their own higher education programme in private, 
called the Bahaʾi Institute of Higher Education. In 1998, 36 of the voluntary 
faculty members of the “institute” were arrested in cities across the country 
(The Bahaʾi Question 1993: 61–64).
Already from 1979, the government began to dismiss Baha iʾ civil servants 
and teachers without compensation (Cooper 1982: 13; Warburg 1985: 33–75). 
According to Bahaʾi sources all Bahaʾi public servants had been dismissed 
by 1982, and the pensions of retired Bahaʾi civil servants had been termi-
nated (The Bahaʾi Question 1993: 31). Some of the dismissed persons were 
even told to repay the salaries they had received during their lifetime 
employment (A Faith Denied 2006: 43–44). These measures were followed 
by attacks on Bahaʾis in the private sector, where the trading licenses of 
Bahaʾi businesses were revoked, the assets of businesses run by Bahaʾis 
were confiscated, bank accounts of Bahaʾi businessmen were frozen, and 
Bahaʾi farmers were denied admission to farmers’ co-operatives (Warburg 
1985: 33–75; A Faith Denied 2006: 43–45).
The leading role of the Iranian government in inflicting physical per-
secutions of the Bahaʾis, such as destruction of property, arbitrary arrests, 
torture and executions is well-documented and has naturally been a main 
point in the many international protests against Iran’s gross violation of 
human rights (Cooper 2002 passim; Warburg 1985 passim; A Faith Denied 
2006: 23–39).
Popular Anti-Bahaʾi Sentiments
Nationalism, and Anti-Western Attitudes
The official persecutions of the Bahaʾis are nourished by widespread popu-
lar prejudices against Bahaʾis and other non-Muslim minorities. Political 
scientist Eliz Sanasarian writes that common prejudices against Bahaʾis are 
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“apostasy, association with the West and Israel, pro-monarchism, and an 
elite club bent on self-promotion and propaganda” (Sanasarian 2000: 53). 
These prejudices reflect to some extent a reaction against the westernisa-
tion during the last shah—a reaction that eventually brought the ulama to 
power in 1979. The accusations against the Bahaʾis as associates of the West 
and Israel perpetuate earlier accusations that the Bahaʾis were instruments 
of British conspiracies against Iran (Vahman 2005). In fact, much of the 
material from the persecutions of the Bahaʾis plays on popular nationalism 
and anti-Western attitudes.
An example of the nationalistic arguments against the Bahaʾis is an early 
letter (dated 29 July 1979) from the provincial government of Sirján to a 
local agricultural cooperative, urging the management to dismiss a Bahaʾi 
from the cooperative. The letter, which states that it has been discussed 
in the local council of “pious and reliable men”, characterises the Bahaʾi 
religion as follows:
Bahaʾi is not a religion, nor is it a sect or philosophical school; it is not even 
a creed. The Bahaʾis are lackeys created by the assistants of the imperialist 
Russian Czars, and the Englishmen’s aggressive and deceitful policy has 
helped them, and the bitter and ugly fruits of this unclean tree are plucked 
by America and Israel. Bahaʾi is the fifth column of imperialism in Iran, and 
it is obvious that the adherents of this misguided sect definitely are mushrik 
[polytheists], and that they represent from an intellectual point of view some 
of the worst imaginable reactionary tendencies of the twentieth century 
(translated from Warburg 1985: 71–73).
These accusations carefully play on prevalent sentiments among many 
Iranians—sentiments that are rooted in the humiliations of Iran during 
the nineteenth century by the combined efforts of Britain and Russia and 
which made it possible for the Pahlavi shahs to cultivate a strong Iranian 
nationalism (Vahman 2005). All Iran’s traditional and new enemies are lined 
up in the quotation above, and the fact that the Bahaʾi world headquar-
ters is situated in Haifa gives public credibility to accusations that Bahaʾis 
are agents of Israel. Accusations of being the fifth column of imperialism 
indicate that Bahaʾis are regarded as internationalists and traitors of Iran. 
This is a well-known prejudice, also before the Islamic revolution (Vahman 
2005; Tavakoli-Targhi 2008). The implications are, of course, that Iranian 
Muslims themselves are nationalists and stand up against the enemies of 
Iran. This implicit characterisation of “good” Iranians as being both nation-
alistis and true Muslims should be seen in the light of the fact that, when 
the above letter was written in July 1979, nationalistic liberal groups still 
played an important role in the revolutionary government (Cottam 1989). 
Later, the liberal forces were ousted by Khomeini, but the nationalistic and 
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anti-imperialistic appeal to the public was retained, undoubtedly in tune 
with popular sentiments in Iran (ibid.).
In the surge of accusations against the Bahaʾis the Iranian authorities 
do not always seem consistent in their view of the Bahaʾis as political or 
religious opponents to the Islamic Republic: In the letter above Bahaʾi is 
first described as not being a sect or not even a creed, but a little later 
these “adherents of this misguided sect definitely are mushrik [polytheists]”, 
which clearly places them as religious opponents.
Another illustrative example of the above ambiguity in the official views 
of the Bahaʾis is from the leading, conservative Tehran newspaper, Kayhan 
16 July 1980. It reproduces the verdicts from the Islamic Revolutionary Court 
in Tabriz, which led to the execution of 14 persons, including two Bahaʾis. 
One of the verdicts runs like this:
Yadʾullah Astani, son of Ahmad and chair of the Bahaʾi council in Tabriz is 
accused of having collaborated actively with the rotten Pahlavi-regime and 
the now dissolved SAVAK [the secret police of the shah regime] with the 
purpose of oppressing the fighting Muslims. He is charged with spreading 
prostitution, undertaking other unforgivable things, and having direct con-
nection with the occupying power in Israel [i.e., the Israeli government] and 
international Zionism, with the purpose of oppressing noble Muslims anew. 
He is further charged with sending detailed reports with cultural, political, 
geographical and military information to Israel, to collect money and transfer 
it in support of Israel, to rebel against Islam and the Muslims by direct col-
laboration with Israel, and to have travelled frequently to Israel to accomplish 
the ominous plans of Zionism. He is condemned as an opponent of God and 
the Messenger of God, and he is thus the corruption of the world (translated 
from Warburg 1985: 134–137).
It is interesting that the pronounced anti-Zionism is intertwined with the 
charges of being a potential suppressor of the Muslims and an opponent 
of God. The verdict concludes that Yadʾullah Astani is the “corruption of 
the world”, and this is a crime which implies a death sentence (United 
Nations General Assembly 2009: 9).
The above examples illustrate that the official propaganda against the 
Bahaʾis seems to operate along two tracks. Part of the propaganda openly 
appeals to those who oppose the Bahaʾis for religious reasons. For example, 
in 2005 the newspaper Kayhan brought a series of articles criticising and 
defaming the Bahaʾi religion and its leading figures right back to its first 
prophet, the Bab, who was attacked in several articles (A Faith Denied 
2006: 50–51). Such a reference to a religious schism, which took place 
160 years ago, is obviously addressing the ulama and the broad circle of 
more or less self-appointed religious specialists among the supporters of 
the regime.
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However, the government is also aware that most people do not care 
much about theological finesses rooted in historical events. Appeals to anti-
Zionist and anti-Western attitudes are likely to reach a wider audience in 
Iran, and other Kayhan articles therefore devote a fair share of words on 
claims that Bahaʾis are the fruits of Israeli and Western imperialist influ-
ence (A Faith Denied 2006: 50–51).
The stereotyping of the Bahaʾis as agents of Western imperialism is in 
concord with popular anti-Bahaʾi feelings rather than possible popular 
animosities against Westerners in general. A study of stereotypes held by 
different social groups in Iran in 1980 showed that stereotypes of Americans 
were generally favourable (Beattie, Agahi, and Spencer 1982). The authors 
conclude that the rather intense anti-Western propaganda in the first years 
after the revolution had not resulted in negative attitudes towards Western-
ers in general. The study also showed that Arabs were viewed unfavourably, 
being stereotyped as “lazy” and “happy-go-lucky”—just as black Americans 
were stereotyped by white Americans in the 1930s. Anti-Arab sentiments 
run deeply in Iranian society, nourished by the rise of Iranian nationalism 
in the early twentieth century (Vahman 2005).
Muslim Morals
Bahaʾis have often been met in court with charges of prostitution, adultery 
and immorality. These charges were formally founded in the fact that until 
recently the Iranian authorities did not recognise Bahaʾi marriages as legal 
marriages, and their children were considered illegitimate. In the logic of 
the ulama the Bahaʾi couple had an extra-matrimonial relationship, which 
is religiously forbidden (Cooper 1982: 14). Behind these charges are general 
prejudices about the Bahaʾis’ bad or absent morale (MacEoin 1989: 4–5). 
Most Iranians know very little about the Bahaʾis, and all kinds of rumours 
circulate. Some of the most stubborn rumours tell that Bahaʾi families 
have incestuous relations: Father and daughter, and mother and son sleep 
together (Warburg 1985: 20).
The Bahaʾi doctrine and practice about equality of the sexes further 
nourishes the imagination. One of the quite common rumours is that 
Bahaʾi assembly meetings are in reality group sex parties (MacEoin 1989: 
5). A more fanciful variation of that rumour is that when the Bahaʾis have 
an assembly meeting, they turn off the lights. Then, the men put on the 
women’s clothes and the women put on the men’s clothes (Warburg 1985: 
20)! This rumour may reflect that in many Muslim countries cross-dressing 
is controversial: for example in December 2007 the Kuwaiti parliament 
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amended the penal code to make cross-dressing illegal (Whitaker 2008). 
Obviously, the rumour implies that decent behaviour with regard to the 
opposite sex is part of Muslim moral. Such prejudices about the sexual 
immorality of minority groups are common in many societies.
The Case of the Anti-Bahaʾi Society in Yazd
The public animosity against the Bahaʾis is also channelled into private 
organisations, of which the Iranian anti-Bahaʾi society, called Hujjatiyeh, is 
the most important. In the following I shall give an example of the activities 
of this organisation, which was founded in the 1950s and became widely 
represented among the ulama (Vali and Zubaida 1985).
As part of a rare autobiography, Iranian Mehdi Abedi tells about his 
own joining of the local branch of the anti-Bahaʾi society in Yazd, when 
he was a young, enthusiastic student before the revolution (Fischer and 
Abedi 1990: 50).
I did not know much about Bahaʾis before this time. Children in the alleys 
would sometimes chant, Tū pīr-e bābi ridam (“I shit on the Babi saint”), and 
my father had told me that the “Babis” (he did not distinguish Babis and 
Bahaʾis) did not say their prayers, and were najes (impure).
When Abedi’s father said that the Bahaʾis did not say their prayers, he 
implied that proper Muslims did. Abedi’s father also said that he regarded 
the Bahaʾis as impure, implicating that he, himself, was religiously pure. The 
concept of religious impurity, najes, is very important in Iranian society, 
and I shall expound on this in the subsequent section.
The local branch of the Hujjatiyeh society in Yazd operated from a 
mosque across the street from the Bahaʾi centre, and its strategy was to 
recruit young men to infiltrate the Bahaʾi community, pretending to be 
potential converts. Abedi describes, for example, how he befriended a 
young Bahaʾi man and abused his friendship by stealing a rare Bahaʾi book 
that he did not return, despite the pleas of his friend (Fischer and Abedi 
1990: 52–53).
Shortly after the revolution the activities of the Hujjatiyeh society indi-
rectly led to the execution of one of the leaders of the Yazdi Baha iʾs, Nurul-
lah Akhtar-Khavari, (Fischer and Abedi 1990: 49). The execution was filmed 
for television, but when it was discovered that the viewers were repulsed 
by the scene, the broadcast was suppressed (Fischer and Abedi 1990: 49). 
The local leader of the Hujjatiyeh society, Dr. Paknejad had received private 
tutorials in English from Akhtar-Khavari, but Paknejad did not use his influ-
ence to prevent the killing. The Bahaʾis here again  suffered from being a 
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diffuse minority, and even in Yazd, which historically was one of the centres 
of the Babi movement, the Bahaʾis were obviously defenceless.
In 1983 the Hujjatiyeh society was banned and went underground, but 
in the beginning of the 21st century the organisation has resurfaced, and 
it seems to attract support also from the upper strata of Iranian society 
(Radio Free Europe 2004). The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
is claimed to fraternise with the anti-Bahaʾi society (Hughes 2005).
Najes
The concept of religious purity/impurity may be traced back to pre-Islamic 
Zoroastrism, and the question of pollution (nejasat) is much more elabo-
rated among the Shiʿites than among the Sunnis (Sanasarian 2000: 23–24). 
It became more widespread in Iranian society with the writings of the 
Shiʿite theologian, Muhammad Baquer Majlesis (d. 1699) who prescribed 
the rules for how Muslims should behave in the presence of non-Muslims 
(Sanasarian 2000: 23–24). Non-Muslims are najes, which means that physical 
contact with a non-Muslim, or food or drink from a non-Muslim should be 
avoided. For example, a Bahaʾi refugee told in an interview that when he 
had been arrested together with other Bahaʾis and transferred to an inter-
rogation centre, the wardens called them najes, and they tried to avoid 
touching the prisoners for this reason (Gilad 1989). Even indirect contact 
may pollute; for example, it has been reported that a Muslim, after receiv-
ing money from a Jew, washed the unclean Jewish money before he could 
have it in his pocket (Fischel 1934).
The codes of pollution vary considerably, both locally and socially, and 
they have had significant consequences not only for the Bahaʾis, but also 
for other non-Muslim groups in Iran. I shall give a few brief examples in 
the following—the two first are from Eliz Sanasarian’s book, the next two 
from my own informants:
1)  After the Islamic revolution, non-Muslim food store owners such as bak-
ers or sandwich-sellers had to put up signs, “especially for minorities” 
as a warning to Muslims (Sanasarian 2000: 86).
2)  The Armenian owned Coca-Cola factory was confiscated, and the 
Armenian workers were fired and replaced by Muslims. The reason 
was that non-Muslims could not touch the bottles or their contents 
(Sanasarian 2000: 84–85).
3)  One of my own informants told me about a mullah who had confiscated 
an apartment from a wealthy Bahaʾi family. Before he took over the 
apartment, he had to make it religiously clean. Relatives and friends 
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to the unfortunate Bahaʾi family could watch while he had the whole 
apartment including all the furniture and carpets washed with a fire 
hose (Warburg 1985: 19).
4)  Another of my informants was a female high school student. She told 
me that all the students in her school in Iran had been asked to give 
blood to the wounded soldiers from the Iran-Iraqi war. When she heard 
about the need for blood, she immediately went to the school nurse to 
get an appointment for the next day. However, the class prefect had 
talked to the teacher about it, and they had agreed that her unclean 
Bahaʾi blood should not be offered to the Muslim soldiers (Warburg 
1985: 19).
The belief underlying these and many other accounts is that religious 
impurity is contagious. Muslims who have a self-image of representing 
religious purity must therefore protect themselves from all contact with 
the impure.
These reports are not exotic cases; in fact, they follow typical patterns 
of how people deal with religious purity and impurity—a dichotomy that 
is ubiquitous in, for example, traditional Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and 
Zoroastrism. Such religious classificatory systems are deeply rooted in 
tradition. According to my informants many Muslim Iranians ridicule the 
concept of najes, which they claim is only believed by uneducated peasants 
and the city proletariat. Nevertheless, incidents like the above are known 
to all Iranian Bahaʾis and have also occurred in situations among people 
from the middle class.
Conclusion
Behind the present persecutions of the Bahaʾis in Iran there is a logic, 
which can be understood (but not excused, of course) on a complex his-
torical background, where Islamic doctrines, popular religious beliefs, and 
nationalistic currents in Iran are mingled into a pêle-mêle of justifications 
for the anti-Bahaʾi stance of the regime. The relationship between the 
Iranian Bahaʾi community and the Iranian ulama was moulded during the 
Babi period, where the Babis broke with Islam in 1848. The Bahaʾis were a 
revival and continuation of the defeated Babi movement, and in religious 
terms the Bahaʾis continued the Babi track of heterodoxy and heresy rela-
tive to mainline Shiʿism and gradually developed a religion of their own. 
This was bound to result in permanent tensions between the Bahaʾis and 
the ulama, who logically enough regard the Bahaʾis as apostates.
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The Babi insurrections following the schism in 1848 laid the foundation 
for the often strained relationship between the State and Bahaʾi community 
of Iran. Politically, the Bahaʾis attempted an appeasement with the Iranian 
State, and from the late nineteenth century and until the fall of the last 
shah in early 1979, the Bahaʾis were largely accepted by the government, 
and many Bahaʾis became employed in public service. However, the gov-
ernment also occasionally tolerated persecutions and harassments of the 
Bahaʾis, exploiting the widespread popular animosity and the prevalent 
ulama hostility against them. As a diffuse minority in Iran the Bahaʾis could 
not mobilise enough local support to resist persecutions but were vulner-
able to informers, to mob harassments, and to anti-Bahaʾi organisations, 
such as the Hujjatiyeh.
The Bahaʾis’ unstable balancing between the two pillars of power in 
Iranian society, the State and the ulama, was brought to an end with the 
Iranian revolution of 1979, where they merged into one totalitarian regime. 
The Islamic revolutionary government was very hostile to the Bahaʾis right 
from the take-over of power, and soon the government unleashed wide-
spread, organised persecutions of its Bahaʾi citizens, including dismissal 
of thousands of Bahaʾi public servants, arrests, torture and executions of 
representatives of the Bahaʾi leadership.
Like other historical examples of state-organised persecutions, the per-
secutions of the Bahaʾis of Iran follow a common pattern: The minority 
is stereotyped in negative terms, utilising existing, more or less diffuse, 
prejudices among the majority population, and the persecutions are 
justified by reference to the imaginary threats posed by such potentially 
subversive elements. The persecutions of the Bahaʾis are both in tune with, 
and also extreme extrapolations of, widespread sentiments and prejudices 
against Bahaʾis among the Muslim majority in Iran. In the state-organised 
propaganda these prejudices are repeatedly and systematically projected 
into negative stereotypes of the Bahaʾis. In particular, the accusations of 
the Bahaʾis being disloyal to Iran and agents of Israel and the West strike 
a chord mirroring Iranian nationalism. Occasionally, the propaganda 
reminds the public that the Bahaʾis are also religious enemies of the Islamic 
Republic.
Stereotypes, prejudices, and discriminatory attitudes can be analysed 
as cultural mirrors of self-understanding. For example, there are popular 
prejudices in Iran depicting the Bahaʾis as immoral, irreligious, and reli-
giously impure (najes), and these prejudices contrast with a self-image 
of Shiʿite Iranians being moral, pious and unpolluted. In particular, the 
understanding of the Bahaʾis as being najes gives many Shiʿites a reason 
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to understand why the Bahaʾis must be removed from positions within the 
teaching and medical professions.
State-orchestrated manipulations of popular prejudices as an argument 
for persecutions often serve a cynical purpose of diverting attention from 
governmental mismanagement. Although this motive cannot be ruled out, 
considering that the persecutions (except for the executions) have intensi-
fied during the period of the Ahmadinejad government, the selection of 
the Bahaʾis as prime scapegoats can only be understood by tracing the 
religious-historical origin of the ulama hostility against the Bahaʾis. With 
the ulama coming to power in 1979, history inevitably made the Bahaʾis 
the chosen internal enemy in Iran.
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SHIʿI IDENTITY POLITICS IN SAUDI ARABIA
Laurence Louër
Introduction
The Saudi state was born as the result of the conquest, from the mid-
eighteenth century on, of the major part of the Arabian Peninsula by the 
Al-Saʿud, a clan originating from Najd in the centre of the peninsula. In 
order to legitimise their military enterprise, the latter presented themselves 
as the armed champions of a particularly strict version of Sunni orthodoxy, 
that articulated by Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). The latter 
advocated a return to strict monotheism and incited his followers to launch 
jihad against those who refused to comply with the commandments of “true 
Islam”. In his mind, Shiʿis were no less than false Muslims needing to be 
put back on the right track. He was particularly vocal against their practice 
of, as he deemed it, “worshipping” the Imams and other members of the 
Prophet Mohammed’s family, which he considered to be a contradiction 
of the monotheist principle. Hence, the successive military campaigns that 
accompanied the formation of the Saudi State were regularly marked by 
the ransacking of Shiʿi shrines and the slaughtering of Shiʿi populations.1
In the final act of its creation in 1932, the Saudi State incorporated a size-
able Shiʿi population. The majority of them inhabited the eastern parts of 
the newly-created kingdom, in the two oases of Qatif and Hasa. There was 
also a Shiʿi minority in Medina, as well as a sizeable Ismaeli population in 
the city of Najran, located south east of the kingdom on the border with 
Yemen. The Shiʿis probably represented the majority of the population 
of Qatif and Hasa in 1913, upon their final conquest by Abd al-Aziz, the 
founder of the modern Saudi State (Steinberg 2001: 236). Needless to say, 
the institution of Wahhabism as the Saudi State’s official ideology put the 
1 Among the most well known episodes are the destruction of Imam Husein’s shrine 
in Karbala in 1802 and the killing of some 4,000 Shiʿis there (Vassiliev 2000: 96–8); and 
the destruction of the Imams’ mausoleums in Medina’s Baqi‘ cemetery in 1925 (al-Hasan 
1993: 208–12). 
© Laurence Louër, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_011
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Shiʿis in an uncomfortable situation, to say the least. While Abd al-Aziz 
quickly put an end to the exactions of Wahhabi zealots against them, the 
Shiʿis nonetheless have continued to suffer from various types of discrimina-
tion until today. They have been severely restricted in the practice of their 
creeds, the regions they inhabit have been deliberately left underdeveloped, 
and they have been prevented from acceding to the most rewarding jobs. In 
this context, it is all the more natural for Saudi Shiʿis systematically to play 
down their religious belonging in the everyday social intercourse with their 
Sunni fellow-citizens. The difference in routine religious behaviour between 
the regions of Qatif and Hasa is particularly revealing in this respect. In the 
city of Qatif and the surrounding villages which are entirely Shiʿi or where 
the Shiʿis represent the overwhelming majority, the muezzins call to prayer 
according to the Shiʿi formula: “I testify that Mohammed is the Prophet of 
God and that Ali is the vice-regent (wali) of God”.2 People also celebrate 
many Shiʿi rituals in public places. Processions of mourners lamenting the 
martyrdom of Imam Husein (the so-called ʿAshura ritual performed dur-
ing the month of Muharram) march in the streets and, when time comes 
to celebrate the birth of the Hidden Imam in the middle of the month of 
Shaʿban (nusf Shaʿban), children disguised in fancy dresses go round the 
houses in their neighbourhood asking for money or candies. The picture is 
totally different in Hasa, located some 250 km south of Qatif, where esti-
mates put the Shiʿis at roughly fifty per cent of the total population. There, 
Shiʿis are discreet and content themselves with practising their faith in the 
privacy of their homes or in their mosques and huseiniyya.3 Typically Sunni 
Bedouin names are also widespread among Hasawi Shiʿis, and many Shiʿi 
clerics confess to preferring to go out without wearing their turbans.
As these examples show, the free expression of Shiʿi identity in Saudi 
Arabia is reserved for what French sociology calls the “entre soi”: that is, 
socially homogeneous contexts. However, for some years at the time of 
writing, the displaying of Shiʿi identity has become possible in public 
debate. Shiʿi figures express themselves on a regular basis in the local and 
national media, making open demands for the government to put an end 
to discrimination against their co-religionists and, overall, to improve their 
lot. Many of these figures are well-known Islamic activists who, in the 
2 This information comes from my own observations during one month of fieldwork 
undertaken in Saudi Arabia in October 2004. 
3 A huseiniyya is a place initially devoted to the lamenting of Imam Husein’s martyrdom 
but which also serves for marriage and burial ceremonies. It also functions as a community 
centre where, for example, people can attend computer lessons.
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1980s, belonged to the Organisation of the Islamic Revolution in the Ara-
bian Peninsula (OIRAP). As its name explicitly indicates, this organisation 
was devoted to the revolutionary overthrow of the Saudi regime. Having 
renounced their radical project, they are today engaged in typical ‘identity 
politics’: they act politically in order to affirm the Shiʿis’ distinctiveness and, 
by so doing, hope the Shiʿis will be empowered. This strategy of empower-
ment through the affirmation of the Shiʿis’ difference is surprising if one 
is to considerer the overall political and social context I briefly described 
above. How do we explain that, on the one hand, the Shiʿis resort to iden-
tity politics, while they favour discretion in the framework of their routine 
interactions with Sunnis on the other hand? What led them to think that 
this strategy was more rewarding than the discreet negotiation with the 
rulers they had long practised?
The Institutionalisation of Shiʿi Distinctiveness
Saudi Shiʿis have traditionally been a rather silent minority, favouring ‘exit’ 
and ‘loyalty’ over ‘voice’.4 During the various Al-Saʿud military campaigns, 
many Shiʿis chose to leave for more hospitable areas rather than fighting. 
Hasawis, in particular, are known for having chosen this strategy of ‘exit’, 
so that today there is a Hasawi diaspora settled all around the Gulf ’s coast, 
in the little monarchies that escaped Saudi annexation (Kuwait hosts 
the largest Hasawi community), in southern Iran and southern Iraq (the 
region of Basra). In Qatif, when the army of Abd al-Aziz reached the city’s 
walls in 1913, the notables debated which attitude to adopt. Those who 
favoured peaceful surrender got the upper hand while many of the others 
chose to leave for Bahrain and Iraq (Steinberg 2001: 244–245). Among the 
arguments brought by the partisans of peaceful surrender was that the 
Al-Saʿud were a strong military power able to put an end to the exactions 
of the Bedouin tribes against Shiʿi peasants and urban dwellers. Indeed, 
the Ottomans, who controlled Qatif and Hasa before the region’s conquest 
by the Al-Saʿud, had been unable to protect its inhabitants in 1908 when, 
enraged by the increased fiscal pressure and the Ottomans’ refusal to let 
them collect their seasonal surplus of dates, Bedouins besieged Qatif and 
killed hundreds of civilians (Fuccaro 2008: 47–8). At this time, for many 
4 I am referring here to the concepts elaborated by Albert O. Hirschman, (1970).
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Shiʿa notables the religious identity of the Al-Saʿud mattered less than their 
perceived capacity to bring stability.
In exchange for their conciliatory attitude, Abd al-Aziz granted the Shiʿis 
relative religious freedom. While the public expression of their creed was 
banned, the Shiʿi religious judges (qadhi) were authorised to continue 
their activities. Over the years, their position was institutionalised as they 
became civil servants appointed by the Ministry of Interior after consulta-
tion with the Shiʿi notables. Two Shiʿi religious courts were officially cre-
ated, one in Qatif and one in Hufuf, mainly dealing with family matters, 
inheritance and administration of religious endowments. Up to the late 
1970s, they were also entitled to give property certificates.5 Shiʿi religious 
courts were left indigent in comparison with the Sunni ones, but the 
very fact of their existence indicates that, from the start, the Saudi kings 
were ready to grant the Shiʿis an amount of institutional recognition as a 
distinct sect (madhhab) within Islam. As underlined by Guido Steinberg, 
this signals a pragmatic approach that has been a constant feature of the 
Al-Saʿud’s dealing with the Shiʿi question (Steinberg 2001: 237). They no 
doubt considered the Shiʿis with disdain, and even suspicion, but never 
endeavoured to convert them en masse to Sunni Wahhabi Islam because 
they were first and foremost driven by the concern of building a stable 
state. This meant avoiding alienation of the newly conquered populations 
and, hence, refusing implementation of the kind of radical religious policy 
of Wahhabisation advocated by the Wahhabi ulama. One should add that 
the stability of the kingdom’s eastern regions, inhabited by the Shiʿis, was 
particularly essential because of their very dynamic economy. Not only did 
they have important agricultural production, but their port towns hosted 
intensive commercial activities. From 1938 on, when oil was discovered 
there in commercial quantities, it appeared that the Eastern Province was 
hosting the vast majority of the kingdom’s hydrocarbon resources, and it 
became even more crucial to maintain the stability of the Shiʿi areas. Hence, 
while pressuring the Shiʿis has always been an easy way for the Al-Saʿud to 
please the Wahhabi religious establishment, in the case of conflict between 
the necessities of state-building and the ulama’s ideological demands, they 
always arbitrated in favour of consolidating the state.
5 This information was collected during a personal interview with the qadhi of Qatif, 
Sheikh ʿAbdallah al-Khunaizi, carried out in Saudi Arabia in October 2004. In 2005, the entire 
Shiʿi religious court system was reshuffled. I will elaborate on this later on in the article.
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One can give another explanation for this pragmatic approach. Abd 
al-Aziz was a political leader typical of pre-industrial society such as 
described by Ernest Gellner in his Nations and Nationalism: that is, a society 
where the ruling elite does not consider cultural homogenisation between 
rulers and ruled as necessary to secure their domination. In opposition to 
industrial society, which Gellner considers as structurally bound to generate 
nationalist ideologies that deem necessary the correspondence between 
political borders and cultural boundaries, political power in pre-industrial 
societies functions by maintaining the cultural difference between rulers 
and ruled. Since cultural difference is the symbolic expression of the power 
gap between rulers and ruled, from the point of view of the rulers it would 
be totally irrelevant to launch policies of cultural homogenisation: that is, 
in the specific Saudi context, policies of mass Wahhabisation. Hence, when 
the Wahhabi ulama, with the ethos typical of the clerical classes, pushed 
for such policies, they were logically rebuffed by the Al-Saʿud. Contrary to 
the ulama who saw Wahhabism in a missionary perspective, the Al-Saʿud 
considered it as the specific creed of the rulers, the sign of their moral 
distinction and the symbol of the legitimacy of their rule.
Contention Within the New Middleclass
Up to the 1950s, Saudi Shiʿis were content with the tacit pact of loyalty 
in exchange for relative peace of mind. When the first real structured 
opposition movement appeared, it did not articulate its criticisms of 
the regime in terms of defence of minority rights and a fight against the 
specific discrimination suffered by the Shiʿis. On the contrary, it framed 
its demands in the universalistic grammar provided by the great political 
ideologies popular in the Arab world: Arab nationalism and communism. 
The diffusion of these ideologies among Saudi Shiʿis was the result of the 
transformation of the Shiʿi population’s class structure, due to the Shiʿis’ 
extensive participation in the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 
the oil company operating on Saudi soil, initially owned and managed by 
Americans. As ARAMCO was located in the Eastern Province long inhab-
ited by the Shiʿis, the latter represented the bulk of the company’s Saudi 
employees (Vassiliev 2000: 424). For the Shiʿis, the presence of ARAMCO 
was a true opportunity. Indeed, despite the mediocre wages and working 
conditions on the oil fields, employment in ARAMCO permitted them to 
improve their lot. As ARAMCO’s management realised that it was in its 
interest to secure a stable and loyal workforce among the local population, 
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it quickly undertook to train its Saudi employees, who therefore managed 
to climb the rungs of the ladder, including to managerial positions. One 
should add that in the absence of a developed state apparatus, ARAMCO 
turned into a kind of quasi-welfare state for its employees and their fami-
lies, providing them with education, healthcare, and even housing loans. 
This is how a new middle class emerged from among the Shiʿi population, 
which was exposed to leftist and Arab nationalist ideas imported to Saudi 
Arabia by ARAMCO foreign workers (Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese but also 
Italians). A number of Shiʿis enrolled in the National Reform Front, which 
emerged in 1953 from a labour movement within ARAMCO and which, in 
the 1970s, constituted the bulk of the activists of the Saudi Communist Party. 
Founded in 1975 by communist members of the National Reform Front, 
the Party demanded a constitution establishing a parliament and guaran-
teeing political pluralism. The Saudi Communist Party also demanded the 
nationalisation of the oil resources (Salameh 1980: 20).
Although they left a legacy of leftist political activism among Saudi 
Shiʿis, these political organisations never developed into broad social 
movements and always had a narrow membership. Their relative success 
among the Shiʿi population reflected the latter’s particular exposure to the 
transnational ideological currents of the era, due to their strong presence 
among the oil industry’s labour force, rather than a massively diffused will 
to organise in order to oppose the State. The situation was different with 
the diffusion of the Message Movement (al-Haraka al-Risaliyya) in Saudi 
Arabia from the mid-1970s onwards. Indeed, while it partly recruited its 
members from the same milieu as the Saudi Communist Party—that is, the 
new middle class that emerged from ARAMCO—the Message Movement 
had much better success at mobilising the Shiʿis. Its success lay in its abil-
ity to make the conjunction between the new middle class and the older 
merchant and clerical classes, as well as linking the Saudi Shiʿis’ struggle 
with a geographically wider Shiʿi political mobilisation.
From Domestic to International Politics
In order to understand what the Message Movement is, one needs to leave 
Saudi Arabia to glance at the developments that affected the Shiʿi religious 
institution based in Iraq in the course of the 1960s. The need to make such 
a geographical detour shows that it is impossible to analyse the political 
evolution of Saudi Shiʿis as if the latter were totally encapsulated within 
the borders of the Saudi state. Indeed, the ties Saudi Shiʿis have with 
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co-religionists in other parts of the Middle East played a central role in their 
political re-orientation. Of particularly importance is their insertion within 
the centre-periphery pattern progressively established from the second half 
of the nineteenth century onwards in the framework of the centralisation 
of the marjaʿiyya, the supreme religious authority (Litvak 1998: 80–95). 
Located in southern Iraq, the city of Najaf became the place of residence 
of the marajiʿ al-taqlid (sing. marjaʿ al-taqlid), the most knowledgeable 
of the Shiʿi scholars, to whose rulings the laity and those clerics who had 
not reached the level of ijtihad6 had to refer.7 Clerics from all corners of 
the Shiʿi world were trained in Najaf ’s seminaries, where they inserted 
themselves into the patronage networks woven around the marjaʿiyya. 
These networks continued to function after the students return home, 
where their legitimacy in the face of their local flock in great part rested 
on the delegation of authority endowed to them by the marjaʿiyya. The 
ties with Iraq were also maintained by the intensive practice of pilgrim-
age to the tombs of the members of the Prophet’s family (ahl al-bayt), in 
particular the Imams whom the Shiʿis consider as the legitimate successors 
of Mohammed. The most popular pilgrimage was to the city of Karbala, 
located some fifty miles north of Najaf, where in 680 CE the third Imam 
Husein and most of his family were massacred by the caliph’s army. Last 
but not least, most of the Shiʿis in the Arab world used to pay the khoms8 
to Najaf ’s scholars, either directly, by undertaking regular trips to the holy 
city, or through local intermediaries from the merchant and the clerical 
notability. When, from the 1930s onwards, the oil revenues progressively 
transformed the Gulf sheikhdoms into wealthy states with important per 
capita incomes, the ties between Iraq’s religious institution and the Gulf 
Shiʿis were considerably reinforced, the latter becoming chief contributors 
to the marjaʿiyya’s budget.
The centripetal attraction exerted by Iraq’s religious institutions favoured 
political integration between Iraqi Shiʿis and their co-religionists elsewhere 
in the Middle East. The diffusion of the Message Movement from Iraq to 
Saudi Arabia is only one example of this. The movement originates in the 
quarrel that developed in the course of the 1960s between the ‘Shirazi-
yyin’ and the Najafi religious establishment. The Shiraziyyin, literally the 
6 The capacity to interpret the religious texts.
7 The marjaʿiyya means literally the “source of emulation”. On this institution, see 
Walbridge 2001.
8 The specific Shiʿi religious alms consisting of one-fifth of a family’s yearly surplus.
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‘partisans of al-Shirazi’, were initially a clerical faction aggregated around 
the charismatic figure of Mohammed al-Shirazi (1926–2001). Mohammed 
al-Shirazi established himself as Karbala’s main religious leader at the 
beginning of the 1960s and then launched an all out campaign to accede 
to the status of marjaʿ. This was taken as an unacceptable challenge by 
Najaf ’s religious establishment, who dismissed the pretension of somebody 
seen as deliberately circumventing some of the tacit rules regulating the 
marjaʿiyya: he was much too young (in his thirties) and therefore allegedly 
not knowledgeable enough; moreover, he never studied in Najaf, having 
been trained in Karbala (Louër 2008: 88–96).
The creation of the Message Movement in the mid-1960s was initially 
one of the tools used by Mohammed al-Shirazi to consolidate his position 
in the struggle with the Najafis. In 1957, the latter had created a political 
party, al-Daʿwa (the Call), deeply inspired by the ideas of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to which it accommodated some of the main Shiʿi religious 
concepts. Headed by one of Mohammed al-Shirazi’s nephews, Mohammed 
Taqi al-Mudarrisi (b. 1945), the Message Movement, like al-Daʿwa, aimed 
to fight the Iraqi regime and replace it by an Islamic state. But it was also 
marked by a strong transnational ethos, which made it look beyond Iraqi 
domestic politics to the oppressed Shiʿi communities in neighbouring 
countries, considered as part of a single transnational community. The 
actual realisation of this transnational calling into a concrete transnational 
religious and political practice was hastened when the movement became 
the target of the Iraqi regime’s repression and was forced physically to 
redeploy itself to the neighbouring countries, in particular Kuwait. It was 
here that Mohammed al-Shirazi moved with the bulk of his family in 1971 
and where he established several religious institutions that served not only 
to consolidate his position as a marjaʿ but also to recruit and ideologically 
train a whole generation of Shiʿi Islamic activists, mainly from Iraq and the 
Gulf (Louër 2008: 120–9).
Among them was a young Saudi cleric named Hasan al-Saffar (b. 1958). 
The latter had first met with Mohammed al-Shirazi during a trip he had 
undertaken to the Iraqi shrine cities with his father, a devout merchant 
of Qatif; his father used to pay regular visits to the religious scholars, to 
whom he paid the khoms directly. At this time, Hasan al-Saffar was already 
known in Qatif and the surrounding villages as “Molla Hasan”, a preacher 
recounting the life of ahl al-bayt during the religious ceremonies. In 1974, 
after a stay in Najaf ’s and Qom’s (in Iran) seminaries, Hasan al-Saffar 
became one of the main propagandists of Mohammed al-Shirazi’s ideas 
in the Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, of course, but also Oman where he 
 shiʿi identity politics in saudi arabia 229
spent several years. In Saudi Arabia, he created a branch of the Message 
Movement that was renamed the Organisation for the Islamic Revolution in 
the Arabian Peninsula (OIRAP) after its leadership went into exile in Iran 
by the end of 1979.9 Militants of the OIRAP mainly came from two social 
milieus. On the one hand were people from the traditional notability— 
what Gilles Kepel calls the “devout bourgeoisie” (Kepel 1985)—and the 
clerical corporation, both having close ties to Iraq’s religious institutions. 
On the other hand were people from the new middle class that emerged 
from the ranks of ARAMCO: students from the University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, which trained future ARAMCO cadres, and junior and mid-rank 
employees of the company.
The OIRAP made itself known after what Saudi Shiʿis call the “Muharram 
1400 Intifada”, the uprising of November 1979 that occurred in Qatif and its 
vicinity during the Ashura celebrations that followed the Iranian revolu-
tion. Ignoring the ban forbidding them to celebrate their rituals in public, 
thousands of Shiʿis went down to the streets to lament the martyrdom of 
Imam Husein in the cortèges of mourners dressed in black traditionally seen 
in Shiʿi communities. The march quickly turned into a political demonstra-
tion when the mourners began raising portraits of Ruhollah Khomeyni and 
chanting slogans hostile to the regime (Jones 2006: 223). The confrontation 
with the police was harsh, with dozens of demonstrators killed and dozens 
of others arrested. Far from being a spontaneous upsurge of solidarity with 
the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran, the demonstrations were 
carefully prepared by the OIRAP, which conceived them as the first step 
of a process of religious and political awareness-raising among the Shiʿi 
population.
Indeed, the events represented a watershed in the history of the Shiʿis’ 
relation with the Saudi regime, which for the first time saw the potential 
for the constitution of a strong radical opposition movement with wide 
popular support from within the previously compliant Shiʿi population. 
Something else made the shift even more dramatic: the positioning of 
Iran as the Shiʿis’ protector, and, as a result, the status change of the Shiʿi 
issue in Saudi Arabia, which ceased to be only a Saudi domestic matter 
and became a geo-strategic issue. Indeed, quickly after the revolution, 
the new rulers of Iran began criticising Saudi Arabia as a corrupt regime 
pledged to the American “Great Satan” and promoting a distorted version of 
9 While the Iraqi branch of the Message Movement took the name Islamic Action 
Organisation (Munazzama al-ʿAmal al-Islami).
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Islam. A rivalry for the leadership of the Muslim world developed between 
the two countries, in which both resorted to sponsoring transnational 
politico-religious movements to expand their spheres of influence (Nasr 
2006: 156–158).
Exile Politics
The first episode of the trial of strength between Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
the 1979 uprising entailed a deep transformation of Shiʿi Islamic activism 
in Saudi Arabia. Targeted by the regime, the bulk of OIRAP’s leadership 
relocated to Iran. It was from Tehran that the movement officially revealed 
its existence and began publishing its mouthpiece, the title of which left 
no ambiguity about the organisation’s political programme: The Islamic 
Revolution (Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya) (Fandy 1999: 198). The uprising thus 
transformed OIRAP from an embryonic, clandestine cell into an opposition 
movement in exile. Exile favoured the reinforcement of the movement’s 
transnational ethos by prompting it to embrace the Iranian regime’s 
rhetoric about global revolution against the unjust rulers. Together with 
their Iraqi mentors, OIRAP militants made themselves ardent proponents 
of the political model embodied by the Islamic Republic of Iran; in this 
model, according to the wilayat al-faqih (government by the specialists in 
religious law) doctrine articulated by Ruhollah Khomeyni, supreme political 
authority is vested in the clerics. At this stage, revolution in Saudi Arabia 
was conceived as part of a wider process, and the Saudi Shiʿis were regarded 
as members of a Shiʿi transnational community bound to mobilise itself 
beyond the borders of the nation-states. As envisioned both by Mohammed 
al-Shirazi and Ruhollah Khomeyni, the very concept of the nation-state was 
considered illegitimate because it established false social divides between 
Muslims. So was the idea of a territory being the property of a family. As 
reflected in its name, in which no mention was made of the term ‘Saudi’, 
the Organisation for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula 
refused even to define itself as a ‘Saudi’ opposition movement, referring 
to the territory of Saudi Arabia using neutral geographic terminology, such 
as ‘the Arabian Peninsula’. The idea of being ‘Saudi’ in one way or another 
was totally rejected, despite the fact that OIRAP’s members all bore Saudi 
citizenship and that, despite their reference to the ‘Arabian Peninsula’, 
their political project was to liberate the territory of Saudi Arabia from the 
Al-Saʿud and did not concern other parts of the geographic entity covered 
by the geographic denomination ‘Arabian Peninsula’.
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It is interesting to note that the same perspective was adopted by 
another Shiʿi Islamic opposition group created in the course of the 1980s: 
the Hijazi Hezbollah (Hezbollah al-Hijaz). It has its origins in a group of 
Saudi students of Qom’s seminaries who, in 1983, constituted themselves 
into an association named the Assembly of the Hijazi Ulama (Tajammuʿ 
ʿUlamaʾ al-Hijaz) (Louër 2008: 210). Around 1987, the association was 
renamed the Hijazi Hezbollah and began to be involved in acts of terror-
ism against Saudi interests on Saudi soil and abroad (Teitelbaum 2000: 
83–98). Contrary to what the use of the geographic denomination ‘Hijazi’ 
would suggest, none of the members were actually from the Hijaz, that is, 
the region of Mecca and Medina. Like OIRAP’s activists, they were all from 
the Eastern Province. They chose to name themselves “Hijazi” following 
a usage established by Ruhollah Khomeyni himself, who used to refer to 
Saudi Arabia as ‘the Hijaz’ in order both to point to the illegitimacy of the 
Al-Saʿud’s rule and to the sacred nature of the territory they ruled: the 
land of the revelation and the location of the two holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina (Louër 2008: 209).
Exile generally entails a kind of acculturation of opposition movements 
to the political culture of the host country. It also submits them to strong 
constraints, due to the essentially unequal relation that develops with the 
host state, which all the time threatens to transform them into mere instru-
ments in the hands of a power whose interests may come to diverge with 
theirs (Schain 2005: 118). This is exactly what happened to OIRAP, which 
was forced to revise both its ideology and its strategy radically after it came 
up against the resilience of the Iranian nation-state beneath the Islamic 
regime’s global rhetoric. OIRAP first suffered from the trial of strength 
that developed between Ruhollah Khomeyni and Mohammed al-Shirazi. 
Mohammed al-Shirazi, a politicised marjaʿ who was not sparing in his 
criticisms of several aspects of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy and who, 
moreover, considered himself as a marjaʿ whose standard perfectly matched 
that of Khomeyni, was typically the kind of independent politico-religious 
activist the Iranian regime could not afford to leave out of control. First, 
he was a threat to Khomeyni’s effort to exert a monopoly over religious 
authority. Second, his transnational networks in the Arab world, and most 
notably in the Gulf, risked endangering the Islamic Republic’s reputation 
among its foreign supporters. He finished his life under house arrest in 
Qom, where he had established himself in the aftermath of the revolution, 
while dozens of his partisans were jailed (Louër 2008: 186–95).
OIRAP also suffered from the revision of Iranian foreign policy under 
the influence of the Iranian regime’s pragmatic wing. Indeed, beneath 
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its rhetoric of sponsoring an all-out revolution against the unjust rulers, 
the Islamic Republic rather rapidly resumed a foreign policy essentially 
guided by the will to preserve its interests as a state; at the end of the day, 
this hardly differed from the Shah’s own policy. In this framework, it first 
created its own network of so-called ‘liberation movements’ in order to 
have direct control of actions undertaken in the name of the ‘exportation 
of the revolution’. The Shiraziyyin had their own agenda, which increas-
ingly came to contradict that of the more pragmatic circles of power in 
Iran. The Shirazi transnational network was definitively set aside in the 
framework of the final settling of scores between Iranian pragmatics and 
radicals that occurred in 1986 following the Iranian-Contra affair, the 
secret arms deal between Iran and the United States. Headed by Ali-Akbar 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the pragmatics eliminated the radicals who had been 
the Shiraziyyin’s main supporters.
Among the bones of contention between Iranian pragmatics and radi-
cals was the relation with the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular. 
After the end of the war with Iraq (1980–1988), which bled Iran dry and 
left it deeply isolated within the international community, the pragmat-
ics reached the conclusion that it was in Iran’s interest to reconcile with 
its Gulf neighbours. The latter had played a crucial role during the war 
by massively financing the Iraqi war effort and pushing the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to maintain low oil prices that 
greatly affected Iranian financial capacity. Elected president in 1989 after 
Khomeyni’s death, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was the main artisan of 
the rapprochement with Iran’s Gulf neighbours. During the 1991 Gulf War, 
he offered political, logistical and material support to the Western coali-
tion that set Kuwait free from Iraqi occupation. While Iran’s relations with 
Saudi Arabia were the most difficult to repair, the two countries finally 
normalised their diplomatic relations when then Crown Prince Abdallah 
attended the 1997 Islamic Conference held in Tehran in person (Marschall 
2003: 101–43).
Re-Manufacturing Shiʿi Identity
For OIRAP, all these developments logically meant that it could no lon-
ger rely on Iranian state power as a strategy to achieve the revolutionary 
overthrow of the Saudi regime. Because of this it operated a geographic 
redeployment of its leadership, which left Iran for Syria, while the offices 
based in London and the United States gained in importance. But the failure 
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of the revolutionary strategy also implied the questioning of the move-
ment’s submission to its Iraqi patrons, who were the main architects of this 
strategy; besides, these Iraqi patrons’ conflict with the Iranian regime had 
left them with few alternatives in terms of concrete political action. After 
the Gulf War, OIRAP leaders took the decision to sever ties with the Iraqi 
mother organisation. A new name was chosen to express the new status 
and aims of OIRAP: the Reform Movement (al-Haraka al-Islahiyya). As for 
the movement’s mouthpiece, The Islamic Revolution, it was renamed The 
Arabian Peninsula (al-Jazira al-ʿArabiyya). One conclusion can be drawn 
from these two names: they made no reference either to religion or to revo-
lution, and they signalled a focus on domestic issues. “Reform” indicated 
the will to participate in the debate about the reform of the Saudi State 
that, as I will show, developed after the Gulf War in Saudi Arabia.
Choosing the name ‘Arabian Peninsula’ was more ambiguous about the 
movement’s intention. It could indeed have signalled a will to continue to 
refuse the legitimacy of the Saudi regime. The organ’s content, however, 
clearly showed that this was not what was at stake. The Arabian Peninsula 
indeed dealt mainly with the history of the Shiʿis of Saudi Arabia with the 
aim of demonstrating their status as native inhabitants of the Arabian 
Peninsula and, incidentally, their cultural and moral superiority over the 
Bedouin ethos which, they said, was pervading the Saudi State (Al-Rasheed 
1998). The Sunni/Shiʿi divide was reinterpreted in socio-cultural terms, as 
a manifestation of the classical opposition between hadhara (the settled 
and urbanised population) and badu (Bedouin desert dwellers).10 The 
centrality of religion in the Shiʿis’ social identity was presented as deriv-
ing from their status as long-settled and urbanised people who, contrary 
to the Bedouins, favour religious belonging over tribal ties as a tool for 
social integration. In this vein, a specific publication entitled The Oasis (al-
Waha) was created, entirely dedicated to academic-style articles about the 
customs of the Shiʿis of the Eastern Province (marriage patterns, culinary 
habits, architecture, etc.).
The reinterpretation of the Sunni/Shiʿi divide in the terms of the tradi-
tional badu/hadhar divide permitted the Reform Movement to alleviate 
10 One should note that this way to present Najd and the Al-Saʿud does not correspond 
to the complex history and social fabric of Najd. Indeed, when they made themselves the 
proponents of Wahhabism, the Al-Saʿud were long settled in the little locality of Darʿiyya. 
While they used the zeal of the Bedouin warriors in their enterprise of conquest, they were 
overall profoundly distrustful of the Bedouins, seen as a destabilising element in the phase 
of state-building (Al-Fahad: 2004).
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the stigma for Shiʿis, deriving from belonging to a controversial minority 
Islamic current, by inserting them symbolically into a larger and moreover 
socially dominant status group throughout the Arabian Peninsula, that of 
the hadhar. In line with this effort to play down the religious dimension 
of Saudi Shiʿis’ collective identity, the Reform Movement also developed 
a nativist and quasi-nationalist narrative about Saudi Shiʿis.11 This perspec-
tive was particularly articulated by Hamza al-Hasan, one of the leaders 
of the Reform Movement based in London. In a book he published in 
1993, entitled The Shiʿa in the Arab Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he portrayed 
Saudi Shiʿis as being part of a fully-fledged people: that is, a collective 
entity endowed not only with a specific cultural identity but also with a 
territory of its own. Named the Baharna (sing. Bahrani), these people are 
the original inhabitants (sukkan asliyyin) of the Arabian Gulf coast. This 
fact, he stressed, is asserted by numerous old Arabic sources in which 
“ Baharna” is a denomination designating the inhabitants of “Bahrain”, 
an entity comprising the Gulf coast between the port town of Basra in 
present-day Iraq to present-day Oman and of which the modern state of 
Bahrain is only a small part.
This way of presenting Saudi Shiʿis has a twofold consequence. On 
the one hand, it permits once again a reversal of the stigmas tradition-
ally attached to Shiʿis. Indeed, as in other Gulf states, the Shiʿis in Saudi 
Arabia are often seen by the Sunnis as ethnic Iranians, established on the 
Arabian side of the Gulf in the course of the proselytising activities of Iran, 
where Shiism has been the state religion since 1501. Referring to the Shiʿis 
as belonging to the Bahrani people is a way of saying that it is the Sunnis 
who, in the Eastern Province, are the strangers. They came following the 
conquest by Abd al-Aziz and, by comparison with the Shiʿis, will always 
be latecomers. One cannot but notice that this nativist discourse, far from 
the Islamic register of legitimacy which stressed that religion was the sole 
legitimate social divide, once mobilised by OIRAP, is adopting one of the 
dominant registers of political legitimacy in the modern world. The idea 
that the natives are entitled to more rights than latecomers on a specific 
territory is indeed common ground to many contemporary conflicts.12
On the other hand, the narrative about the Bahrani people suggests that 
Saudi Shiʿis can claim the status of indigenous national minority. One can 
11 In very much the same way as the Coptic narrative analysed by Delhaye in this 
volume.
12 On this matter, see the special issue of Critique Internationale edited by Jean-François 
Bayart and Peter Geschiere 2001.
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surmise that it was constructed from this perspective. It was indeed articu-
lated by Reform Movement cadres based in the West (mainly London) at a 
time, the 1990s, when the United Nations Organization was being subject to 
intense lobbying on the part of associations self-described as representing 
this or that indigenous minority experiencing discrimination from the cen-
tral state. As a consequence, the 1995–2004 decade was declared by the UN 
as the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People. The United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was created in 2002, and 
a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People was adopted in 2007. In 
other words, it looks as if the Reform Movement re-manufactured Saudi 
Shiʿi identity in order to make it fit with what was emerging as a legitimate 
international standard to formulate political demands.13
From Indigenism to Patriotism
The re-manufacturing of Saudi Shiʿi identity by the Reform Movement 
clearly signalled a will both to diversify the content of Saudi Shiʿis’ identity, 
in order to go beyond the sectarian dimension of its challenge to the Saudi 
regime, and to adapt to the dominant concepts framing political contes-
tation, in order to disentangle itself from the transnational Shiʿi activist 
networks and reach a broader international audience. This allowed the 
movement to reframe its demands towards the Saudi regime in terms that 
would not appear to be challenging its religious legitimacy, that would not 
result in deepening the movement’s difference with the other opposition 
movements and, finally, that would sound familiar and acceptable to pos-
sible Western supporters.
As in 1979, it is the changes in the regional context that permitted 
the actualisation of the conceptual changes articulated by the Reform 
Movement into an empowerment strategy. Two events were decisive in 
this respect: the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 regime change in Iraq. Both 
weakened the Saudi regime in a way that opened a window of opportunity 
for the Shiʿi opposition. In 1991, the kingdom’s call on US troops to protect 
it from a possible Iraqi invasion of at least part of its oilfield projected an 
image of the Saudi regime as a militarily weak power obliged to rely on non-
Muslim protectors. While the liberals took the opportunity to come back 
with demands pertaining to the establishment of a popular  participation 
13 This point is also underlined by Picard in this volume. 
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mechanism, the most serious criticism, from the regime’s point of view, 
came from the ranks of the Sunni scholars educated in its generously-
financed Islamic universities. In two petitions presented in the aftermath 
of the war, the Letter of Demand and the Memorandum of Advice, they 
publicly criticised the regime’s lack of commitment to Islamic principles 
and suggested a whole set of reforms in order to restore Islamic values to 
the kingdom’s core policies (Dekmejian 1994, Okruhlik 2002).
It is noticeable that none of the Letter’s signatories were from the Shiʿi 
opposition, despite the fact that they probably agreed with many of the 
demands formulated by the petitioners, which touched upon a wide range 
of issues such as the redistribution of wealth, the implementation of justice 
and equality, and the appointment of qualified people for state office. Put 
simply, the Shiʿi opposition could not but be wary of petitions, the declared 
aim of which was to restore Islamic principles: that is, actually to reaffirm 
a Sunni orthodox way of interpreting Islam in which the Shiʿis would be 
given no legitimate place. As a matter of fact, they were not asked to join, 
an indication that the core of the new opposition did not consider them 
as potential partners. However, the upsurge of criticism from among the 
ranks of those who most benefited from the regime’s largesse, and who 
used to embody the regime’s Islamic legitimacy at home and abroad, totally 
transformed the regime’s perception of its Shiʿi opposition. In the context 
of the improvement in relations with Iran and the related abandonment of 
a revolutionary perspective by the Reform Movement, the Shiʿis appeared 
much less threatening than they used to be, especially in face of the emerg-
ing Sunni Islamic dissent. Reconciling with them then appeared an easy way 
to gain, if not the support of the strategically-located Shiʿi population, at 
least an appeasement of relations. As a result, while the regime undertook 
to crack down on the Sunni opposition, it finally concluded an agreement 
with the Reform Movement in 1993. Most of the movement’s leaders were 
authorised to move back to Saudi territory in exchange for a promise not 
to pursue opposition activities (Ibrahim 2006: 190–191).
The 2003 deposition of Saddam Husein marked a second turning point 
in the evolution of the Shiʿi opposition. The invasion of Iraq was made 
in the context of serious strain in Saudi-American relations after the 11 
September 2001 attacks in New York by a group of mainly Saudi militants 
from al-Qaʿida. The Americans suspected the Saudi-sponsored Sunni ultra-
orthodoxy of being responsible for the diffusion of hatred, violence and 
tyranny in the Middle East. On the eve of the invasion, the Shiʿis, who 
constituted almost 60 per cent of Iraq’s population and were expected to 
be the future rulers of Iraq, were increasingly presented as an oppressed 
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population, the first victims of a religious intolerance rooted in the Sunni 
interpretation of Islam embodied by Saudi Arabia. Rumours spread about 
an American-Shiʿi alliance to reshape the Middle East, including the 
possibility of a partition of Saudi Arabia, leading to the constitution of a 
new state under American protectorate composed of the oil-rich Eastern 
Province and the current state of Bahrain. This would actually be no less 
than the reconstitution of a state for the Bahrani people as rediscovered 
by the Reform Movement, and whose customs it had described at length 
in its publications.
The 2003 regime change in Iraq hence fostered a radical change of image 
for the Shiʿis both at the international and the Saudi domestic level. From 
radical revolutionaries subservient to Iran, they were now seen as the vic-
tims of Sunni intolerance and allies of the United States. For the Reform 
Movement, it was a golden opportunity to reassert itself and come back 
with the old and unanswered demands of equal treatment for the Shiʿis. 
The 1993 accord had indeed not fundamentally changed things in this 
respect: the Reform Movement’s subversive potential has been neutralised, 
but the overall situation of the Shiʿis had not improved, making the move-
ment’s leaders increasingly the target of criticism within the community 
(Ibrahim 2006: 211–212). As in 1991, the opposition of various ideological 
backgrounds took the opportunity of the strain put on the Saudi regime 
to present the rulers with a petition, the ‘Vision for the Present and Future 
of the Country’. For the first time, Shiʿis were invited to sign. A few weeks 
later, however, in the direct aftermath of the regime change in Iraq in 
April 2003, Hasan al-Saffar took the initiative to present Prince Abdallah14 
with a petition specifically dealing with Shiʿi issues entitled ‘Partners of the 
Nation’ (Shuraka fi al-Watan). The 450 signatories, all Shiʿis coming from 
various social, political and geographic backgrounds, affirmed their full 
allegiance to the Al-Saʿud and their commitment to their nation, demand-
ing in exchange that Shiʿism be recognised as a full-fledged and legitimate 
Islamic school of thought (madhhab), implying that they would have the 
right to practice their creed freely. The petitioners were received by Prince 
Abdallah who, a few weeks later, launched the first of a series of National 
Dialogue Conferences meant to establish dialogue between the various 
components of the Saudi nation and propose reforms helping to improve 
overall social relations in the kingdom. The first conference was dedicated 
14 Prince Abdallah was then the kingdom’s regent following the stroke that incapacitated 
King Fahd in 1995. 
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to an unprecedented dialogue between representatives of the various reli-
gious components of the kingdom: Shiʿis, Sufis, and representatives of the 
non-Wahhabi Sunni schools of thought sat together with prominent figures 
of the Wahhabi religious establishment as well as personalities from the 
Sunni Islamic opposition (Louër 2008: 247).
The petition and the conference have had the effect of positioning 
Hasan al-Saffar and other leaders of the Reform Movement as actors in 
the debate about reform, which was launched after the 11th of September 
attacks. Their contribution to this debate is twofold. On the one hand, they 
clearly promote liberal-inspired reforms based on the idea that the state 
should promote pluralism as well as freedom of thought and speech. This 
liberal-oriented programme was articulated by Hasan al-Saffar as early as 
1990 in his Pluralism and Freedom in Islam (al-Taʿadudiyya wa l-Hurriyya fi 
al-Islam). Some of his close associates have gone a step further by writing 
that the best way to implement such a programme would be to establish 
a ‘civil state’ (dawla madaniyya) blind to the religious convictions of its 
citizens (Mahfuz 2004). On the other hand, the Reform Movement is clearly 
engaged in typical identity politics, demanding that the specific grievances 
of the Shiʿis be addressed and, overall, that the Shiʿis be recognised as a 
community with the right to express its religious difference. It is significant 
that it is mainly on that ground that the demands of Hasan al-Saffar have 
been partly addressed. The Shiʿis have not been granted full recognition as 
a religious community, but they have obtained more room for manœuvre 
in terms of religious freedom. The almost systematic hindrance to the 
construction of Shiʿi mosques, for example, has been cancelled in the 
Eastern Province. The Shiʿi judiciary system has been completely reshuf-
fled (in 2005), which permitted a significant increase in the number of 
Shiʿi judges—from two to seven—as well the allocation of more financial 
and infrastructural means.
In exchange for this relative religious recognition, and in the hope of 
getting more, Hasan al-Saffar has effectively engaged in what many deem 
an excessive pledge of allegiance to the Saudi regime. Every time the 
Shiʿis’ loyalty to the rulers risks being put into question, mostly following 
international and/or regional events, he writes communiqués explaining 
that the Shiʿis are loyal Saudi citizens and that foreign powers hoping to 
instrumentalise them in their influence strategies would be confronted with 
the depth of their patriotic feelings. In 2004, following the release of the 
US State Department report on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia, which 
denounced the mistreatment of the Shiʿis by the Saudi regime, he criticised 
the American intrusion into Saudi domestic affairs. In November 2009, 
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Saudi Arabia decided to undertake a military strike against the Houthist 
movement in Yemen, seen as supported by Iran because it fights in the 
name of the scorned rights of the Zaydis, a religious minority related to 
Shiʿism. In open rebellion against the Yemeni regime, the movement has its 
bases in regions bordering Saudi Arabia and had made several incursions 
into Saudi territory. A few days after the Saudi military operations began, 
Hasan al-Saffar released a communiqué supporting the right of the Saudi 
State to protect itself.15
Shiʿis, Reform and Royal Factionalism
We can now return to the initial question of why there is a discrepancy 
between daily social intercourse, in which Shiʿis tend to avoid displaying 
their religious identity, and the public debate level where, on the contrary, 
Shiʿis overtly take part as Shiʿis. There is no doubt whatsoever that the 
unprecedented position gained by Hasan al-Saffar and his followers in 
public debate in post-9/11 Saudi Arabia does not result from a genuine 
reform of the Saudi regime, susceptible to generate overall societal effects. 
Rather it results from a variation in the traditional competition between 
various centres of power within the Saudi royal family, of which the lan-
guage about reform is only one attribute.
In Saudi Arabia, the king was never an absolute monarch but a primus 
inter pares, who has constantly to take into account the views of the most 
powerful members of the royal family. He can only rule by drawing on a 
coalition of princes, who have either administrative, regional, military, or 
media fiefdoms and, sometimes, also international supporters (Mouline 
2010). During the reign of King Faysal (1964–75), a strong and close-knit 
faction emerged called the ‘Sudayris’, composed of the seven sons of King 
Abd al-Aziz and Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudayri. Their aim was to secure 
power for their leader, and this was achieved with the accession of Fahd 
to the throne in 1982. But the other royal factions endeavoured to balance 
the Sudayris’ domination and succeeded in imposing Abdallah as Fahd’s 
crown prince.
After Fahd suffered a stroke that incapacitated him in 1995, Abdallah 
became the de facto regent and undertook to consolidate his position so 
as to weaken the Sudayris. His enthronement in 2005, after Fahd’s death, 
15 For the English version of the communiqué, see www.saudishia.com/?act=artc&id 
=152.
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fostered the competition, with Abdallah struggling to enlarge his sphere of 
influence in the face of the still strong Sudayri faction. In the  competition, 
and under the special international circumstances described above, the vari-
ous princes engaged in a campaign to gain supporters outside of the royal 
family, both at the international and the domestic levels. King Abdallah 
worked to build an image of himself as a reformer that departed from his 
previous reputation of being among the most conservative and religiously-
minded of the great princes. In Saudi Arabia, he showed benevolence 
toward liberals, reformers, technocrats and entrepreneurs (Al-Rasheed 2008: 
15). He also endeavoured to appear as a king close to his subjects from all 
regional, tribal and religious backgrounds, touring the country in order to 
meet the citizens, and assure them that they were all equally cherished. 
The evolution of the Shiʿis’ position must also be seen in this perspective: 
in the international context described above, Abdallah constructed them as 
one of his constituencies in the factional struggle against the Sudayris. The 
consequence is twofold. On the one hand, as long as Abdallah succeeds in 
containing the Sudayris, the Shiʿis will benefit from the king’s protection 
and potentially gain more room for manœuvre. On the other hand, if the 
Sudayris win, the Shiʿis will be seen as the allies of the vanquished faction 
and somehow punished. This is exactly what happened in March 2009. 
Emboldened by the king’s benevolent attitude, a group of young Shiʿis 
decided to visit the tombs of the Imams at Medina’s Baqiʿ cemetery and 
perform the traditional Shiʿi rituals there. They were beaten by the religious 
police who took them into custody. The king tried to intervene to set them 
free, but their release was opposed by Prince Nayef, the powerful interior 
minister, who also happens to be the chief of the Sudayris. The pilgrims 
were only released a few days afterwards, when Nayef decided to do so, 
in a sovereign act aimed at showing the king the limits of his power.16 A 
few days later, Nayef was appointed vice prime minister, a position that, 
according to an established tradition, makes him de facto the next crown 
prince17 and, hence, king.
16 On the Baqiʿ events, see Mathiessen 2009. I am indebted to Nabile Mouline who 
made me realise how these events were directly related to the struggle between the king 
and the Sudayris.
17 Sultan, the current crown prince and defence minister, is very ill and expected to 
die soon.
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Conclusion
The political attitude of Saudi Shiʿis has shifted radically from the time of 
the conquest of Qatif and Hasa by the Al-Saʿud in 1913 to the present day. 
Like many other minorities in the Middle East, they have chosen ‘voice’ 
over ‘exit’ and silence, but not over ‘loyalty’. This is probably what makes 
the specificity of the Saudi Shiʿi case as compared with others: they have 
raised their voices in order to affirm their difference, but at the same time 
their most visible leaders, namely Hasan al-Saffar and his aids, have chosen 
to pledge allegiance to the regime. This is despite the fact that, when the 
Reform Movement engaged in the re-manufacturing of Saudi Shiʿi identity 
in cultural and nativist terms, it gave the Shiʿis all the symbolic material 
necessary to frame their demands in nationalist language. This confirms 
what Picard notes in her chapter for this volume: that religious minorities 
in the Middle East have seldom made territorial claims and have instead 
looked for ways to have a better share in the existing state structures.18 
This is also why I have chosen to describe their empowerment strategy 
with concepts such as ‘nativism’ and ‘identity politics’, in contrast with 
‘nationalism’: political sovereignty is not the issue for the cadres of the 
Reform Movement, who have renounced any strategy that would appear 
to challenge the integrity of the regime in one way or another.
Another point is worth underlining as a conclusion: the central role 
played by the transnational networks and, overall, the international con-
text in most of the political shifts experienced by Saudi Shiʿis. First, the 
transnational clerical networks linking the Saudi Shiʿi notability to the great 
religious centres of Iraq were a key in the birth of Shiʿi identity politics. 
Second, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which positioned itself as the spon-
sor of oppressed Shiʿi minorities all over the Middle East, played a leading 
role in orienting the Message Movement strategy towards revolution rather 
than negotiation with the Saudi regime, and, after the Iranian pragmatics 
defeated the radicals in the late 1980s and 1990s, in the abandonment of 
revolution altogether. Third, the Reform Movement took great care to frame 
its language and demands in terms congruent with international standards 
for promoting minority rights. The resort to the international level in vari-
ous ways is a striking feature of many other cases broached in this volume. 
18 See also the work of Reidar Visser on the quasi-inexistence of Shiʿi secessionism in 
southern Iraq (Visser 2005).
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This should prompt us to depart for good from analytical approaches that 
consider minorities as enclosed within national boundaries. Such minori-
ties are probably the exception rather than the rule.
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CHAPTER TEN
NATIONALISM AND CONFESSIONALISM:  
SHIʿIS, DRUZES AND ALAWIS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON
Kais M. Firro 
Introduction
Comprising more than twenty religious and ethnic groups, the modern 
states of Syria and Lebanon face the overriding problem of regulating con-
fessional and ethnic conflicts.1 The Syrian and Lebanese ruling elites have 
strongly emphasized the importance of ‘national unity’ against internal 
and external threats. Despite the call for unity, an implicit and explicit 
confessional competition has endured, inducing the leaders of most of the 
religious communities to jockey for securing slices of power. 
Although the question of power and powerlessness in Syria and Lebanon 
is related to economic, social, constitutional and cultural aspects, the pres-
ent chapter investigates this question through the prism of the nationalist 
discourse adopted by intellectuals and politicians of the Shiʿis, Druzes and 
Alawis. The article focuses on this discourse during the period of the Arab 
Nahda (the Arab awakening) at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and its implication on ethno-politics 
within the two states.
Perhaps the distinction drawn by some scholars between the ‘Jacobin-
istic’ and ‘syncretistic’ types of state nationalism would provide clues for 
understanding the ways in which the ruling elites in Syria and Lebanon 
have regulated the confessional cleavages (Hanf 1993: 28–37). Jacobinism 
and syncretism have become two models of nationalism for Syria and 
Lebanon since their independence in 1940s. However, Syrian Jacobinism 
and Lebanese syncretism have their origin in the late Ottoman period 
and before the creation of the two States in the 1920s. From 1908 to 1920, 
the Arab nationalist discourse advocated an integration of the religious 
1 The terms “confessional” and “confessionalism” are used here as translation of the 
Arabic terms taʾifi and taʾifiyya that refer to collective identities rather than to religious 
doctrines and tenets (madhhab). 
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communities in one and indivisible nation, not only in social and politi-
cal domains but also in the cultural one, rather similar to the Jacobinistic 
type of nation and nationalism based on the principle of equality. In the 
same period, Maronite intellectuals and politicians developed their own 
nationalist discourse that called for the creation of a separate Lebanese 
nation that recognizes confessional diversity.
Since 1946, the successive regimes in Syria have adopted the Jacobinistic 
type of nationalism. In 1960s, this nationalism helped military officers from 
the Alawi, Druze and Ismaʿili minority groups to assume control of the 
state institutions, paving the road for Hafiz al-Asad, the powerful Alawi 
officer, to takeover in 1970. To avoid the image of a minority regime and 
the symbolic deprivation of the Sunni majority, and in the hope of mini-
mizing the latter’s opposition, Hafiz al-Asad’s regime strongly emphasized 
the Jacobinistic ideology and the discourse of secular Arab nationalism. 
However, in Syria, Jacobinism increasingly degenerated into an illusion of 
equality, because politics in the multi-communal states are about power 
and wealth rather than about suitable ideologies. 
With the ideology and discourse of Lebanese nationalism which emerged 
before the 1920s, modern Lebanon adopted syncretistic nationalism, setting 
out the principle of proportional representation of the religious communi-
ties as a basis for power sharing in the State. The supporters of this syncre-
tistic nationalism believed that an independent Lebanon could unite the 
various discrete religious sects into one single nation. However, Lebanese 
syncretistic nationalism, instead of creating unity, has perpetuated the 
country’s diversity and deepened the confessional rivalries. 
The civil wars in 1958 and 1975–1990 introduced a growing convergence 
of interests among Lebanese politicians, historians, and political scientists: 
the subject of their concerns was the political system in Lebanon. The 
supporters of the system claim that the confessions or tawaʾif (sing. taʾifa) 
in Lebanon are the natural units of history and integral elements of the 
human experience that have entailed the formation of a political system 
based on confessional representation in the State’s institutions. Prior to 
the Ta’if Agreement signed in 1989, most of the political elites and intel-
lectuals who supported the system belonged to the Christian communities. 
They depicted the Lebanese political system as ‘democracy of proportional 
representation’ or ‘democracy of consensus’ (Harik 1972: 65–66). Even in 
the face of the breakdown of the Lebanese State as a result of the civil war 
from 1975 to 1990, they retained their convictions, arguing that the war was 
an outcome of external interventions and that the confessional system 
would function again if the Lebanese could succeed in rebuilding a strong 
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state that makes it more “compatible with the heterogeneous makeup of 
society” (el-Khazen 2000: 9–11, 396–397).
Shiʿis Between Nationalism and Confessionalism 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the nationalist germ began to spread 
among Shiʿis, Druzes and Alawis. Writing about the Shiʿis at the end of the 
Ottoman era and the beginning of the Mandate period, Waddah Sharara 
depicts his community as a perplexed community (umma qaliqa). Sharara 
analyzes the social, political, and cultural changes in the southern part of 
modern Lebanon, pointing out that, historically, the Shiʿis were known 
under two designations. They were called Matawila, a word derived from 
the root-noun wilaya, which means to be loyal to Ali, son-in-law of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The designation matawila links them to the broader 
religious Shiʿi identity that Sharara calls al-tashayuʿ (Shiʿism). The Shiʿis 
were also known as al-Amiliyya or al-Amiliyun, based on their claim of 
ancestral descent from Amila, a Yemenite tribe that had immigrated into 
the area before the rise of Islam. The emergence of the Arab nationalist 
discourse induced Shiʿi intellectuals to seek theoretical ways to integrate 
their community within the ‘nascent nation’ without losing their traditional 
tashayuʿ and their tribal identity as components of their collective identity. 
The different designations of the Shiʿis are at the origin of the community’s 
perplexity regarding its self-perception (Sharara 1996: 61–67).
Throughout their history, the Shiʿis had used the principle of taqiyya,2 
shielding their religious belief while manifesting loyalty toward the rul-
ing Sunni majority. But the rise of Arab nationalism at the end of the 
nineteenth century prompted a new outlook within the growing circle of 
Shiʿi intellectuals. They searched for a new blueprint by which they could 
adapt themselves to the new nationalist ideas. Such adaptation led to 
what one could describe as a redefinition of the ‘we-group’ identity. In this 
process of redefinition, the intellectuals played a decisive role. They laid 
emphasis on different affiliations in accordance with different situations. 
The redefinition of the we-group identity led to a phenomenon known 
as polytaxis (poly many, taxis order) or the polytactic potential. As Georg 
Elwert illuminates: “Groups and individuals may belong to different refer-
ence groups simultaneously. According to the opportunity of situations, 
2 Taqiyya is usually translated into English as dissimulation. In Arabic, it means pru-
dence and carefulness. 
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they may stress one or other of these affiliations as their ‘real’ one . . . We 
may call this phenomenon polytaxis . . . or the polytactic potential” (Elwert 
1997: 71–72). 
Since al-nahda, Shiʿi, Alawi and the Druze intellectuals and politicians 
had used their polytactic potential in their search for new ways to adapt to 
the era of nationalism. One might argue that the polytactic potential used 
by these heterodox communities is nothing but another form of taqiyya 
under new circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this article to delineate 
all the complex aspects of the practice of taqiyya among the Shiʿis, Alawis, 
and Druzes throughout their histories. In general, the practice of taqiyya is 
a conscious act through which Shiʿis, Alawis, and Druzes pretend to accept 
the faith and rituals of the Sunni dominant religion while remaining deeply 
attached to their own religious uniqueness. The ultimate aim of taqiyya has 
always been to maintain religious independence and avoid being assimi-
lated through external religious dictates and persecutions. Unlike taqiyya, 
the polytactic potential is not an act of pretending, but a genuine attitude, 
through which intellectuals of these communities attempt to accommo-
date their collective identity to the wider social, cultural, ideological, and 
political frameworks. The polytactic potential is not unique for the Islamic 
heterodox communities, but a universal phenomenon characteristic for all 
minorities trying to find their place in a society with dominant majority. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, religious leaders were the 
sole stratum to codify and transmit the practice of taqiyya among the 
members of these heterodox communities. In pre-modern societies, when 
formal education was deficient, religious leaders assumed a pivotal role in 
ensuring the perpetuation of religious lore and practice that provided the 
axis of religious identity for successive generations. The socio-economic 
changes and the expansion of educational systems required a new breed 
of intelligentsia and leadership that can determine the framework of the 
relationship between their communities and the ‘others’. Although religious 
leaders retained a hold over the affection of the illiterate lower strata, the 
expansion of education had put a premium on the activities of intellectuals 
who began to replace taqiyya by a new strategy of polytactic potential seen 
as more appropriate in the new era of nationalism. They realized that their 
religious communities were no longer isolated in their mountainous areas 
where the practice of taqiyya had helped them to survive and maintain 
their religious identities for centuries. 
Because they have misconstrued taqiyya, many researchers still go on 
using the concept as a passe-partout to explain the political behavior of the 
Islamic heterodox communities in the past and present. To use taqiyya alone 
to account for the behavioral patterns of these communities in modern 
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politics would amount to an anachronistic explanation, where the past 
explains the present and vice versa.
The journal al-Irfan—established in 1909 by Ahmad Arif al-Zayn—is 
a good example of the polytactic potential used by the Shiʿis in an era of 
nationalism. Its writers looked for ways to reconcile their confessional and 
national identities (see Khalidi 1981: 118–123). An article published in the 
second issue of al-Irfan by Musawbi, a pen name, under the title “Law and 
History” exemplifies attempts to reconcile Shiʿi identity and nationalism. 
The author of the article deals with the relationship between milla (religious 
community) and umma (nation). Assuming that history retains memories 
and records of both, the author differentiates between ‘natural civic law’ 
and religious law. The former is dynamic and adaptable, in accordance 
with changes that occur within the nation, while the latter is stable and 
based on religious texts. This differentiation led the author to distinguish 
between two kinds of identity: the one attached to the milla and the other 
attached to the umma. The law of the milla refers to the personal status 
of marriage and inheritance, while that of the umma refers to the general 
status of the polity. The author sees the nation as a superior political entity, 
containing several sub-entities, in this case religious communities (al-Irfan, 
vol. 1, March 1909: 60–68; Sharara 1996: 29–31). 
One year later, Ahmad Rida, one of the prominent Shiʿi intellectuals, 
wrote an article entitled “What is a Nation?” in al-Irfan. In this article, Rida 
seeks to define the identity of his religious community in relation to three 
different collectives: the Muslim [religious] umma, the Ottoman [civic] 
umma and the Arab [national] umma (al-Irfan, vol. 2 no. 9, November 
1910: 459–462; Sharara 1996: 40). In attributing to the Shiʿis more than one 
component of identity, Rida provides Shiʿi intellectuals with the funda-
mental arguments concerning their collective identity. These became the 
basic tenets used by many Shiʿi intellectuals who published their ideas in 
al-Irfan. 
Dealing simultaneously with different references of collective identities, 
al-Irfan reflects the polytactic potential of its writers and the ability of its 
Shiʿi readers to redefine their collective identity in accordance with the 
occasion. In addition to articles on nationalism and localism, an editorial 
article, in 1913, assigns another goal to the organ: “It specially focuses on 
Shiʿi affairs, both old and contemporary” (al-Irfan, vol. 5, no. 21, November 
1913: 1, quoted in Sharara 1996: 12).
In December 1920 when he resumed the publication of his journal after 
the First World War, al-Zayn bewailed the division of “the unfortunate 
homeland” into several entities including Greater Lebanon. It was clear that 
he alluded to the colonial division of the Levant, where the Arab nationalists 
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had aspired to establish their nation-state (al-Irfan, vol. 6, no. 1–2, 1–3; 
Sharara 1996: 183). However, apart from the nationalist intellectuals, the 
majority of the Shiʿi leaders and religious scholars could not adopt a stable 
political stance vis-à-vis the French occupation and the territorial division 
of Syria and Lebanon until 1920 (Shuʿayb 1987: 87–91; Bazzi 1993: 50–104).
During the Mandate, the main clan chiefs not only went along with the 
confessional system of Greater Lebanon but contributed to its crystalliza-
tion (Shuʿayb 1987: 72–104). However, to justify their integration and to 
satisfy the Shiʿi demands for equality within Greater Lebanon, the powerful 
leaders of these clans had now to change the outlooks of both elites and 
peasantry by emphasizing the interests of their community and formulating 
their protests against the discrimination of the Shiʿis in Lebanon. Although 
the intellectuals were attached to Arab nationalism and were opposed to 
the mandatory regime, they also had to accommodate their nationalist 
discourse to include the Shiʿi grievances. In order to compete with the 
discourse of the confessional leaders, the intellectuals of al-Irfan began to 
link local grievances with the Arab nationalist demands for unity between 
Syria and Lebanon (Shuʿayb 1987: 93; al-Irfan, vol. 16, no. 2, September 
1928: 122–124). The Arab nationalist discourse of al-Irfan endowed the Shiʿi 
literati with a new consciousness that the French authorities in Lebanon 
attempted to preclude through great efforts at separating Shiʿi affairs from 
those of the Sunnis (Rondot 1947: vol. 1. 66). In the 1930s, a new generation 
of Shiʿi Arab nationalists emerged. Their opposition to the French Mandate 
was stronger than that of the first generation, and they spoke the same 
political language as the Sunni nationalists. Meanwhile, they combined 
their confessional demands for civic equality in the Lebanese state with 
their nationalist discourse (Shuʿayb 1987: 119–120).
By presenting the Shiʿi grievances and demands for equality in Lebanon, 
both the nationalist and confessionalist Shiʿis coined the term matlabiyya 
(a word derived from the root-noun matlab, a demand). Since the Man-
date, matlabiyya has become the core of the political discourse of the Shiʿi 
intellectuals and political leaders, being embraced by both nationalists and 
confessionalists. In this sense, matlabiyya presents another example of the 
polytactic potential of the intellectuals and political leaders to adapt to the 
era of nationalism and nation-state. Although the approval of the Franco-
Lebanese Treaty of 19363 resulted in muting the demands for Syrian unity 
3 The Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1936 redefined the relation-
ship between the French Mandate and the state of Lebanon. According to this Treaty, the 
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among the Muslim leaders, including the Shiʿis (Shuʿayb 1987: 162–163), 
the matlabiyya confessional discourse, since this treaty until today, has 
become an important component in Shiʿi collective identity. Shiʿi confes-
sional leaders and nationalist intellectuals have relied on matlabiyya to 
propagate their respective ideas among their coreligionists.
Following the first and second generations of intellectuals, the modern 
Shiʿis would stress one component of their identity and omit another in 
accordance with different situations. Since the independence of Lebanon, 
one can discern several components of this collective identity: local commu-
nalism with its matlabiyya character, Shiʿism, Lebanese patriotism (watani-
yya), Arab nationalism (qawmiyya), and Islamism. These components have 
been internalized and have come to characterize the polytactic potential 
of Shiʿi collective identity. Leaders of the active confessional organizations 
of the Amal and the Hizbollah movements continue to address their Shiʿi 
interlocutors with discourses similar to those of the first generation intel-
lectuals. Thus, polytactic potential has become an inherent component of 
their identity, enabling Lebanese Shiʿis to play a leading role in Arab and 
Lebanese politics. 
Although since 1980 the Shiʿis have constituted more than 30 percent 
of the total population of Lebanon (Johnson 2001: 3), they still behave as 
a minority. Neither their demographic size nor their political power can 
bring about a radical change in the confessional political system of the 
country. The 1975–1990 civil war and the recent clashes between Shiʿis and 
Sunnis in 2008 testify to the impossibility of introducing radical changes 
in a political system based on ‘virtual’ demography. Their main political 
organizations, Amal and Hizbollah, abstained from changing the existing 
political system that hinges on confessional distribution of the political 
power and, in the absence of a new census since 1932, on ‘virtual’ demog-
raphy. Because Christian and Muslim elites could not agree to conduct 
a new census, the ratio of 6:5 decided upon in 1943 continued to be the 
basis for distributing the parliamentary seats until the Ta’if Agreement that 
changed this ratio to 5:5. 
The emergence of Amal in 1976 and Hizbollah in 1982–3 was a result of 
socio-economic and political processes that have eroded the traditional 
and obsolete Shiʿi elites. These processes began in the 1950s and became 
French government obliges itself to defend the integrity of the Lebanese territory. The Treaty 
of 1936 appends two annexes that guarantee equality of all citizens and ensures an equitable 
representation of the different religious communities in the state institutions. 
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stronger in the 1960s and 1970s through the activities of Musa al-Sadr (1928– 
1978), who became the paramount leader of the community in the 1960s. 
His first significant acts were to establish a series of vocational institutes. 
In 1967, al-Sadr promoted a parliamentary legislation to establish, two 
years later, the Supreme Islamic Shiʿi Council as an independent body from 
the Supreme Islamic Council of the Sunnis. In 1974, he founded Harakat 
al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) that exhorted Shiʿis not to 
accept their deprivation fatalistically. The growing influence of al-Sadr prior 
to the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 gave direction to the political awakening 
of the Shiʿis, embodied by the rise of Amal. In the early 1980s, a coterie 
of radical clerics among Amal’s supporters disapproved of what they saw 
as the Amal leaders’ tactic of seeking a modus vivendi with the ‘corrupt’ 
political system of Lebanon and even with the Israeli occupation. With 
the assistance of Iran in 1982, this coterie made up the cadre of Hizbol-
lah (God’s party). Hizballah’s fierce ideological tenor and commitment to 
confront Israel’s occupation in the south attracted many Shiʿis. By eroding 
Amal’s influence among the Shiʿis, at the end of the 1980s Hizbollah became 
one of the leading parties of the country. Although it has served—at least 
until 1989—as a stalking horse for Iranian interests, Hizbollah has proved 
responsive to the Shiʿi aspirations of their domestic constituency (Norton 
2007: 13–46). 
The rise of Hassan Nasrallah as the secretary-general of the party in 
1992 inaugurated two parallel and interrelated changes in Hizbollah’s 
political stance. The party decided to abandon its previous denunciation 
of the ‘corrupt’ confessional system and take part in the elections of 1992. 
By battling the economic ‘exploitation’ of the Shiʿis and by retaining a 
fierce confrontation of the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon, Hizbollah 
succeeded in broadening a mass political mobilization among the Shiʿis. 
Although attached to its religious convictions, Hizbollah adopted a strategy 
which does not dwell only on religious themes, but opens the doors for 
non-religious Shiʿi middleclass to take part in its politics. Thus many Shiʿis 
who did not yearn to accept its religious and ideological passions have 
embraced its radical appeal, converting it to a Janus-faced organization 
(Norton 2007: 45–46, 98–103). 
The strategy adopted since 1992 is reflected in Nasrallah’s and other 
leaders’ speeches, which merge a religious discourse with a mundane one. 
A good example is their speeches in the ʿAshura commemorations which 
have been converted by Hizbollah into opportunities for mass political 
mobilization. The ʿAshura (derived from the Arabic word for tenth) com-
memorates the mourning of the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet, 
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Husayn Ibn Ali, killed and mutilated by the Sunni ruler of Iraq in the tenth 
day of Muharram in the year 61 of the Muslim calendar (10 October 680 
CE). In pre-modern time, Shiʿis used to avoid publicly commemorating the 
ʿAshura. But, in 1938 when nationalism and Islamic reformism removed 
their sense of prudence, Shiʿis abandoned taqiyya, inaugurating the modern 
public commemoration of ʿAshura, which since the 1960s has become a 
symbol of their religious and political awakening, and a manifestation of 
power in Lebanon (Norton 2007: 51–68). 
We find a striking illustration of this change in the televised speeches 
which have two parts, religious and political, made by Nasrallah during 
the Ashura commemorations. In the religious part, he emphasizes the 
‘uniqueness’ of the Shiʿis as equal partners with the Sunnis in the Islamic 
umma; in a speech on Shiʿi religious values, Nasrallah openly refers to 
several specific religious ceremonies and tenets without shielding them 
behind the old taqiyya. The political part of Nasrallah’s speeches recalls 
the polytactic potential adopted by the Shiʿis since al-Nahda when he rou-
tinely castigates the ‘enemies’ of the Arab and Muslim ummas, stressing the 
loyalty of his community to Arab nationalism and Lebanese patriotism.4 
The recent ‘Document of Hizbolla’ dated 30 November 2009 is a cogent 
exposition of the polytactic potential strategy through which Hizballah 
pragmatically confronts the shifting political landscape of regional politics 
in the Middle East, as well as the changing terrain of Lebanese politics 
after 2005. Although it stresses the necessity of abolishing the Lebanese 
confessional system in order to achieve a ‘just democracy’ in Lebanon, the 
document avers: 
Until the time the Lebanese, through their national dialogue, reach the his-
torical and sensitive goal, i.e. the abolition of political confessionalism, the 
democracy of consensus will remain the basis of governance in Lebanon, 
because it is the real embodiment of the Constitution and the Pact of the 
coexistence (Document of Hizbolla, 30 November 2009). 
While dealing with the role of Hizbollah in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and its relationship with the Arab countries and the Iranian Revolution, 
this document reiterates three pillars which still hold Shiʿi identity and 
self-perception, i.e. Lebanese patriotism, Arab nationalism, and Islamism 
(Hizbolla Document: Website of Muntada Rabitat al-Tullab al-Muslimin 
fi Lubnan).
4 Hassan Nasralla’s speeches are available in many internet sites under the Arabic title: 
Khitabat al-Sayd Hasan Nasralla. 
254 kais m. firro
The Druze Response to the Nationalist Message 
The Druze religious faith is an offshoot of the Shiʿi-Ismaʿili doctrine 
developed during the tenth century, when the Ismaʿilis established the 
Fatimid State in Tunisia and subsequently conquered Egypt in 969. The 
Fatimid rulers called themselves khalifas and soon claimed to be imams. 
The Ismaʿili daʿwa (religious mission) endowed the Fatimid’s rulers, the 
khalifas-imams, with heavenly powers, and introduced the notion that 
they are messianic candidates. During the reign of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah 
(996–1021), the imam-khalifa of the Fatimid dynasty, a group of scholars, 
eager to see the messianic promise fulfilled, began from 1017 to propagate 
their own daʿwa, which they themselves called daʿwat al-tawhid (mission 
of Unitarianism), and which outsiders called al-Durziyya (Druzism). They 
claimed that al-Hakim was of divine nature. It is at this rupture point that 
tradition locates the origin of the Druze religious sect. Druzism claimed 
that lahut (Divinity) had manifested itself in al-Hakim under human form 
(nasut), because human beings cannot escape their physical nature and 
their comprehension is bound by space and time. God can be understood 
only within the limits of human comprehension by nasut. The nasut is not 
tajasud (an incarnation) of God, but an image through which He brings 
Himself closer to human understanding (Firro 1992: 7–12). The Druze Canon 
puts a strong emphasis on the Unitarian concept, warning against taking 
the nasut image for the Deity itself because “God is unique, eternal, without 
a beginning, and abiding without end. He is beyond the comprehension of 
human understanding and cannot be defined by words or attributes distinct 
from His essence. He has no body or spirit” (Epistle 13, Druze Canon).
According to the Druze faith, God created all human souls and bodies 
at once, their number is fixed for all times. A soul cannot exist outside a 
human body, which serves as the vestment (qamis) of the soul. Through 
transmigration of their souls, the ‘true believers’ accepted the Unitarian 
daʿwa, and they will be able to free themselves from their shortcomings 
and reach a ‘state of completion’ (al-kamal al-akhir). Because the ‘true 
believers’ apply their hearts and minds in deep devotion to God, they are 
exempt from the performance of the Islamic daʿaʾim (pillars). Instead, the 
Druze faith substituted seven Unitarian principles (Firro 1992: 13).
The influence of Islamic sufism comes to the fore in the many sufi prin-
ciples to which the Druze sheikhs adhere in their overall maslak (behavior). 
These sheikhs form the uqqal (the initiated or wise men and women), who 
have full access to the Druze Canon. The others, the juhhal (uninitiated or 
ignorant) have no permission to access the Druze Canon, receiving only 
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oral religious instruction until they decide to join the initiated group. 
Keeping faith in secrecy led the members of the community to practice 
the Shiʿi principle of taqiyya. However, taqiyya could not convince many 
Sunni scholars that they were faithful Muslims. Therefore, many of these 
scholars follow Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa from the beginning of the fourteenth 
century that declared the Druzes and the Alawis as heretics outside Islam 
(Ibn Taymiyya 1998: vol. 18, 98–99). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Druze intellectuals from Mt. 
Lebanon embraced the Arab nationalist discourse. Shakib Arsalan (1869–
1946) was among the first who attempted to articulate the fundamental 
arguments in order to integrate the community within the Muslim and 
Arab umma. His mother was a Muslin Sunni who probably had a strong 
influence upon her son’s ideas. Until the end of the Ottoman period, Arslan 
kept up his contacts with many scholars among the Islamic reformers and 
Arab nationalists. It was within this cultural context that Shakib Arslan 
elaborated his Islamic and Arabist discourse and ideology (al-Mawla 1990: 
28–30, 53–54). 
The study of his extensive writings and his political activities show that 
his Pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist notions were genuine and not a mani-
festation of taqiyya. Until his death in 1946, Arslan had preached a blend 
of Islamic reformism and Arab nationalism that had a strong appeal for 
many Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims, and even for most of the Druze literati in 
Mt. Lebanon. The Druze revolt of 1925 in Mt. Hawran against the Mandate 
and its connection with the Syrian Arab nationalists, prompted Arslan to 
reiterate his previous arguments regarding the Druzes’ Arab identity. He 
focused exclusively on the Druze racial origin and on the Islamic charac-
teristics of the Druze community. While Arslan emphasizes the pure Arab 
origin of the Druzes, he claims that Druzism is a branch of Islam, notably 
Shiʿi-Ismaʿilism. When dealing with the Druze faith, it was enough for Arslan 
to point out that the principles of the Druze doctrine are similar to those 
of many sufi Muslims. Like the sufis, the Druzes’ esoteric interpretation 
of the Qur’an led them to call for ‘the unity of the cosmos’. Probably in 
an effort to make his arguments appear more convincing, he deliberately 
avoids dealing with the Druze doctrine’s abolition of the pillars of Islam. 
Without referring directly to the Muslim pillars, Arslan claims that the 
Druzes fulfill all the Islamic duties (al-Mawla 1990: 75–77). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, other Druze intellectuals emerged 
to adopt ideas similar to those of Arslan. Among these was Ali Ibn Yusuf 
Ibn Nasir al-Din, who directed the school of al-Dauudiya for ten years; the 
school was established in Mt. Lebanon in 1862 by Dauud Pasha, the governor 
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of Mt. Lebanon. In 1886 Nasir al-Din founded a journal in Beirut called 
al-Safaʾ (Clearness). The journal appeared for several months, stopped, 
and was reestablished in 1898 by his son Amin Nasir al-Din (al-Bʿayni 1984: 
95). Like the first generation of their Shiʿi peers who wrote in al-Irfan, 
Druze intellectuals who studied in al-Dauudiya and wrote in al-Safaʾ had 
formulated arguments that would integrate the Druze community within 
the Muslim umma and Arab nation. 
Two new schools of thought had emerged among the second generation 
of Druze intellectuals. The former sought to define Druzes as part of the 
Arab nation, while insisting on the community’s special character. The lat-
ter, represented by a smaller group, called for the revival of Muslim unity, 
including the ‘heterodox’ communities within a single Muslim umma. 
Abdalla al-Najjar (1896–1976) was one of the leading figures belonging to 
the first school. In 1924 al-Najjar published Banu Maʿruf fi Jabal Hawran, 
(The Druzes in Mt. Hawran), the first book ever to cover the religious and 
historical aspects of his community. The first chapter contains reflections 
about the relationship between umma (nation) and milla (religious com-
munity); these are reminiscent of similar reflections by Shiʿi intellectuals 
of the same period. Al-Najjar distinguishes between al-milla as a religious 
group and al-umma as a national collective. He argues that Islam comprises 
several millas (religious sects), each with its special characteristics, such 
as the Druze milla whose members are of Arab descent. Al-Najjar presents 
the main religious issues that differentiate the Druzes from other Muslims. 
He emphasizes that these issues are esoteric interpretations of Islamic 
dogmas and not a total deviation from Islam (al-Najjar 1924: 14–15, 18–19, 
43–52, 108–109).
Hani Abu Muslih (1893–1971), Ajaj Nuwayhid (1896–1982), and Fuʾad Slim 
were the prominent representatives of the second group, not only in their 
verbal discourse, but also in their actions and in their personal behaviour 
that exemplified assimilation within the orthodox Muslim umma (al-Hut 
1982: 861–863, 867–871: Nuwayhid 1993: 12–27). Thus, they even showed 
tolerance towards the marriage of their sisters and daughters with Sunnis. 
The writings of Nuwayhid still have great influence on Druze literati today. 
Although he devoted his political activities and most of his writings to the 
Palestinian cause and to general Arab-Islamic issues, he also published in 
1935 a book on the Druze historians and religious scholars who lived before 
the seventeenth century. Nuwayhid merged his analysis and narrative 
with the Arab nationalist-Islamic discourse, placing Druze historians and 
scholars in the mainstream of Islamic heritage (Nuwayhid 1975). 
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The activities of Ali Nasir al-Din (1888–1974) and Saʿid Taqiy al-Din 
(1904–1960), two Druze intellectuals from the second generation, illustrate 
the recourse to polytactic potential instead of the old taqiyya. Motivated 
by deep devotion to Arab nationalism, Nasir al-Din joined several Arab 
nationalists from Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq to hold an Arab 
nationalist congress in August 1933 in the Druze village of Qrnayil in Mt. 
Lebanon. The participants decided to organize Usbat al-Amal al-Qawmi 
(the League for National Action). Not only was Nasir al-Din the secretary 
of the Lebanese section of the League, he was also one of the League’s 
ideologues who formulated its goals and ideology. Recent studies consider 
Nasir al-Din as a central figure, whose ideas had great impact on the Arab 
nationalist parties that emerged after 1946. His book Qadiyat al-Arab (The 
Arab Cause), published in 1946, presents a synthesis of his ideas which 
have been adopted by Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-Arab (The Movement of 
Arab Nationalists) and the Baʿth Party (Nasir al-Din 1946, rpt. 1963; Bad-
ran 1996: 74–110; Busʿid 2004: 56–70; Shlash 2004: 45; al-Tall 1996: 77–100; 
Saghiyya 2000: 165–188). Taking their cue from Nasir al-Din, many Druze 
elites and intellectuals in Lebanon and Syria supported Arab nationalist 
organizations as a vehicle for integration in the political arenas of the two 
countries, applying their polytactic potential through which they adapted 
Druze identity to pan-Arab nationalism. 
Saʿid Taqiy al-Din provides another clear example for this Druze poly-
tactic potential. He followed his uncle Amin (1884–1927) who, since 1907, 
had been a member of the circle of Christian Lebanese intellectuals, who 
called for Lebanese nationalism. Both conceived of al-uruba (Arabism) as 
a revival and development of Arab culture based on the Arabic language 
(Taqiy al-Din 2004: 43). Saʿid’s political and social ideas illustrate his views 
concerning the various components of the Druze collective identity: Druze 
communalism, Arab Nationalism, Syrian nationalism and Lebanese patrio-
tism (Taqiy al-Din 2004: 26–31, 92–93). 
Even when Saʿid joined the SSNP of Antun Saʿada in 1949, he argued 
that his support for the party does not mean that he changed his position 
toward Greater Lebanon, Greater Syria, and uruba (Arabism). In one of his 
talks, he declared: “I am Lebanese, therefore I am an Arab. Consequently, 
it is imperative to unite [Greater Syria] into one integral political entity” 
(Taqiy al-Din 2004: 94). He supported the party, he said, because it was the 
only one that called for a genuine separation between religion and politics 
(Taqiy al-Din 2004: 73–81, 95–98).
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Ever since the end of the nineteenth century, the socio-economic and 
cultural development in Syria and Lebanon has exposed Druzes to the 
outside world and has eroded many traditional elements of their society. 
No longer isolated in their mountainous localities, many Druze juhhal have 
faced difficulties in getting information about their faith from the uqqal. 
Because the juhhal, who constitute the majority of the community, have 
no direct access to their secret religious literature, their main resort is to 
rely on secondary sources of the Druze intellectuals. It is, therefore, no 
wonder to find many Druzes adopting the nationalist discourse of their 
intellectuals and joining Arab nationalist parties that advocate secular 
nationalisms. The historical record since 1925 indicates that most of the 
Druzes have accepted the arguments of their intellectuals regarding the 
collective identity of the community.
Although their community is a tiny minority in Syria (3 percent), in 1963 
Druze officers in the army joined their Ismaʿili and Alawi peers in establish-
ing a new political elite in the country. However, as a result of an abortive 
Druze coup d’état in 1966, the Druzes found themselves excluded from this 
new elite and joined other minorities in supporting the present Syrian 
regime. By using the Jacobinistic national discourse, as well as polytactic 
potential strategy, Druzes have attempted to secure slices of power. 
Unlike in Syria, the Druzes in Lebanon have played an important role 
in the politics of the country. The main vehicle for this role is the PSP 
(Progressive Socialist Party) established in 1949 by the Druze leader Kamal 
Jumblatt (1919–1977) on the basis of the modern ideologies of socialism, 
liberal democracy and Arab nationalism. From the 1950s until the late 
1970s, the PSP led all the leftist and Arab nationalist parties that opposed 
the dominance of the ruling elites and the ‘corrupt confessional system’ in 
Lebanon. Jumblatt’s collected works expound his ideology of Arab nation-
alism and political thought that recalls many ideas of Shakib Arslan, Ali 
Nasir al-Din, and other Druze intellectuals who have abandoned taqiyya 
and adopted polytactic potential (Jumblatt 1987). In his reassessment 
of the taqiyya’s role in the Druzes’ history, Jumblatt explicitly rejects its 
interpretation as an act of prudence, arguing that taqiyya was an inherent 
characteristic of the ‘Gnostic tradition’ to which the Druze faith belongs 
(Makarem 1966: 7–16). 
Although the death of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977 and the confessional strife 
in the 1980s have eroded the influence of the PSP among non-Druze com-
munities, Walid Jumblatt, the son of Kamal, seeks to cultivate the legacy 
of his father and maintain the Druze minority’s influence on Lebanese 
national politics. 
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Nationalism as the Road to Power: The Alawis in Syria 
As in the case of Druzes, the historical record of Alawis-Nusayris shows 
that taqiyya was never an absolute guarantee against hostile treatment. 
Sunni Muslim scholars and chroniclers placed this minority beyond the 
pale of the formal Shiʿi doctrine. Supported by his extremist followers, Ibn 
Nusayr (d. 883), the founder of the sect, related himself to the twelfth Shiʿi 
imam as his bab (door), through which his followers among the Shiʿis can 
reach the inner meaning of al-imamiyya (the guidance) of the true faith. 
By adding the central role of al-bab to Shiʿism, the Nusayris claim that their 
abwab (sing. bab) were the representatives of the ‘true faith’ (Massignon 
1934). According to them, every Shiʿi imam had a bab on whom the Shiʿis 
rely to understand the ‘true faith’. Ibn Nusayr was the bab of the last and 
twelfth imam who had gone into cosmic ghayba (concealment) (al-Tawil 
1981: 253–256; Uthman 1994: 44–45). 
The Nusayris had added another sense to the term bab when they placed 
it within the Trinitarian concept of their faith. They based the concept on 
the three figures of Ali, Muhammad, and Salman, abbreviated by the let-
ters A.M.S. (Bar-Asher and Kofsky 2002: 7–41). Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, 
represents al-maʿna (the meaning) of the divinity. Muhammad, the Prophet 
represents al-ism (the name) and Salman al-Farisi, one of the prophet’s 
Sahaba (Companions) represents al-bab (the door). In his interpretation 
of the Trinitarian concept, Abu Musa al-Hariri (a pseudonym of Butrus 
al-Qazi) argues that the Prophet Muhammad is no more than an envelop 
of al-maʿna, as a hijab (veil) or as a bayt (house). In this sense, al-maʿna 
(the meaning) is al-batin (the internal) of the divinity that resides within 
al-zahir (the external) in the form of a bayt (house) and a hijab (veil) that 
contains the inner meaning. To enter this ‘house’ one needs a bab which 
is embodied by Salman al-Farisi, through whom believers obtain access to 
the inner meaning of the divinity (al-Hariri 1984: 24–36). Modern Alawi 
authors reject this interpretation, claiming that A.M.S. is connected with the 
symbols of letters practiced by the Muslim sufis (Uthman 1994: 193–198). 
Most of the studies on Nusayris since the nineteenth century focused 
on the Trinitarian concept of A.M.S. Some of these assign great weight to 
the Christian influence expressed through the concept, to such an extent 
that some of these studies speculate that the roots of Nusayriyya go back to 
Christianity (Lammens 1901: 33–50). However, the recent revisionist stud-
ies on Nusayriyya reject the ‘Christian connection’ and relate the Nusayri 
trinity to the Shiʿi legacy (Friedman: 2009). 
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Unlike the case of the Druzes and the Shiʿis, the first generation of 
intellectuals among the Alawis-Nusayris emerged only on the eve of the 
mandatory period when they began to name their sect Alawiyya, instead 
of Nusayriyya (al-Tawil 1981: 448–449). When the new name appeared, 
educated Alawis began to formulate historical and religious arguments in 
accordance with the new name. Thus, this name and its religious implica-
tions became the subject of a series of six articles entitled “What History has 
Neglected: The Alawis or the Nusayris”, written by Isa Saʿud, a prominent 
Alawi sheikh, and published in the Alawi organ of al-Amani in Latakia in 
1930 and 1931. Distinguishing between the old name and the new one, Saʿud 
claims that the Alawis are an authentic Shiʿi sect and their name Alawiyya 
stems from the great love of its members towards Ali. While he emphasizes 
the new name, Saʿud alludes to the fact that the name Nusayriyya would 
revive suspicions among many Muslims (al-Amani, November 1930 to May 
1931; the full texts of these six articles in al-Ibrahim 1999: 265–280). 
Although such suspicions remain, since the Mandate certain Syrian 
Sunni writers began to adopt the new name, accepting part of the Alawi 
arguments concerning their faith (Ali 1983, vol. 6: 260–263; al-Sharif 1994). 
The religious arguments of the Alawis in al-Amani had encouraged Shiʿi 
intellectuals in Lebanon to write about the close relationship of the Alawi-
yya with the Imamate Shiʿis (al-Irfan, vol. 20, no. 5 December 1930, quoted 
in Uthman 1994: 11–12). In addition to al-Amani, in 1937 educated Alawis 
established another journal, al-Nahda (the Awakening). Conscious of the 
importance of religion for promoting nationalism, al-Nahda invited Sheikh 
Abd al-Rahman al-Khayr, one of the Alawi ulama, to contribute to the new 
journal. Under the title: “The Awakening of the Alawi Muslims”, al-Khayr 
wrote a series of five articles published in the first issues of al-Nahda. In 
the first article: “Who are the Alawis?” al-Khayr defines the community 
as ‘Imamate Muslims and pure Arabs’. Referring to the non-Muslim and 
alien rituals of the Alawis, he argues that these rituals were adopted by 
their populace without the acceptance of their religious elites (the texts 
in al-Ibrahim 1999: 381–397).
By adding the appellation of ‘Muslims’ in his title, al-Khayr presented the 
historical and religious arguments that relate the tenets of the community 
to the Imamate Shiʿis. One month after the publication of this special issue 
in al-Nahda, the most powerful chiefs of the Alawis, including the notorious 
separatist Salman (Sulayman) al-Murshid, accepted al-Khayr’s arguments 
and signed a memo declaring their attachment to the Jaʿfari Shiʿi doctrine 
and to Islam (Uthman 1994: 93). 
Until his death in 1986, al-Khayr continued to elaborate his religious 
arguments that had become the fundamental basis for Alawi writers. 
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Ten years after his death, his followers collected some of his writings and 
published them in a special book bearing his name. While the phrase “The 
Alawi Muslims” was used in the title of his 1937 articles, the collective 
name ‘Alawis’ adopted since 1922 was absent from the title of 1996 volume. 
Thus, the term Alawiyya was replaced with Jaʿfariyya, i.e. Imamate Shiʿa 
(al-Khayr: 1996). In order to transform Alawiyya into Jaʿfariyya, al-Khayr 
gives a summary of the main tenets and then presents several declarations, 
petitions and fatwas of Alawi ulama to attest their attachment to the Shiʿi 
creed. He also refers to ‘the mistakes’ of western scholars who wrote about 
his community (al-Khayr: 1996: 37–51). The publishers of the volume in 
1996 provide a list of 76 books and articles by al-Khayr on religious and 
nationalist subjects which place the Alawiyya within the Jaʿfariyya as well 
as within Arab nationalism (al-Khayr: 1996: 103–117).
During the 1960s, when sectarianism, regionalism, and factionalism 
were evoked in the political arena for the power struggle in Syria, al-Khayr 
chose to republish the book of Muhammad Ghalib al-Tawil, History of the 
Alawis, which was first published in 1924. Al-Khayr himself reedited the 
book, adjusting it to the new political constellation of the 1960s and to 
his religious interpretations. Through his long detailed annotations and 
introduction, al-Khayr portrays the Alawis as a genuine Muslim sect and 
a pure Arab community whose principal tribes had migrated from Arabia 
into Syria. A special annotation was dedicated to the overlapping between 
Alawi and Imamate Shiʿi doctrines. Because al-Tawil’s book and al-Khayr’s 
comments establish new historical and religious arguments useful for con-
temporary Alawis, the volume was republished in four editions between 
1966 and 1981 (al-Tawil 1981: 5–64). 
Most of the recent Alawi books that focus on religious matters take their 
cue from the ideas formulated by al-Khayr and are prefaced with intro-
ductions written by famous contemporary Shiʿi religious scholars. These 
introductions emphasize the Jaʿfari characteristics of the Alawi tenets. It is 
worthwhile noting that these books quote several fatwas and declarations 
by Sunnis and Shiʿis that legitimize the Alawi sect as a Muslim one (the 
introductions of al-Ibrahim 1995, and Abbas 2000). 
However, in order to maximize their influence within the state, since 
1946 Alawi intellectuals and politicians preferred to support two models of 
nationalisms: the Arab or Syrian model in which nationalism is separated 
from religion, and the other model in which Islam is considered as the main 
component of the Arab nation. Under the rule of the army and the Baʿth 
party, which purged tribalism, particularism, and confessionalism from 
the political discourse, the road was opened for Alawis to enter the politi-
cal arena under their redefined communal identity. At the socio-political 
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level, the Baʿth ‘s coups d’état between 1963 and 1970 enabled officers from 
minority groups and Sunnis of rural areas to replace the urban and elite 
establishment. Ideas that had been developed during the Mandate by the 
first Alawi intellectuals had facilitated the integration of the Alawi intel-
ligentsia and leadership into Syria’s political life. The role of these Alawis 
in the internal political affairs of the community grew stronger while the 
national ideologies and discourse were being widely spread through the 
printed word and the educational system. Although the Alawi officers in 
the Syrian army and political leaders embraced Arab nationalism and its 
Jacobinistic discourse, Sunni Muslims have looked upon the Alawis with 
suspicion, and ethnic tensions have existed. On several occasions, such as 
in 1976 and 1982, confessional conflicts between Sunnis and Alawis have 
threatened the political stability of the country. 
To de-politicize this confessional cleavage, the Syrian regime of Hafez 
and Bashar al-Asad uses different means, such as creating coalitions with 
the Sunni religious scholars and partially renewing the intermediary roles of 
rural and tribal chiefs. The regime has also thrown wide open the doors to 
state bureaucracy. The only condition is that people are loyal to the regime 
and to its national ideology and discourse; which confessional background 
they have is irrelevant. The question remains however: can the national-
ist ideology and discourse and the Alawi adoption of Shiʿi Islam lead the 
Alawis toward full integration within Islam and the Arab Syrian nation 
when nationalism and similar universal ideologies are eroded by the rise 
of Sunni Islamist movements?
Conclusion
Summing up the analysis, we can say that the polytactic potential was a 
successful strategy to empower Shiʿis, Druzes, and Alawis as long as nation-
alism, state patriotism and moderate Sunni Islamism prevailed in the politi-
cal arena of the Middle East. However the recent Shiʿi-Sunni strife and the 
reemergence of extremist Sunni ‘Islamist-fundamentalism’5 in many parts of 
the Middle East will arguably harm the strategy of the polytactic potential. 
Since 2003, the Shiʿi-Sunni strife coupled with the infiltration of extremist 
5 In Arabic there are two terms, salafiyya and usuliyya that mean the return to the 
Islamic fundamentals. However, using salafiyya or usuliyya would confuse the reader 
because salafiyya and usuliyya comprise many different schools of thought, some moder-
ate, others radical.
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Sunni organizations in Lebanon and Syria has alarmed Shiʿi, Druze, and 
Alawi leaders. New Sunni daʿis (religious propagators)—brimming with 
Sunni extremist passion—have become familiar figures on the political 
scene of the Lebanese cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and in Sunni villages 
in the Akkar and the Biqa, along the border between Syria and Lebanon. 
These daʿis are very active at propagating Sunni Islamic ‘values’, attract-
ing many Sunnis affiliated with militant Islamist groups, thus posing new 
threats to the political order in the two countries. Since 2005, the Lebanese 
media have quoted statements by Shiʿi, Druze, and Alawi leaders urging the 
authorities to challenge the ‘dangerous militant Sunni discourses’ that seek 
to incite communal strife in Lebanon and Syria, similar to those in Iraq. 
In this sense, what is happening elsewhere in the Middle East can have 
serious repercussions on the Syrian and Lebanese political arenas.
Some Western and Arab scholars use ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to 
describe radical Shiʿi groups; this is an unfortunate misuse of the term. In 
his study Islam, the People and the State, Sami Zubaida (1993) is critical to 
such misuse, and argues convincingly that there is a difference between 
Sunni fundamentalism and Shiʿi radicalism. The former rejects the modern 
state and the ideology of nationalism in favour of a universal project based 
on one Islamic umma and state. It aspires to rebuild ‘the essence’ of Islam 
embodied in the rule of the Prophet and his Companions. The latter does 
not seek the same ‘inherent essence’ of Islam to rebuild the Islamic origi-
nal State, but simply to awaken the people from their ‘slumber’ to play a 
greater role in the politics of the modern State. According to Zubaida, the 
evolution of Iran since the Revolution, followed by Shiʿi militant activism 
in Lebanon, has lent credence to the difference between Sunni Islamist-
fundamentalism and Shiʿi radicalism (Zubaida 1993: 18, 23–32, 53–56). 
A cogent exposition of the Islamist-fundamentalist notion of al-umma 
in Syria and Lebanon is contained in the theoretical work of Saʿid Hawa 
(1935–1989), a prominent Syrian Islamist scholar whose ideas continue to 
inspire many Islamist-fundamentalists in Syria and Lebanon. Dealing with 
qawmiyya (nationalism) and wataniyya (patriotism), Hawa argues that 
Muslims have no collective identity other than Islam, even though they 
belong to different tribes and linguistic groups. For him, only non-Muslims 
make their attachment to homelands, ethnic groups, and races the basis of 
their dominant identities (Hawa 1970:  70–71). Hawa claims that the Islamic 
message had changed the course of human history when it replaced what 
he anachronistically calls al-itar al-qawmi (the national framework) with 
the wider cosmopolitan framework of the indivisible Islamic umma (Hawa 
1970: 111–1112). 
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To face the new Sunni Islamist trend, Shiʿis, Druzes, and Alawis have 
no alternative but to resort to their polytactic potential because they have 
already uncovered their specific religious tenets and abandoned taqiyya. 
Thus, they continue to advocate their attachment to secular Arab, or 
Arab-cum-Islamic, nationalism, and insist on the pluralist characteristic 
of Islam. 
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EDUCATION AND MINORITY EMPOWERMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Catherine Le Thomas
Introduction
Religious minorities in the Middle East have travelled different historical 
and political paths, depending on local, regional and international history as 
much as on their internal evolution. Far from being mere powerless groups 
dominated by a Sunni or Shiʿi Muslim majority, they have lived through 
complex economic and cultural conjunctures. Among the events that left 
a decisive impact on the religious minorities in the Middle East was the 
European expansion in the region which culminated in the nineteenth 
century, when the European Powers intervened more or less directly in 
Ottoman internal affairs under the pretext of protecting the Christian and 
Jewish minorities. This intervention occurred at various levels—politically, 
economically, and militarily. As a result, the social fabric of the Ottoman 
Empire underwent profound changes, not least regarding the economic and 
social position of the Christian minorities. All over the Empire, increased 
European involvement in the economy meant an increased demand 
for services from linguistically and culturally skilled go-betweens, a role 
Christians and Jews were in a good position to fulfill. In Syria, for example, 
Christians served as mediators between local agricultural producers and 
European merchants in the silk trade, as dragomans (translators), or as 
administrative intermediates.
The Christians’ major asset was their greater familiarity with European 
languages and the European way of life, acquired through their Western 
education. Western or ‘modern’ education is understood here as a form of 
education that does not have religious knowledge as its only, or its main, 
goal, contrary to the traditional teaching provided in the Muslim kuttab 
or madrasas and the Christian seminaries. Modern Western education 
aimed at training laymen, through the teaching of subjects like literature, 
sciences, and languages—the number of subjects depending on the size of 
the school. Religion became one subject among several others. Although 
secularized in its content, education remained, nonetheless, faith-based at 
the organizational level, as most of the schools were missionary schools, 
© Catherine Le Thomas, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_013
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funded and run by Christian congregations. Modern Western education was 
brought into the region by the Christian missionaries from the seventeenth 
century onward. In the wake of European expansion, missionaries enjoyed 
great freedom to set up schools, an activity that increased remarkably from 
the seventeenth century onwards and fully blossomed in the nineteenth 
century. Western education benefited the communities which early came 
in touch with the missionaries. As time/passed, the local Christians—Arme-
nians, Greeks, Copts, Maronites—also opened their own schools throughout 
the Ottoman Empire and in Persia (Mayeur-Jaouen 1995). By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Christians of the Ottoman Empire were far 
ahead of the Muslims in terms of school enrollment (Courbage and Fargue 
1992: 187). For the Christian minorities throughout the Ottoman Empire, 
whether in Syria, Irak, Armenia, or Egypt, access to missionary education in 
the nineteenth century often meant empowerment (Mayeur-Jaouen 1995). 
More educated, more urban, and more influenced by European culture than 
their Muslim counterparts, Christians had better economic opportunities 
than Muslims, and emigration as a means to life improvement was a real 
possibility for them. Modern education also explained why, in the Arab 
part of the Empire, Christians held a prominent place in the Arab cultural 
and political awakening (al-Nahda) of the nineteenth century. To a lesser 
extent, Jews also benefited from European faith-based education, as they 
had their own schools run by the Mission Israélite. In general, Jews were 
more educated than Christians in the provinces where modern education 
was not well spread (e.g. the provinces of Aleppo and Basra), but they were 
less educated than Christians where missionaries and local actors were 
more active (e.g. the provinces of Beirut, Mossoul, Baghdad) (Courbage 
and Fargue 1992: 179). In Irak, both Jews and Christians played the role 
of ‘agents of modernization’ and ‘transmission belts’ between the local 
Muslim population and the Western Powers (Tsimhoni 1996: 97). These 
assets had a negative side as well: because of their privileged educational 
situation and their close contact with Europeans, non-Muslim minorities 
were often suspected by the Ottoman authorities of being loyal supporters 
of European interests. Tensions and upheavals in the Empire in the late 
nineteenth century resulted in massacres in which minorities were often 
the first victims. The legacy of this history of unequal development and 
distribution of modern education in the Middle East can still be seen in 
the political cultures, as well as in the formation of national and communal 
elites, in present-day Middle Eastern societies.
To account for these processes, we have chosen to focus on Lebanon, 
where the Ottoman legacy has been especially salient. First we will analyze 
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the strong impact of modern missionary education on the local Christian 
communities, especially among the Maronites and, more broadly, on the 
Lebanese elites until today. We will then focus more extensively on the 
case of the Shiʿi community, which has experienced the most significant 
development over the last half-century, and whose relatively recent process 
of institutionalization and ‘catching up’ is of an exemplary character. We 
will explore the role played by education in the empowering process the 
Shiʿis have gone through since the 1960s, and how they opened their own 
faith-based schools, drawing on various resources and alternative interna-
tional networks. The choice of these two communities is motivated by their 
underprivileged legal or political status as minorities during the Ottoman 
period, and by some similarities as to their geographic settlement (in rural, 
mountainous regions) (Khury 1990). Despite very different historical trajec-
tories, both communities have experienced rapid cultural and economic 
changes as a result of internal as well as external developments at some 
point of their history: the Maronites in the nineteenth century, the Shiʿis 
in the second part of the twentieth century. These two cases illuminate 
the different ways in which education intervened in the empowerment 
process of religious minorities in the region.
The Model of Christian Schools: A Still Influential Historical Precedent 
The Maronite community, a small minority in the Syrian province of the 
Ottoman Empire, has enjoyed a prominent place in the state of Greater 
Lebanon created by France in 1920. The historical example of the Maronite 
community illustrates the importance of the educational system in the 
mobilization and organization of Christian groups and their access to the 
State: the opening of schools played a crucial role in the community’s 
mobilization. Starting in the early seventeenth century under the reign 
of the Emir Fakhr al-Din II (who ruled from 1590 to 1635), the influx of 
Catholic missionaries, especially from France and Italy (Hanf 1969: 60–74), 
resulted in the establishment of small schools in Mount Lebanon, led by 
the Capuchins and Jesuits.1 From the early seventeenth century, the first 
1 The Capuchins in particular opened a series of small schools in the mountain, where 
they taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as English and French. In 1626 they 
moved to Beirut. In 1645, it was the turn of the Jesuits to start their missionary work in 
Lebanon, opening small schools whose best students could get a scholarship to study in 
Rome (Hanf 1969). The Jesuits were replaced by the Vincentians in the late eighteenth 
century. The missions of the Levant withered away for a period before experiencing a 
revival from the 1820s onwards (Verdeil-Donzel 2004: 42–43).
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contingents of Maronites educated at the Maronite College of Rome, 
founded in 1584 and administered by the Jesuits,2 returned to their home-
land and set up schools in Mount Lebanon (Labaki 1988: 17). The Maronite 
Synod of 1736 at Loueizé represented another important milestone in the 
history of modern faith-based education in Lebanon, as it called upon 
priests to follow the example of the Rome-educated clergy and open 
schools (Hanf 1969: 64). Local educational efforts were pursued in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Hanf 1969: 65), in tandem with 
the European commercial expansion in the region. A class of educated 
Maronites arose and soon enjoyed a certain amount of political influence 
(Salibi 1992: 50). After the disturbances of 1840 in Mount Lebanon, and 
in the wake of European political and economic interests, Catholic mis-
sionary activity was revived. The Jesuits had established a new mission to 
Syria in 1830, which led to the opening of a series of schools, especially 
in the Mountain and the Zahleh region. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Jesuit schools had over 5,400 students in the region corresponding to 
modern Lebanon (Donzel-Verdeil 2003: 484). The Lazarists were also active 
in forming a pro-French Maronite elite in the Mountain (Chevallier 1971: 
264). At the same time the Catholics faced competition from the newly 
arrived Anglo-Saxon Protestant missions that were particularly active in the 
Druze-dominated areas (Salibi 1989: 186). Some Russian initiatives existed 
among the Orthodox community, but they remained limited, making it 
necessary for the rich Greek orthodox to send their children to Protestant 
schools.3 Italian, German, Swiss and Danish establishments also contrib-
uted to making the nineteenth century the century of the development of 
Christian missionary education in Lebanon, completed by the founding of 
the American University of Beirut (initially called Syrian Protestant College) 
by the Protestants in 1866 and the Saint Joseph University by the Jesuits 
in 1875.4 Meanwhile, local Christian communities continued to establish 
their own school systems, aided by the Ottoman tanzimat decree (Hatt-i 
humayun) of February 1856, which endorsed the general trend by allowing 
communities to establish their own schools under the authority of a Board 
of Public Education.5 From the Mountain, the educational movement spread 
to Beirut: from the 1860s, the Orthodox community opened schools in those 
2 The College survived the dissolution of the order in 1773 (Hanf 1969).
3 See Longva in this volume.
4 For a presentation of nineteenth century Lebanese education see also Favier (2004: 
61).
5 Hatt-ı humayun, paragraph 15 (Hanf 1969: 70).
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neighborhoods of Beirut where Orthodox were in majority (Davie 1993: 
99). In addition to European missionary schools, Beirut also had schools 
established by the local Catholic Churches, such as the Maronites, the 
Greek Melkites (or Greek Catholics) and the Armenian Catholics. These 
Western-type institutions benefited primarily the Christians6—because 
they were located in Christian areas and the majority of their teaching 
body and audience were Christian (Atrissi 1979)7—and, secondarily, the 
Druzes in the Mountain. 
At the political level, Donzel-Verdeil shows that the Jesuits were involved 
in the development of Maronite nationalism in the late nineteenth 
century by encouraging the faithful to gather around their clergy (2003: 
551). Several scholars, including Judith Harik (1994: 15) and Fouad Khury 
(1975: 189), claim that one of the principal reasons for the early organi-
zation of the Maronite and Druze communities in the political arena is 
the early development among them of Christian educational networks. The 
interactions between Europeans and local Christian communities on the 
political, economic and cultural levels led to a social institutionalization 
which favored the advancement of these communities, particularly the 
Maronites, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The global trend 
towards nationalism, in which schools were deeply involved, enhanced the 
capacity of the Maronites to mobilize under the leadership of the Church, 
and ultimately favored their political and economic hegemony over the 
young mandate State established by France in 1920 with the support of 
the Maronite Patriarch Hoyek. 
In contrast, Muslims were still lagging behind in terms of modern secu-
larized education (Labaki 1988: 57). Members of the Muslim elite resorted 
to the few Ottoman public schools created in Syria, or to Christian schools 
(Bocquet 2005). The Ottoman authorities had started to open modern 
public schools, mainly in the big cities after the 1839 tanzimat reforms, 
to strengthen their military power and train civil servants. A network of 
public primary schools was later set up after the passing of the General 
Law on Education in 1869. These schools provided religious as well as basic 
practical knowledge, and replaced the traditional Islamic madrassas. This 
6 Private non-religious educational institutions only appeared in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The National College (kulliya wtaniyya) was founded in Beirut in 
1863 by Butros al-Bustani, with the aim to reconcile the Lebanese after the 1860 massacres 
(Labaki 1988: 52).
7 For the same reason, Christians were better educated and attended the missionary 
schools more often, not only in Lebanon but also in Syria and in Irak (Hourani, 1947: 70). 
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school system aimed at promoting the ideology of the Empire according 
to the conservative principles of the Hamidian era; but it also aimed at 
combating rival educational systems, particularly missionary schools. 
Students enrolled in the Ottoman schools were overwhelmingly Muslims, 
as the institutions were intended to be a synthesis between Islam and 
modernity. However, this educational policy remained limited in scope. 
In 1914 there were about 125 primary public schools and three secondary 
schools in what corresponds to current Lebanon, among them the Sul-
taniyyeh College, opened in 1897 (Hanf 1969: 71). Meanwhile, the Sunni 
community of Syria began to establish its own secular schools toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, in response to demands by a rising 
elite, itself educated in Christian schools. In Beirut, the Sunni notabilities 
created the association al-Maqased8 al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya in 1878. 
Formed under the leadership of Midhat Pasha, governor of the province 
of Damascus, the Maqased association explicitly aimed at challenging the 
Western missionary schools by opening ‘modern’ secular schools which, at 
the same time, observed the religious and cultural traditions of the group. 
It rapidly established secondary schools in Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
(Labaki, 1988: 21), but could not compete with the more prestigious and 
experienced Christian schools. In the early twentieth century, more than 
three quarters of the total number of students enrolled in Lebanon were 
registered in Catholic schools; this proportion was still about a half in 1939 
(Abou Rjaily, 1981). 
During the Mandate, state schools and Catholic schools complemented 
each other to educate new generations committed to the regime. While the 
former were mainly destined for under-privileged Muslim children, the lat-
ter attracted the elite and formed one of the pillars of the Maronite power 
structure. In those days, Lebanese education was said to be “predominantly 
Christian and clerical in spirit and control, and more particularly Catholic” 
(Hourani 1947: 67). 
The number of Christian students was far greater than that of Muslims, 
particularly in secondary and higher education. A majority of the high-
ranking civil servants were French-speaking Christians, most of whom had 
graduated from the University Saint Joseph or the French Law School in 
Beirut, which was then a branch of the University of Lyon. From 1919, the 
French School of Law also became “a supporter of French policy in Syria 
8 The term maqased refers to the laudable intentions, the pious plans and the com-
mendable goals that a pious man should have.
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that [taught] its students to “serve France” and “defend the principle of 
the Mandate” (Verdeil 2004: 151). Moreover, from 1926 to 1952, six out of the 
seven Presidents of the Republic of Lebanon were former students of the 
Jesuit schools.9 
While the proportion of students enrolled in Catholic schools decreased 
significantly in the decades following independence, due to the expansion of 
free public education and the rise of new private schools, Catholic schools 
still enrolled 30 percent of Lebanese students in the late 1990s, as against 
34 percent for public schools and 36 percent for other private schools 
(Muslim, Christian and secular).10 In the 2000s, the Catholic school system 
still has an extensive network of nearly 300 schools, run by 59 groups and 
congregations and with approximately 200,000 students enrolled.11 More 
than any other religious or even local community schools, Catholic schools 
are still regarded by most Lebanese as being elite schools. Present in the 
whole country and not only in Christian areas, they have a high percentage 
of Muslim students nowadays.12 However, while many Lebanese political 
and cultural leaders in the past were educated in elite French-speaking 
Catholic schools, this monopoly is now being challenged by a very strong 
demand for education in English in the context of globalization. 
This recent development notwithstanding, Christian education seems 
to have become the consecrated model, both organizationally and 
institutionally, in independent Lebanon, especially during and after the 
1975–1990 Civil War: formerly in a quasi-monopoly position, it has been 
emulated in various ways, and the result is a flowering of new faith-based 
Islamic schools, whose sponsors themselves willingly admit their debt to 
their Christian predecessors. Emulating the Christian model does not only 
apply to the school systems: this method of community institutionalization, 
of which the Maronites were the primary beneficiaries, has become in the 
 9 Charles Debbas (1926–1934), Habib Saad (1934–1936), Emile Eddé (1936–1941), Alfred 
Naccache (1941–1943), Petro Trad (1943), Bechara el-Khoury (1943–1952) (Muawwad 
2008).
10 http://www.opuslibani.org.lb/liban/Dos004.htm. According to the statistical booklet 
published by the Lebanese Centre for Research and Educational Development, 38,5 percent 
of Lebanese students were enrolled in public schools in 2002–2003 (primary, middle and 
high school levels).
11 Interview, Marwan Tabet, general secretary of the Catholic Schools of Lebanon, 
November 2007.
12 On the national level Muslims make up nearly one quarter of the students at Catholic 
schools. They are an overwhelming majority in some schools in southern Lebanon or in the 
Beqaʿa. Interview, Mawan Tabet, November 2007. Muslim students are also the majority in 
Catholic schools in West Beirut.
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twentieth century “the ideal type of organization adopted by all parties.” 
(Beydoun 2004: 29). Most religious groups have implicitly tried to reproduce 
the Maronite or Christian ‘success story’ through formally institutionaliz-
ing their communal networks along similar lines (Beydoun 1994: 108). In 
this sense, one could say that the collective organization of the Lebanese 
socio-political system is strongly dependent on certain historical structures. 
It is possible to speak of institutional isomorphism to describe the organi-
zational similarity between different communities, the school being one 
of the pillars of this organization, and one that facilitates access to power. 
Despite these common tendencies, however, different communities accord 
different degrees of importance to the role played by clerics and politicians 
in their educational system and, in these matters each community borrows 
practices from a variety of religious and political sources. The result is a 
number of hybrid models which, while applied in the pursuit of different 
socio-religious objectives, have a similar goal: communal empowerment.
The ‘Coming of Age’ of a Sociological Minority: The Shiʿi Community and 
Its Educational System
The case of the Shiʿi community and its evolution over the last fifty years is 
one of the clearest examples of an educational institutionalization linked 
to the empowerment of the group that promotes it. This educational devel-
opment represents as well as accompanies a set of particularly important 
socio-political mobilizations within the Shiʿi community since the 1960s. 
Once seen as a ‘sociological minority’, the Shiʿis have long suffered from 
social and political marginalization in modern Lebanon, in spite of their 
demographic weight. Today, they represent nearly one third of the Lebanese 
population and have a substantial political weight in the Lebanese conso-
ciative system of power sharing. Education, whether public or private, has 
played, and still plays, an important role in this empowerment process. 
As a heterodox Muslim minority, the Shiʿis were not recognized as a 
separate entity in the Ottoman Empire. For many centuries, due to their 
isolation, the Shiʿis of Jabal Amil were left to their own devices in their 
fortified villages. They were subject to indifference, and occasionally, to 
persecutions, as was the case during the era of al-Jazzar Pasha, who was 
sent to Jabal Amil in the eighteenth century to reassert Ottoman control 
over the region. As for the Northern Beqaʿa region, another Shiʿi stronghold, 
it was dominated by clans and prominent families, such as the Harfoush 
and the Hamadeh, who had played a dominant role in the seventeenth and 
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eighteenth centuries in connection with the emirate of Mount Lebanon. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was no real sense of 
a common identity or common economic and political interests between 
the two main regions of Shiʿi settlement; links and exchanges remained 
relatively limited. Differentiated ways of life partly account for this phe-
nomenon: while the Beqaʿa region was oriented towards farming and a 
tribal type of social organization, the economy of Jabal Amil, in the South, 
was based on the cultivation of tobacco and citrus, articulated around a 
system of small landholdings. These different patterns of economic and 
social organization accentuated the divisions between the two regions; 
besides, traditionally the Beqaʿ was oriented towards Damascus, whereas 
Jabal Amil was linked to the commercial center of Haifa until 1948. On 
the administrative level, this discontinuity was intensified by the fact that 
Northern Beqaʿa was included, from 1860 until 1914, within the autono-
mous mutasarrifiyya (district) of Mount Lebanon, while Jabal Amil was at 
first part of the wilayat (province) of Sidon, then of the wilayat of Beirut 
upon its creation in 1888 (Beydoun 2004: 27). Both regions were organized 
around a traditional or ‘feudal’ system in which notables, known as zuʿama, 
played a key role; these leaders represented the group and maintained a 
certain status quo, despite the increasing emergence of a modernizing 
merchant elite eager to change the balance of power. The clerics or ulama, 
meanwhile, enjoyed only limited independence vis-a-vis the zuʿama. They 
appeared poorly organized as a clerical group, and managed a very limited 
set of awqaf (religious endowments) compared to the Christian Churches 
(Beydoun 2003: 77). The majority of the Shiʿi clergy supported the existing 
socio-political order, except for the action of a few reformist ulama. 
While facilitating the emergence of communities with a legal status 
and institutions defined by the terms of the Constitution of 1926, mandate 
Lebanon, established in 1920, favored the Maronite community. Tradi-
tionally close to French interests, this community had already been well 
structured for some time. Independent Lebanon, which emerged in 1943, 
was then shaped by a compromise between Maronites and Sunnis, a fact 
which reflected and reinforced the peripheral status of the Shiʿi commu-
nity, whose political organization was still embryonic. This marginal posi-
tion on the political scene found its economic and geographic expression 
in the Shiʿis’ concentration amongst the poor and in the rural, marginal 
areas of Lebanon. Similarly, the first half of the twentieth century was 
marked by a lag in the dissemination of modern secular education in the 
predominantly Shiʿi regions, by contrast with the prevailing situation in 
Beirut or Mount Lebanon (Jaber 1978: 214). In 1931, more than 80 percent 
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of the inhabitants of Jabal Amil were illiterate (Rondot 1947). According 
to other corroborating sources, the illiteracy rate in 1932 was 83 percent 
among Shiʿis, compared with 66 percent among Sunnis, 53 percent among 
Greek Orthodox and Druzes, 48 percent among Maronites and 39 percent 
among Greek Catholics (Labaki 1988: 87). At the time, Christian schools 
attracted most of the lay elites of the South, especially among former 
migrants. In the early twentieth century, these elites were sending their 
children to well-known schools like the boarding convent of Mashmusheh 
(Jezzine district), the Antonine Sisters’ school in Nabatiyyeh, the Francis-
can schools in Tyre, and the Orthodox school of Marjayoun, supported by 
Russia since the 1860s.
It is important to point out that traditional Islamic education had existed 
for centuries in Southern Lebanon. It was taught by clerics within the kut-
tab system as a preparation for potential higher studies in Najaf or Qom. 
This tradition represented a very lively and prestigious cultural heritage, 
but it concerned only a very small fringe of the population (Bazzi 1995: 
125–126). The education was of a religious nature, run by clerics whose 
reputation had sometimes spread beyond the borders of Jabal Amil across 
the entire Shiʿi world (Jaber 1978: 58). The launching of modern and par-
tially secular schools is a question which had been discussed in the region 
since the late nineteenth century, but it was slow to materialize due to the 
rivalries between the clergy and the competing notable families (Mervin 
2000: 146, 179).
The efforts made by some Shiʿi elites to set up secular faith-based schools 
for the community finally resulted in the opening of the Amiliyyeh school 
in Beirut in the 1920s, followed by the Jaʿafariyyeh school in Tyre in the 
mid-1930s. Although these two institutions had a symbolic significance 
for the community, they remained of modest proportion and could not 
compete with the older Christian schools. In predominantly Shiʿi areas, 
the illiteracy rate was still 68.9 percent in 1943, compared to 31.5 percent 
in the Catholic communities (Picaudou 1989: 103), despite the development 
of a new system of public schooling under the Mandate. It was not until 
the 1960s, partly under the influence of Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian cleric of 
Lebanese descent, that new community schools dedicated to training the 
youths of the region were founded near Tyre. Al-Sadr particularly favored 
the opening of a technical school in Burj al-Shamali (Tyre district) and a 
nursing school in Tyre. These were, however, modest achievements, and 
access to education for the Shiʿis at the time still took the form of attend-
ing public schools, or, for the elite, Christian schools, and after graduation, 
the public Lebanese University, established in 1953. From its inception, the 
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Lebanese University played an important role in the social mobility of a 
significant fraction of young Shiʿis, and of young Lebanese in general. 
The current integration of the Shiʿis at all levels of the society and 
in the Lebanese political system thus appears as the result of relatively 
recent changes and mobilizations. In the 1960s, a series of economic and 
demographic changes—a generalization of commercial agriculture, rural 
migration, urbanization, financial flows arising from emigration to Africa 
or America, natural growth—took place: these were boosted by the poli-
cies of president Fuʿad Chehab, which opened up and improved access to 
public education. As a result, a strong political commitment emerged on the 
part of Shiʿis who were increasingly well-educated and less dependent on 
the local elites. State schools played a major role in the collective upward 
mobility of the Shiʿi community in the 1960s and 1970s, and contributed to 
its politicization. Inscribing these demands into a communal framework 
was by no means an easy process, given the ideological polarization and the 
growth of leftist movements during those decades. The achievement was 
mainly the work of imam Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Movement of the 
Disinherited (Harakat al Mahrumin) in 1973, then of the armed organiza-
tion Amal in 1975. This militia then became the main instrument for the 
rapid insertion of the Shiʿis as a community within the Lebanese political 
arena in the early 1980s. At the same time Hezbollah was being built by 
the merging of different Shiʿi Islamic groups under the influence of the 
Iranian revolution. Hezbollah soon became the new main communal actor; 
under its influence, the Shʿi community underwent a process of militant 
re-Islamization. The number of clerics and their role in the community 
grew perceptibly, making them the major communal entrepreneurs, as 
evidenced by their place in the organization of many community structures 
put in place during the Civil War. The rise and ‘coming of age’ of the Shiʿi 
community were especially significant during the 1990s, as the Maronite 
community went through a leadership crisis at the end of the war, and as 
the Sunni community, under the leadership of its new elite, sought to invest 
in political rather than military power. A corollary of the community’s social 
and political mobilizations has been the multiplication of institutions more 
or less identified with Shiʿi Islam or with groups formed in reference to 
Shiʿism. The trend was particularly striking in the educational field. While 
for some time the Shiʿis had been making use of education facilities external 
to their community, in the 1970s, and during the Civil War, they set up a 
growing number of endogenous institutions of education and socialization 
which drew on diverse financial resources. By the late 2000s, there were 
about 90 general and technical schools run by Shiʿi associations, with over 
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70,000 students from kindergarten to the last year of high school.13 Mutatis 
mutandis, the social and institutional dynamics experienced by the Shiʿi 
community at the end of the twentieth century could be compared to that 
of the Maronites in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Catholic 
schools went through a remarkable development. 
The majority of Shiʿi schools belong to networks widely known for their 
political and/or religious links to the community. They can be roughly 
divided into three main groups. The first group is, directly or indirectly, 
linked to Hezbollah and includes: al-Mahdi schools: founded in 1993 by 
the party (about fifteen schools and 13,500 students in 2005), they seem 
to have relatively limited autonomy; al-Mustafa schools: created in 1984 
(8,500 students in 2005), indirectly placed under the control of the second 
in command of the party, Naim Qasem; and al-Imdad schools (3,500 stu-
dents) created in Lebanon in the 1980s by representatives of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The other two groups are Amal al-Tarbawiyya schools 
(approximately 10,000 students), founded by Amal, the political movement 
headed by Nabih Berri; and the Mabarrat schools (more than 20,000 stu-
dents in 2009) founded by Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Shiʿi 
religious figure with ambivalent ties to Hezbollah, who died in July 2010. 
Moreover, as in other communities, there are schools founded by individual 
leaders for commercial purpose, as well as all those which offer a more or 
less religious education, depending on the definition adopted; these can 
be added to the recognized associative corpus. These private schools often 
relate to their religious community in terms of symbolic affiliation and 
audience. They are rather difficult to identify, but their numbers are far 
from small, particularly in Beirut’s Southern suburbs. They too contribute, 
actively or accidentally, to the strengthening of the community. Finally, as 
in the case of the Sunni and Christian communities, we find institutions 
which might be termed ‘MP schools’, i.e schools belonging to Members of 
Parliament who use their families’ involvement in educational activities 
as a basis from which to launch their political careers: one example is 
the Beydoun family who owns the Amiliyyeh schools; another example is 
Hussein Iatim, a member of the Amal movement and a deputy of Beirut 
from 1996 to 2000 (Le Thomas 2009: 282–288). In total, at the primary and 
13 These statistics, as well as those that follow, have been obtained from brochures 
and interviews made with participants in different networks (Autumn 2005 and Autumn 
2006). These are also the statistics that the groups declare to the Ministry of Education, 
and which are published in the Dalîl al-Madâris (School Guide) of the Ministry of Educa-
tion every two years.
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secondary education level, the major Shiʿi educational associations now 
enroll more students than the major Sunni school networks. This Shiʿi 
communal educational sector has mainly developed since the 1970s; it is 
more or less directly connected to the community, which often supports 
it. These developments also signal a clear confessionalization of the group, 
visible in its leadership and in the prominence of religious symbols used 
by these institutions. 
In contrast, as a community, the Shiʿis are only moderately represented 
in the private sector of Lebanese higher education.14 There is currently only 
one Shiʿi university, the Islamic University, opened in 1996 in South Beirut 
(Khaldé) and supervised by the Shiʿi Higher Islamic Council, the central 
communal body of the Shiʿi community. For the moment this university is 
still relatively small. Although commercial institutions of higher education 
have proliferated in Lebanon in recent years as a result of a permissive 
policy followed by the government in the 1990s (Bashshur, 2003: 169), the 
universities of Christian origin remain the leading private academic institu-
tions with a certain influence in Lebanon,15 alongside the public Lebanese 
University, where the majority of Lebanese students are enrolled. Thus, if 
the institutionalization of Shiʿi education has developed dramatically in 
recent years, this has so far happened mainly in the sector of primary and 
secondary education, not in the private university sector. The ongoing com-
munalization of some faculties of the Lebanese University, which allows 
movements such as Amal to take control of parts of this very fragmented 
institution, may be one of the reasons for this prioritization. 
By reinforcing the group structure through the setting up of school 
networks, the Shiʿis, like other communities before them, seek to acquire 
additional resources with which to negotiate a more significant place within 
a rapidly evolving system. At the same time, these schools are also a locus 
for redefining a plural and constantly changing collective identity and for 
objectifying socio-political and religious standards for the community. 
Although the institutions in question rarely call themselves ‘Shiʿi’, the sym-
bols deployed everywhere in and around these facilities are all identifying 
signs in this regard, as are the general atmosphere and the chosen methods 
14 There are more than 40 establishments of higher learning (Institutes and Universities) 
officially recognized in Lebanon.
15 The major institutions are the Saint Joseph University, Notre Dame, La Sagesse, and 
Kaslik for the Catholics; Balamand for the Greek Orthodox community; the American 
University originally Protestant, and Haigazian for the Armenian community.
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of religious and political socialization. Furthermore, they attract students 
almost all of whom come from this community. 
The techniques of religious socialization which have been developed 
in these schools can be found elsewhere in other communities as well, 
although the content may differ. The major differences include the organi-
zation of religious or scholastic ceremonies, the display of an iconography 
characteristic of the group in question, a fairly dense marking of their 
territory, and the use of a language, values, and standards adapted to the 
school environment. Here, as in Catholic or Sunni schools, religion and 
history classes are devised strategically, according to the politico-religious 
identity projected by the group that runs the school, but also according to 
more strictly practical considerations, such as the established norms for 
the passing of official exams.
Catholic schools have provided and still provide a model for the Shiʿi 
faith-based schools as far as educational organization and extracurricular 
activities are concerned. Shiʿi scouts activities, for instance, were created in 
conjunction with the schools, as an Islamic avatar of the Christian scout-
ing model. To some extent, one can speak of a mirror structure between 
Catholic schools and their Shiʿi counterparts. The teachers and school 
administrators who have played an active role in this transfer, are often 
themselves former students of Catholic schools.
Shiʿi (Islamic) faith-based schools, from this common basis, now seek 
to assess their originality by inscribing their initiatives in a more global 
framework, borrowing methods and techniques directly at the global level. 
Since they have very little experience to draw on, the major Shiʿi schools 
have chosen, with varying degrees of success, to rely on ‘educational moder-
nity’, that is, the resolute adoption of advanced techniques and methods, 
usually of Western origin. This strategy is often combined with a refusal 
to assimilate certain values associated with Europe or the United States, 
like secularism, individualism and liberal morals. The most telling example 
of this can be found in al-Mabarrat Islamic schools, where globalization, 
productivity, performance and devotion are emphasized altogether, in a 
more visible way than in most Catholic schools. The same insistence on 
performance and modernity can be found in other Shiʿi Islamic school 
networks, at least on the level of rhetoric, and despite great variation in 
quality standards. Implicitly or explicitly, the Christian school model is 
also something with which one has to compete; some of the Shiʿi schools 
try to become themselves models for Catholic schools.
Despite some modest efforts at coordination, the Shiʿi educational 
field remains characterized by competition between networks affiliated 
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to different independent movements. This is unlike the Catholic schools, 
which have been federated since 1950 in a General Secretariat, which acts 
as interlocutor with the State. The Shiʿi educational field thus reflects the 
diversity of religious and political centres within the Shiʿi community; at 
the same time, because the schools serve the educational needs of the Shiʿi 
population throughout Lebanon, they also act as a unifying element for 
the community at the institutional level. 
The funding for these schools is an elusive matter. It seems to derive 
from various Shiʿi voluntary associations as well as from large, international 
religious or political networks. However, here as in other communities, 
the major source of funding remains the tuition fees: these schools have 
now reached self-sufficiency, according to their managers, and are mostly 
financed by fees paid by their students, except for orphans of Hezbollah 
martyrs, whose tuition fees are covered by associations close to Hezbol-
lah. Because most Catholic schools usually ask for high tuitions, which 
many members of the middle classes can no longer afford in the 2000s, 
a number of students have recently moved to public schools or cheaper 
private ones. Islamic schools, which are often less expensive than Catholic 
establishments, attract the Shiʿi lower middleclass and sometimes even 
capture some of the Shiʿi clients of Catholic schools, for whom they rep-
resent an alternative. 
On the whole, these new Shiʿi schools—which the poor are usually 
unable to attend—are meant for families concerned about their status 
within the group, and who shun the public school system discredited since 
the Civil War. The recent rise of Shiʿi schools thus reflects a concern for 
social advancement, coupled with a process of communal identity politics. 
Schools, especially private schools, are perceived to be a key instrument for 
individual and collective upward mobility, while being reinserted into a pre-
existing theological framework, which holds knowledge in high esteem. 
In the long run, the use of schools as part of the group’s empowerment 
process highlights a series of ‘embedded’ mobilizations, since the open-
ing of communal schools can be considered as the result of some of these 
mobilizations and the precondition for others. In this process education 
plays an important role, both on the institutional level and on that of col-
lective identity. The foundation of a series of schools also illuminates the 
power strategies of the Shiʿi leaders in the twentieth century, and appears 
as organically linked to the political and religious fields. The Shiʿis’ strate-
gies are not exceptional within the Lebanese context. Similar changes have 
occurred, although over a longer period and in a somewhat less dramatic 
manner, in the Sunni and the Druze communities. Examples from other 
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Lebanese communities could be called upon to support the analysis of 
the relationship between educational institutionalization and community 
empowerment. The fact that most of the communal networks have foreign 
connections, whether religious or political, whether to France, Iran or the 
Gulf countries, show that the communities in question are tuned to the 
world and well integrated in transnational networks, from which they 
derive part of their influence. Some of these tendencies were already at 
work under the Ottoman Empire. What we are seeing here are different 
reproductions of the initial organizational model, born under the influence 
of European Christian missionaries and their local allies. Various versions of 
this organizational model have developed at different periods, depending 
on the relative strengths and loyalties within the community, and they are 
inspired by very diverse local and international sources. 
Beyond Lebanon: States, Minorities and the Diffusion of Westernized 
Education 
What is true for Lebanon is, on the whole, true also for the rest of the Middle 
East. Access—or lack thereof—to Western-modelled education from the 
seventeenth century onwards had important consequences for the politi-
cal and symbolic position of minorities in the late Ottoman Empire, and 
subsequently in colonial and post-independence states. Groups that came 
early in contact with mission schools went through a process of empower-
ment while groups that did not remained largely marginalized. The Shiʿi 
communities of the Ottoman Empire, in particular, could not benefit from 
the growing European penetration, and most of them were twice disem-
powered: in relation to the ruling Sunni majority, and in relation to the 
other minorities with privileged access to modern European education. 
This education was further developed through the creation of public 
educational systems during the colonial period following the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. In most cases, public education was secular or based 
on Christian values in the colonies, and it gave lesser importance to 
Islamic subjects; religion became just one subject among others. Curricula, 
examinations, schedules, were all copied on European educational models. 
Although never colonized, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also 
introduced modern Western-type education in the nineteenth or early 
twentieth century (Daun and Walford 2004: 7). 
In Iran, Western education was introduced in the nineteenth century in 
the wake of European influence: some students were sent to Europe, and 
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some European schools were opened in the country by French, English and 
American missionaries to serve the needs of Christian minorities (Naraghi 
1992: 91). Students from minorities as well as the ruling elites enrolled in 
these mission schools which were established in the major Iranian cities. 
Here, as in the Ottoman Empire, Jews benefited from the educational 
services provided by the French-based Alliance Israélite Universelle. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, later than in the Ottoman Empire, a 
Western-modelled Iranian endogenous education appeared as a response 
to this foreign model. This kind of modern education was systematized by 
the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) which developed a primary and secondary 
public education, mainly based on the French model that aimed at devel-
oping a secular middleclass. Meanwhile, from 1927, foreign schools had 
to abide by official educational programs at all levels, while their Muslim 
students were prohibited from attending classes in Christian religion. As 
a result of this restriction the popularity of foreign schools slowly declined 
in Iran (Naraghi 1992: 150).
After World War II, most of the new independent states in the Middle 
East continued in the path of formal Western modelled education. They 
maintained the structures of the inherited educational systems, changing 
its content and broadening its scope more or less successfully. As for the 
Christian congregations, after the heyday of the late nineteenth century, 
they were faced with growing suspicion in the era of Arab nationalism. 
Under several of the Arab regimes which arose out of the independence 
movements, private schools of a religious character, in particular those of 
religious minorities, were nationalized in the name of a certain concep-
tion of national unity. This is the case in Syria, where the Baʿthist regime 
decided in 1967 to nationalize the educational institutions founded by 
the missionaries in the nineteenth century: these institutions, here as in 
Lebanon, had favored Christians and the Sunni notables (Bocquet 2005). 
The Baʿthist regime promoted a unitary conception of society, precisely as 
a way of pushing into the background the fact that, since 1963, the system 
was dominated by a minority from the Alawite community. This religious 
community went from being a peripheral and marginalized minority to 
being the community most favored by the regime. The Alawis also ben-
efited from modern public education in their empowerment process, as 
they had access to better state educational services in the predominently 
Alawi Lattakieh area. The Baʿthist regime thus modified the balance of 
power between the different religious minorities of Syria in the political as 
well as the social fields, and one of the mechanisms was the redistribution 
of the national educational resources.
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More generally, in the twentieth century various Muslim minorities 
experienced a process of empowerment—albeit a relative one—through 
public education: just like the Shiʿis of Lebanon in the 1960s, they used 
modern state schools or non-communal private schools as a way to 
achieve collective upward mobility and as a prerequisite for their cultural 
and political mobilization. The establishment of communal religious or 
secular schools is often a consequence of their socio-political emergence 
rather than a precondition for it, and is generally related to the structure 
of opportunities granted by the regime in place. 
In Iran, after the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic introduced a 
shift in formal education, changing the curricula and the texbooks so as 
to promote an Islamized, Shiʿitized, and revolutionnary type of educa-
tion. The study of religion was emphasized, and new role models from 
the Islamic era were proposed to the children. Nevertheless, the Islamic 
regime retained the Western-type organizational model of education 
and did not revert to traditional Islamic education, which had gradually 
weakened in the country (Daun and Walford 2004: 77). Minority schools, 
whether Zoroastrian, Jewish, Armenian, Assyrian, or Chaldean, saw their 
autonomy reduced.16 Restrictions were put on teaching of language and 
religion, as the regime produced a series of common religious texts for 
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians (Sanasarian 2000: 76–84); religion can 
only be taught in Persian. In doing so, the Islamic Republic produced its 
own version of modern education. At the same time, it tried to control the 
religious and potentially political dimension of minority schools, as they 
were suspected of fostering nationalist views for their groups. Here as in 
other cases throughout the region, a competitive rather than complemen-
tary relation can be observed between government and minority schools: 
the stronger the former, the less room for maneuver for the latter, particu-
larly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts.
Nowadays, several movements actively promote faith-based, Islamic 
private modern teaching throughout the Muslim world. Some of these 
movements are minority-based, while others try to spread a specific, 
sometimes politicized, conception of Sunni Islam. The Muslim Brothers 
in Jordan, Palestine and Egypt provide an historical example of Muslim 
educational activities. These unfolded in a context in which Christian 
minorities had already had their own schooling networks for a long period. 
An interesting parallel could be drawn with developments in Central Asia. 
16 The Bahaʾ is are not officially recognized as a religious minority.
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With the Central Asian countries acceding to independence in 1991, Fethul-
lah Gulen, a Muslim Turkish cleric, established a whole series of private 
Turkish Islamic schools among the Turkic populations in the region. In 
1997, his association was running about 75 such establishments in Central 
Asia (Balci 2003: 145). According to Balci, Fathullah Gulen’s movement is 
a “kind of missionnary congregation”, and could be compared to a “Turk-
ish Jesuit movement”. Gulen’s schools combine faith and modernity and 
promote technology and languages with the aim of forming an elite in 
Turkey and Turkic-speaking countries. Like the Christian missionaries in 
the nineteenth century, Muslim religious groups today are paying close 
attention to education as a tool of empowerment and religious mobiliza-
tion in the Middle East and beyond, so as to create new religious elites 
likely to play an active role on the political stage.
Conclusion 
While education obviously cannot, by itself, be a sufficient yardstick for 
assessing the power of a minority and its historical trajectory, the close 
relationship between education, politics, and religion in the Middle East 
makes it a particularly relevant field in the study of community dynamics. 
In Lebanon and, more broadly the Middle East, the existence or absence 
of religiously based private schools is revealing of the power strategies and 
trajectories of a minority group (whether demographically or sociologically 
defined) and of its relationship to the State. 
Education in this region, whether public or private, has been a preferred 
method of upward mobility for religious minorities, particularly during the 
Ottoman Empire, when some of these minorities had already achieved a 
high degree of communal organization. Modern education first spread 
among Christians and Jews. This phenomenon had important consequences 
in that it gave some of these minorities a social and even political power 
which lasted until late in the twentieth century. The colonial and post-
colonial Middle Eastern states adopted different versions of these modern 
school systems, most of which were Islamized and/or Arabized in the 1950s. 
In doing so, they tried to reach a compromise between borrowed Western-
style models and local values and ideologies. 
In this context, some Muslim minorities could also accede to modern 
education. They accumulated new resources so as to create their own struc-
tures and narratives. Other private school networks, whether faith-based 
or not, have rendered the situation of formal schooling in the region more 
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complex. On the whole, since the nineteenth century, mass education on 
the Western model has spread through various channels and by-passed 
traditional religious educational institutions, thus reorganizing the balance 
of power between the various ethno-religious groups in the Middle East, 
often to the benefit of minorities open to foreign influences. Nowadays, 
new forms of modern faith-based schools are still being put in place in 
various communities throughout the Middle East, redrawing in the pro-
cess the interactional map between ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ and their 
respective resources and power. The study of the links between education, 
religious groups, and politics in the Middle East can throw light on the role 
played by education as these groups mobilize in search for political and 
social self-empowerment. 
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ALEVIS IN TURKISH POLITICS
Ali Çarkoğlu and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili
Introduction
The religious scene in modern Turkey is often described in a way that 
conceals diversity. In so far as any reference to religious minorities is made, 
these groups are assumed to solely consist of non-Muslims, ignoring the 
sizeable Muslim minority groups. This misrepresentation of the religious 
character of modern Turkey’s population can be traced back to the Peace 
Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923, which effectively shaped the foundation 
of the Republican regime in the international arena. In its definition of 
religious minorities whose rights are to be protected by the new Republican 
regime, the Treaty of Lausanne is exclusively concerned with non-Muslim 
groups. No similar explicit recognition can be found for Muslim minori-
ties, whether ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, or religious groups, such as 
the Alevis.1 Both the Kurds and the unrecognized religious groups posed 
a formidable challenge to the young Republic in its formative years. The 
Republic answered this challenge by systematically denying the existence of 
ethnic or sectarian differences among the Anatolian populations. Over the 
years, a hegemonic discourse of ethnic and religious homogeneity, which 
denies recognition to ethnic and sectarian minorities, developed in the 
country. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as Turkey’s domestic as well as 
international policies underwent radical changes, due especially to closer 
relations with the European Union (EU) and the start of membership nego-
tiations in 2005, the hegemonic discourse and the related public practices 
have increasingly been challenged. There is today a growing recognition 
1 The section concerning minority rights of the treaty clearly stipulates that the articles 
therein “shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official 
action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor 
official action prevail over them.” In Article 38, the assurances are granted that “full and 
complete protection of life and liberty of all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of 
birth, nationality, language, race or religion.” As such, all minority rights, be it of Muslim 
or non-Muslim origin, could find protection under the Lausanne Treaty.
© Ali Çarkoğlu and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_014
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of the country’s ethnic and religious diversity, even though limitations and 
severe pressures upon certain groups still exist.
The Turkish religious scene is marked by two distinct cleavages. The 
first is based on sectarian differences between Sunnis and Alevis (White 
and Jongerden 2003; Shankland 2003); the second is based on lifestyle and 
cultural differences among the Sunnis, between those who adopt a lifestyle 
in accordance with the tenets of Sunni Islam and those who take a more 
secular (laik) view of life. Alevis have historically been the minority which 
has stood almost uniformly behind the secularist regime since the begin-
ning. Alevis consider the secularist principles as their protection against 
Sunni infringements upon their religious freedom. Among Sunnis, there 
are various conservative traditions which can be described as ‘pro-Islamist’. 
They support a religious revivalism in reaction to the secularist policies of 
the Republican establishment. The two divides, between Sunnis and Alevis 
on the one hand, and among the Sunnis themselves on the other, are at 
the source of political tensions in the country. The protagonists here are, 
on the one side, the secularist state establishment and its centrist mass 
public support (consisting primarily of Alevis) and, on the other, the Sunni 
peripheral masses of pro-Islamist inclinations.2 
The Alevis are thus not a powerless minority; in the center-periphery 
dichotomy they side with the center, in other words, with the secularist 
state establishment. Hence, whatever marginalization they may suffer from, 
due to the sectarian division, is partially compensated by the power gained 
as they position themselves on the right side of the cultural divide between 
‘religious’ versus ‘secular’. Yet, the nature of the secular regime prevents 
the full recognition of Alevi identity, Alevi religious and cultural practices, 
and Alevi political preferences concerning the recognition of their identity. 
Our aim in this chapter is primarily to explore the contours of political 
empowerment and disempowerment among Alevis in Turkey. We will first 
give a brief description of Alevism, followed by details about population 
2 We adopt here the center-periphery framework of Şerif Mardin (1973). According to this 
framework, Turkish politics is built around a strong and coherent state apparatus, or the 
“center”, run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military and bureaucracy. The 
‘center’ is confronted by a heterogeneous and often hostile ‘periphery’, composed mainly 
of peasantry, small farmers, and artisans. Kemalist secular principles form the founding 
ideology of this center which runs a nationalist modernization program. The ‘periphery’ 
is built around hostile sentiments towards the coercive modernization projects of the 
center and includes regional, religious, and ethnic groups with often conflicting interests 
and political strategies.
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characteristics; we will then look into Alevi political alignments in the 
Republican era, focusing particularly on the most recent developments. 
The Alevi Population
Except for a couple of serious clashes in the 1970s and 1980s, the historical 
animosities between the Alevi and Sunni communities have been kept 
mostly under control during the Republican era.3 Nevertheless, as Alevis 
have moved into urban areas over the years, they keep their sectarian 
identity concealed in the public space. As a result, a solid assessment of 
the size of their population is practically impossible. As John Shindeldecker 
notes: 
You cannot count them according to what language they speak, because 
most of them speak Turkish as their mother tongue. You cannot count them 
according to where they live, because there are Alevis in almost all provinces 
of Turkey. Alevis have no distinguishing physical characteristics such as skin 
color, hair color or eye shape. They wear no traditional dress that sets them 
apart from anyone on the street. In fact, unless an Alevi tells someone he is 
an Alevi, it is difficult to discern. (Shindeldecker 1996: 4)
Population estimates vary widely: from 10 to 12 million at the lowest, to 
one-third of Turkey’s population at the highest (Shindeldecker 1996; Shank-
land 2003; Kehl-Bodrogi 1992; Zeidan 1999). While census data do not tell 
us much about the sectarian divide, those gathered at the micro-individual 
level through academic surveys are much more informative. Çarkoğlu 
(2005) provides a first attempt at diagnosing Alevism in a nation-wide sur-
vey based on field research. Only about 3 percent of the respondents said 
they were Alevis when asked about their sectarian background. Such a low 
percentage is indicative of identity concealment among Alevis (Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycığlu 2009). Two additional rounds of questions were asked 
about people’s beliefs, in order to diagnose their sectarian background 
and to show that indirect methods function better in uncovering identity 
concealments. In the first round, a list of names of famous religious figures, 
including men of historical and theological significance for the Alevis, was 
3 Notable exceptions to this peaceful coexistence of the Alevi and Sunni communities 
can be found in bloody clashes between the two communities in the late 1970s in Çorum 
and Kahramanmaraş. In early July 1993 an Alevi group called Pir Sultan Abdal Association 
sponsored a conference in Sivas. Sunni reactionists put fire to the hotel where the confer-
ence was being held; as a consequence 37 participants died from flames and smoke. (Doğan 
2007; Sokefeld 2008; White and Jongerden 2003). 
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provided. Respondents were asked to point at the most important religious 
figures for them; twenty percent of the respondents picked the Alevi names. 
In the second round, the respondents were asked if they had pictures of 
religious leaders in their homes. This question was used as a distinguish-
ing criterion, as only Alevis tend to display pictures of Caliph Ali and the 
twelve imams. Thirteen percent confirmed that they had the pictures 
of these Alevi leaders. These percentages indicate that Alevis constitute 
a larger proportion of the Turkish society than the 3 percent arrived at 
through direct questioning about sectarian identity. The survey findings 
show that it is practically impossible to obtain definite answers to direct 
questions regarding the sects of the respondents. A more indirect method, 
meanwhile, shows that approximately 15 percent of the respondents display 
some signs of Aleviness. These figures are overall national estimates, we 
do not have any breakdowns by provinces.
More useful is the recent publication by the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy of a map of Turkey with estimates of the Alevi population 
by provinces.4 When we use this map in conjunction with the 2008 popula-
tion figures released from TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) on January 
2009, we arrive at an Alevi population estimate for the whole country. 
According to this estimate, approximately half of the Alevi population has 
now moved to metropolitan areas; the other half still live in the provinces 
that were originally predominantly Alevi. As Alevis increasingly move into 
urban areas, the provinces are becoming more mixed. Such a long-term 
trend has the positive effect of easing the historical tensions between the 
two communities which now live side by side, especially in metropolitan 
settings. On the negative side, sectarian mixing renders the Alevi popula-
tion more socially and politically disempowered. As a result of geographic 
dispersion, Alevis are now faced with challenges regarding political repre-
sentation both on the national and the local level. Political mobilization 
is more arduous nowadays, when Alevis live in cities among large Sunni 
populations, than previously when they lived in rural communities. 
Alevi Doctrine and Religious Practices
A peculiar feature in the case of Alevis is that there is no generally accepted 
definition of Alevi identity.5 Alevism is considered by some as a branch of 
4 See http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/4616b6127d683.pdf.
5 The name Alevi derives from Arabic, and means “of Ali” or “pertaining to Ali”. It thus 
links the Alevi tradition to the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali, who along 
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Islam that differs from other, more orthodox, orientations only in that it 
leaves wider room for various heterodox traditions and cultural elements; 
others, meanwhile, look upon Alevism not as a religious but rather as a 
cultural orientation. Even young immigrant Alevis in Istanbul are said 
to view Alevism as a ‘life-style’ rather than a religion (Seufert 1997: 172). 
Although Alevism share many common features with orthodox Islam, for 
example veneration of the Prophet Muhammad and emphasis on his fam-
ily (most important of all, his son-in-law Ali), it has certain characteristics 
that differentiate it from both Sunni and Shia Islam, in particular the Shia 
Islam practiced at present in Iran. Although Shia Islam and Alevism look 
highly similar in their respect for the trinity of Allah-Muhammad-Ali and 
for the Twelve imams, they diverge significantly in religious practices. For 
instance, like Sunnis, Shia use mosques for worship; meanwhile, most Alevis 
do not attend mosques at all, but make use of cem houses, an exclusively 
Alevi feature. Shia also fast during Ramadan, again as Sunnis do, while 
Alevis have a different fasting period during which they recall the death 
of Hussein, the son of Caliph Ali, in Karbala. 
The religious identity of Alevis can best be delineated in reference to the 
Sunni majority in Turkey. The oneness of God is commonly accepted by 
both groups, but Alevis tend to reject a vision of God as an “angry master 
who delights in forcing the slaves he has created to obey strict religious 
rules or face the penalty of burning for eternity” (Shindeldecker 1996: 4). 
Although they respect all major holy books and their prophets, and see the 
Quran as the last and most inclusive book that was ‘let down from heaven’, 
Alevis tend to interpret the Holy Quran more esoterically and mystically. 
Accordingly, they emphasize the understanding of the Holy Quran rather 
than its recitation, and call for the Quran to be read in Turkish. Besides the 
Quran, the most important sources of Alevi belief are the mystical poems 
and musical ballads (deyişler, nefesler) that largely remain part of an oral 
tradition rather than being recorded in writing. The Alevi practice of replac-
ing the strict structure of ‘orthodox religious teachings’ with un-structured 
oral tradition is the main reason for other Muslims’ skepticism as to the 
nature of Alevism’s identity (Melikoff 1998; Erman and Gökar 2000; Koçan 
and Öncü 2004). There are also significant differences in beliefs and wor-
ship practices between the Sunni majority and Alevis. To cite just a few: 
with the Prophet is the central figure in the Shia tradition. Shindeldecker (1996) notes that 
the term Alevi fits a linguistic pattern in Turkish for the followers of Moses (Musa in Turkish 
or Musevi for Jews) and followers of Jesus (Isa in Turkish or Isevis). Turkey’s Alevis should 
not be confused with the Alawi of Syria with whom they only share a veneration of Caliph 
Ali and little else. See Shindeldecker (1996), for different definitions regarding Alevis. 
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Alevis do not have a literal understanding of heaven or hell; divine judg-
ment according to Alevi belief is not determined on the basis of religious 
worship or ritual participation but on inter-human behavior. Thus, not 
all Alevis necessarily observe ritual prayer (namaz), mosque attendance, 
fasting, pilgrimage and almsgiving (zekat). 
A central Alevi communal worship practice is the cem, or ayini cem, 
which is held in an assembly house, a building or a room set apart for such 
meetings. These buildings have no distinctive signs, e.g. minarets, to distin-
guish them as worship places and there is no call to prayer corresponding 
to the Sunni ezan. A cem meeting is held by an elderly man or dede who, 
besides holding a spiritual and moral authority among Alevis, also has a 
claim of direct descent from the Prophet Muhammed through one of the 
twelve imams (seyyitlik). Traditionally, the dedes’ authority used to extend 
over whole villages. It is not clear how this has changed nowadays, with 
Alevis being scattered throughout Turkish cities, or gathered in small groups 
in these cities. As the Alevi patterns of settlement underwent rapid change 
so have also their centers of authority. For instance, previously dedes had 
the authority to solve conflicts among Alevis, and they could expel people 
who were found guilty through communal trials. To what extent dedes still 
retain this power in modern urban settings is unclear (Rossum 2008). 
The complex relationship between Alevis and the Turkish public in 
general is reflected in the political sphere as well. None of the major 
political factions have genuinely sought to advocate for the rights of Ale-
vis throughout the multi-party Republican history, perhaps to avoid the 
risk of hurting or alienating the overwhelming Sunni majority of voters. 
Although they have never embraced any major political party as their sole 
representative on the political scene, Alevis have usually supported the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP). This support 
is widely interpreted as a reflection of Alevi support for the official ideol-
ogy of Kemalism, usually attributed to their fear of an Islamic state (Kehl-
Bodrogh 2003). The Islamist parties and their governments have always 
been looked upon by Alevis as the main threats to their survival in Turkey. 
This suspicion has been clearly evidenced since 2002, when the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) came to power as 
a single-party government. Although no single party has emerged as the 
Alevis’ political representative, the leftist parties have frequently drawn 
attention to their situation in Turkish society. Hence, any republican and 
secularist policy against Islamist politics has involved at least a brief refer-
ence to Alevi presence in Turkey and their rights. 
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Alevism in Republican Turkey: A Brief Overview of Political Trends
Social and political oppression and isolation of Alevis can be traced back 
to the sixteenth century confrontation between the Sunni Ottomans and 
the Sufi-Shia Safavids which resulted in an Ottoman victory that pushed the 
Safavids out of Anatolia into Iran. With their protectors exiled in Iran, the 
Alevis or Kızılbaş—Turkmen followers of the Safavid Sufi order—largely 
retreated into isolation in remote Anatolian rural lands. Since then, their 
isolation has been a key factor in the shaping of their peculiar doctrine 
and social structures noted above. Survival strategies were necessary within 
the dominant and hostile Sunni Anatolian communities. The use of taqi-
yya or religious concealment under danger, a practice central to Shiism,6 
importantly contributed to the survival of Alevism in this environment 
(Kuran 1995; Bozkurt 1998; Çamuroğlu 2000; Selçuk, Şaylan and Kalkan 1994; 
Shankland 2003). Given this historical background, it is no surprise that the 
Alevi minority faced continuous discrimination by the central authority. As 
a result, the ambitions of the Kemalist Republicans to replace the Ottoman 
Empire with a modern and secular state were embraced enthusiastically 
by Alevis. However, the end result of their support for the Republic did 
not really meet the Alevis’ expectations. 
The Kemalist Republic of 1923 relieved the Alevis from considerable 
legal pressures. Within a few years, the new Republic no longer had an 
official religion in its Constitution. The daily problems concerning religious 
practice in cem houses and the socio-economic discrimination they had 
faced within the Sunni communities may have remained largely unre-
solved; nonetheless the new secular Republic was the very basis of Alevi 
security. From the very beginning of the multi-party Republican regime, 
Alevi support for the secularist principles and their ardent opposition to 
Islamist Sunni electoral traditions have been visible and significant. This 
state of mind brought the Alevis closer to the Republican left-wing. “Alevis 
have been the main allies of secularist groups, organizations and political 
parties as they have a direct interest in resisting the rise of Sunni Islamic 
fundamentalist influence” (Koçan and Öncü 2004: 477). The right-wing 
parties in Turkey have long kept their distance from the Alevi communi-
ties. While this might be due to the parties’ fear of losing Sunni conserva-
tive support, the foremost reason is more likely to be a lack of ideological 
congruence between the conservative right-wing political orientation in 
6 See Firro and Loüer in the present volume. 
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Turkey and the deeply progressive, egalitarian, and left-wing orientation 
among Alevis in the post-1960 era (Çakır 1998; Seufert 1997; Koçan and 
Öncü 2004; Göner 2005).
As Turkey plunged into an anarchic fight between opposing armed 
groups in the 1960s and 1970s, Alevis’ left-wing orientation became increas-
ingly apparent. The leftists of this period were more concerned with class 
struggle within a socialist or communist ideological framework than with 
secularism, Kemalist principles or identity issues, all matters that would 
dominate the public agenda in the 1990s. At a time when the new urban 
Alevi communities were going through social/political transition, the ris-
ing left-wing ideology did not seem to recognize Aleviness, or any cultural 
or religious distinctiveness of Alevis. Its rhetoric focused exclusively on 
economic class struggle. 
Instead of being concerned with their own tradition, the Alevi youth joined 
the left in political struggles prior to 1980 and sometimes even physically 
attacked Alevi holy men, the dedes, for being rural conservatives. Alevi 
political activism pushed religious and identity issues to the background. 
The Alevis tended to see themselves as part of the national and international 
working-class. (Seufert 1997: 164) 
The nature of the ideological armed struggle meant that involvement was 
particularly pronounced among the Alevi youth. Together with the pres-
sures caused by migration to the cities, this resulted in a weakening of the 
communal cohesion that existed under the control of its traditional author-
ity figures such as the dedes and the elders. As the country was heading 
towards a military regime, the Alevi communities of the late 1970s seemed 
to have lost their distinct cultural and religious character and increasingly 
adopted a working class identity.
The military junta of 1980 put an end to all the political parties, and their 
leadership cadres were jailed and banned from politics. Not surprisingly, 
labor unions and left-wing youth organizations also took their share of 
the beating. The implications of such oppression upon the left, that had 
represented an ideological comfort zone for the newly urbanized Alevi com-
munities, were quite significant. The mobilization push provided by the left-
wing class struggle rhetoric and the socialist explanations that emphasized 
class identities and relations were now displaced by cultural and religious 
argumentations focusing on the teachings and rituals of the Alevi belief 
(Erman and Göker 2000). This new emphasis on Aleviness brought forward 
a glorification of Alevi identity. Alevism thus was seen as even more “just, 
egalitarian and libertarian than socialism” (Poyraz 2005: 505).
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Three factors explain this revival of Alevi identity: urbanization, or what 
Shankland (2003) describes as the effectual emptying of the rural Alevi com-
munities; the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist 
bloc; and the continual rise of the pro-Islamist movement in Turkey, ending 
with its capture of the executive office as a single party government in 2002. 
When this occurred, the Alevis, out of their own will, opted not for exit but 
for the second option put forward by Hirschman (1970), that is, voice. They 
felt the need to make their sectarian identity explicit and emphasize it so 
as to make both the state establishment and the government aware that 
Turkish society is not exclusively Sunni, and that the Alevis need protec-
tion in the face of rising Islamism in the country. 
From the early 1950s onward, urban settlements have increasingly 
attracted peasant communities in search of a better life. Typically these 
migrant communities have settled on the outskirts of the cities and formed 
what came to be known as shanty towns or gecekondu (literally ‘settled 
over night’) neighborhoods. From the perspective of formation and main-
tenance of Alevi identity, urbanization posed new challenges. The most 
important challenge for the mainly working class shanty town dwellers 
was the reshaping of, and emphasis on, a distinctive Alevi identity that 
could counter pressures to blend into the urban setting. The left-wing 
socialist or class-based identities which were all-inclusive, and thus ignored 
Alevi cultural peculiarities, became increasingly unacceptable in the new 
era. Alevi self-identification, with its emphasis on culture and faith, was 
becoming more appealing. With urbanization came better opportunities 
for education and economic advancement. These paved the way for a new 
Alevi bourgeoisie (Çamuroğlu 1998: 79; Şimşek 2004: 129). The priorities of 
this new middle class did not necessarily overlap with those held by Alevis 
with a more modest socio-economic status. Rather than stressing the dif-
ficulties in Alevi living conditions and the economic hardships experienced, 
members of the bourgeoisie were more concerned with issues such as self-
identification. The Alevi bourgeoisie exhibited a high degree of sectarian 
awareness, and had the progress of the Alevis as their sole aim.
The collapse of the communist bloc, on the other hand, rendered socialist 
ideology outdated, as it symbolized the defeat of socialism/communism by 
liberal democracy throughout the world. Everywhere, claiming devotion to 
this ideology and its practical application was no longer appreciated and 
respected, and Turkey was no exception. As a consequence, the meaning 
of the left-right dichotomy, that had dominated both social and political 
life in Turkey for several decades, was replaced by rising identity politics. 
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The military takeover in 1980 already put a temporary end to the con-
flict between the left and the right in Turkey. To be able to control the 
left, which is regarded by the state establishment as the more dangerous 
of the two sides involved in this conflict, the military itself used Islam and 
embraced a policy called Turkish-Islam synthesis; through this the State 
and its institutions allocated and promoted a particular place to Islam, 
with a clear Sunni flavor, in the Turkish public sphere. More specifically, 
the declared policy of the 1980 junta to build a mosque in each village 
that did not have one effectively brought Sunni imams with a state salary 
and an official Sunni world view into all the Alevi villages (Zeidan 1999; 
Şimşek 2004). The exploitation of religion for political purposes was not 
a new concept for Alevis who have felt themselves threatened by policies 
based on religion since the 1950s. Yet, the direct glorification of Islam by 
the State itself was viewed by Alevis as the most dangerous of all their 
experiences. Over time, they seem to have decided that making their Alevi 
identity explicit and putting emphasis on it rather than on other social or 
political ideologies would be to their benefit, as this will remind the State 
of the existence of non-Sunni Muslims in the country.
Although the Turkish-Islam synthesis was part of a latent state policy 
during the 1980 regime, the Turkish State was never comfortable with the 
rise of social and political Islam outside of its immediate control. It was 
nevertheless obvious that the state establishment was unable to fully control 
the Islamization process it originally encouraged, at the beginning of the 
1980s, in its struggle against left-wing tendencies in Turkey. The attitude 
of the State with regard to Islam changed considerably in the 1990s. The 
state elite, fearing that Islamism would grow out of control, took defensive 
measures against the rising tide of Islamic activism. One of the preven-
tive measures adopted in the 1990s was to use Alevis to counter-balance 
Islamism. Alevis were considered suitable for such a role, as they were 
well known for lending “support to democratic and tolerant ideals, while 
shying away from some of the more fundamentalist practices found in the 
Sunni religion” (Poyraz 2005: 506). The Alevi stance towards democracy 
and secularism, in general, was congruent with the defensive standpoint 
of the Turkish State and its elite against political Islam. This fact fostered 
the alliance between the state elite and Alevis, to prevent the latter from 
being overrun by the rising Islamist forces. “A more rigid secular discourse 
began to be disseminated by various state institutions” (Koçan and Öncü 
2004: 478) when, in 1996 a pro-Islamist party, for the first time in Turkish 
political history, had the chance to rule the country through a coalition 
government. “The support of Alevis were even more vital after February 
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1997, when the Turkish State declared open war on radical Islam” (Poyraz 
2005: 512) after the experience of a short-lived government by an Islamist 
party as one of the coalition partners. 
Given the dichotomization and polarization between Alevi identity and 
Islamist politics, the relationship between the AKP and Alevis deserves 
particular attention. The AKP is the most recent extension of the National 
Outlook (Milli Görüş) Movement, the group that has established all of the 
major Islamist parties in Turkey since mid-1960s. All have eventually been 
closed down for being against the secular principles of the Republic, and 
most of their members were banned from politics for certain periods. Yet, 
a core elite group has repeatedly re-created these parties under different 
names, each and every time. The AKP elite cadres come from a relatively 
younger generation within this movement; they tried hard to distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the movement immediately after their breakup 
with the older generation leadership of Necmettin Erbakan and his follow-
ers. The young generation Islamists argued that they have a more liberal 
and a more democratic stance compared to members of the earlier Islamist 
parties. They even insisted that the AKP was not an Islamist party and 
that they could be considered only as conservative democrats (Hale and 
Özbudun 2010; Yavuz 2009; Turunç 2007).
Despite all these discussions and various self-identifications made by 
members of the AKP, the popular opinion has always regarded the party 
as an Islamist one; so have the Alevis. Hence, during the seven years 
between 2002 and 2009, when the Turkish political scene was dominated 
by AKP governments, Alevis in Turkey have felt themselves under threat. 
This feeling of being intimidated might not, however, be as high as it was 
under the preceding Welfare Party’s (Refah Partisi-RP) coalition govern-
ment with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP). One immediate 
reason is the aforementioned new liberal re-orientation of the younger 
generation Islamists. However; a number of political openings by the AKP 
aiming to appeal to Alevis have apparently failed, and Alevi uneasiness 
seems to continue.
Alevis and the AKP Government
Two major factors explain this uneasiness between the AKP and Alevis. 
The first and perhaps more important is the ambiguous stance of the 
AKP leadership towards Alevi identity in Turkey. Admittedly, there have 
been some positive changes in the AKP’s policies, such as the decision to 
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allocate a seat in the Turkish Grand National Assembly to the well-known 
Alevi historian and author, Reha Çamuroğlu, and to hold a couple of well-
publicized meetings with the Alevi leaders. Most of the conciliatory steps 
taken by the AKP concern the month of Muharram and the incident of 
Karbala, when the son of Caliph Ali, Hussein, was killed. The discourse 
employed has always included signs of resentment about this happening. 
The Minister of Education of the AKP government lately described this 
event as a tragic memory in Islamic history (Radikal February 09, 2006). 
However, the prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan’s open denial of Alevis as 
a suis generis religious group to be reckoned with can be interpreted as 
a sign of the AKP’s negative stance towards this group. To support his 
view, Mr. Erdoğan made a comparison between mosques and cem houses 
and called the former worshipping places, while the latter were spoken 
of as only culture houses (Radikal September 14, 2003). Many Alevis feel 
uncomfortable with such a definition for two reasons. First of all, even 
though members of the group are known for their secular outlook, they 
regard Alevism as their religion, rather than their culture; hence, the cem 
practices are for them part of a religious ceremony. Moreover, in Turkey, 
places of worship (whether churches, synagogues, or mosques) are exempt 
from paying fees for water and electricity. Therefore, having the cem build-
ings recognized as places of worship would help Alevis also in economic 
terms. Mr. Erdoğan’s attitude is what Alevis in general expect from the 
leader of an Islamist party. 
Within the course of the first government—between 2002 and 2007— 
formed by the AKP, the deputy chairman of the party claimed that failure 
to have an Alevi among their parliamentarians was a pity, and a result 
of the misrepresentation of the AKP as the party of the Sunnis. He even 
encouraged Alevi citizens of Turkey to enroll in the party and to become 
MPs through the seats of the AKP. His one and a half hour-long speech on 
an Alevi television channel, Cem TV, also attracted the attention of both 
the political sphere in general and his party’s cadres in particular (Radikal 
January 12, 2007). The deputy chairman’s declared aim was to include Alevi 
politicians among the party cadres as MPs. This aim was realized during 
the second government formed by the AKP in 2007, with three Alevi MPs 
taking seats in the parliament as members of the AKP. One of these MPs 
was a well-known figure among the Alevis, and his status as an AKP MP 
was widely discussed. He was severely criticized by many Alevis. The people 
who trusted him and believed that he would improve the social and political 
conditions of Alevis felt, however, highly disappointed by his statements. 
He said that his priorities do not include the problems of the Alevis, as 
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there were more important ones. This was interpreted as a perfect sign of 
his incompetence in this regard and even displayed the fact that he did not 
much care about satisfying the Alevis at all (Radikal July 26, 2007). 
The second factor affecting the relationship between Alevis and the AKP 
has more to do with the inner dynamics and convictions of Alevis than 
with those of the AKP. Firstly, Alevis do not consider the AKP’s conciliatory 
moves towards them sincere; they believe that all the steps taken towards 
Alevis are results of electoral calculations for winning elections. The Alevi 
elites seem to believe that, although the AKP was the winning party in the 
2002 elections and had the chance to form the first single-party government 
in Turkey since 1991, the vote percentages showed that the party enjoyed 
the support of less than two thirds of the electorate. The AKP, according to 
Alevis, were aware of this fact and knew very well that Alevis were among 
the first groups it had to reach or neutralize for a long and peaceful survival 
in government. This reasoning explained every step the AKP took towards 
Alevis as an extension of the assimilationist process they pursued against 
this group (Radikal March 23, 2003).
Secondly, Alevis are an inherently heterogeneous group. While some 
seek the legal recognition of their belief system by the State, ask for gov-
ernment support for their cem houses, and hence react favorably towards 
the conciliatory moves of the AKP in these respects, others object to such 
a cooperative stance, and argue that the AKP never acts for the benefit of 
Alevis but instead has ulterior hidden motives. 
In consequence, the relationship between Alevis and the AKP is still full 
of problems and could not have been smoothened, despite the advance-
ments attempted by the AKP government during their more than seven 
years long tenure in executive office. Alevis seem to position themselves in 
opposition to Sunni fundamentalism in the political arena. They believe that 
they have to secure the permanence of secularism in Turkey, and to block 
any advance by fundamentalists. With these aims in mind, the main allies 
they have are secularist forces; yet they also want to ally with moderate 
Sunnis against fundamentalists. With respect to nationalism, on the other 
hand, Alevis perceive themselves as the real guardians of Turkish culture 
and religion. Defining Alevism as a combination of Islam and Turkish 
culture, Alevis label Sunnism as an Arab Islam. “Alevis view themselves 
as the true preservers of authentic Turkish culture, religion, and language 
amidst Ottoman pressures to Arabize or Persianize. In sum, the Turks 
are the real guardians of Islam, and the Alevis are the real Turks” (Zeidan 
1999). 
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Despite their long-enduring leftist inclination, during the last couple of 
years, Alevis have begun to express anger at the CHP, the à la Turca left 
or self-declared social democratic party in Turkey, as it had been reluctant 
to answer their calls. For instance, the CHP has still not objected to the 
mandatory religious education courses, a legacy from the 1980 military 
regime. Nevertheless, these developments and the sour relations between 
Alevis and the CHP can hardly detach Alevi votes from the CHP, as Alevis 
believe they cannot embrace the conservative approaches of political Islam, 
due to the humanist nature of Alevism, and to its doctrine that equates all 
nations, cultures and identities (Radikal February 12, 2007). 
Progress or Stagnation: Alevi Complaints and Demands
Alevis’ main complaint is that they are not recognized by the Turkish State. 
The state institutions, they claim, impose Sunni Islam on the population 
even though the Turkish Republic officially proclaims itself to be a secular 
state. The status of cem houses, the mandatory religion courses, and the 
limits they face in upward mobility in public employment constitute the 
crux of Alevi complaints and demands. 
The Turkish Constitution recognizes freedom of religion, according to 
the International Religious Freedom Report of 2008, published by the US 
State Department. 
Alevis freely practiced their beliefs and have built cem houses, although 
these have no legal status as places of worship and are often referred to as 
“cultural centers”. 
Representatives of Alevi organizations maintained that they often faced 
obstacles when attempting to establish cem houses. They said there were 
approximately 100 cem houses in the country, a number that they claimed 
was insufficient to meet their needs. (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
irf/2009/130299.htm). 
Alevis are considered to be a heterodox Muslim sect and are often referred 
to as ‘heretics’ or ‘outcasts’ by traditionalist Sunnis who view Alevi theol-
ogy as ‘wrong’ and as a “threat to their way of life and an obstacle to their 
ideal of creating a pious society built around the Qur’an.” (The Independent 
January 7, 2007)
A suspicious approach towards the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(DRA)—a bureaucratic state institution that is blamed for favoring Sunni 
Islam at the expense of Alevis, and for its aim to assimilate Alevis into 
mainstream Sunni Islam—is a common feature of several Alevi groups. 
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However, the solutions offered in dealing with inequalities created by the 
DRA also form a basis for deep differences among Alevis. Some seek legal 
recognition of their belief system by the State and ask for government sup-
port for their cem houses; they argue that the government should provide 
electricity and water to cem houses as it does for mosques, churches and 
synagogues; hence, they react favorably to the recognition attempts of the 
State. Others blame the members of the first group for being adulators of the 
State and argue against a cooperative stance towards these new overtures 
of the State. The former group argues for the integration of Alevis into the 
DRA, whereas the latter supports the abolishment of the DRA altogether, 
as they believe that this institution creates a formal bias in favor of Sunni 
Islam in Turkey (Dressler 2008: 289–290). Indeed, what makes Alevis really 
nervous with respect to their relationship with the DRA is the fear that 
they might lose their independence from the State once they get involved 
with the DRA, which is by nature a state institution.
Compulsory religious education provided throughout all Turkish sec-
ondary education is another major point in the Alevi criticism of the 
established system. It deems these classes to be highly problematic for 
Alevis’ religious freedom, and views them as a vehicle of assimilation by 
the State. “Critics claim that Turkish religious education, which has been 
compulsory since 1982, effectively tries to indoctrinate children to the 
state-sponsored approach to Islam” (Stewart 2007: 55). The State is believed 
to force Alevi students to learn the Sunni interpretation of Islam, and to 
ignore Alevi identity totally, while claiming to be talking about Islam in 
general. Meanwhile, the students belonging to the religious communities 
that are legally recognized as minorities in Turkey are exempted from this 
compulsory religious education. 
As part of its policies towards religious communities, the Republi-
can regime aimed to control and regulate Islamic movements through, 
among other means, the use of the DRA, which has always had a Sunni 
orientation and has thus kept the Alevis mostly outside the Republican 
administrative circles of influence. Thus, although Alevis provided the 
backbone of popular support for secularism, the very Republican policies 
aiming to regulate religion in the country resulted in an effective exclusion 
of Alevis from the State apparatus. These policies also turn a blind eye 
towards Alevi community rights. More than 4000 court cases against the 
Ministry of Education regarding this discrimination are reported in the 
2008 International Religious Freedom Report (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/irf/2009/130299.htm).
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Alevis also complain about lack of upward mobility in the Turkish public 
sector. Most of the officeholders in the public sector change with each and 
every election, as each ruling party prefers to appoint its own supporters 
in these offices. Alevis believe that none of the parties ever cares about 
them when they make the appointments. “The complaint of the Alevis 
regarding political representation is about holding public office. The Alevi 
claim is that there are no Alevi governors in the 81 provinces in Turkey, 
and none of the 400 general managers in the public sector organizations 
are Alevis.” (Özalay 2006: 18) 
These historical animosities and the continuing Alevi complaints, that 
the Turkish State favors the Sunni community at their expense have resulted 
in a number of deep rooted individual reactions and attitudinal patterns 
among Alevis. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) report individual level 
reflections of cultural and attitudinal differences which seem to distinguish 
Alevis from the rest of Turkish society, which is pre-dominantly of Sunni 
orientation. As noted above, such individual level analyses suffer from the 
difficulties of finding out who is an Alevi in the context of a nation-wide 
representative survey. Nevertheless, we observe that the pattern of attitudi-
nal contrast between the Alevi minority and the Sunni majority in Turkey 
fits many of our expectations. For instance, Alevis appear less religiously 
conservative and more liberal in their religious attitudes. Especially focusing 
on anomic attitudes and political efficacy, we observe that the two major 
minority groups in Turkey, Kurds and Alevis, are not situated far from each 
other on average, but they are distinctly different from the average of Sunni 
Turks.7 Comparing levels of anomie, we find that Kurds and uneducated 
individuals are about equal, while both have about average levels of political 
inefficacy. The average Alevi respondent, on the other hand, has a lower 
than average level of political inefficacy, and about the average anomie 
level for our sample. In other words, Alevis appear to feel more politically 
efficacious as well as being less anomic than Kurds, which implies that, in 
comparison to the latter, Alevis are more integrated into Turkish society. 
7 Feelings of efficacy and anomie have been chosen as being reflections of the empower-
ment and disempowerment of Alevis within the larger Turkish society in social and political 
arenas. Higher anomie would function as an indicator of Alevis’ perception of powerless 
status in the Turkish society. Efficacy, on the other hand, is defined as the ability to actualize 
the intended social or political effect in the society. Inefficacy, hence, is also believed to be 
a character of powerless groups that do not have the necessary competence or opportunity 
to affect social and political outcomes. For more discussion on the conceptual merits and 
shortcomings of both anomie and political inefficacy as well as measurement details see 
(Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). 
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Even in a multivariate setting where demographic and attitudinal control 
variables are included in our evaluations, Alevi respondents appear to be 
at a lower level of political inefficaciousness than the non-Alevi group. 
While Alevis are not different from the sample in general in terms of their 
feelings of anomie, in political efficacy they seem to rate higher than the 
average member of Turkish society, indicating that Alevis do not think that 
they are underrepresented in decision-making processes and in political 
outcomes. In some respects these findings may sound like a contradiction 
to our earlier arguments. However, as we already argued, Alevis are not 
strictly a powerless minority, for they use the center-periphery cleavage 
in Turkish society by siding with the center to maintain a certain level of 
efficacy in Turkish society. Thus, our observation concerning the higher 
level of political efficacy for Alevis as opposed to Kurds is very much in line 
with our preceding historical analysis. From a perspective of comparative 
evaluation, these empirical measures of anomie and political inefficacy 
offer informative opportunities. Obviously limited in scope and explanatory 
power, they are the only measures of the feelings and attitudes of Alevis 
as opposed to Kurds, who are the two largest Muslim minority groups in 
Turkey. One should be cautious about the limited diagnosis capability of 
these two simple measures. Yet, as an aggregation of attitudinal evaluations 
within a scale format, these are the only two measures with wide empirical 
data basis from the recent Turkish social experiences. 
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from our analyses above. The first one 
is about the historical evolution of Alevism in modern Turkey. The Alevis’ 
role in defining the scope and limits of the Turkish State as it relates to 
the overwhelmingly Muslim Turkish society has always been critical in 
modern history. Recently, Alevis seem to have become important actors 
in the resistance to the rise of pro-Islamist forces in Turkish politics and in 
the protection of secularist principles. There has also been a clear emphasis 
upon a new Alevi identity. 
As there are no easy ways to identify Alevi respondents in an empirical 
setting, it is difficult to carry out studies based on representative samples 
and draw general inferences about this group. Given these difficulties and 
the resulting limitations of our empirical data about Alevis, we can none-
theless observe that most Alevi respondents in empirical settings appear 
to be better educated and to have a higher socio-economic status than the 
306 alİ çarkoğlu and nazli çağin bİlgİlİ
rest of our nation-wide representative samples. As a result, Alevis appear to 
feel politically more efficacious than the rest of the predominantly Sunni 
Muslim samples. Alevis political alliances also appear to be increasingly 
complex due to the changes which have taken place with the rise of pro-
Islamist electoral forces. We should also note that migration to the cities 
creates a de facto situation in which Alevis are increasingly surrounded 
by conservative urban Sunni majorities. While this situation may lead 
to a weakening of their potential for political mobilization, hence their 
political representation, it may also result in aligning them behind some 
of the right-wing parties. 
Despite concerted efforts by the AKP government since its coming to 
power in 2002, Alevis’ demands remain largely unresolved and their expec-
tations unfulfilled. This leaves them in search of new allies in the political 
arena, since the traditional ones seem to have abandoned the Alevi cause. 
In the immediate future the Alevi minority will most likely concentrate its 
efforts on demanding the recognition of their distinct sectarian identity, 
and on searching for new political representatives in the political scene 
who are ready to defend the Alevis’ social and political rights. Both efforts 
aim to further the group’s empowerment within Turkish society. 
Alevis’ relations with the ruling Islamist conservative AKP government 
are likely to exert an enduring influence on the way their role within the 
Turkish polity is redefined. As they moved into urban settlements over the 
past few decades, Alevis have effectively disconnected themselves from 
the traditional left-wing ideological and political agenda and adopted a 
series of demands in the realm of identity politics. They are now in a bet-
ter position to enter into effective social and political alliances. The AKP’s 
overtures to the Alevis, for example, are not only aimed at broadening the 
party’s electoral support base; rather, they are meant to legitimize the AKP’s 
own identity claims based on conservative Islamist ideology. However, the 
skepticism with which Alevis view these AKP advances is evidence of the 
enduring difficulties on both sides. Alevi demands come at a time when 
this minority is widely spread in urban areas that are predominantly Sunni 
and where Alevi communal identity is on the rise. It is not easy to reach 
simple conclusions about their empowerment and disempowerment as of 
the early decades of the twenty- first century. Segregation between the Alevi 
minority and the Sunni majority has decreased significantly, but the fact 
that the majority has become increasingly more religiously conservative 
has not contributed to making it easier for Alevis to express their sectarian 
identity. Nevertheless, as a result of Turkey’s quest for membership in the 
EU together with the rise in identity politics among ethnic and religious 
 alevis in turkish politics 307
groups, there are signs that Alevis today enjoy greater recognition as a 
distinct group with distinct identity demands. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN
Eliz Sanasarian
In discussions of social and political dynamics involving the state and 
society, themes such as religious and ethnic groups, minority and majority, 
identity and modernization have been used with frequency. Some of these 
themes have been interchangeable, and in different time periods the focus 
of studies has shifted. Prior to the 1990s nationalism and nation-building, 
debates on modernization, communication, integration, and the role of 
ethnic groups and conflict were dominant. By the late 1990s ‘identity’ had 
become a new focus, often mixed with a psychological approach. This 
was “a ‘neo-way’ of addressing identity, and this new tool preordained the 
questions that would be asked and the answers that would be given. Not 
explained were the trajectory, ideology, successes, and failures of modern 
nationalist movements” (Newman 2000: 23).1 Mark Juergensmeyer, reflect-
ing on world events in the 1990s, used the term ‘religious nationalism’ as 
a way of describing “longing for an indigenous form of religious politics 
free from the taint of Western culture”. This “new cold war” was based 
on the “resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious 
allegiances” (Juergensmeyer 1993: 1–2). As old models had failed, the new 
ones were here to challenge Western secular nationalism. 
World events, in many ways, seemed to be supporting parts, if not all, 
of Juergensmeyer’s worldview. Yet, as we approached the end of the 1990s, 
with the spread of internet and intensification of globalization, something 
was changing. These shifts were throwing all discussions, theories, and argu-
ments out of order. Transformations were at both macro and micro levels 
driven by the information technology.2 Here, for example, the active role 
of diasporic communities and human rights organizations had intensified 
1 This is a study of the evolution of the concept of nationalism. I have discussed the 
ethnicity literature and its relevance, or lack of, to Iran in Sanasarian 2000: 1–8. 
2 This point is cleverly portrayed in the journalistic work first published in 1999 by 
Thomas L. Friedman 2000.
© Eliz Sanasarian, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_015
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with an impact (not yet clearly measurable) on the behavior of societies 
and states. 
This transformation has not yet been able to shed light on one very 
important issue, namely power politics. This dilemma was expressed by 
John Breuilly: “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or moderni-
zation is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and 
beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. The central 
task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state 
power” (Breuilly 1993:1). The significance of Breuilly’s comment is that 
ultimately power is where the interests lie; therefore, the interests can 
change depending on the situation. 
This study places power and powerlessness in the components of 
nationalism (identity, ethnicity, and religion). It argues that the reason 
politics is lost is because it is extremely challenging to pinpoint its dynam-
ics. Politics and power are not displayed openly, particularly in countries 
like Iran, making it almost impossible to assess details. When one engages 
specifically with empirical evidence to find ‘politics’, still mysteries remain. 
Lack of institutional framework contributes to the complexity; the polity is 
secretive, multilayered, and personal. The Islamic State with its clergy have 
become more complicated than the monarchist regime of the past, and 
James Bill’s comment rings true even more today than ever before: namely 
that the “processes of power and decisionmaking are usually hidden within 
the deepest recesses of society, where they exist in a state of constant flux” 
(Bill 1988: 10). Ultimately, it is almost impossible to assess correctly and 
clearly both “the shadowy corridors of the political system” (Bill 1988: 10), 
and the shadowy activities of members of religious minority communities 
as they act, react, respond, resist, compromise, defend, inform the authori-
ties, betray their own communities, or other minority groups. 
This chapter identifies religious minorities in Iran and their present 
condition, discusses the legal ramifications of their situation, assesses their 
responses, and concludes by reverting back to the issue of nationalism. 
Religious Composition
Iran is a heterogeneous society. Group characteristics and geographical 
settings have led to a society where primordial ties are strong. The over-
whelming majority of the population are Shiʿi, about nine percent are Sunni, 
and the rest are Bahaʾi, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and a very small and 
little-known group are Mandeans. Muslim groups’ main identification is 
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along ethnic or tribal lines: Arab (Shiʿi and Sunni), Azeri (Shiʿi), Bakhtiari 
(Shiʿi), Baluch (Sunni), Kurd (some Shiʿi, mostly Sunni), Lur (Shiʿi), Qashqai 
(Shiʿi), Shahsevan (Shiʿi), and Turkmen (Sunni).3 
The Sunni Population
The majority of the Sunni population resides in the Kurdestan, Sistan, and 
Baluchestan areas. To address Sunnis as one whole group is erroneous; 
they are divided regionally and ethnically, and there has rarely been close 
cooperation among these groups. Sunnism as a minority religion becomes 
an issue only in one grand context: namely proclaiming Iran a Twelver Shiʿi 
State. This was a contentious issue from the beginning, clearly reflected in 
the debates over devising the Constitution in 1980. During the discussions 
in the Assembly of Experts, Sunni deputies were uneasy about the Shiʿi 
domination and made several suggestions for change, to no avail. However, 
even during these debates ethnic identities were overriding Sunnism, as 
regional sensibilities were voiced. Representatives from large non-Persian 
speaking regions/provinces showed discontent with the center’s institu-
tional domination of policy, and this concern crossed over even to those 
from some Shiʿi ethnic communities (Sanasarian 2000: 62–3).4 Therefore, 
the dynamic of regionalism (provincial needs and priorities) were of utmost 
importance even in 1979–1980. During debates, some Sunni ethnic deputies 
showed deep discontent with official recognition of Zoroastrians, Jews and 
Christians in the Islamic Constitution. “How is it that we officially recognize 
the religions of Israel and the United States who are our formal enemies and 
their religions are obsolete, . . . but we do not accept Sunnism?” demanded 
a deputy from Baluchestan.5 
Since the establishment of the Shiʿi Islamic Republic, the Sunni popula-
tion has voiced discontent in different areas. A myriad of problems were 
reported in recent times. Sunni Majlis deputies have complained about 
discrimination in appointments at the executive and judicial branches 
and in government-appointed positions in Sunni dominated provinces. 
Disallowing the teaching of Sunni religious literature in public schools in 
3 Precise numbers are hard to come by because the Iranian official census does not 
include ethnic categories. The CIA World Factbook (February 2007) identifies Persian (51%), 
Azeri (24%), Kurd (7%), Arab (3%), Lur (2%), Baluch (2%), Turkmen (2%). 
4 Analysis of the entire debates, based on the documents of the proceedings of the 
Assembly, appear in Sanasarian 2000: 58–72.
5 Surat-e Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majilis-e Barrasi-ye Nahaiye Qanun-e Asasiye Jomhuri-ye 
Islami-ye Iran, 8th session, 31 Mordad 1358 [22 August 1979], p. 184.
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Sunni dominated regions has been another long time complaint (Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Report 2008: 4). The Arab minority in the south 
has protested and clashed with government security forces over plans 
for forcible relocation under the guise of an agricultural-business project 
(Jane’s Intelligence Digest and Human Rights Watch). There have also 
been reports of clashes between government forces and the Baluchis as 
well as the Kurds, including arrest of some due to their involvement with 
online writings against the regime (Amnesty International 2009: 3–4 on 
the Baluch and the Kurds).
In a February 2009 report, Amnesty International, identified a host of 
charges which are used to target members of religious and ethnic minori-
ties: “acting against state security”, “spreading lies”, “propaganda against the 
system”, “creating unease in the public mind”, “insulting the holy sanctities”, 
and “defamation of state officials” (Amnesty International 2009: 1).
The root causes of disturbances involving the Sunni population are a 
mix of their religious minority status with ethnicity, sectarianism, regional 
disparity, and cross-border problems. These factors make the Sunni case 
much more complicated, going beyond mere religious discrimination. 
Recent reports indicate disturbances are caused by a high unemployment 
rate among the youth, perpetual poverty (including in the oil-rich southern 
Khuzestan province where much of the Sunni Arab population is concen-
trated), an inferior educational system, and the lawless borderlands (such as 
the organized drug-smuggling networks along the Baluchestan route or the 
open frontiers of the Kurdish borders). Despite all these critical problems, 
the only group which still demonstrates a high likelihood for secession are 
the Kurds. However, anything involving Sunni borderline ethnic groups 
is impossible to discern with clarity; this is partially due to the divisions 
within these groups, both their and the Iranian government’s disinforma-
tion campaigns, as well as legitimate state security concerns.
The Non-Muslim Population 
The Islamic government officially recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroas-
trians. Christians are politically represented in parliament by ethnic groups, 
therefore, Armenians have two deputies (representing the northern and 
southern populations), and Assyrians and Chaldeans combined have one 
deputy. Jews and Zoroastrians each have one deputy. This type of political 
representation is an exact replica of what existed during the monarchy. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the references to the Christian popu-
lation are divided into two segments: the ethnic Christians, made up of 
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Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans; and the Iranian Christians, Muslim 
converts to Christianity, mainly of the Protestant denomination.
Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans have lived in Iran for centuries; 
their histories are closely intertwined with developments of the Persian 
State and society. The cultural links between Persians and Armenians 
can be traced back to the Zoroastrian era. For twelve centuries, Armenia 
was under the direct or indirect rule of the Persians. Later, Armenian 
Christianity retained some Zoroastrian vocabulary and ritual. Reports 
indicate that there were Zoroastrian Armenians in Armenia until the 1920s. 
Persians and Armenians claim to be of Indo-European origin. The bulk 
of the Armenian population was forcefully transported (within the same 
empire) from their ancestral lands during the early seventeenth century 
for military and economic reasons (Sanasarian 2000: 34–40). The majority 
of the Armenians belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, an ancient 
orthodox and autocephalous branch of eastern Christianity that became 
the church of the original Armenian State in 314 AD. There are also small 
numbers of Catholic and Protestant Armenians in Iran.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to summarize the evolution of the Assyr-
ians and Chaldeans in Iran and the modern Middle East. This is related to 
the convoluted and complex history of their social and political develop-
ments as well as the role of missionaries in the region. Suffice it here to say 
that, in general, the Nestorians in their various reincarnations are referred 
to as the modern Assyrians. The bulk of the Chaldeans are Catholic, and 
they traditionally reside in the Khuzestan province. Their patriarchal seat is 
in Baghdad (Sanasarian 2000: 40–44). Starting around 2006, there has been 
a movement led by the Holy See in Vatican to encourage unity between 
the various Catholic Eastern Christian churches, particularly between 
Chaldeans and Assyrians.6
The decline in the numbers of ethnic Christian groups in Iran has been 
dramatic. The Armenian population declined from 250,000 in the mid-1970s 
to 150,000 in the mid-1990s. One source places them at 90,000 today. The 
number of Assyrians and Chaldeans declined from 30,000 in the mid-1970s 
to between 16–18,000 in the mid-1990s; today their numbers are negligible 
(Sanasarian 2000: 36–7).7
6 www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/docum. The author thanks 
Mr. Sina Mossayeb for this information.
7 See Table 2. For a summary of the 1996 official census, see, United States Department 
of State, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2005. Also see Iran Daily, 
21 December 2005.
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Iranian Christians are Muslim converts, mainly to Protestant faiths, who 
have never had political representation in Parliament. They refer to them-
selves as ‘Christians’ and mix and socialize with ethnic Christians of Prot-
estant beliefs who retain their ethnic identity. In other words, Protestant 
Armenians see themselves as Armenians and socialize with the Apostolics 
as well as Muslim converts. Even in the pre-Islamic government era, during 
the Pahlavi regime, these Churches were watched closely by the govern-
ment. Acts of vigilantism against these churches were common, and they 
did not feel protected by the State (Tafti 1364: 44–6). Much persecution has 
befallen this group of Christians, ironically including Armenian Protestants, 
though they are not converts from Islam. Due to their missionary nature 
and their zeal to spread Christianity among Muslims, all Protestant groups 
have been suspect. According to the Iranian Christians, their numbers were 
around two to three thousand in 1977. By the end of 2007, their numbers 
had increased to over 250,000, some one thousand fold increase (Mojdeh 
2007: 1; U.S. News & World Report). These numbers, however, cannot be 
substantiated. The Islamic Republic’s official national census of 2006 states 
the total number of Christians in the country (including ethnic Armenians, 
Assyrians, and Chaldeans) is a mere 109,500.8
The Jewish presence in Iran predates the Christians. At least since the 
conquest of the Babylonian Empire by Cyrus the Great in 539 BC, Jews 
with a distinctive identity lived in the region. There were also many Jewish 
sectarian and even messianic movements in Persia. Jews wrote classical 
Persian in Hebrew letters (known as Judeo-Persian), and their prose and 
poetry reflected a synthesis of the two cultures. The Jews have faced many 
problems in post-1500 Persia, with the founding of the Safavid Dynasty 
which made Shiʿism the official state religion. These problems continued 
through the nineteenth-century.9 The Pahlavi era was most congenial to 
the Jewish population. Jewish synagogues, organizations, and associations 
operated freely, and their economic and educational status improved 
dramatically. In post-1979, the decline in the number of Jews has been 
substantial. They numbered 75–80,0000 in the 1970s and 20–30,000 in the 
1990s (Sanasarian 2000: 48). The latest national census placed them at 
around 9,250 (Paivandi 2008: 41, note 21).
Zoroastrianism was the state religion of three pre-Islamic Persian 
empires, and Zoroastrian communities continued to live in the country 
8 Iran Statistical Center, 2007 cited in note #20 in Paivandi 2008: 41.
9 For a detailed study of this period, see Tsadik 2007.
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after the Islamic take over. They experienced oppression and conversion, 
but they also participated in various important national events in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Zoroastrians acquired special 
importance during the time of the monarchy, which used a lot of pre-
Islamic Zoroastrian symbols to design and enrich its modern nationalism. 
Before 1979, their numbers were reported to be 30,000; in the mid-1990s 
at 50,000, and today the official statistics reports them as having 19,800 
adherents in Iran (Sanasarian 2000: 48–50, Paivandi 2008: 41, note 19). Due 
to the association of Zoroastrianism with the pre-Islamic Persian past, 
members of the disenchanted population tend to declare themselves to be 
adherents of Zoroastrianism; therefore, although there are generationally 
solid Zoroastrians in Iran, there is also a fluid identity among non-formal 
Zoroastrians of Muslim Shiʿi background. This is evident in a number 
of cultural practices such as the celebration of the first day of spring as 
Persian New Year.
The Bahaʾi case has been distinct from other non-Muslim communities. 
First, it rose in the nineteenth-century from amongst Shiʿi Muslims as a 
post-Islamic religion, violating the belief among Muslims that Prophet 
Muhammad was the last of the prophets [Seal of Prophets]. Second, it got 
entangled with political and historical developments of the time in the 
region. While there were always conspirational rumors about non-Muslims, 
other factors intensified the Bahaʾi existence. They “did not belong to any 
particular ethnic group; they spoke the same language, and could not be 
identified by their names or specific geographic location” (Sanasarian 2008: 
163). In addition, they were welcoming converts, therefore easily becoming 
“the enemy within” (ibid.). During the Pahlavi reign, Islamic groups contin-
ued their harassment of Bahaʾis; however, due to the general atmosphere 
of modernization, secularization, and education, many Bahaʾis, like other 
non-Muslims, prospered in Iran. The statistical numbers for Bahaʾis are 
difficult to ascertain; their numbers were generally reported at 300,000 
during the mid- to late 1970s. For today, that number is not reliable but is 
still being used (Sanasarian 2000: 53).
Not much is known about the Mandeans who reside in Khuzestan prov-
ince. Sometimes referred to as Sabians, they seem to trace their religious 
beliefs to John the Baptist. They are not officially recognized as a religious 
minority and have claimed much discrimination. Research indicates that 
the name Sabi’a appears several times in the Quran and mostly in favora-
ble references. Yet, this one name appears to be referring to two separate 
groups. There seems to have been consistent confusion about their identity 
from the beginning. According to Yohanan Friedmann “The great number 
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and variety of definitions which can be found in the literature of hadith, 
fiqh and tafsir stem from the fact that the Muslim traditionalists had no 
firm knowledge of Sabiun [plural]. They were obliged, nevertheless, to 
deal with them in order to explain the relevant references in the Quran” 
(Friedman 2003: 82; notes 146 and 147).
The Legal and Social Situation
Due to the dramatic reduction of non-Muslims in Iran, any discussion of 
their legal and social status seems pointless. After a very rich and dynamic 
history in medieval and early modern Iran, old Jewish and ethnic Christian 
communities are fast disappearing (Khanbaghi 2006).
In the past thirty years of theocracy, legally not much has changed. 
Recognized non-Muslims are second class citizens and non-recognized 
Bahaʾis, Iranian Christian converts, and Sabians are simply non-citizens. 
Bahaʾis and Iranian Christians live constantly under the threat of apostasy, 
the penalty of which is death. 
The issue of apostasy in Islam has been discussed by others with special 
attention to complex religious texts, special cases, and historical develop-
ments (Friedman 2003: Chapter 4); it remains outside the scope of this 
article. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, apostasy has been used 
in three ways: against Muslims who have converted to Christianity, against 
Bahaʾis for their post-Islamic religion (violating the belief that Prophet 
Mohammad was the seal of prophets), and against all those who are accused 
of insulting the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams.
The worst of all legislation (which curiously still remains in the books) is 
regarding inheritance. Although each officially recognized religious minority 
determines inheritance according to its own community’s religious rules, 
another law takes precedence. If there is a Muslim in the family (or if one 
member of the family converts to Islam), he inherits the entire estate. 
Non-Muslim relatives cannot inherit from a Muslim. This is a repeat of the 
“Law of Apostasy” which was in effect during the Safavid Dynasty several 
centuries ago (Sanasarian 2000: 131). It was elaborated in the written works 
of Shiʿi religious figures before the 1979 revolution and afterwards became 
the law of the land. 
The penal code treats Muslims and non-Muslims differently, extending 
it to include gender and sexual orientation. For example, the penalty for 
a non-Muslim male who engages in a sexual relationship with a Muslim 
woman is death; for the Muslim male, it is one hundred lashes (Sanasarian 
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2000: 131–32). The intensity and depth of Muslim/non-Muslim differentia-
tion is most evident in legislation dealing with homosexuality. The law 
distinguishes between active ( fael) and passive (maful) partners. In the 
case of sexual intercourse, if both are Muslim, their penalty is death. If, 
however, the intercourse has not taken place, both receive one hundred 
lashes. The picture changes, however, if the active partner is a non-Muslim 
and the passive partner is a Muslim; then, the non-Muslim is subject to 
death (instead of lashes).
Several points are significant in this distinction: 
(1)  the hierarchical placing of the value of life between Muslim and a 
non-Muslim; 
(2)  the harsher treatment of the non-Muslim; and 
(3)  the designation of active or passive partner, which has two implica-
tions—the non-Muslim can easily be identified as active either by the 
Muslim partner or the Islamic judge and put to death, and the connota-
tion that even in the realm of homosexual intercourse the non-Muslim 
will not be allowed to act as the active (which implied aggressive) 
partner in contact with the Muslim (Sanasarian 2000: 132–3).
For three decades, the legal value placed on the officially recognized 
religious minorities has been based on the following: a Muslim male is 
supreme; a recognized non-Muslim male is worth half of a Muslim male; 
a recognized non-Muslim female is worth half of her male co-religionist, 
making her worth one-fourth of the Muslim male. This was pertinent to the 
disbursement of blood price in criminal cases. After a lot of behind the scene 
maneuvering, by direct orders of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei 
the blood price between Muslims and officially recognized non-Muslims 
was made equal. In other words, the blood money paid by a perpetrator 
for killing or wounding a Jew, a Zoroastrian, and an officially recognized 
Christian is the same as for the killing or wounding of a Muslim. In all 
other areas of law, the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims has been 
preserved (Sanasarian and Davidi 2007: 63–6). If crimes were committed 
against Bahaʾis and Iranian-Christian converts, either the perpetrator went 
free or paid compensation to the judge, the court, or the government. 
Law is important, as it institutionalizes behavior and practice. It also 
impacts on social interactions, and unjust laws embolden the bullies and 
spread fear. For example, in a recent case, an ethnic Christian mechanic 
asked to be paid after repairing the car of a Muslim customer. The customer 
refused to pay, and when the mechanic complained, the customer threatened 
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to report him to the authorities as having insulted Prophet Muhammad. 
Fearing the consequences, the mechanic backed off in despair.10
The impact of words as a force for unleashing untruths and violence has 
been discussed elsewhere (Sanasarian 2008: 159). While the legal system is 
discriminatory, the leadership of the regime emboldens individuals to do as 
they wish, and even the officially recognized religious minorities have no 
recourse. The situation is magnified for the non-recognized religious minori-
ties. Attacks against Iranian Christians and their arrest and imprisonment 
in different parts of the country have been an ongoing process.11 From late 
2007, over a dozen cases of arson attacks against the Bahaʾis were reported 
throughout the country. This intensification of anti-Bahaʾism was brushed 
aside by the press attaché for the Iranian delegation at the United Nations 
in New York by saying “They are full of claims, not verified by anybody.” 
Yet, the Director of Human Rights Watch for the Middle East described the 
events as “a natural outcome of the government’s most recent campaign to 
vilify and attack the Bahai community, disparaging them and their beliefs in 
the press with a spate of anti-Bahai articles in the government-run press”12 
The widespread attacks and their intensity led to a number of unusual 
moves inside the country such as: a fatwa in support of the Bahaʾis by 
Ayatollah Montazeri, who had been an avid anti-Bahaʾi in the past; Nobel 
laureate attorney, Shirin Ebadi, accepting the defense of the seven arrested 
leaders of the Bahaʾi community; and signatures of a few individuals inside 
Iran on a declaration stating how ashamed they were of the treatment of 
Bahaʾis in Iran. These were all major unprecedented events.13
Reaction to Discrimination and Injustice
As the last case demonstrates, the harsh, persistent, and particular escala-
tion of the persecution of Bahaʾis has ignited the most intense reaction 
internationally. An assessment of the actions of the regime and the reactions 
of international bodies has been presented in another work showing that 
the Khatami administration and its proponents were more likely to try to 
10 The story was conveyed to the author by a close relative of the mechanic in question. 
The encounter was in 2009.
11 www.TelevisionWashington.com, 26 Day 1388 [16 January 2010].
12 “Iran: Religious minority reports arson attacks”, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/
meast/07/29/iran.arson/index.html?eref=rss_world.
13 See, http://www.we-are-ashamed.com.
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appease the international community than is Ahmadinejad’s administra-
tion (Sanasarian and Davidi 2007: 61–3).
From amongst recognized non-Muslims, Jews have been targeted by the 
Ahmadinejad administration. As before, the Jewish leadership has been 
extremely accommodating and supportive of the regime. For thirty years, 
the Iranian Jews have emphasized their separation from Israel and Zion-
ism, reiterating their loyalty to the Islamic State. Attacks on synagogues 
and the negative portrayal of Jews in the media do not provoke a nega-
tive response from the existent Jewish community. However, in a striking 
departure in 2006, the Jewish deputy in parliament reacted to the denial of 
the Holocaust: “It’s very regrettable to see a horrible tragedy so far reach-
ing as the Holocaust being denied . . . it was a very big insult to Jews all 
around the world”; he also condemned the exhibition of cartoons about 
the Holocaust organized by an Iranian newspaper owned by the Tehran 
municipality.14 While the protests against the denial of the Holocaust were 
impressive, no change was forthcoming. The anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, and 
anti-Israel messages continue to be intertwined. They have been uttered 
with such frequency that whether the Jewish community reacts positively 
or negatively at this stage would not matter at all. 
A year after the public reaction of the Jewish deputy, Hashemi Rafsanjani 
(generally known as a ‘moderate’ and rarely in the Ahmadinejad camp), 
chairman of the Expediency Council, during the Friday sermon on “Inter-
national Jerusalem Day” said that
Europe resolved a great problem . . . What Hitler and the German Nazis did 
to the Jews of Europe at that time was partly due to the circumstances with 
the Jews. They wanted to expel the Zionists from Europe because they always 
were a pain in the neck for the governments there . . . The first goal was to 
save Europe from the evil of Zionism, and in this, they have been relatively 
successful.15
In December 2008 in a pre-agenda speech to the Majilis, with President 
Ahmadinejad present, the Jewish deputy condemned Israel’s invasion 
of Gaza calling it “the barbarous behavior of the occupying regime” and 
“crimes of the Zionist regime”. Afterwards, the Jewish deputy left the 
podium and shook hands with the President kissing him on the cheek, 
14 “Iran’s proud but discreet Jews,” 22 September 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/5367892.stm
15 The speech aired on Channel 1, Iranian TV, 5 October 2007, translated by The Middle 
East Media Research Institute. http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/1575.htm.
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while some members of the Jewish community carried a protest against 
the State of Israel in front of the United Nations office in Tehran.16
Conformity and acceptance have long been a characteristic response 
from recognized religious minorities. They have shown an impressive 
resilience and an instinctive activation of historically ingrained survival 
techniques. Expressions of loyalty to the regime, any regime, have been 
common. In the face of discrimination, the protests have been measured. 
During the early years of the founding of the Islamic regime, some actions 
were overt, such as the stand-off between the Armenian community and 
the authorities over education and the teaching of the Armenian language. 
This was a right which the Armenians had enjoyed (with occasional dis-
ruption) for centuries; it was inconceivable that it would be taken away 
(Sanasarian 1995: 247–52). A host of issues attacked the sensitivities of the 
minority communities at different periods: confiscation of their schools (for 
whatever reason), headcover for Zoroastrian and ethnic Christian women, 
harassment of community members, and teaching minority religions with 
a text written by unknown Muslims. 
“Recognized religious minorities adjusted but also resisted, they bent 
but stood firm, they educated but realigned themselves with the new 
circumstances. Each group resorted to its own shrewd traditional pattern 
of subterfuge, reconciliation, negotiation, and show of obedience to deal 
with the regime” (Sanasarian 2000: 155). Some acts of resistance did pay 
off, but most did not; those who had power were arrogant and ideologi-
cally equipped with a sense of righteous superiority, characteristics which 
finally turned them against each other with venomous force.
Thirty years have revealed another form of response from religious 
minorities, a response which was not so readily available to them earlier. 
While there had been occasional groups of minorities leaving for the West, 
Israel, Armenia, Australia and so forth, the twenty first century provided 
a much easier exit strategy. Mass out-migration from the country (and 
for Christians, from the Islamic Middle East) is the ultimate response. It 
makes a statement that these minorities do not want to suffer persecution, 
lack of political and economic opportunities, inferior legal status, confined 
segregated existence, adjustment, or compromise. Only one generation 
earlier, it was a novelty to leave; now it is the norm. When aspirations 
are not fulfilled and opportunities for exit exist, there is no reason to stay 
16 WashingtonTV, 30 December 2009. http://televisionwashington.com/media1 
.apsx?lang=en&id=727
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and suffer, manage, conform, and accommodate. This is particularly rel-
evant to the younger generation of the minority (and also the majority) 
populations. In other words, the nature of response is changing and it is 
changing fast.
Nationalism, Religion and Identity
The concern over discrimination against minorities thirty years ago was 
actualized not only through laws but also through school textbooks. Text-
books were the means of repression and identity formation. An extensive 
study of 95 compulsory school textbooks published in the school years 
2006–2007 reveals the systematic cultivation of a desired identity by the 
State. The textbooks used in the study covered the sciences, humanities, and 
religious subjects from grades one to eleven; both statistical and qualitative 
analysis of image and content were used. 
The study’s conclusions are that the Sunni-Shiʿi differences are played 
down but remain intact. While the emphasis is on unity, “all historical, 
social, and religious issues are interpreted from the stance of Shiʿite beliefs 
and traditions”. Here the unity “must come from the government and take 
place based on the superiority of Shiʿism and its beliefs and traditions” 
(Paivandi 2008: 40; 41). References to “we Muslims” abound, but “the 
Shiʿites’ quest for superiority is a main feature of the Iranian curriculum. 
This structural approach causes even the discourse on the equality of fol-
lowers of all religions and ethnic groups to remain only a claim and to be 
negated in practice” (Paivandi 2008: 73). While there are some nationalist 
trends in textbooks, what dominates is “Shiʿite-egocentrism, ideological 
view of the world, and fear of growth of ethnic movements. In addition, 
the national and Islamic identities are all-encompassing and there is little 
room for other forms of identity” (Paivandi 2008: 47).
The textbook study also reveals the overall ethos of the Iranian theocracy. 
It shows that the Islamic Republic is portrayed as a sacred regime, the result 
of God’s will and immune from criticism. Finally the textbooks perpetuate 
a dichotomy between the “self ” and the “other”, for instance between Iran 
and its enemies, between the godly and the infidel, or between the truly 
pious and the monafegh (hypocrite), and this dichotomy fuels antagonism 
toward groups or individuals who are different (Paivandi 2008: 4).
As the 2009 post-election demonstrations unraveled and flare ups 
continued in the following months, the reaction of the authorities was an 
indicator of a worldview discerned in the above study of textbooks. The 
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Minister of Information, in a speech to state governors in December 2009, 
said that the purpose of the demonstrations was to change the regime. He 
identified the following elements to be responsible for the chaos: “Hypo-
crites [opposite of pious], the monarchists, religious and ethnic terrorists, 
Bahaʾis, homosexuals, feminist groups and those who favor equal rights of 
women and men, nationalists and Marxists”.17
By January 2010, the official Keyhan newspaper called the attorney Shirin 
Ebadi a Bahaʾi and asserted that supporters of Mr. Mussavi (the main con-
tender against President-elect Ahmadinejad) are Bahaʾis and terrorists. The 
article engaged an old diatribe about Bahaʾis penetrating the monarchist 
regime and being responsible for recent events.18 Several days before, the 
state-owned television of the Islamic Republic broadcast an interview with 
“an expert” who accused the female advisor of the other failed contender 
of the June presidential elections, Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi, of being a sup-
porter of the Bahaʾis. Karrubi, former Speaker of the Majlis [parliament], 
was called a “pseudo-cleric”.19
Thirty years ago neither Mr. Karrubi nor Mr. Mussavi would have 
envisioned a day when they would be closely associated with the Bahaʾis. 
Yet, a system which is built on a constant perpetuation of ‘self ’ and ‘the 
other’ always gives birth to new ‘others’ from old ‘selves’; and finally turns 
against itself as the list of enemies multiply and power struggles intensify. 
The State’s response to the events following the June 2009 elections shows 
that ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationalists’, whoever they may be these days, have 
become culprits along with other undesirables. The response demonstrates 
the State’s ideological view of the world, built-in dichotomies, and the 
resurfacing of deeply entrenched long-time-in-the-making power struggles 
within the regime. 
The relationship between nationalism and religion has been odd through-
out the modern history of the country. During the Pahlavi monarchy, 
while Shiʿism was not cast aside, the Zoroastrian components and symbols 
were used in order to connect modern Iran to an ancient pre-Islamic and 
pre-Arab-dominated past. The term used in this era was Persian national-
ism. The overthrow of the monarchy was also the fall of the Zoroastrian 
components of nationalism by the religious-dominated State and its total 
replacement by Twelver Shiʿism. Due to the lack of serious survey data, 
17 www.TelevisionWashington.com, 2 Day 1388 [23 December 2009].
18 www.TelevisionWashington.com, 15 Day 1388 [5 January 2010].
19 WashingtonTV, 29 December 2009. (http://televisionwashington.com/floater_article1 
.aspx?lang=en&t=1&id=16876 
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it is hard to say where an individual citizen’s identity lies, whether they 
live inside the country or reside abroad. At best, it should be a confused 
one revolving around some convenient self-serving identity with selective 
cultural nuances.
In the policy toward religious minorities, there remains an important 
difference between the Persian nationalism (with secular overtones) of the 
monarchist regime and the Shiʿi-egocentrism of the religious State. The 
former was more inclined to a policy of homogenization than the latter 
(Sanasarian 2000: 15; 54–6).20 It insisted on inclusivity, at least ideologi-
cally, while prejudice and stereotypes remained below the surface. The 
mixing of members of religious and ethnic minorities was encouraged 
and welcomed. 
The Shiʿi theocracy is exclusive by design, resulting in separation and 
segmentation along religious lines. Emphasis on Twelver Shiʿism as a state 
ideology would not convert religious minorities but simply reinforce their 
own identity. Perpetual discrimination against Sunnis and non-Muslims 
has made them more of a Sunni and a non-Muslim than ever before. Such 
a narrow particularistic religious dictatorship has been maintained merely 
by intimidation and coercion. The objective here has been to obtain and 
use state power against enemies, both internal and external. The main 
challenge and power struggle continues to be within the Shiʿi majority 
society and the State.
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CONCLUSION
NATION-BUILDING AND MINORITY RIGHTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Elizabeth Picard
Numerous and converging indications suggest that the religious minorities 
of the Middle East are living at a critical juncture in this early twenty-first 
century. Every other day, news media bring the subject to the front pages, 
reporting tensions raised in Algeria by the conversion of a few dozen 
citizens to Christian evangelism, persecutions suffered by non-Muslims 
in Northern Iraq, and sectarian strife in the rest of the country or in Leba-
non. And while full of promises, the revolutionary wind blowing from the 
Persian Gulf to the Atlantic in the early 2010s raises new questions. What 
is often referred to as a global minority crisis ‘in the Arab world’ or ‘in the 
Muslim world’ is a complex phenomenon which combines structural and 
cultural dimensions, and needs to be examined in light of its historical 
background and sociological context. On the one hand, it is a structural 
crisis where demography and law are determining factors. A long-term 
difference in birth rates and emigration traditions between religious and 
confessional groups1 has resulted in deep demographic imbalance, while 
several decades of discriminating legislation have deepened the gap (Cour-
bage and Fargues 1997; Jones 2006: 252.). On the other hand, the current 
‘minority crisis’ is a crisis of difference: a crisis where “relation between 
individuals is characterised by uncertainty” because the old social and 
cultural order is falling apart (Balandier 1986: 501). Together, structural and 
cultural factors combine. In view of the hundreds of thousands of people 
who took refuge in another country of the Middle East or emigrated to the 
West during the recent decades, we cannot but acknowledge that several 
1 In the following I use the term “confessional” to mean both religious and confessional, 
since a confessional group is de facto part of a larger religious one. However, in this chapter, 
the variable of interest is less the doctrine or faith of the group than its collective social 
identity. For this reason, I use the terms ‘community’ to refer to the group as a social orga-
nization, and ‘communalism’ as a sociological concept and a social formation in history. 
To refer to the collective political identity and mobilization of the group, I use the terms 
‘sect’ and ‘sectarianism’. Cf. Joseph and Pillsbury 1978.
© Elizabeth Picard, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_016
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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religious and confessional minorities do not enjoy freedom in their home-
land, where they may be symbolically excluded from the public sphere and 
political life and most often oppressed and even condemned to exile. To 
use Hirschmanian categories, their response to their precarious situation 
is either exit or silence (Hirschman 1970).
In several circumstances this existential crisis has led to multidimen-
sional violence: the structural violence of unequal constitutional laws 
enacted for specific identity groups; the spatial displacement or forced 
exile of local communities; assaults against individuals; street fighting along 
lines separating religious or sectarian communities; or even unnamed civil 
war. Truly, the social sciences cannot underestimate the seriousness of a 
crisis which concerns several local states to different degrees. Both history 
and sociology are needed to look into the genealogy of the crisis and take 
its context into account in order to overcome the blunt characterisation 
of violence against religious minorities as a cultural stigma, specifically 
associated with the societies and polities of the Middle East. Political 
sociology, for its part, is required to shed light on the complex relation 
between the political power—‘the state’—which claims sovereignty and 
the exclusive use of ‘legitimate violence’ (or legal use of force), on the one 
hand, and subordinated and discriminated sectarian communities, on the 
other hand. 
In order to do so, this chapter is organised under three main themes. 
First, it offers a retrospective look at the process of importation and 
adaptation of the nation-state formula in the newly created and/or newly 
independent entities of the Middle East. The main hypothesis is that 
diverging constitutional choices—either the choice of government of the 
demographic majority (Tocquevillian democracy), or the choice of ‘consen-
sus democracy’—namely the government of a coalition of identity groups 
acknowledging specific constitutional rights for the minorities (Lijphart 
1999)—shaped state-society relations differently in each country of the 
region, where they yielded both positive and negative effects which need 
to be assessed. 
Second, this chapter reflects on today’s revival of the minority issue and 
endeavours to analyze its specificity. My contention is that the minority 
crisis of today is radically different from the crisis which stirred social 
and political mobilisations in the nineteenth century, although it is also 
the product of a combination of a specific international conjuncture—
“glocalization” (Roudomatof 2005)—and its internalisation by local soci-
eties in the Middle East. Namely, I assume that the authoritarian regimes 
established in the region since the mid-1950s tend to compensate for the 
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failure of their pro-active national development policies and flamboyant 
regional ambitions by ‘redeploying the state’: leaving the management of 
national economies to private actors and investing rather in security and 
in the cultural and religious sectors they had until then neglected (Levy 
2006). Correlatively, the minority issue becomes the great “question of 
the century” (Debray 2008: 227), fed by exacerbated identity fundamental-
isms and established at the global level as a legitimate problem through 
the birth of a new international humanitarian law. This is why the term 
‘minority’ should be discussed beyond its indistinct reference to groups 
whose self-designation, legal status and political function vary widely 
(Bengio, Ben-Dor 1999).2 
In the third part, I look at Middle East identity mobilisations in the 
defence and promotion of minority groups and show how they mirror the 
nationalist ideologies of the ruling regimes, often using the same resources 
and the same strategies, thus questioning the supposed contrast between 
the powerful state and the powerless minority. My hypothesis is that the 
ruling power and the minority compete in the construction of we-groups. 
They concur in the strengthening of identity boundaries in order to gain 
access to limited material and symbolic resources. In this respect, religious 
diasporas play a specific role in politicising identities at home, exposing 
them, and supporting them. However, the surprising resilience of the 
nation-state suggests that what is taking place between state leadership 
and minority groups in many countries of the Middle East is a political 
exchange, of specific nature and means, which challenges the notion of 
citizenship. 
Examination of these three dimensions of the minority issue in the 
Middle East needs to be carried out in comparative perspective in order to 
open up the understanding of a region often labelled as ‘exceptional’ and 
un-amenable to global change. At the same time, a sound comprehension 
of the current situation requires taking into account the specific historical 
trajectory of each local state. Therefore, I use the perspective of historical 
sociology to try to read the current crisis in light of the crisis that struck 
religious minorities in the late Ottoman era, after the adoption of a revo-
lutionary code of citizenship and the growing interference of European 
powers in the affairs of the Empire’s non-Muslim minorities (Karpat 1992). 
2 For lack of respect of such a requirement, analysis might be plagued by ideological 
prejudice.
328 elizabeth picard
To this day, the legacy of the millet system,3 the recognition of freedom 
of religion and culture (and sometimes language), and the allocation of a 
specific personal status to non-Muslim confessional communities are the 
major stakes of the legal and judicial institutions in most regional states. 
At the time of independence, a large majority of them took account of 
the confessional variable when enacting and applying personal and family 
law. Some of them even inscribed the legal pluralism inherited from the 
Ottomans into their constitutional rule. Today, the millet system—or at 
least its remainders—imposes a specific meaning (Geertz 1973: 12–3) to 
the organisation of the local societies. It provides clues for understanding 
the power brokering at work between the minorities and the state. As a 
result, “[its legacy] distils complex social categories into bounded catego-
ries whose correspondence to reality is problematic” (Peteet 2008: 550). By 
consequence, it is a controversial concept, as some analysts consider it a 
source of inspiration for liberalising the status of minority groups, while 
others denounce its fragmenting role and the subsequent paralysis of the 
nation-building process in the Middle East. 
Minorities and Nation-States
Middle Eastern states—either succeeding empires, like Turkey and Iran, 
or resulting from decolonisation, like most Arab states and Israel—were 
inspired by, and modelled along, the twentieth century European model 
of the nation-state. This genealogy is not always explicit in the institutions 
of the independent state, as it is often denied by its political elite. Still, it is 
easily discernable over a wide spectrum of political regimes as diverse as 
family emirates in the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary republics like Syria, 
regimes which refer primarily to Islamic rule such as Iran or Sudan, or 
marginal cases such as Somalia whose statist identity appears dubious. 
In spite of the strong influence of the secularist model,4 an overwhelming 
majority of the local states took into account the confessional variable when 
3 “The millet system of the Ottoman Empire enabled Christian, Jewish and Muslim com-
munities to co-exist more or less peacefully, each with their own form of self-government. 
While the millet system was generally humane and tolerant of group differences, it was 
not a liberal society, for it did not tolerate individual dissent within its constituent com-
munities. Rather it was a deeply conservative, theocratic and patriarchal society”. Kymlicka 
1992: 143. 
4 Including separation between state and religion, which has become a major char-
acteristic of contemporary Britain and France, the former major colonial powers in the 
Middle East. 
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enacting personal and family law and organising the cultural dimension 
of their public life; even the most secular among them, such as the Turk-
ish Republic and the Tunisia of Bourguiba, could not ignore the impact of 
religious identities on the basic social dynamics in their country.5 
When it came to enacting a constitution and adopting a modern mode 
of political representation, these states chose between one of the two 
options offered in Western Europe at that time: majority rule and con-
sensus rule.
Majority Rule and the Denial of Cultural Differences
In the so-called Tocquevillian model, the party and leader who secure the 
numerical plurality of votes in more or less fair, more or less open, electoral 
processes enjoy the legitimate right to govern and impose upon state and 
society their own identity and cultural preferences (Tocqueville1951: 374). 
When the political system presents a certain degree of democracy, it is open 
to a certain degree of uncertainty, and today’s majority might eventually 
become tomorrow’s minority (Przeworski 1988). Also, majority democracy 
is open to arrangements with minority groups and is required to organise 
the legal protection of their collective rights (Lijphart 1991). 
In most of the countries which emerged in the Middle East at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, majority rule bore another meaning, and 
rested on another rationale: in order to strengthen their new and often 
fragile power, the rulers held a discourse of unanimity, either in support 
of a charismatic or traditional leader, or based on a nationalist ideology. 
Authoritarian regimes were prone to deny cultural (either religious or 
ethnic) pluralism, suppress minority claims, and even eradicate minority 
movements in the name of a shared national identity. This was the case 
when the young Turkish Republic expelled non-Muslim populations from 
Anatolia in the 1920s, and when Arab regimes such as the Iraqi and Yemeni 
monarchies tolerated anti-Jewish pogroms and supported the massive emi-
gration of their Jewish communities organised by Israel in the 1950s. 
In 1951, Colonel Shishakli, Syria’s strong man, banished all references 
to confessional affiliations in official data such as the national census and 
in the political sphere. Invoking modernity, he suppressed the parliament 
seats traditionally reserved for religious minorities. The rhetoric of this 
eradication was that the implementation of the principle of secularism 
5 In these ‘secular’ states, religious institutions are not autonomous from the state, and 
Islam remains a constant reference, implicit or explicit, for the regime (Webb 2008).
330 elizabeth picard
shielded non-Muslims from being stigmatised because of their religious 
identity, and that the common Arab identity of the Syrian people subsumed 
any sub-national cultural difference.6 Since that period, parliamentary rep-
resentation in Syria is based on formal equality between citizens (one man 
one vote), and the only difference admitted is between ‘workers’ (wage—
earners) and other citizens, in order to enhance the representation of the 
former. This system is purported to be best suited to guarantee individual 
rights and collective democracy. The state leadership, supposedly issued 
from the national majority, claims to be accountable for its public policies 
only to “exquisite citizens” freed from their confessional (or ethnic) prison 
(Gellner in Leca and Schemeil 1983: 479).
In the last decades, an alternative discourse of unanimity has tended 
to substitute for secular nationalism, namely the reference to the Muslim 
identity of an overwhelming majority of the local populations. In the 
Middle East, several governments amended the national constitution and 
promulgated new laws to stress the Islamic nature of their regime. Beyond 
their deep differences in nature and processes, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Wahhabite Saudi monarchy and the Sudanese religious dictator-
ship epitomize this trend. Their central reference to Islam allow each of 
them to rule arbitrarily in the name of equity, social justice and common 
good, and by the same token to claim to protect non-Muslim minorities 
maintained under their domination by means of social contracts (‘pacts’). 
Majority rule, in these cases, amounts to the impossibility of integration 
of individuals belonging to minority groups into the national community 
and their forced submission to the dominant rule.
Ever since the mid-1950s, the authoritarian implementation of the so-
called majority rule and reference to an exclusive or dominant common 
identity has amounted to the imposition of a “forced consensus” on reli-
gious out-groups (Copeaux 2000). What was really taking place was that 
a family or clannish coalition managed to seize power by violent and/or 
illicit means, and monopolize political and economic positions in several 
kingdoms and republics of the Middle East. Instead of governing for the 
sake of the nation, these rulers co-opt and exclude segments of the society 
on a regional, ethnic or confessional basis, sometimes imposing a ruling 
majority at odds with its demographic and social weight.7 Among many 
6 In Syria as in Iraq and Turkey, such a stance was first and foremost anti-Kurdish. 
7 In several cases they condemned the demographic majority to political minorisation 
and forbade the birth of a program-based alternative majority. Cf. Salamé 1991. 
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documented cases, we can mention the examples of Syria, governed by 
members of the Alawi sect (11 percent of the nation’s population) since 
1970; of Iraq, tyrannised by Saddam and his Sunni Baʿth ist networks8 from 
1969 to 2003; and the case of Bahrain, where a Sunni monarchy still rules 
over a 65 percent Shiʿi majority. 
Although more recent, experiments with the so-called ‘Islamic rule’ have 
proved even more detrimental to minorities because of the discrepancy 
between legally imposed inequalities and official claims for theocratic uni-
versalism. In the eyes of a ruler claiming a privileged link between God and 
society, minority groups—even those granted a legal status and some kind 
of state protection such as ahl al-kitāb9—remain social anomalies meant 
to be either assimilated by the umma or expelled from it. Consequently, 
Bahaʾis are persecuted in Islamic Iran, the Sudanese regime fights continu-
ous wars against its animist and Christian populations, and the Saudis treat 
their Shiʿis as a second class population at best.
Under such rulers, societal response to the alternative integration/ 
exclusion (either you belong to the nation or you are condemned to sym-
bolic or physical exile) revolved around the three famous Hirschmanian 
strategic categories: either tacit submission (‘loyalty’), because the dominant 
discourse could only be challenged in privacy; or exposure and political 
mobilisation (‘voice’) against the rule of unanimity; or concealment and 
exile (‘exit’), because the cost of the other strategies was not sustainable.10 
Until 1990, when the conflict between the capitalist and socialist worlds 
prevailed and kept ‘in the fridge’ ethnic and religious identities, most reli-
gious minorities of the Middle East chose the first response. Also, many 
minority members expected to be part of the promised national develop-
ment, either as its beneficiaries like any citizen, or as actors, because they 
enjoyed a high level of education and proficiency. In fact, a noticeable 
number of minority members did benefit from upward mobility in the 
‘nationalist’ decades. For example, the history of Egypt in the 1940s and 
1950s echoed with the names of Coptic leaders and intellectuals deeply 
involved in their nation’s development. All over the Middle East, Christians 
and Jews were numerous in Communist and leftist parties, convinced as 
they were of sharing with their Muslim fellow citizens a common secular 
faith in development. Correlatively, local leaders and ignorant or accomplice 
 8 By network I mean stable schemes of horizontal interaction.
 9 People of the Holy Book, meaning mainly Christians and Jews. 
10 For an example of the alternative see Bozarslan 2002: 137. On forced silence and the 
practice of taqiya (concealment), see the chapters by Firro and Louër, in this volume.
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Western commentators were prone to praise the aggressive nation-building 
engineered by the state and to predict its progressive substitution for 
obsolete primordial identities—such as family links, clannish affiliations, 
attachment to a confessional community or an ethnic minority—that 
used to compete with one another and fragment the nation. Still, beneath 
this outward unanimity, intractable identity claims kept boiling, and they 
were occasionally suppressed with extreme state violence: examples are 
the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama (Syria) in 1982, the 
assassination of members of the Sadr sādaʾ family in Najaf (Iraq) and the 
deportation of thousands of Shiʿis in April 1980 (Tripp 2002: 229–31), or 
the military suppression of Shiʿi demonstrations in the Eastern Saudi prov-
ince of Hassa in the late 1980s. 
Minority Representation and the Improbable Nation
After the end of the bipolar era and following the series of identity crises in 
the Balkans and the Caucasus, Middle East authoritarian states’ claims to 
national unanimity lost their credibility domestically and internationally. 
A critical reappraisal of the legacy of empires in the region—the Otto-
man and Safavid Empires, but also the European colonial empires in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries—revealed the durable impact of their 
institutional engineering of societal pluralism. Social institutions, such as 
the millet, and political institutions, such as minority representation, were 
revisited, often to underline their efficiency in the peaceful regulation of 
state-society relations in contrast with the devastating effects of “unani-
mist” communist and socialist authoritarian regimes (Poulton 200). In 
addition to this powerful revisionism, constitutionalists who reflected on 
political engineering in the Middle East were deeply influenced by North 
American communitarianism (Etzione 1998).11 Post-conflict constitutional 
schemes increasingly favoured political sectarianism, i.e. the representation 
of ascribed identity groups in state institutions, and consensus govern-
ment, i.e. the government of a ruling coalition of sectarian (and/or other 
primordial identity) leaders. 
Although most of the Middle East states had broken off with pluralist 
representation at the time of independence or in the thrill of nationalist 
fever in the 1950s and 1960s, several of them kept elements of political 
confessionalism in their constitutional framework. For example, there are 
11 In reference to their attention to minority rights in today’s diversifying societies. 
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traces of minority representation in the constitutional systems of states 
as distinct as the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sanasarian 2000),12 Israel,13 
Palestine,14 or Jordan, where a quota of nine seats is reserved for Christians 
in the National Assembly (majlis al-umma).15 In these states, identity plays 
a crucial role in the distribution and exercise of power. Moreover, the rela-
tionship between the state and social groups, but also between the state 
and individuals belonging to these groups, remains partly based on ascribed 
identities rather than on acquired qualities and virtues or constructed 
interests. Ascribed identities are held as the legitimate criteria to confer 
cultural, educational and even territorial autonomy, and, more generally, 
to distribute functions, positions, and material and symbolic public goods. 
There is more: the majority itself, either demographic or political, has, 
in its turn, become contaminated by the practices of the leadership and 
tends also to establish its relationship to the state through confessional 
criteria, playing on the centrality of its identity within the polity. Both 
government policies and societal responses concur to reinforce sectarian 
discourses, behaviour and interactions. Finally, the society as a whole tends 
to formulate its political expectations and demands in terms of identity 
privileges, frustration or alienation. 
Identity politics gained momentum as development and welfare poli-
cies waned. It has been argued that, by producing an instant photograph 
of a country’s diversity, the confessional (or ethnic) variable offers a fair 
criterion for distributing political (as well as economic and military) power 
between segments of the population. Once the groups are counted, fair dis-
tribution of power could be organised. Strong communal organisation and 
especially the presence of a powerful communal leadership might ensure 
better participation in the state. Rather than competing or splitting apart, 
the sectarian groups of a given country would supposedly become satisfied 
with their respective status and share of the cake, and be able to come to 
12 The constitution of the Islamic Republic reserves four seats (out of 73) for deputies 
representing the Assyrian/Chaldean, Armenian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian communities. 
Cf. Sanasarian 2000. The Constitution also discriminates against religious minorities. Cf. 
Fédération internationale des Ligues des droits de l’Homme, 2003.
13 The Jewish state acknowledges three “nationalities” (Jewish, Arab and Druze) with 
their separate identity and communal institutions, whose proximity to the state differs, 
for example, in military drafting and access to state employment.
14 The Palestinian electoral Law of 1995 reserved a quota of 6 seats for the Christians 
and 1 for the Samaritans; in the new electoral Law (2005) 6 out of the 66 seats allocated to 
the majority system are reserved for Christians.
15 At odds with their demographic weight (3–4%) but also with their remarkable share 
in the private economic power (40%), according to Sabbagh 2004. 
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an understanding over power devolution. Minorities, once recognised and 
legalised, might be full actors on the public scene (Hanf 1993). 
Such a positive assessment stands in sharp contrast with the dramatic 
failure of ‘majority’ rule, a political system still plaguing several countries 
of the region at the turn of the millennium. Eager to see the Middle East 
‘democratize’, the US and its allies not only launched devastating military 
campaigns, they also have ambitions to put an end to the local despotic 
regimes and their ‘majority’ rule, and they searched for constitutional 
systems altogether adapted to plural nations and respectful of liberal con-
sensus. In the opinion of many international experts in state- and nation 
(re)-building, elite consensus becomes the key to fair political represen-
tation of minorities, as it is credited with organising fair power sharing 
between confessional (or ethnic) segments of a country’s population. 
‘Lebanonisation’, once a term which stigmatised the shattering agonistic 
societies in the Balkans, became a desirable model. In Lebanon, the execu-
tive and the legislature are meant to be equitably distributed along the 
supposed demographic weight of the 18 confessional indigenous groups, 
which are granted cultural, administrative and educational autonomy (Kerr 
1966). The political history of modern Lebanon is referred to as a constant 
search for inter-confessional balance at state level, and for the government 
of a large coalition altogether representative of the country’s major com-
munities and respectful of its minorities. 
Therefore, liberal (and supposedly democratic) consensus was chosen 
to rebuild the constitutional institutions of war-torn countries such as 
Iraq and Sudan. The Constitution of 2005 in Iraq16 and the Sudan Peace 
Agreement in the same year17 both entailed a mix of traditional individual 
federalism inspired by the Lebanese formula, in line with its Ottoman 
legacy, and by innovative and far-reaching territorial federalism. While 
the ethnic (Arab versus Kurdish) variable was prevalent in the Iraqi case, 
confessional affiliations tended to become the operative rationale behind 
regional mobilisations, party organisation, and even ideological division in 
the Arab two-thirds of the country. In Sudan, the distinction between Mus-
lim and non-Muslim regions was the criterion for separate administration 
and different sets of laws. In a complete reversal of analysis, the homoge-
16 The Constitution adopted in January 2005 refers, in its Article 9, to the “components 
of the Iraqi people”. The full text of the Iraqi Constitution approved by referendum has 
been translated from the Arabic by the United Nations’ Office for Constitutional Support; 
See McGarry and O’Leary 2007.
17 UN Security Council, Press release February 2, 2005.
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neous and egalitarian nation-state promoted at the time of independence 
was now seen as an evil. An odd coalition of Orientalist scholars and neo-
conservative administrators have re-discovered or re-invented the ‘true’ and 
intractable social dynamics of the local societies: tribes susceptible to be 
co-opted in the pro-American sahwa (“awakening”) in Sunni Iraq, African 
versus Arab ‘ethnies’ (not to say races) segmenting the society in Darfur, 
and religious communities described as the inevitable and constant victims 
of discriminatory minority policies (Davis 2008: 556). 
Real life, however, proved to be far from fulfilling these normative 
expectations. While democracy—or democratisation—became the slogan 
of constitutional engineering and good governance in the Middle East in 
the early years of the twenty-first century, one could not but notice the 
gap between principles and practices. Here again, the example of the 
post-Yugoslav Balkans was far from confirming the claim that constitu-
tional promotion of primordial belonging is crucial to securing minority 
rights (ICG 9 March 2009). Not only have individuals in a given religious 
group remained unequal in their relation to their communal leadership, 
but inequality between sectarian groups before the law, as well as their 
unequal access to the state, have been institutionalized. In Middle Eastern 
countries, where the economy is most often characterised by the prevalence 
of rents over production profits, the exchange of loyalties and symbolic 
and material goods takes place along identity channels—confessional 
belonging being one of the most salient. In other words, identity politics 
establish clientelism as the privileged mode of political exchange (Roni-
ger 2004). As a result, competition between sectarian groups for access to 
public goods feeds the persistent fragmentation of the nation and creates 
a deep sense of insecurity among minorities. Notwithstanding that, social 
dynamics (demographic change and social and spatial mobility) concur in 
belying the basis for the distribution of power and goods between sectar-
ian groups, thus raising incessant frustration and contest as illustrated in 
post-civil war Lebanon, where the ‘consensus’ rule had been renewed and 
reinforced in the new Constitution of 1990, only to feed new sectarian strife 
(Salamey, Payne 2008). 
The problem with the ‘consensus’ formula is that it locks up people 
in identity categories, instilling supposedly primordial differences in the 
political culture, submitting political negotiation to supposedly immutable 
rules, and paralysing governmental decision in the name of power-sharing. 
While no society, not even plural societies like those of the Middle East, is 
‘naturally’ sectarian, taking the risk to enhance sectarianism cannot protect 
against authoritarianism. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes are keen 
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to take advantage of social segmentation and encourage political fragmen-
tation in order to ‘counterbalance’ between rival confessional segments 
(Belkin, Schofer 2004). Comparative analyses concur: proportional repre-
sentation of segmental groups—either family, clannish or local—might 
produce the closest image of social composition at a precise time, or at least 
the clearest image. It nevertheless results in locking up a society within the 
boundaries of primordial identities and, finally, in freezing and deepening 
its inner boundaries, with the risk of drawing a nation toward civil conflict 
and secession. Consensus democracy might help the empowerment of 
some segmental groups, especially confessional minorities, in the short 
term; it succeeded in Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s, but it simultaneously 
hampers the promotion of collective interests such as the production and 
distribution of public goods; it paralyses trans-confessional dynamics, and 
denies them legitimate political expression (Picard 2010).
Certainly, the respective flaws of majority and consensus rules in securing 
fair minority representation and promoting democratic transition do not 
exonerate analysts and decision-makers for their long-lasting underestima-
tion of minority issues in the Middle East (Picard 1980). After WW2, the 
imperative of top-down national development in countries then labelled 
‘underdeveloped’ was promoted by liberal and Marxist theoreticians concur-
rently. They were far less attentive to primordial identity differences than 
to inequalities of revenue and class. The minorities they had in mind were 
sociological minorities: children deprived of access to health care and edu-
cation; women deprived of equal human rights; and economically deprived 
peripheries. And they sometimes deliberately ignored cultural differences 
in the name of collective improvement. But today, as the cover is being 
lifted from the identity cauldron and the minority question has become a 
legitimate, and in some cases pressing, issue, we should be cautious not to 
be drawn into another hegemonic discourse; we should remain suspicious 
of the role of sectarian entrepreneurs in driving social dynamics, and of 
the negative effects of their instrumentalization. 
New Challenges for the State
The awakening of the ‘minority question’ in the Middle East was largely 
the product of the new conjuncture of the post-bipolar 1990s: domestically, 
authoritarian states were forced to become ‘modest’ and retreat from the 
economic field; in return they ‘re-deployed’ and invested in the cultural 
and security fields; internationally, Western powers’ and NGOs’ awareness 
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of the issue of human and cultural rights grew in response to the grow-
ing tensions in the region and thanks to information channelled through 
diaspora networks. 
The new visibility and topicality of the minority question can be linked 
with the re-deployment of the state in the Middle East, namely its retreat from 
the economic field and, in return, its strong involvement in the awakening 
and promotion of ascribed identities as well as in their securitisation. 
Since the mid-1980s, a majority of governments in the region have been 
compelled to adopt structural adjustment plans and partially de-regulate 
their national economies under direct and indirect pressure from interna-
tional financial institutions. In accordance with the new liberalisation dog-
mas, they chose to get rid of their redistributive policies, totally or partially. 
Most of them cut public subventions and reduced their intervention in the 
domains of health, education, housing, and subsidies for basic commodi-
ties. In order to trim the national budget they also suppressed a number of 
public jobs, traditionally destined to mask a high level of unemployment. 
These rough policies affected the local societies differently, according to 
their heterogeneity. At the core of each patrimonial state, the opening of 
the market (infitāh) to new bourgeoisies was organised and controlled by 
the same political military elite, and along the same primordial networks 
of identity (confessional and/or ethnic). Collaboration between political 
leaders and economic entrepreneurs took the form of clientelist exchange 
(dyadic and reciprocal) based on sectarian and matrimonial proximity. By 
contrast, distant peripheries, powerless social actors such as women and 
youth, and marginal cultural groups such as minority religious communi-
ties, were affected, as access to public goods became restricted through 
inter-personal filters. While facilitating an enlargement of the bourgeoisie, 
this new Middle East crony capitalism enhanced intra-sectarian solidarity 
and inter-sectarian competition by organising either rapprochement or 
marginalisation of given confessional groups (Johnson 1986; Kienle 1992; 
Bahout 1994).
As the domestic and foreign private sectors took the lead in the economic 
field, the domination of the state over its society through the redistribution 
of rents wore away, along with the discrediting of its legitimizing ideology 
(Henry, Springborg 2001). Hence, it became necessary for the state to re-
deploy and invest in domains previously neglected. Monarchies as well as 
republics endeavoured to raise patriotic feelings among their population 
and replace trust in the welfare state by a new form of attachment to the 
regime. Their investment in identity politics took a strong discursive dimen-
sion: publication of history and civic education school books, glorification 
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of turāth (cultural heritage) and its display in newly built museums, and 
the intensive use of i.t. communication tools were used to re-invent and 
re-format collective identities based on affects and private memories (Ger-
shoni, Jankowski 1997; Davis 2005). Moreover, the new patriotism promoted 
by the regimes stressed a new distinction, not between the domestic and the 
external realms but within the country, between the national community 
and its domestic enemies, between loyal citizens and Others whose affili-
ations remain dubious because they are not part of the confessional (or 
ethnic) ruling we-group, and therefore, suspect of foreign collusion. The 
most important political issues were now: in the name of which identity 
group the state acted, who was regarded as the state’s legitimate owner, 
and who was entitled to its services (Wimmer 1997).18 Therefore, politics 
became increasingly formulated and exerted in a non-negotiable mode, as if 
it implied subscribing to a rigid (ideological or religious) belief. Accordingly, 
the politicisation of sectarianism became a central aspect of state-building 
through which the ‘people’ and the regime are mutually related within the 
ideal of a legitimate order. While the nation-state was undermined both 
in ideal and implementation, ruling coalitions and their opponents were 
transformed into “tribes with flags” (Glass 1991). 
The ‘re-islamisation’ of state and society played a central part in this 
political re-configuration. During the modernisation decades, most rulers 
in the Middle East had distanced themselves from Islam. In the globalisa-
tion era, on the contrary, they made extensive use of Islam in order to rally 
popular majorities. They insisted on giving proofs of their own religious 
identity through participation in public prayer or in the hajj to Mecca. 
They encouraged, or at least tolerated, public display of religious belonging, 
such as the veil for women. They financed Muslim social and educational 
institutions and NGOs, whose quietist or Sufi orientation was supposed to 
counter jihadist influence, while compensating for the withdrawal of state 
institutions. While this strategy of re-islamisation strengthened their legiti-
macy in the short run, it also bore middle and long term divisive effects: 
the public display and legitimisation of confessional affiliation and the 
rehabilitation of religious actors induced sectarian segregation in the urban 
space, dissonances in dress codes and ethos, separate education, segregated 
socialities, and generally the organisation of separate cultural and political 
18 Referring to Harold Lasswell’s famous definition: “Politics is about who gets what, 
when and how”, Wimmer mentions ethnic groups, but his commentary also applies to other 
identity groups, e.g. confessional groups.
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lives—a trend reminiscent of the closed society of the late Ottoman Empire, 
with its negative effect on civil society and entrepreneurial spirit. 
Finally, identity politics initiated by Middle East authoritarian states 
in compensation for economic liberalisation bears a security dimension. 
While systematic statistical and police control substituted for development 
in power practices in a Foucaldian manner (Foucault 1983), the spread-
ing of trans-boundary networks and global interdependence means that 
enemies of the state have to be fought within, precisely among minority 
groups supposedly alien to the identity and project of the political major-
ity (Kumaraswamy 2003). In the past, communal groups opposed to the 
government were suspected of collusion with European powers; now 
they are accused of being ‘agents’ of Israel and the United States. Instead 
of being part of the legitimate political game, protestation by minorities 
became stigmatised as manipulation by the West and Israel, and repressed 
through land confiscation,19 restriction of public expression, and heavy 
security rules. 
Minorities, ‘the Issue of the Century’
The rise of identity politics on the domestic scene mirrored the change 
taking place on the international scene. Until recently, international law 
legislated exclusively about native minorities in colonisation states (e.g. the 
Inuit people). As for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, it protects the cultural and 
religious rights of individual members of minority groups, respecting the 
sovereignty of the state and reflecting its reluctance to take into account 
sub-national collective aspirations—especially of a political order (Mar-
quardt 1991; Henrad 2000). Then, in the 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Empire 
drew the minority issue ‘out of the fridge’. A new legitimate problematic 
prevailed. International law specialists began elaborating a more exten-
sive and politically consistent legal definition of the minority. “National 
minority” was henceforth considered a cultural entity, concentrated on a 
territory, with a past experience of political independence before it was 
incorporated into a larger state entity (Kymlicka 2001: 17–38). 
In this era of globalisation, the minority issue is established as a central 
preoccupation of humanitarian law and advocacy NGOs. Simultaneously, 
academic studies, media denunciation, and pro-active policies overstep 
19 See the chapter by Kårtveit, in this volume.
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international boundaries. International advocacy and relief NGOs take the 
lead in the promotion of the collective rights and protection of the groups 
they judge to be persecuted due to their confessional (or ethnic) affiliations. 
They keep demanding that several Middle Eastern states revise the legal 
status of these groups and adopt ‘universal’ criteria for national integra-
tion. For every state of the Middle East, respect for minority rights has 
become—together with women’s rights—the barometer of its successful 
transition to democracy. Paradoxically, this criterion is also brandished a 
contrario to denounce the ‘authoritarian exception’ of the Arab and Mus-
lim worlds, notwithstanding the diversity of cultures in the region and the 
complex history of each state formation in the colonial and post-colonial 
eras (Schmitter 1999; Lakoff 2004). But experience shows that whenever the 
minority issue is promoted on the political scene and the powerlessness of 
a minority underlined, it is done in a normative way and for a normative 
purpose. Formally latent social formations and affiliations are activated in 
order to re-organise hierarchies of power according to a pre-determined 
scheme, seemingly convenient for those who manipulate them.20
A critical examination of their ethical stand reveals that, while NGO 
militants have a direct and non-ideological knowledge of local situa-
tions and generally display proper commitment to human rights, their 
administration, leadership, financial and logistical resources are rooted 
physically and ideally in Europe and North America. Like the European 
powers who established themselves as the “protectors” of the Christian 
communities in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the major 
powers of the twenty-first century under the pressure of missionaries and 
colonial entrepreneurs, allow themselves to ascribe the quality of ‘minor-
ity’ to groups that never defined themselves as such before. They design 
and implement authoritative policies to deal with their cases. As a matter 
of consequence, together with international humanitarian institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court, NGOs tend to reflect a view of 
the world, with its values, hierarchies. and rules, which is far from ‘neu-
tral’, to use the Weberian theory. And like any actor in the international 
arena they are inevitably influenced by (material and symbolic) power 
pressures. 
20 See for example the scholarly literature published in the 2000s in support for US 
administration policy in the Middle East, arguing that local societies remained organised 
in sects and tribes.
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In this era of globalisation and inter-dependency, protection of minori-
ties has become a “formidable tool for a power to intervene in another 
state’s domestic affairs” (Corm 2006: 64). It may be used by a coalition 
of NGOs and states as was the case for the Darfur in the 2000s; it may 
even be invoked by a great power intervening militarily in a neighbour-
ing state, like Russia ‘defending the rights’ of the Ossetians in Georgia in 
2008. Unfortunately, the philosophical notion and the legal definition of 
‘the minority’ remain exploited by strategic stakes and powers’ interests. 
While it rightly emerged from an oppressing silence, the minority issue 
remains controversial and blurred. 
Competition, Integration or Adaptation?
Actors of the Middle Eastern public arena, be they states, organised com-
munities or even national NGOs, prove to be sensitive to the current 
international debate on the minority issue—even in countries the most 
protected from external influence, such as the Islamic Republic. They 
also react and adapt to domestic societal dynamics in such a way that 
the politicisation of primordial identities can be described as an interac-
tive process: first, it is a two-level process, taking place simultaneously at 
the state and official institutional level and at the societal level of routine 
encounters and dynamics; then, the politicisation process implies that 
state and society act, react, and carry out successive adjustments of frame 
and practices. The mimesis between the ruling group (‘the state’) and the 
opposition has been underlined in the case of ethnic minorities such as 
the Kurds in Turkey and Arab lands, who borrowed nationalism and other 
ideological and institutional tools for nation-building from their rulers and 
adapted them in order to dominate their own society (Bozarslan 1997). 
But mimesis was rarely observed in the case of sectarian groups, because 
few of them raised their identity claims to the point of demanding greater 
autonomy, as have some segments of the Assyrian community in Syria, or 
even calling for secession, as have some political parties in southern Sudan 
or in Lebanon during the civil war. 
Most confessional communities, while not adopting such extreme posi-
tions, are prone to shape their collective identity according to the ‘national’ 
model,21 i.e. through discrete cultural, moral and sociological—not to men-
21 In this respect, the translation of millet by “nation” has induced much confusion since 
the nineteenth century.
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tion psychological or physical—traits. They also borrow the social engineer-
ing and political practices used by the state in order to build their own 
national community, organise its institutions, and mobilise its members. 
They use the same strategies and the same resources—inventing genealo-
gies and hierarchies, distributing goods and security, repressing dissidents 
(Picard 1994). Paradoxically, in their competition for the construction of 
rival we-groups, the ruling power and the minority concur in strengthening 
mutually exclusive identity boundaries in order to take over limited mate-
rial and symbolic resources. Together they turn dormant and fluctuating 
collective identities into tangible sectarian groups. Diasporas have become 
a driving force behind this interactive process as they exacerbate identity 
fundamentalisms at the two ends of the migratory network.22 As a result, 
the minority issue succeeds in opening a new debate and entailing new 
political negotiations within several Middle Eastern states. It challenges 
the relation between the ruling power and the population and calls for a 
reappraisal of the notion of citizenship.
Local Identities, Nationalism, and Diaspora
An imported ideology, nationalism has been willingly adopted by the rul-
ing elite of the Middle East since the nineteenth century. It gave meaning 
to their disrupted political life, allowed them to rely to their past, and 
project into their future.23 Nationalism also spread among members of 
the confessional (and ethnic) elite who did not wish to return to the mil-
let system, with all its limits and flaws, and could not return to it anyway, 
after the imperial order was swept by the creation of nation-states. Now, 
the model for collective demands and the promotion of an identity group 
implied territorial sovereignty, homogeneous cultural identity, and politi-
cal autonomy (Masters 2001: 189–99). Between conflicting ambitions, there 
was hardly a middle ground: wherever the governing state was denying 
minority rights, the confessional minority denied belonging to the nation-
state, thus raising the level of contest and tension between dominant and 
minority ideologies.
A noticeable change in the globalisation era is that minorities, once 
denied access to the public space, oppressed, and sometimes physically 
threatened in their homeland, turn en masse from ‘exit’ to ‘voice’ at the 
22 See Delhaye, in this volume. 
23 Michel Foucault calls this temporary shared meaning “regime of subjectivity.” Foucault 
1976: 1001–26.
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instigation of their exiled members (Appadurai 2006: 49–87). In their new 
migratory space, these migrant members generally enjoy freedom of faith 
and expression. Consequently, they are prone to re-politicisation and 
to turn into ‘cultural mediators’, especially when they benefit from dual 
citizenship. Of course, diaspora involvement in democratisation processes 
in the original homeland should not be over-estimated, as diasporas are 
generally made of people who migrated to flee from dictatorship and secure 
their family life, not to become militants (Daum 2005: 1). Still, diaspora 
mediators, with the support of international and transnational actors, con-
tribute to raise the level of conflict between state and minorities through 
their radical nationalist discourse and material support to local militants. 
Geographical distance (as most Middle Eastern migrants settled in North 
America, Europe or Australia) and the passing of time (as some diasporas 
are several decades, sometimes centuries, old) induce them to mythologize 
history and re-invent an idealised common identity, altogether rooted in 
a romanticised past and projected in a dazzling future (Koselleck 2004: 
20–5). Because they ignore the daily accommodation experienced by their 
fellow minority members who stayed put in the country, migrants tend to 
be more radical, to the point of endangering the local community.
A striking illustration is offered by the case of the Assyrians. At the 
turn of the twenty-first century, members of the Nestorian (autonomous) 
and Chaldean (Catholic) Assyrian communities who left southern Turkey, 
northern Iraq, and eastern Syria during the twentieth century outnum-
bered by four times their local confessional fellows, whose number kept 
dwindling in reaction to Kurdish nationalist mobilisations, Arab states’ 
repressive policies, and lately, the wars in Iraq. At the end of the migratory 
network, Assyrian exilés in North America became as mobilised as their 
Middle Eastern fellows were silent. Anticipating a turn in the regional 
balance of power after the US invasion of Iraq, they have begun acting as 
substitutes for the failing local regimes and financing the construction of 
schools, health centres, language teaching institutions, and also of over-
sized churches in order to raise the visibility of the community, especially 
in the remote underdeveloped Syrian Jazirah. Their numerous and vibrant 
websites and news agencies harbour confusion between confessional and 
national belonging. On the one hand, they negotiate with the local states 
on behalf of the community; on the other hand, they interpret any public 
policy decision as a possible means to victimize their community, any 
political vote or deliberation as a danger to survival. And, finally, they for-
mulate projects of autonomy, and even independence, that are completely 
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at odds with the reality on the ground.24 In this matter, they offer a vivid 
example of the mixture of powerlessness and empowerment, of escalation 
and compromise, of attachment and alienation, which characterise minori-
ties in the Middle East today.
It can be argued that, “outdoing [the ruling power] has become the self-
defence tactic of the minority” (Debray 2008: 220). In the decade 2000 such 
a trend could be observed all over the Middle East, and it was emphasized 
locally by a generation of intellectuals and cadres better educated and 
endowed with better resources than their elders of the previous decades. 
While the defence and promotion of justice and civil rights generally ben-
efit from their enhanced capabilities, the durable frustration of minority 
groups offers a fertile ground for the birth and growth of intolerance and 
mutual exclusion. In reaction, state nationalism stiffens, as it, too, is rooted 
in cultural references and loaded with collective emotions, but armed with 
superior asymmetric power. And as everywhere else in the world, political 
and sectarian entrepreneurs ride over popular feelings to enhance their 
own power and wealth. The political arena has become the battlefield 
for competing segmented interests instead of the search for common 
good. Each fundamentalism feeds a rival fundamentalism as observed in 
the growing importance of religious parties in Israel and Palestine (Ked-
die 1998: 696–723). The ‘communitarian disease’, a mixture of collective 
representations and strategic calculation of greedy leaders, which had 
destroyed Lebanon in 1975–1990, plagues the Middle East (Rodinson 1989; 
Todorov 1995: 96).
Renewing the Political Exchange
Neither in its former integrative version nor in its latter pluralistic clien-
telist version does the authoritarian state in the Middle East resolve the 
minority issue. The ruling regimes appear unable to overcome increasing 
minority mobilisations, in spite of their ever more powerful and sophis-
ticated communication and security tools. At the end of the first decade 
of the millenium, the state is paralysed in Lebanon; it is threatened with 
implosion in Iraq; shaken by popular insurrections in Syria and in several 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb. Nearly two decades 
24 On the Columbia University Network on minorities, the Assyrians of the Middle East 
are represented by six websites—more than the Armenians but second to the Jews (42) 
and the Kurds (47). Some of them, like the Assyrian International News Agency, offer a 
constant denunciation of Syrian oppression of Assyrians.
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after the ‘great transformation’ of 1989, the point at issue remains for these 
states to accommodate individual human rights and cultural demands of 
confessional (and ethnic) minorities and to do so in securing the continu-
ity of public services, respecting the rule of law, and guaranteeing the fair 
management of collective goods in a secure territorial space. After the 
failure, first of the development and unanimity model, then of the liberal 
divisive model, what is now at stake is the renewal of the terms of the 
political exchange between state and society according to a new institu-
tional framework (North 1990; Painter 2000). For local societies at large, 
this implies a revolutionary turn in constitutional and juridical terms as 
attempted in 2011 by Tunisia and Egypt: the return of the rule of law and 
the instauration of participatory democracy. And for confessional (and 
ethnic) groups, it implies specific changes.
Middle Eastern states will remain stuck in intractable identity conflicts 
as long as they do not envisage a limited reconfiguration of power by 
adding to the three constitutionally legitimate dimensions of citizenship 
(civic, political and human), the promotion of individual and collective 
cultural rights in their society and polity and, more specifically, in their 
constitutional law. Because identity politics has become a dominant preoc-
cupation all over the world in this early twenty-first century, such a change 
of configuration is needed in many states, democratic and authoritarian. 
However, in the Middle East, where national identity was more often than 
not built on the false premises of cultural homogeneity, the political centre 
can hardly acknowledge pluralism without de-legitimizing itself. This is 
often where the democratization process meets its limits and where the 
notion of political exchange becomes operational: the state could exchange 
some measures of cultural autonomy for the compliance of the minority 
within its collective regulation. It should make up the economic deficit of 
its cultural—more precisely, religious—peripheries, meet some of their 
symbolic demands in matters of public display of identities and collective 
commemorations, and eventually satisfy their claims for more autonomy 
of cultural and educational institutions. At this point, the state would not 
have to acknowledge a nationalist character to the demands of the sectarian 
groups.25 Co-existence between the (state) national culture and religious 
sub-cultures would subsequently be organised following the principle of 
‘hegemonial exchange’ i.e. mutual accommodation between the autono-
25 This is probably the watershed separating confessional demands from ethnic demands, 
as ethnic identities/movements are prone to morphing into identities/national movements.
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mous (better than ‘powerful’) central state and less autonomous (rather 
than ‘powerless’) segmented interests “on the basis of commonly accepted 
procedural norms, rules, or understandings” (Rothschild 1985: 98–101). A 
positive point in this direction is that Arab political sociology establishes 
a distinction between jinsiyya (nationality) and muwātana (citizenship).
This suggests its affinities with the liberal model of distinction between 
cultural and political identities. It opens the way for a possible coexistence 
of a public space blind to cultural differences with differentiated communal 
spaces,26 although a delicate point concerns the difficulty of ‘neutralising’ 
Islam in the constitutional framing of the Middle East states in view of its 
historical and ethical weight. 
More generally, a positive political exchange between state centre and 
religious peripheries cannot take place as long as local polities are plagued 
by a deficit in the respect of civic, political and human rights—a deficit 
affecting every citizen, irrespective of his/her confessional or cultural (or 
ethnic) identity. Here again, the minority issue in the Middle East proves to 
be closely related to the issue of democratization and the respect of the rule 
of law: on the one hand, collective minority demands might be alleviated 
by the promotion of individual rights; on the other hand, respected indi-
viduals would become respectful citizens; they might promote the virtues 
and loyalties required by democratic citizenship, among which would be 
the acceptance of identity differences. Nation-building and minority rights 
might improve dialectically.
Conclusion
It is difficult to conclude a chapter such as this one, because this early 
twenty-first century is probably witnessing the peak of identity politics all 
over the world. Like development theory, identity politics might display 
its flaws, encounter its limits, and be dismissed in the coming period. This 
makes today’s reflection upon religious minorities in the Middle East all 
the more fragile. It is also why scholars should be wise to keep in mind 
two basic principles in social sciences: first, that identity discourses and 
processes always need to be read in a historical and constructivist perspec-
tive (Brubaker, Cooper 2000); second, that issues such as the minority issue 
26 A source of inspiration might be the Habermassian model of ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
combining a civic ideology with the public respect of differences. Habermas 2001.
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are at risk to remain being assessed through a normative lens as long as 
they are not studied in a comparative perspective. 
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